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No one theory in international relations can fully describe the complicated 
actions and motivations formulating a state’s foreign policy. Yet the paradigm 
that best describes the approach taken by Western governments, such as 
Canada, when supporting peace building between Israel and the Palestinians is 
neoliberalism. They did this by sponsoring an Oslo Peace Process with 
Palestinian development aid in a development for peace model built upon 
precepts of cooperation and free market trade. That approach to peace building 
failed though because Israel and the Palestinians never altered their behaviour, 
remaining mired in a state of violence. Still, Western states continue to provide 
aid funding based upon the precepts of this model after more than twenty years 
of failure following the 1993 Oslo Accord. 
The unique contribution of this research study is to provide insight into why 
these peace building efforts failed to take hold through an analysis of 
development aid projects from one Western country, Canada, for a period from 
2001 to 2012. Specifically this is done through an account of the experiences of 
project coordinators from Canadian organisations that ran human rights and 
poverty reduction projects in that time. By taking the neoliberal paradigm into 
account, when assessing their experiences we gain insight into the factors that 
led to Oslo’s undoing, at least via Canada as a sponsor of the Peace Process. 
In this case failure is built upon a combination of degrees of naivety by aid 
practitioners and measures taken by Canadian elites to undermine Canadian 
development aid projects for Palestinians. In particular, from 1993 onward the 
Canadian government offered unswerving support to Israel, to the point where 
Canada was either contributing directly to Israeli settler colonialism in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, or else helping to obscure it. Altogether this 
suggests at a theoretical level that, in spite of employing a strongly neoliberal 
foreign policy adopting progressive principles such as international law, human 
rights and cooperation, Canada in reality takes a foreign policy track that 
favours special or national interests, as well as favoured state allies, all at the 
expense of cooperation in world affairs or the rights of people being oppressed 
by an ally. The Canadian case suggests that the progressive elements in 
neoliberalism might only be applied selectively and not universally by a state, 
depending on its government’s perceptions of its self-interests. 
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Prior to my PhD, I was working within the linear, neoliberal framework of cyclical 
foreign aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). After spending time in 
2002 volunteering with several Palestinian community organisations in the West 
Bank city of Nablus during the Second Intifada, my reaction to the civilian crisis 
was to cofound with Palestinians a local non-government organisation (NGO) 
meant to address the crisis in youth education at a time when schools were 
closed or access to them limited. Unbeknownst to me at the time youth 
education is a tragically neglected area of aid funding in times of humanitarian 
crises, even though that is when children need education more than ever. For 
us at the community level, without the theoretical knowledge it was just obvious 
that this gap existed and needed to be addressed. Our contribution toward 
closing it was to establish remedial education programmes run at 
neighbourhood community centres that were relatively safe spaces for young 
people to meet in, as they were otherwise unable to move freely for days, 
weeks or months at a time due to fighting and Israeli military curfews.1 
Observing that there already existed an infrastructure of buildings and centres 
built on previous development aid funding in the 1990s, but which lacked 
funding for programmes in the impoverished and conflict-ridden OPT, we 
decided to provide activities to dozens of existing Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) 
on that infrastructure around the city and countryside. This would allow us to 
maximise our limited resources by working together to reach large numbers of 
young people on very modest financial resources. Also observing that many – if 
not most – PNGOs saw each other as rivals for limited aid dollars rather than 
partners in society, we realised we would maximise our impact by remaining as 
neutral as possible and working with as many partners as possible. We even 
encouraged those PNGO partners to show our joint activities to donors to raise 
funds to cover their operational costs. From our perspective those partner 
PNGOs were not just serving their community, but at that time they were one of 
the few ‘enterprises’ keeping people employed and families fed. To reinforce 
our perceived neutrality we – and imbued with a certain level of youthful naivety 
                                                
1 Save the Children, ‘Growing Up Under Curfew: Palestinian Children’s Experiences - 
growing_up_under_curfew_1.pdf’ (London, UK: Save the Children Sweden and Save the 
Children UK, March 2003), 
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/growing_up_under_curfew_1.pdf. 
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– registered our organisation not as Palestinian but as a foreign entity with the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), as a Canadian NGO working in the OPT at a time 
when the image of Canada was still positive in the region. 
Even though the need for both humanitarian and development aid was very 
great in Nablus, which was then under an Israeli military siege encircling the 
city, donors seemed in our experience to neglect it along with the other more 
violent regions. Instead they seemed to prefer to congregate and fund in much 
safer locales like Israeli-occupied Jerusalem, Christian Bethlehem or the PA 
headquartered Ramallah, a ‘golden triangle’ of financing sitting atop a very 
uneven topography of aid in the OPT. When aid workers from large international 
agencies did visit places like Nablus their stay was brief, and when programmes 
were announced they often appeared poorly thought through and contextually 
inappropriate, wasteful and/or unnecessary. 
All the while our work was not easy. It was thankless, exhausting and at times 
quite dangerous. Over time we grew frustrated with the challenge of finding 
funding to support our work, even though our model had proven highly 
successful in the context of what the community in Nablus wanted. Further, 
working with Canadian registration we were by far one of the largest and most 
successful ‘Canadian’ initiatives in the OPT, yet one of the more underfunded 
by scale. It was not just us in this predicament. We knew of many good local 
PNGO partners who could barely find funding to get by, all while funding 
remained concentrated in the golden triangle. The crux of the problem was that 
there was no money in the impoverished OPT economy for Palestinians to 
apply their own solutions to address the problems they identified themselves, 
relying instead on Western foreign donors who had their own complicated 
perceptions of and complex aims for the Palestinian indigenous other. All the 
while those donors were working within an aid regime officially dedicated to the 
promotion of peace and Palestinian economic growth, both of which were 
regressing rather than progressing from the 1993 Oslo Accord onward.  
I carried out this work for eight years. Growing frustrated by a perceived 
ineffectiveness of foreign aid, and aware of its powerful economic and political 
position in the OPT, I wanted to explore at a research level the question as to 
‘why Palestinian aid was not working’. In my mind at the time, carrying out such 
	 11 
a study might lead to a better understanding of how to navigate aid to make it 
work better for the Palestinians, and in a way that they might eventually not 
need to rely on it any longer because they would gain influence over the funding 
to address their real needs. That would mean aid that assisted them – or at 
least did not prevent them – in directly addressing the Israeli military occupation 
and Palestinian rights. Those were issues that in my experience donors 
preferred to avoid dealing with, instead deferring vaguely to a negotiated peace 
that was never going to happen give Israel’s settler colonial aims. 
By that point I had a great deal of experience running Canadian funded projects 
and the Canadian charity I had incorporated. I was quite accustomed by then to 
working in a Canadian environment that was nearly as oppressive as the Israeli 
over the point of Palestinian rights, and the way in which Canadian regulations 
or elite actions specifically undermined Palestinian aid work. Given my 
familiarity with the Palestinian aid scene in Canada, and with the power of a 
project coordinator’s role in determining Palestinian aid, I felt my biggest 
contribution could be to contextualise why aid appears to be failing by 
interviewing fellow project coordinators from Canada to analyse their combined 
experiences together. 
During my eight years, I had split my time pretty evenly between living Canada, 
Europe and the OPT, working primarily with Palestinian colleagues. So when I 
set out on my research survey I had in mind their years of complaints that aid 
was not responsive to their actual needs, that it was wasteful and that far too 
many stupid projects got funded. They also complained about a phenomenon of 
entire PNGOs changing their mandate to get funding, because donors were not 
funding what they needed to address, and how this often led to nonsensical 
projects. So when I first stated out I had in mind these complaints and was 
inclined to finding out why donors were funding in this manner, and the 
overarching question as to why they continued to support the Oslo Peace 
Process when it had clearly failed to anyone actually living in the OPT.  
So at the time I wanted to look at the gap that existed between the actual needs 
identified by community PNGOs versus donor aims, because this was a point of 
conjecture where the aid model appeared to be failing. To do this I would be 
able to draw on the critiques of aid given by international aid observers like 
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Arturo Escobar, James Ferguson and Norman Long. To do this I had planned to 
look at several projects through the three stages of the linear model of project 
management under which contemporary aid projects are run – a linear model 
that critics feel is too rigid to ever succeed at development. With the benefit of 
hindsight I must have approached this question about aid efficacy with the 
simplistic caricature of an unknowing Western project coordinator that was 
based on the Palestinian’s – and occasionally my own – unsatisfying 
encounters in the OPT aid sector. To us those Westerners seemed well 
meaning but naïve and ineffective, never really able to help but welcome to visit 
because they are trying nonetheless, and funding in the process.  
So at first I expected simply to have to critique the neoliberal model of aid 
project coordinators followed by showing how it influenced the design of their 
OPT projects and then how they failed because they did not actually address 
the occupation. Yet the realities of Canadian aid to the OPT was not so simple 
as I had come to understand it, particularly at the project coordinator level. 
There were still stupid projects to be certain, and some of my interviewees were 
quick to point this out in their interviews. Mostly though I discovered my own 
ignorance, meeting with highly thought through specialists who pushed as hard 
as they could against the boundaries of aid set around them in a hostile 
Canadian environment, all while striving to work in solidarity with beleaguered 
Palestinian colleagues to uphold their rights and address their problems caused 
by the Israeli occupation.  
However, the constraints in Canada proved to be immense, and in many cases 
insurmountable. As my initial round of research interviews were rounding out a 
Conservative Canadian government began to brazenly suppress most 
Canadian civil society engagement with Palestinians. It also became apparent 
to me that it would be difficult carry out the original survey I wanted, because 
information was becoming scarce in a country once famous for transparency. 
People became legitimately afraid of losing work or funding for speaking out on 
Palestine, the government or providing information about their aid projects. That 
fear became the centre-piece of my investigation, as I discovered it was not 
possible to see where in the linear process the projects of these Canadian 
coordinators went wrong, because the government of Canada was so busy 
sabotaging their projects before they could get off the ground. 
	 13 
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
Introduction 
When the Oslo Accord was signed in 1993, there was genuine global optimism 
that Israelis and Palestinians could find peace based on the liberal 
underpinnings of the accord.2 In order to help nurture the Oslo Peace Process 
along, countless state and non-state actors (NSAs) from around the world 
contributed funds toward Palestinian development aid projects. The logic was 
that this funding would encourage Palestinians to abandon violence and 
cooperate with Israel on a peace process. The biggest donors funding this 
Peace Process were state actors that either gave directly themselves, or 
indirectly through shared multilateral institutions and development aid 
organisations. However instead of this leading to peace, Israeli settlement 
building accelerated in the OPT leaving millions of Palestinians living under a 
greater degree of insecurity and poverty than ever before.  
This collapse did not come due to any failure to implement the Oslo Process 
properly.3 Rather, it was the philosophical ontology with which Oslo itself was 
built that guaranteed it would be its own undoing. It is impossible to undertake 
acts of cooperation and economic development in the context of on-going 
settler colonialism, because settler colonialism requires the total destruction of 
one group for the benefit of another. This was and has always been Israel’s 
state-building relationship with the Palestinians. Yet what Western policy 
makers, donors and Palestinian aid coordinators did wrong from 1993 onwards 
was, in an act of reflexive self-denial, to explicitly not craft policy that 
acknowledged the complex realities of Israeli settler colonialism or the Israeli 
government policy designed to sustain it. Nor did they prove capable of 
acknowledging the powerful partisan actors ensconced in Western governments 
that offer unswerving support for Israel, and thereby its settler-colonial policy.4 
                                                
2 Liberalism is the foundation upon which the modernised theory neoliberalism is based upon in 
IR Theory, and they will occasionally be used interchangeably. 
3 Ron Pundak, ‘From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 
21 February 2008, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330112331343035. 
4 In this thesis, the ‘West’ encompasses Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan. Western society is based on a set of structures, and shared religious and 
cultural traditions that are closely related enough that we see them as forming a coherent whole 
– as is the case for Islamic civilisation. The End of Civilization (In the Bronze Age): Crash 
Course World History 211, YouTube, Crash Course World History 2, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErOitC7OyHk&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
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In fact, it is very possible that Israel’s Western allies wanted to do little other 
than provide support to Israel, with which they share strategic aims and crucially 
view as a fellow liberal democracy in a hostile and uncivilised Muslim Middle 
East. 
What policy makers instead did was design development aid policy for OPT 
Palestinians that specifically chose to ignore the politics of settler colonialism, 
the violent oppression of Palestinians and the Western governments protecting 
Israeli policy. They justified avoiding the hard political issues of Israeli-
Palestinian conflict by arguing that development aid should be separated from 
politics in order to build confidence through economic growth, in order for peace 
to then take hold. By taking this approach they chose a path that expressly 
ignores a destructive ambiguity that masked large gaps in each major actor’s 
conceptualisation of what mutual recognition meant in practice for Israelis and 
Palestinians, and how this fit within Oslo. 5  They also operated under an 
assumption that aid can be a neutral, depoliticised component in the conflict, 
even when research has shown that aid always becomes a political actor in any 
conflict it is applied to.6 Thus development aid projects were designed which 
were wrong for the actual conditions of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
lands, by the Western governments that permit the occupation to happen. 
Instead that aid came increasingly to subsidise the status quo of occupation 
and settler colonialism, relieving Israel of the costs while allowing them to 
benefit from a captive OPT economy.7  
This thesis assesses the way this Western approach to Israeli-Palestinian 
peace building affected the development aid actors carrying out Palestinian 
development aid projects meant to contribute to the Peace Process. Specifically 
it delves into the experience of Canadian organisations running Palestinian aid 
projects in the OPT – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem – from 2000 to 
2012. The underlying structure of this study is built on a series of semi-
structured interviews I conducted with sixteen project coordinators from ten 
                                                
5 Jonathon Rynhold, ‘Liberalism and the Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle 
East’, Journal of Diplomacy - School of Diplomacy and International Relations - Seton Hall 
University, Winter/Spring 2009, 49, 
http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/05%20Rynhold.pdf. 
6 Read Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1999). 
7 Read Shir Hever, The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation: Repression Beyond 
Exploitation, 1st ed. (Pluto Press, 2010). 
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different Canadian organisations that funded either human rights and advocacy, 
or capacity building and poverty reduction development aid projects. Their 
experiences are contrasted against reports on the conditions and needs in the 
OPT at the time, as well as Canadian policy and politics. The overall aim of it is 
to shed light on the experiences of the people occupying the powerful position 
of project coordinator running, funding and evaluating projects. In this way we 
get to see how that aid model faired through the accounts of a group of Western 
coordinators from one country whose foreign policy has been characteristically 
liberal/neoliberal in post World War II era. 
In order to do explore this phenomenon my research study sheds light on 
Western and Canadian donor policy and how the donors modelled aid projects 
for Palestinians, how realistic those models were for the actual problems of 
Palestinians, the challenges coordinators faced running projects, what they 
achieved – or failed to achieve – and how these experiences were perceived by 
aid coordinators. The point is not to look their individual failures, or successes, 
so much as to use their experiences to get an idea as to why the neoliberal aid 
process has consistently failed to foster development and peace since 1993. 
Following the lead of the interviewees this research study pays particular heed 
to the problems they had dealing with Canadian government and officials, as 
they often sabotaged, undermined or belittled their work. If it is a critique, it is a 
critique of neoliberalism as a tool of Israel-Palestine peace building, and 
Canadian government policy backing the neoliberal Oslo Peace Process.  
Canada is not a marginal player in either international affairs or Israeli-
Palestinian relations, and is a close ally both of Israel and the Peace Process 
mediator the United States (US). Into the 2000s Canada wielded a great deal of 
soft power, such as moral authority, on the world stage and the Peace Process. 
It also exercised a great deal of hard power as a major financial backer of the 
Oslo Process. Its position on Israel and Palestine has typically, and not 
coincidentally, fallen somewhere between that of the US and the European 
Union (EU) by its official rhetoric.8 Like the EU, Canada tends to work through 
multilateral institutions, particularly in tandem with the US and its other Western 
allies, to project its power and interests abroad.  
                                                
8 Rex Brynen, ‘Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process’, in Canada and the 
Middle East in Theory and Practice, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Waterloo, Ont.: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 77. 
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While acknowledging that no one theory may adequately describe the 
complicated actions and motivations of the Western backers of Oslo, even 
Canada alone, this thesis shows that the foreign policy that continues after 
more than two decades to sustain the precepts of the failed Peace Process is 
best described as neoliberal within the lexicon of international relations (IR) 
paradigms. If proof of power is characterised by the ability to alter the behaviour 
of others, a fundamental concept to neoliberalism, then the Western approach 
to the Peace Process clearly failed because Israel and the Palestinians never 
changed their behaviour to enter into a state of non-violence and cooperation – 
in fact they have consistently done the opposite. By taking the neoliberal 
paradigm into account and assessing development aid at the project level 
through the experiences of Canadian aid actors in the OPT, we get a glimpse 
into the factors that led to Oslo’s undoing. Doing this reveals the combination of 
a degree of naivety by neoliberal aid practitioners and countervailing measures 
by Western (specifically Canadian) elites that help ensure both Palestinian aid 
and Oslo cannot succeed. It also exposes flaws within the neoliberal paradigm 
itself, as practiced by Western governments, which undermines more 
progressive elements within the system of belief itself. In the case of Canada, 
elites in government offered from 1993 onward unswerving support to Israel, to 
the point where Canada was either contributing to or else helping to obscure 
the reality of Israel’s settler colonialism. Altogether this suggests at a theoretical 
level that, in spite of employing a strongly neoliberal foreign policy that 
references ideas such as international law, human rights and cooperation, 
Canada in reality takes a foreign policy track that favours special or national 
interests, as well as groups or states it is allied with, all at the expense of 
cooperation in world affairs or the rights of people being oppressed by their 
allies. 
 
Neoliberal Donor Aid 
Western donors have since 1993 disbursed over $27 billion of aid in the OPT by 
2015 to support the Oslo Peace Process.9 This process has been dominated 
politically by the US in an approach that is best described in IR using the 
                                                
9 Benoit Challand and Alaa Tartir, ‘Palestine’, in The Middle East, ed. Ellen Lust, 14th ed. (Yale 
University, 2015), chap. 20. 
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neoliberal paradigm – developed by Nye and Keohane in the 1970s.10 Working 
within that neoliberal framework donor states have publicly backed the Peace 
Process through the use of traditional coercion like financial inducements in 
order to shape Palestinians politics and society.11 However, that traditional form 
of hard power has been heavily intertwined with soft power elements meant to 
attract and co-opt Palestinians into the process, reshaping Palestinian OPT 
society in the vision of the West, particularly through support for the OPT’s now 
infamously crowded NGO-landscape, ‘developing, democratising and civilising’.  
When creating an aid model for the OPT in 1993, Western donors gave the 
World Bank a lead ‘soft power’ role planning how the development aid model 
would take shape. Together they optimistically, and prematurely, classified 
Israel and OPT Palestinians as a post-conflict scenario.12 A neoliberal cadre of 
technocratic policy makers then conceived of an aid model that looked at 
Palestinian poverty as little more than a ‘technical problem’, which could be 
solved through well-constructed and non-political policy. Emphasising the need 
to solve that ‘technical problem’ those Western aid actors in the 1990s inverted 
cause and effect, and came to look at Palestinian poverty as the primary issue 
that needs to be resolved in order to foster political peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians – rather than the Israeli military occupation and settler colonialism 
that was actually causing the poverty.13 By specifically trying to exclude politics 
from the development and peace process aid providers chose to ignore the 
cause of the conflict and poverty in the OPT, when building peace. 
                                                
10 Read Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
in Transition (Little, Brown, 1977).  
11 The EU for instance, the single biggest donor bloc to the Palestinians in the OPT, has only 
applied conditionality toward Israel on only limited occasions and has generally opted for 
constructive engagement. And even though the EU has been much more willing to criticise 
Israel than the United States, Israel still enjoys an extremely close trade and institutional 
relationship with the EU, to the point of nearly being considered a member of the union by some 
high level EU bureaucrats.  Bouris, Dimitris. ‘Riding Shotgun: The EU’s Role in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict’.  Dimitris Bouris, ‘Riding Shotgun: The EU’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 17 September 2014, http://carnegie-
mec.org/2014/09/17/riding-shotgun-eu-s-role-in-israeli-palestinian-conflict/i2xe. 
12 Their classification of Israel and Palestinian being post-conflict situation has remained 
unchanged since 1993, allowing the original aid and peace models to continue largely unaltered 
well into the 2010s. CDS-BZU, ‘Public Debate on Alternatives to Aid and Neoliberal 
Development in the oPt (unpublished)’ (Center for Development Studies, Birzeit University, 
2011). 
13 Robert A Zimmerman, ‘The Determinants of Foreign Aid’ (OECD, August 2007), 5, 
http://www.oecd.org/dev/40699467.pdf. 
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This should not come as major surprise since development experts have a long 
history of optimistically working with autocratic rulers, which Israel’s military is 
vis-à-vis the disenfranchised and ethnically different Palestinians. Easterly 
observed that,  
Those who work in development prefer to focus on technical solutions to 
the poor's problems, such as forestry projects, clean water supplies, or 
nutritional supplements. Development experts advise leaders they 
perceive to be benevolent autocrats to implement these technical 
solutions. The international professionals perpetrate an illusion that 
poverty is purely a technical problem, distracting attention away from the 
real cause: the unchecked power of the state against poor people 
without rights. The dictators whom experts are advising are not the 
solution – they are the problem.14  
Those technocratic aid providers were optimistic that OPT poverty could be 
reduced and their approach work relying on the application of good policy that is 
neutral, rational and objective.15 They also based this optimism on the belief 
that it is in the best interest of every government is to adopt ‘good’ policy that 
provides public goods and open markets for all the people they govern, 
eliminating poverty in the process. For these technocrats there was and is no 
hidden agenda to aid, and development policy can largely be taken at ‘face-
value’ from official documents, public statements and decision-making records. 
A claim to neutrality is after all a hallmark of the self-believed ‘impersonal 
power’ that lies at the heart of the neoliberal state.16 
History has though revealed with great consistency that government does not 
always have at heart the best interests of all the people it rules, particularly a 
group of people it has conquered by force and whose land it covets for its own 
citizens. Further, in spite of its most progressive elements, historical liberalism 
and its contemporary iteration neoliberalism have been handmaiden to 
                                                
14 William Easterly, ‘The New Tyranny’, Foreign Policy, 10 March 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/10/the_new_tyranny. 
15 David Mosse, Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice (Pluto 
Press, 2004), 3–4. 
16 Read David McNally, ‘The Blood of the Commonwealth’, Historical Materialism 22, no. 2 (25 
September 2014): 15, doi:10.1163/1569206x-12341359. 
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destructive, autocratic Western imperialism around the world.17 Put simply, in 
their unknowing faith in the defining ideology of the post-World War II Western 
world these neoliberal technocrats have been unable to cope conceptually with 
the ‘irrationalities’ of settler-colonialism or ethnocentrism, particularly within a 
Western and liberal state like Israel where the government actively seeks to 
deny public goods and open markets to part of the population it rules. They are 
as blind to Israel’s actual policies as the true nature of brutal Western 
colonialism in the past, and neo-colonialism now. 
It is in a similar vein of conceptual blindness that neoliberal economic planners 
display an innate inability to apply their theories to conflict situations.18 For this 
reason they actively avoid analysis of conflict situations, which challenge their 
uniform ‘one-size-fits-all’ frameworks and rigid assumptions. At best these 
policy makers define conflict situations as temporary and ‘too exceptional’ to 
deserve a separate frame of analyses. This meant they had to classify Israel 
and Palestine as being in a post-conflict situation – even though they are not.19 
For this reason the instrumentalists responsible for Palestinian aid have treated 
economic performance during the conflict as a ‘special and temporary phase of 
irrationality, which does not deserve a comprehensive economic analysis’.20 
As a group that resists acknowledging phenomena that challenges their beliefs, 
neoliberal technocrats managing aid have proven remarkably resilient at 
sustaining a development for peace model that failed disastrously in both 
development and peace building. They have notably denied any analysis of the 
Israeli-Palestinian relationship that is based on the settler-colonial paradigm, 
even though cases of settler colonisation by other Western states in other 
regions of the world would offer insight as to how that relationship of 
exploitation and expropriation works. Further incapable of understanding the 
                                                
17 Read Duncan Bell, ‘The Dream Machine: On Liberalism and Empire’, in Remaking the World: 
Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton University Press, 2016), 
http://www.academia.edu/12999578/_The_Dream_Machine_On_Liberalism_and_Empire_; 
Jennifer Pitts, ‘Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question’, Journal of 
Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (1 September 2000): 295–318, doi:10.1111/1467-9760.00104; 
McNally, ‘The Blood of the Commonwealth’. 
18 Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from Conflict or 
Development Delayed? (Routledge, 2010), 42–43. 
19 For this reason the World Bank has repeatedly provided the same policy recommendations in 
a plethora of reports it has produced since 1993 about the OPT economy. Alaa Tartir and 
Jeremy Wildeman, ‘Persistent Failure: World Bank Policies for the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories’, Economic Issues (Al Shabaka, 9 October 2012), http://al-shabaka.org/node/513. 
20 Taghdisi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine, 42. 
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hidden meanings, ethnic cleansing or apartheid inherent to the settler 
colonialism that characterises Israel’s rule over the Palestinians – indeed 
characteristic as a propensity within any instance of settler colonialism itself – 
there should be no surprise that the simplistic aid model the instrumentalists 
produced for Palestinians has failed, and Oslo alongside it.21  
 
A Neoliberal Peace Process 
In carrying out this analysis I cover two periods sometimes referred to as the 
Second Intifada (2001 to 2006) and the Institution-Building period (2007 to 
2012).22 Together they encompass a timespan that starts as a crisis due to 
intense Second Intifada violence that Western donors responded to by 
providing Palestinians with a large increase in humanitarian aid to sustain them 
and to keep the Peace Process alive, before donors refocused again on the 
post-conflict Oslo aid model giving large sums of development aid funding for 
Palestinian Institution Building under a ‘technocratic’ Palestinian government.  
Irrespective of period or conditions Western aid remained wedded to a 
neoliberal conceptual framework that informed donor expectations that 
development aid could be an effective policy tool to foster Israeli-Palestinian 
peace. Through their aid policy they combined financial inducements with soft 
power tools like culture, political ideals and public policy to draw the 
Palestinians into the Peace Process with a liberal democratic and Western 
Israel.23 At its core the approach was based on the classical liberal’s faith in an 
innate goodness of the individual, the capacity for political institutions to 
promote social progress and the idea that states are capable of meaningful 
                                                
21 Patrick Wolfe, ‘Purchase by Other Means: The Palestine Nakba and Zionism’s Conquest of 
Economics’, Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 134, 
doi:10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648830; Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination 
of the Native’, Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387, 
doi:10.1080/14623520601056240; Dirk Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and 
Intellectual History’, in Empire Colony Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern 
Resistance in World History, ed. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 18, 
http://www.dirkmoses.com/uploads/7/3/8/2/7382125/moses_empire_colony_genocide.pdf. 
22 Shir Hever, Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians Under Occupation (Alternative 
Information Center, 2008), 9. 
23 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1 October 1990): 153–71, 
doi:10.2307/1148580; Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 
(PublicAffairs, 2004). 
	 21 
cooperation together.24  Proponents of this approach extol the virtues of the 
cooperative element of state interaction, for which reason civilised governments 
should realise that they have more to gain in absolute terms by working 
together than they are likely to achieve in relative terms by themselves. As 
rational state actors come to realise their general well being is inexorably linked 
together, their interaction will increasingly become distinguished by cooperation 
through shared (multilateral) international institutions or accords. Within this 
logical framework both Israelis and Palestinians, each with a state of their own, 
will realise they have more to gain by working together than they do in conflict 
or at war.25   
Ultimately cooperation should lead to a form of interdependence where security 
and force matter less than the multiple social and political relationships that 
develop and exist between states.26 Cooperation will stimulate mutual economic 
gains, which reinforces peace, and leads to even further economic growth, 
reinforcing peace yet more. As this process progresses it would begin to make 
more sense for Israelis and Palestinians to resolve their problems through 
dialogue and cooperation, than through violence and cooperation. Thus in the 
case of Israel and the Palestinians, Western donors assumed that mutual 
recognition would help nullify the ‘zero-sum character’ of their conflict, which as 
a viewpoint where each side considers economic resources to be limited and 
control over them coming at the expense of the other. By neutralising this 
pessimistic outlook donors felt their economic and peace plans would allow the 
two sides to develop the trust necessary to negotiate a resolution to their 
conflict, realising they have more to gain by working together than fighting with 
each other.  
                                                
24 This also requires not acknowledging of liberalism’s racialized double-standards and historical 
accompaniment to Europe’s greatest and most oppressive settler colonial empires, the British 
and French, both of which established the artificial fault lines plaguing the modern Middle East. 
25 Notably Nye and Keohane appear to find it difficult to see the desired outcomes for their 
theory when applied to the Middle East, the Palestine-Israel conflict in particular. They only 
touch upon the topic occasionally, while themselves appear to display a deep ignorance toward 
the Middle East. For example, in their literature they often use Muslim or Arab societies as the 
antipode when describing what is the opposite of the West’s democracy and freedom: 
‘America’s popular culture, with its libertarian and egalitarian currents, dominates film, 
television, and electronic communications. Not all aspects of that culture are attractive to 
everyone, for example conservative Muslims’. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, 
‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs, 1 September 1998, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54395/robert-o-keohane-and-joseph-s-nye-jr/power-and-
interdependence-in-the-information-age. 
26 Ibid., 83. 
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As such the neoliberal policy makers who put the Peace Process in place 
thought that development aid could act as a catalyst used to stimulate 
Palestinian economic growth, thereby providing Palestinians with a ‘peace 
dividend’ that would encourage them to make peace with Israel. To make that 
peace work though, they assumed Palestinians needed to be ‘caught up’ to 
Israel developmentally in order for Palestinians to become a true, rational 
partner in peace. To do that Palestinians would need to be democratised, 
endowed with modern state institutions and their society remade in the ‘civilised’ 
image of the West.27 Further, those policy makers thought that if the OPT’s 
economic links to Israel were reinforced, and both sides subscribed to a free 
market system, their strengths and weaknesses would come to complement 
one another, contributing to the realisation that they had more to gain by 
working together, much as happened in Europe after World War II. In this way 
liberal free market capitalism would forge the way forward to peace.  
In order to develop the Palestinian state and its economy, Western policy 
makers turned to the World Bank asking it to create a Palestinian development 
programme. The Bank set this programme out in a 1993 document called An 
Investment in Peace. This paper was complemented by subsequent World 
Bank reports and policy recommendations, notably the Paris Protocol to 
establish a customs union between Israel and the PA, which together formed 
the blueprint for Western donors and policy makers building a Palestinian 
state. 28  In this way donors set into motion a process based on liberal 
mechanisms for peace building that incorporated regional institutions, economic 
integration, democratisation, mutual recognition of national rights, and trust 
building.29 It was also an example of the use of neoliberal soft power aimed at 
altering the behaviour of the Palestinians. 
Yet their plans and the Bank’s programme led neither to peace nor even 
growth. Instead, both the Palestinian economy and security declined 
                                                
27 Norman Long, ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented 
Sociology of Development’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 49 
(December 1990): 3–24. 
28 Read World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace (World 
Bank, 1993); Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex IV-Economic 
Protocol’, Government Ministry - Foreign Policy, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (29 April 
1994), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/gaza-
jericho%20agreement%20annex%20iv%20-%20economic%20protoco.aspx. 
29 Rynhold, ‘Liberalism and the Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle East’, 45. 
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precipitously at a time when the Israeli economy enjoyed mostly robust growth. 
Rather than flourish like post-war Europe, the OPT bore more in resemblance to 
the failed economies of other regions transformed in the 1990s by mass 
neoliberal Western intervention, such as Bosnia and Haiti. Meanwhile as the 
Peace Process ensued rapid Israeli settlement growth took place in the OPT 
under its cover. Violence often spiralled out of control, and the Israeli 
occupation became even more severe. Palestinian territorial integrity was so 
effectively undermined that many observers began to argue that a two-state 
peace solution had become impossible.30 In spite of these failures donors chose 
not to deviate from An Investment in Peace or the Oslo Peace Process. Instead 
they increased their commitment to the existing aid model with ever-larger aid 
packages through the 2000s. 
 
The Gap in the Research Literature 
Western policy makers determine how aid is disbursed to aid dependent OPT 
Palestinians, and that money has kept their economy solvent under occupation 
and through colonisation since 1993. It is a completely asymmetrical 
relationship of power that was always considered acceptable by the sponsors of 
the Oslo Process. As a result, those donors have been able to effectively 
redesign the Palestinian economy and government according to their own 
vision, guided by neoliberal principals epitomised in the World Bank’s blueprint 
for Palestinian state building. The structural adjustment policies associated with 
the blueprint mirrors demands made by the Bank dating back to the 1970s, 
such as repeated cuts to public services and a reliance on private markets. Just 
how the World Bank thought that OPT state and economy should look reflects 
Harvey’s description of neoliberalism as an economic paradigm, 
Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that 
human well being can best be advanced by the maximisation of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised 
by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and 
free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
                                                
30 Virginia Tilley, The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Deadlock (University of Michigan Press, 2005), 1. 
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framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to be concerned, 
for example, with the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up 
military, defence, police, and juridical functions required to secure private 
property rights and to support freely functioning markets. Furthermore, if 
markets do not exist (in areas such as education, health care, social 
security, or environmental pollution), then they must be created, by state 
action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. 
State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare 
minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information 
to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interests 
will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
democracies) for their own benefit.31 
 
In spite of the preponderance of power donors exercise in the OPT and the role 
they have played reorganising Palestinian society, not enough research has 
been conducted on the donors and their relationship to the occupation, outside 
a small number of neo-Marxist critiques by researchers such as Adam Hanieh, 
Tariq Dana, Khalil Nakleh and Shir Hever. 32 To date there is no OPT equivalent 
to James Ferguson’s critical ethnography of aid and power in apartheid-era 
Lesotho or carried out for Haiti by Mark Schuller and Timothy Schwartz.33  
This is one reason that analyses of development aid in the OPT rarely ventures 
into the experiences of the project coordinators working from the dominant 
Western donor countries that define development aid itself. As the personnel 
most directly responsible for running development aid projects in the OPT they 
                                                
31 David Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’, The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 610, no. 1 (3 January 2007): 22–23, 
doi:10.1177/0002716206296780. 
32 Read Adam Hanieh, ‘Palestine in the Middle East: Opposing Neoliberalism and US Power: 
Part 1’, 19 July 2008, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hanieh190708a.html; Khalil 
Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development: Political Aid and Sustainable Deceit (PASSIA, 
2004); Khalil Nakhleh, Globalized Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a Homeland, First edition 
(Trenton, New Jersey: The RedSea Press, Inc., 2011); Tariq Dana, ‘The Palestinian Capitalists 
That Have Gone Too Far’, Al-Shabaka, 14 January 2014, http://al-shabaka.org/node/708. 
33 Read James Ferguson, ‘The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho’ (University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Mark Schuller, Killing 
with Kindness Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 2012); Timothy T Schwartz, Travesty in Haiti: A True Account of Christian Missions, 
Orphanages, Fraud, Food Aid and Drug Trafficking (Charleston, S.C.: BookSurge Publishing, 
2008). 
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are particularly well placed in positions of power, outside the opaque corridors 
of government and policy-making, to provide information that can be used to 
assess how Oslo aid went wrong, or why it did not have a positive impact on the 
Peace Process. Nearly every major aid project starts with a design phase 
carried out by international staff from a Western organisation that succeeded at 
securing financing, typically from government, for OPT projects. Regardless of 
whether language such as ‘grassroots’, ‘bottom-up’ or ‘partnerships’ is used to 
describe them, the truth is that the international donors dominate the projects, 
especially from the start, but right through to completion. The Western project 
coordinators overseeing this process are able to provide valuable information 
such as their impressions about government decisions, the influences shaping 
aid policy and how this affected their work, all while describing how they 
themselves ran, funded and monitored projects in the OPT. Thus project 
coordinators are particularly rich sources of information about Palestinian aid, 
and the omission of their experiences in the research literature is striking when 
taking into consideration how important Western donor aid has been as a 
political force in the OPT since 1993. 
Rather than look at a selection of project coordinators working at aid 
organisations originating from multiple different Western states, then broadly 
assessing development aid’s relationship to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
lands, I chose instead to focus on the experiences of project coordinators solely 
from a single important Western supporter of Oslo where I could compare their 
experiences with greater consistency against one another. This allows us to get 
a better impression of a single country’s actual policy, in a way that would not 
be possible with a selection of project coordinators from multiple countries. 
Further, as Canada has been fairly devout in taking a neoliberal policy track 
since developing its own foreign policy independent from Britain in the 1930s, 
the same IR paradigm that constitutes the underpinnings of the Oslo Peace 
Process, we then get to better understand Canada’s actual policy versus its 
stated neoliberal policy, and what that example might mean for the broader 
neoliberal Peace Process. Ultimately this helps uncover Oslo’s shortcomings 
with the role development aid played in its collapse, and the connection 
between the aid providers to the immunity being offered by the West for the 
Israeli settler colonial project. I will argue in this thesis that this was done 
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naively rather then intentionally, as aid providers were simply unready for the 
role government would play in shaping what they could and could not do, and in 
some cases unaware of the broader interests at play beneath the veneer of 
progressive neoliberalism offered by the Oslo Peace and aid processes. In the 
case of Canada this saw government sabotaging and suppressing any aid work 
that presented even the smallest threat to Israel’s settler colonial policy aims. 
This ultimately contributes evidence that neoliberal development aid has been 
used to mask the realities of Israeli rule over the OPT and to sustain the violent 
status quo of settler colonialism that makes peace building impossible. 
 
Chapters Outline 
Chapter 2 of this thesis describes on a conceptual level the neoliberal paradigm 
that best describes the Canadian, and Western, foreign policy that has 
sustained both the Oslo Peace Process and Oslo aid model through more than 
twenty years of failure. It also briefly touches upon the settler colonial paradigm 
that describes Israel’s occupation of the OPT, but which is consistently ignored 
by Western state sponsors of the Peace Process. Doing this it exposes some of 
the conceptual and theoretical gaps in the neoliberal peace model that form the 
proverbial fault line upon which peace failed to take hold.  
Chapter 3 is a methodology chapter where I outline the way in which I 
conducted this research project, and how the primary data was analysed. In it I 
describe the Canadian aid coordinators and organisations being examined, the 
kind of data that was collected, the way it was collected, ethical issues and 
challenges I faced conducting this research. The chapter also explains how 
these findings are corroborated against primary and secondary sources found 
in the context Chapters 4 and 5.  
Those context chapters were researched to provide information both about the 
general case of Western development aid in the OPT, and one specifically 
about Canada’s engagement with Israel and Palestine. The context Chapter 4 
looks at reasons as to why the Oslo Process failed, its connection to 
development aid, why that development aid is neoliberal and the overall story of 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the OPT from 1993 onwards. 
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Chapter 5 looks at Canada’s policy toward Israel and Palestine, the internal 
domestic politics of Israel and Palestine in Canada, aid that Canada has 
granted to the Palestinians, trends in that aid and the overarching story of 
Canada’s partisan support for Israeli policy. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 recount and analyse the experiences of the sixteen 
Canadian development aid project coordinators I interviewed for this research 
project. The chapters are separated based on the three phases that make up 
the way linear aid projects are modelled: planning (Chapter 6), implementation 
(Chapter 7) and outcomes (Chapter 8).34  I took this approach regardless of 
whether or not each organisation an interviewee worked at subscribed to the 
neoliberal paradigm, or a linear process of project management, because 
ultimately those who did not subscribe were outliers in an overall development 
aid environment that was characterised as neoliberal during the study period. 
Chapter 6 provides information on the way in which the interviewees and their 
organisations sought out Palestinian partners, and developed and designed 
projects for the OPT. This provides an idea as to what extent the neoliberal 
paradigm influenced the design of the project coordinators’ projects, to what 
extent Palestinian views were taken into account when designing projects and 
crucially to what extent Canadian organisations took into account the facts on 
the ground of an Israeli occupation designed to further settler colonialism. It 
also reveals how official Canadian policy and unspoken government support for 
Israel influenced Canadian aid projects, and what impact this had in the OPT. 
Chapter 7 assesses interviewee reflections on the challenges of carrying out 
development aid projects in the complicated environment of occupation and 
settler colonialism, the context of which was described in Chapter 4. However, 
what is remarkable is not so much the challenges of working in that 
environment, but that during project implementation all of the interviewees 
faced greater challenges from officials in Canada than from the Israeli 
occupation. The chapter becomes dominated by the challenges originating in 
Canada that monopolised the project coordinator interviews at the 
implementation stage of their work. 
                                                
34 Long, ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented 
Sociology of Development’, 17. 
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Chapter 8 analyses the project coordinator appraisals of their own work in the 
OPT. It is dominated by accounts of the way in which unrealistic rules and 
regulations in Canada undermined their work, and how the Canadian 
government directly sabotaged their projects for partisan pro-Israel political 
reasons. In many cases the interviewees had had their projects cut short 
prematurely during the implementation stage due to political intervention taken 
against them. The chapter also shares project coordinator reflections on the 
politics of the Peace Process, Palestinian development aid and their suspicions 
of a hidden agenda held by the Canadian government. Ultimately many have an 
appraisal of aid that includes the belief that Canada is working against OPT 
development aid that might lift Palestinians out of poverty, or build a peace that 
can uphold their human rights. Instead Canada is providing support for the 
status quo in Israeli policy, and that equates to supporting occupation and 
settler colonialism. By 2012 much of the aid Canada was disbursing came to be 
shaped in such a way that it either works directly toward that aim, or else not to 
disturb Israeli policy. In this way, Canada appears at the government level far 
from interested in real peace building between Israelis and Palestinians. 
All combined the project coordinators experiences indicate that Canadian aid 
efforts were cut short or impeded beyond disrepair due to government 
regulations or it interfering on behalf of Israel, even directly contradicting official 
policy. This all suggests that unspoken and unwritten aims dominate the 
Canadian government policy toward Israel and the OPT, and that this has been 
undermining Canadian development aid efforts in the OPT. Chapter 9 
concludes with a summary of these findings compared against the theory, 
outlined in Chapter 2, and what the implications of these findings mean not just 
for the way in which Canadian aid has been structured in the OPT, but what the 
Canadian case study suggests about the broader failure of neoliberal 
development aid in the OPT. The Canadian case suggests that neoliberalism 
may only be being applied selectively, and not universally, depending on a 
government’s perceptions of its interests. The conclusion is that the reality of 
Canadian support for Israeli settler colonialism, a Western development aid 
donor contributing toward regional peace building, must be taken into account 
when assessing development aid and peace building in the OPT. Thus, any 
accurate assessment of why development and peace failed in the OPT requires 
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analysis that takes into account the unspoken aims of a Western government 




















CHAPTER 2 – Theory: Neoliberalism in International Relations and Settler 
Colonialism in the OPT 
Introduction 
The matrix of settler-colonial control exercised by Israel over the OPT, in 
addition to Palestinian lands taken in 1948 to found Israel, has been 
strategically consistent even if the tactics have adapted over time. 35  This 
process began when Israel, as a settler colonial project within the British 
Empire, emancipated itself from the external supervision and control of its 
métropole (Britain). At that point it established its own sovereign political and 
cultural forms while terminating the substantive indigenous autonomies of the 
Palestinians in a process of settler colonial termination and taming, ethnic 
cleansing and reformation, which continues unabated to this day. 36 
Unfortunately for indigenous peoples, within settler colonialism land is life, and 
contests for land become contests for life, for both the coloniser and the 
colonised.37 
Proponents of IR neoliberalism extol the virtues of cooperative interaction 
between states based on the classical liberal’s enlightenment faith in the innate 
goodness of the individual, the capacity of political institutions to promote social 
progress and the idea that states are capable of meaningful cooperation that 
can lead to positive change (progress). In the case of Israel and the OPT, 
technocratic policy makers assumed, based on their neoliberal belief system, 
that these cooperative elements could be enhanced between Israelis and 
Palestinians, developing ‘integrative elements’ comprised of mutually beneficial 
economic arrangements. 38  Essentially they were proposing peace by 
economics, and those economics would likewise be neoliberal in nature. They 
further believed that the international community could give peace building a 
boost by engaging in institution building to catch the underdeveloped 
Palestinians up to their democratic Israeli counterparts. In this way peace would 
be ‘bought’ by investing in development programmes. The World Bank referred 
                                                
35 Read Ilan Pappe, Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oneworld Publications, 2006); Nur Masalha, 
Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948 
(Institute for Palestine Studies, 2012). 
36 Lorenzo Veracini, ‘The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation’, Journal of 
Palestine Studies 42, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 28, doi:10.1525/jps.2013.42.2.26. 
37 Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, 387. 
38 Technocrat is a term used to give the impression that someone is ‘above’ or ‘unaffected’ by 
political considerations, but in this context is just a blind adherent to neoliberalism. 
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to this most explicitly in 1993 when it designed the guidelines for bilateral 
Palestinian aid, calling the programme An Investment in Peace. 
The approach Western aid actors took though was decontextualized, ahistorical 
and ignored the process of Israeli settler colonialism on Palestinian lands that is 
characterised by ethnic cleansing, apartheid and large-scale human rights 
abuses. Settler colonialism was the basis for conflict, a life or death struggle, 
but Western policy makers could not accept that a fellow liberal democracy 
could be undertaking very illiberal acts of dispossession that are nonetheless 
inherent to settler colonialism. It is in fact unlikely that Israeli Jews would have 
to fear Palestinian violence if they were not colonising Palestinian lands. 39 
However, the only way policy makers could carry on with neoliberal 
development projects so ill-suited to conflict situations, especially settler 
colonialism, was for them to ignore the realities of Israeli settler-colonialism, as 
well as their own inherent biases about Western superiority and their preference 
to support Israel. 40  Tackling the real reasons for Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
would have required those Western policy makers to adopt policy and develop 
aid programmes that challenged the occupation, not worked around it, and that 
was something they are still to this date unwilling to conceive of. 
Typically the perception put forth by Western specialists and held by Western 
policy makers has been that Israel is a state forced to exist in a hostile 
neighbourhood of illiberal, less civilised and more militaristic Arab-Muslim 
‘others’. For those policy makers the annexation of additional Palestinian land in 
1967 (the OPT) was accidental, a ‘defensive necessity’, and that Israel would 
ultimately be willing to excise itself from the OPT in a process of decolonisation 
should it be provided with assurances of security by its neighbours in that 
hostile neighbourhood.41 These views were grounded in the Israeli narrative of 
the conflict, perhaps because Westerners felt more of an affinity to Jewish 
Israelis than Arabs or Muslims. Israel’s plan to conquer the OPT, for instance, 
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long predated 1967 back to the very conception the Zionism ideology and had 
been a policy aim for decades; calling it a ‘defensive necessity’ is as biased an 
interpretation as arguing that the British Empire was built ‘accidentally’ in a ‘fit of 
absence of mindedness’, rather than as the effect of aggressive global 
imperialism. However, Israel resembled after all its liberal European 
métropole(s), a Western society transplanted into the Middle East, much like 
Canada in North America or New Zealand in the Pacific, so the West has been 
willing to prioritise Israel’s narrative over the indigenous one. Meanwhile, the 
West harboured deep feelings of guilt over the mass murder of European Jewry 
during the Holocaust in World War II, evoking genuine sympathy from many 
quarters of society. 
Favouring the Israeli narrative required ignoring the Palestinian voice, and 
devaluing the Palestinian narrative of the occupation. The result was that the 
West would approach the Peace Process heavily biased in favour of Israel. For 
this reason it never put equal pressure on the two sides to make peace, 
ignoring Israeli excesses while emphasising Palestinian mistakes, essentially 
blaming the victim. Yet then there can be no claim to equality between the 
participants where one side is the colonized and the other occupier by military 
force.42  Above all this preferential treatment was linked to ignoring the actual 
characteristics of Israel as a land-hungry settler colonial state with a focus on 
territoriality that required the elimination of Palestinians from the land. Instead 
Western donors remained preoccupied with building a liberal and modern 
Palestinian state that could live in peace with Israel, by being civilised, distinct 
from the typical illiberal and autocratic Arab neighbour. The result was a clash 
between Western perceptions with reality, pitting neoliberal policy against a 
settler colonialism they chose not to recognise was taking place,  
Western peace building in the context of the OPT has attempted to 
constitute one important part of the equation of colonialism: the mission 
civilisatrice of ‘developing’ the local population and preparing them for 
statehood –or at least some version of ‘self-governance’ or conditional 
autonomy. Simultaneously, the practices of the occupying power, Israel, 
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constituted the other part of the equation of colonialism: extracting and 
controlling resources, and settling its own people.43 
 
Neoliberalism 
Western policy makers did not take into consideration Israel’s territoriality, its 
settler colonial nature, but instead to chose identify with Israel as a fellow liberal 
and democratic state that would therefore just naturally be predisposed toward 
peace if conditions allowed it – or at least they liked to believe that about 
themselves, ignorant of the aggression of liberal/neoliberal states for centuries 
the world over. On a conceptual level this had a huge impact on the policy they 
designed to support the Oslo Peace Process, because those same policy 
makers also worked on an assumption that Palestinians were an 
underdeveloped people who were, unlike Western liberals, inherently 
predisposed toward despotism and militancy. Therefore if they were able to 
reform and develop the Palestinians, transforming them into a liberal democracy 
as civilised as those found in Israel and the West, they would become naturally 
predisposed toward living in peace with Israel – a peace that would be 
cemented upon the twin pillars of cooperation and free market trade. Since 
Israel already dominated the Palestinians militarily and economically, containing 
them within the OPT, that meant the West would simply need to use soft power 
to influence how the Palestinians think and organise their society in order to 
make them more like the West. This would make the process of decolonisation 
easier for Israel with a developed Palestinian state to live safely next to.  
With one of the two ‘warring’ sides already liberal and democratic, the West 
under the US’ leadership was adopting an approach to foreign policy and peace 
making in the region that is best described as neoliberal in IR theory. 
Neoliberalism is an important Western IR paradigm in that was developed and 
refined in the US. It is based on liberal theories in world affairs, and 
philosophically grounded in the European Enlightenment. Theoretically it 
represented a modernisation of the preceding liberal paradigm to keep pace 
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with its positivist cousin realism being updated into neorealism. Together the 
two dominate the foreign policy discourse in North America, informing policy 
choices.44 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are often credited with founding 
neoliberalism in the 1970s, along with other influential thinkers such as Michael 
Doyle, known for his theories on liberal ‘democratic peace’; Bruce Russett, long-
time editor of the Journal for Conflict Resolution; Francis Fukuyama, who wrote 
about the triumph of liberal capitalism over communism as a victorious ‘End of 
History’; and Richard Rosecrance, one-time member of the US Department of 
State. 
As a paradigm neoliberalism is highly influential in American foreign policy, as 
well as among its Western allies. One of those allies where neoliberalism is 
particularly influential is Canada, displayed outwardly with its historical 
predisposition to engage in world affairs through multilateral institutions, its 
devotion to international trade and freer markets, and its use of soft power to 
project influence abroad. Neoliberalism is now so influential and pervasive as 
an ideology that citizens in Western states, have so fully absorbed liberal 
principles and institutions into both their domestic politics and foreign affairs that 
they are no longer even able to perceive that liberalism is distinctly there.45 For 
them liberalism has become normality and by adopting liberal policy you appear 
to them to be non-political.  
Liberalism, now neoliberalism, has thus become a norm upon which the 
Western citizen believes ordinary state, and non-state, life should be organised. 
Bell describes this as a contemporary situation where little stands outside the 
‘discursive embrace of liberalism’ in mainstream Anglo-American politics and 
academic political theory, so pervasive that, ‘most who identify themselves as 
socialists, conservatives, social democrats, republicans, greens, feminists, and 
anarchists have been ideologically incorporated, whether they like it or not’.46 
Doyle likewise points out as an adherent from within that paradigm that as an 
ideology, liberalism has, ‘shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign 
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relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic 
to laissez faire’.47 
Modern Twentieth and Twenty-First Century Liberal thought has been shaped 
by its struggle with competing with world views, prominently European fascism 
and Communism, in the interwar period, during World War II and after during 
the Cold War. Before liberal theorists like Fukuyama would declare victory with 
the fall of the Communist Soviet Union as the end of history, liberalism emerged 
as the most authentic and constitutive ideology of the West. Scholars from 
across the political spectrum, and from assorted academic disciplines, 
converged on this new all-encompassing narrative.48 It was largely the product 
of United States human sciences, though mirrored in Britain, and had been 
profoundly influenced in its evolution by British commentators and German 
scholars prior to the World Wars.49 Its emergence came non-coincidentally with 
the emergence of the United States as the dominant power in the non-
Communist Western world, proffering its viewpoint upon the secondary powers 
it dominated in the West. Liberalism would even be described by disciples as, 
‘our “ideology”, inherited from the past as the liberal tradition, the American 
creed, the Judeo-Christian heritage of Western civilization or the like’. 50 
In its modern iteration, updated in the 1970s, Harvey notes that neoliberalism 
has as a paradigm, ‘become hegemonic as a mode of discourse’ and he says  
this has pervasive effects on our ways of thought to the point where it has 
‘become incorporated into the common-sense way we interpret, live in, and 
understand the world’, including for both IR and economic theoretical 
understanding.51 Thus, most Westerners are now conscripts of liberalism, in its 
modern iteration neoliberalism, a tradition and way of thinking that has 
expanded to encompass the vast majority of political positions regarded as 
legitimate. So when we describe what is a norm and what mainstream, it is born 
from that liberal tradition. In this way liberal ideas have invaded the way that the 
West views how a state should be organised and interact with the world. Yet it 
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is not a neutral norm. It is a value-laden way of viewing global society, like any 
other ideology. 
Cooperation and Trade 
Progressive elements of neoliberalism are built upon the enlightenment 
optimism that human beings are rational creatures capable of taking rational 
decisions. For most neoliberals, war and conflict are not considered rational 
because much more can clearly be accomplished for every society through 
cooperation, particularly trade, to create greater wealth for all. Thus rational 
state actors should realise that they have much more to gain in absolute terms 
by working together for a ‘positive sum’ gain, than they would achieve in relative 
terms on their own in a ‘zero sum’ gain. For this reason, it makes more sense 
for states to resolve issues between themselves through cooperation and 
dialogue than through confrontation and violence.  
For neoliberals economic incentives are fundamentally as important as military 
concerns, because trade and prosperity based on free market economics are 
the best antidotes to conflict. 52  Thus, neoliberalism is a particularly strong 
advocate of the liberal right for the individual to own private property, taking that 
concept global to the right to trade goods internationally. For them trade 
constitutes the core element for cooperation in world affairs. When carried out 
freely, they argue that it has the power to abrogate the need of states to go to 
war in search of resources. In this way Rosecrance argues that an open trading 
system offers states ways to transform their positions through economic growth 
rather than military conquest, and that all states can benefit from enhanced 
growth for a positive sum gain for all.53 For this reason neoliberal belief is very 
much rooted in, and promotes, principles of free market capitalism. Many of the 
neoliberal faithful even think that capitalism – and democracy – are inherently 
antithetical to conquest and conflict. Thus following a liberal/neoliberal template 
the US has since the late 1940s operated adopted into its foreign policy the aim 
of creating an open international economy that will forestall economic 
depression and sustain peace. In order to maintain that global system a number 
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of international multilateral institutions were formed, prominent among them the 
World Bank and UN.  
Neoliberal IR theory should though not be misconstrued as one in the same as 
neoliberal economic theory, even though the two approaches often complement 
one another owing to IR neoliberalism’s commitment to free trade and 
capitalism. IR neoliberalism is pre-occupied with cooperation among states in 
world affairs, arguing that states should be concerned foremost with the 
absolute gains they can accrue by working together, rather than the relative 
gains they might make by acting on their own. Meanwhile, as described by 
Harvey, economic neoliberalism is pre-occupied with the proposition that, 
‘human well being can best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property 
rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade’. 54  Even if 
category specialists are quick to explain that each field is unique, perhaps 
because they address different realms of human interaction, they are 
nonetheless completely complementary. For instance, IR neoliberalism is a 
strong proponent of the economic neoliberal theory, while both are the product 
of liberalism, informing their world views. 
 
Making the Costs of War Prohibitive 
Proponents of neoliberalism argue that open markets and global economic 
integration make it increasingly costly for states to turn away from patterns of 
interdependence, and as a result this connectedness helps to preserve peace 
in world affairs.55 The base assumption is that international trade will ultimately 
develop into a harmonious division of ‘labour among equals’ where every 
participant contributes their strengths to the world economy, and then altogether 
benefit from the overall gains made in the world economy. Thus, the primary 
path to prosperity and leadership on the global stage becomes one based in 
peaceful interaction. Further, because modern advanced weaponry is capable 
of inflicting such incredible damage on the participants in war, as discovered by 
Europeans during World War I, this creates disincentives for armed conflict and 
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the use of hard power as a means of economic gain. After World War II, the 
cost of war became exponentially prohibitive with the development of nuclear 
weapons and the threat of mutual assured destruction. Rosecrance described 
this in 1986 as a major crossroads in international affairs where, 
In the past the military-political world was efficient. It was cheaper to 
seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated 
economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from 
commercial exchange with it.56 
Since military expansion begins to be ruled out as a realistic route toward 
development, international trade appears in the mind of neoliberals to have 
become the best way for rational states to grow. As the trading system 
becomes increasingly attractive for those states seeking growth, they become 
even more disinclined to choose a military-political route to achieve a foreign 
policy aim.57 
 
A Rational International System 
Since rational states realise that their good fortunes and general well being are 
inexorably linked to one another, over time their interactions will increasingly 
become distinguished by cooperation, often carried out through shared 
international institutions and accords. In addition, even though world politics is 
dominated by states and only a relatively small number of them play major 
roles, neoliberals recognise that many other entities, both transnational and 
national actors, are able to influence on world events. 58  Thus international 
affairs can never truly be measured without taking into account NSAs that also 
influence it, like multinational corporations, religious networks, terrorist 
organisations, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).59  
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Within this system of ‘complex interdependence’ IGOs and NSAs play an 
important role sometimes rivalling that of states themselves because they are 
contributing to world affairs through multiple channels of interaction, or linkages, 
that often work to great effect between and around the state. Combined with 
culture, international linkages sit within the realm of soft power to achieve 
foreign policy aims, as opposed to the hard power of military or economic force. 
By using soft power international actors can make use of their culture, policies 
and institutions to attract or repel other actors toward a desired end. The US 
itself exercises an incredible amount of co-optive soft power, where with its 
influence, 
Institutions governing the international economy, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, tend to embody liberal, free-market principles that coincide in 
large measure with American society and ideology.60 
Meanwhile NSA’s have contributed to building linkages between liberal states 
and are credited by mainstream scholarship with a decline in the use of hard 
power. Those linkages, along with international trade, have led to the 
development of a neoliberal global system of complex interdependence where 
states have become connected by multiple social and political relationships.61 
According to Nye and Keohane that system is defined by three characteristics:  
1) State policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies, but are 
subject to trade-offs; 2) the existence of multiple channels of contact 
among societies expands the range of policy instruments, thus limiting 
the ability of foreign offices tightly to control governments' foreign 
relations; and 3) military force is largely irrelevant.62 [Author’s underline.] 
One of the best ways to maintain relationships in that system is through the use 
of international law. International law guarantees legitimate rights for states and 
their citizens, contributing to the free exchange of trade and ideas upon which 
the liberal state and international peace rely. It is also provides a means for 
regulating international affairs between states and NSAs, and acts as a stable 
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guarantor for mutual respect that then fosters growth and peace for the benefit 
of all. Further, international law can bring together states with differing 
languages and beliefs, integrating them into a global culture of peace and 
understanding that supersedes a cynical realist system that is only kept in 
balance through the capricious balance of power, war and conquest.63  
Within this neoliberal system of trade and international law a state will never 
wholly surrender their own sovereignty, and can be expected to try to benefit as 
much as possible from their relations in that system while maintaining as much 
individual autonomy as possible. Some states will also exercise more 
sovereignty and power than others. From the perspective of the system itself, 
the problem that it then faces is how to, ‘generate and maintain a mutually 
beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by 
governments and NSAs to manipulate the system to their own benefit’.64 In this 
way neoliberalism retains a positivist preoccupation with the state as the basic 
unit of analysis of international affairs, still striving for power and benefits to 
itself, but in a more cooperative and peaceful manner facilitated by trade, NSAs, 
international agreements and other linkages. In that neoliberal system of world 
affairs other forms of interaction supersede the state’s preoccupation with 
security and force, as soft power begins to rival or exceed hard power in foreign 
policy.65 
Based on the evidence they have collected, neoliberals further argue that there 
exists a significant predisposition toward peace and against warfare between 
states that are liberal and capitalist.66 Since these states are ‘moral’ republics 
whose authority rests on respect for the individual rights of their citizens, they 
tend to display a concomitant level of respect for the rights to freedom of other 
liberal states.67 In this vein countless neoliberal theorists have set forth a simple 
argument – and I would point out a frankly ahistorical argument –that,  
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The aggressive instincts of authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling 
parties make for war. Liberal states, founded on such individual rights as 
equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private 
property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war... 
When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, 
wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the 
benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace.68 
If they are right though, since the number of liberal states in the world appeared 
to proliferate after the Cold War – something Fukuyama described as an ‘End of 
History’ – that would augur well for world peace if liberal states have indeed 
established a separate and durable ‘democratic peace’ among themselves.69 
Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a 
zone of peace, which Kant called the “pacific federation” or “pacific 
union”, has begun to be established among liberal societies.70 
Thus neoliberals are optimistic about a future world inspired by their 
enlightenment belief that humanity is progressively marching toward world 
peace. 
Faith in non-military forms of inter-state cooperation a tenet central in IR 
neoliberalism offering the foundations upon which peace should be able to be 
built, is what then informs the logical framework behind the Oslo Accord and the 
economic model designed for the OPT by the World Bank. 71 Since Israel was 
already a liberal state, Western policy makers came to the conclusion that they 
needed only to construct a new liberal Palestinian state that would be a ‘moral’ 
republic, like Israel, where the state’s foundation of power would rest not on 
autocracy but the true consent of the citizens it represents. Thus, the Peace 
Process represented an attempt to extend the pacific union of liberal states 
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forward into the Middle East by creating a Palestinian state that was liberal, and 
predisposed toward peace with Israel. The resulting approach to peace building 
became built upon economic growth (trade) and liberal mechanisms like 
regional institutions, economic integration, democratisation, mutual recognition 
of national rights, and fostering mutual trust (cooperation).72  
 
Soft Power and Palestinian Development 
One of the tools states can use to achieve foreign policy aims, and to reinforce 
cooperation, is ‘soft power’. Whereas neorealists (and classical realists) 
consider IR to be a zero-sum game where state actors seek out power and 
influence, using resources such as armed force and economics to coerce one 
another, neoliberals stress the utility of alternative and nonviolent processes 
that can be used to achieve foreign policy aims by attracting and co-opting 
other states and NSAs. Those alternatives include using intangible soft power 
resources like culture, ideology and institutions.73 By using them one country 
can get another to ‘want the same things’, assimilating the world-views of 
another like the US has done with its Western allies since World War II. 
Neoliberals believe soft power is potentially just as powerful as the hard power 
preferred by realists. Joseph Nye describes it with a patrimonial analogy, 
Parents of teenagers have long known that if they have shaped their 
child's beliefs and preferences, their power will be greater and more 
enduring than if they rely only on active control. Similarly, political leaders 
and philosophisers have long understood the power of attractive ideas or 
the ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of 
debate in a way that shapes others' preferences.74 
 
If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow it.75 If a 
state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter 
less resistance in attaining its wishes. This co-optive element fosters conditions 
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where other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways 
consistent with the state that is wielding soft power. Soft power has also allowed 
actors like the Papal States, Canada and the Netherlands to exercise 
substantial influence in spite of their hard power limitations. In fact they may 
exercise more power than other states with similar or greater military 
capabilities due to their soft power influence.76 
Although the Peace Process includes elements of hard power coercion, where 
Palestinians are manipulated through the use of financial resources 
undergirded by Israeli military might, Western funding for Palestinian 
development aid projects represented the use of soft power where donors were 
attempting to co-opt Palestinians to behave in a way amenable to Western 
interests. This soft power was applied to Palestinian state building but also 
exerted in OPT society through the thousands of NGOs that came to rely on 
Western sources of funding, through which Western liberal norms such as 
moral values, culture, policy, economy, governance, civil society, personal 
rights and free market economics could be passed.   
Further, neoliberals believe that it is in the best interest of every government in 
the world to apply sound policy to provide public goods and open markets for all 
of the people they govern, eliminating poverty along the way. They hold a highly 
optimistic view of government and its intentions. For them there is no hidden 
agenda to aid, and development policy can be taken at face value from official 
policy, pubic records and other formal documentation. Taken a step further, 
those governments can employ policy makers behind Palestinian (and global) 
aid to carry out development in regions like the OPT, progressively leading 
towards technologically and institutionally more complex and integrated forms of 
'modern' society – a process is set in motion and maintained through increasing 
engagement with commodity markets and a series of interventions involving the 
transfer of technology, knowledge, resources and organisational forms 
borrowed from the more developed world. In this way, a 'traditional' society can 
be ‘propelled’ into the modern world. Though not without institutional hiccups 
often described as social and cultural obstacles, gradually the less developed 
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society’s economy and social patterns can acquire the ‘accoutrements of 
modernity'.77 
A fundamental neoliberal belief of the Western policy makers is that a strong 
central authority, in the case of the OPT that would be the PA, should use its 
power of hierarchy and monopoly to encourage development while making 
certain to balance its own intervention with free markets. Otherwise the state 
might stray down the ‘failed’ path of socialist style intervention, a historical rival 
to the liberal paradigm, risking systemic failure should one monopoly should 
fail.78 That concept of balancing free markets with authority is based on the 
neoliberal’s faith in the power of market forces to correct for inefficiency, 
incompetence or abuse. It builds on an assumption that in the marketplace 
enough entities exist, or can be identified, to provide the required goods and 
services to foster wealth and discourage poverty.79 For this reason they argue 
that the state should not be economically monopolistic yet should encourage 
free market enterprise.80 Thus, where neoliberalism is the dominant ideology 
there has indeed been a consistent increase in the ‘relative power of the 
international and coercive apparatuses of the state’, all done in support of 
market interests, both internally and internationally.81  
In this way neoliberals see development as something that only comes through 
government action; and any lack of development, by definition, is the result of 
government neglect. 82  Whether or not economic growth takes place or the 
economy shrinks depends only on government policy being implemented 
properly, but never because of intervention itself. Thus policy and development 
planning are accorded the utmost importance, with an expectation that the 
implementing local central authority will be a neutral, unitary and effective 
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national agent that heeds the advice of the Western experts. The bureaucracy, 
while inconvenient in an underdeveloped country, just needs further training in 
order to be able to carry out policy in the right way.83  
In order to sustain this form of governance balanced between free markets and 
state intervention, neoliberal technocrats insist on either strengthening existing 
institutions or the wholesale creation of new ones. They require this in order to 
establish a ‘good’ government that can properly implement their development 
advice, using 
Implementation networks [that] employ hierarchical structures containing 
interrelated subunits to establish overarching objectives, planning and 
resource utilisation procedures, monitoring and evaluation systems, and 
formal oversight relationships, as in a bureaucracy.84  
In the OPT this became the PA that they funded, fostered and helped organise. 
By introducing hierarchy into implementation through a strong central authority 
supported by the right institutions, development policy makers can take 
advantage of the ability of that authority to shape individual actors’ preferences 
into patterns that are consistent with the neoliberal development paradigm.85 
 
Economics and De-Development 
Prior to Oslo, there were indications that the OPT economy was suffering as a 
result of its connection to the Israeli economy. When conducting research on 
the Gazan economy in the 1980s, Sarah Roy discovered that a popular belief 
that growth took place in the OPT due to integration with Israel, based on an 
interpretation of GDP figures, was wrong. Rather, Gaza was becoming poorer 
because the Israeli occupation of the OPT had been structurally designed for 
the sole benefit of Israel. Within that structure Palestinians were just cheap 
labourers used to propel forward Israeli economic growth, using their earnings 
to buy Israeli goods in a captive Gazan economy. By absorbing Palestinian 
labour into its workforce, Israel was also able to free Jewish labourers from 
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menial jobs to further develop Israeli advanced industry. 86  Palestinians 
meanwhile could not develop their own economic sectors, as Israeli policy was 
to undermine Palestinian economic sectors that might compete with any Israeli 
equivalent.87  
Salim Tamari argues that the Israeli government had been integrating the OPT 
into Israel after conquering it through the use of three main institutional 
mechanisms – markets, labour and infrastructure – meant to reinforce its rule.88 
Already by the 1980s the OPT had become Israel’s most important export 
market; a market that was tariff-free, non-competitive and from which 
Palestinian goods were prevented from entering Israel. With the gross trade 
imbalance that resulted from this economic relationship, the OPT economy 
came to rely on external remittances from Palestinian labourers in Israel and 
family members working abroad in the oil rich Gulf states in the 1970s, and later 
in the 1980s on ‘sumud’ solidarity funds coming from the Arab world.  
At the time of her initial research, Roy’s said that this type of grossly unequal 
economic relationship between states was often best described through the use 
of ‘dependency theory’, a paradigm describing the post-colonial relationship that 
existed between Western countries and the poorer countries of the ‘developing 
world’ – typically former colonies of the West. Dependency theory had in turn 
spawned the concept of ‘dependent development’, a condition where growth 
becomes disarticulated from the needs of the poorer territory and re-orientated 
to fulfil the needs of an external economy it is oriented toward. 89  In that 
condition, one economy is forced to work not for its own needs but the benefit of 
another. Roy argued that those concepts available in development theory were 
inadequate though, because the necessary preconditions existed at too small a 
degree in Gaza. There economic development was being suppressed to such 
an extent that even conditions of dependent development were being 
suppressed. This led Roy to coin ‘de-development’ to describe the economic 
                                                
86 Salim Tamari, ‘What the Uprising Means’, Middle East Report, no. 152 (1 May 1988): 25, 
doi:10.2307/3012098. 
87 This is an important finding because it undermines, using early analysis, a key argument 
taken by many donors and researchers, notably at the World Bank, that integration benefits the 
Palestinians. This misbelief became a foundational element behind the entire model of Western 
donor aid in the OPT. 
88 See Tamari, ‘What the Uprising Means’. 
89 Sara Roy, ‘The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-Development’, Journal of Palestine 
Studies 17, no. 1 (October 1987): 57, doi:10.2307/2536651. 
	 47 
relationship that existed between Israel and Gaza, a ‘deliberate, systematic 
deconstruction of an indigenous economy by a dominant power’.90 This process 
Roy described could also have been described as settler colonialism. 
 
Settler Colonialism 
European settler colonialism has over the past few centuries been premised on 
violence carried out against indigenous peoples, such as everyday forms of 
humiliation, exclusion and racial segregation. Some of this process is carried 
out informally and some of it sanctioned officially under law.91 Wolfe argues that 
the essential feature of this colonialism is ‘a sustained institutional tendency to 
supplant the indigenous population’. 92  It entails an initial extermination or 
expulsion of a majority of an/the indigenous populations, followed by the, 
‘demographic ‘‘swamping’’ of these territories by settlers from the métropole 
and/or a variety of other locales’.93 Two characteristics of that settler society are 
an exclusionary racial identity and expectations for self-government. It is a 
potent mix of ‘intra-racial egalitarianism’ but ‘inter-racial exclusion’.94 Colonists 
meanwhile are considered always already to be civilised, regardless of their 
actions, and to be imbued with rights and obligations mirroring the métropole. In 
this way they are classified to be radically different to the people they 
conquered and dispossessed. The original inhabitants are in turn considered to 
be child-like and uncivilised, incapable, immature, lacking in both rationality and 
in competence. Upon this basis their rights can be reasonably withheld by a 
state that deems them unworthy of political or social equality. This is a 
precarious condition because as Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer 
who coined the term genocide in 1944, argued based on observations of 
colonialism and the Holocaust, ‘occupations and settlements conducted on 
terms that neither recognised indigenous rights nor engaged in subsequent 
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negotiations were bound to issue in genocide because resistance and its brutal 
suppression was inevitable’.95 
Ethnic cleansing is inf act an age-old means to permanently tip a demographic 
balance in favour of an occupier. 96  Meanwhile, Zionism has consistently 
operated on a settler colonial logical conceptual framework, deeply exclusionary 
and racist, where ethnic ‘purity’ ideas have been cornerstone to Zionist policy 
from the day of its inception.97 In the case of Palestine, Jewish settlers moved 
from their European métropole into Palestinian lands under an ideological 
banner of Zionism, seizing them and reducing the indigenous population 
through a violent strategy, including mass killings, which led to the mass 
expulsion of at least 750,000 Palestinians in 1948 and emptied the first lands of 
non-Jewish inhabitants, which were used to form Israel. 98  Israel overall 
demographically swamped any Palestinian territories it has taken, and even in 
the OPT, where it has not been able to expel Palestinians at the same rate with 
the same levels of violences as in 1948 Israel, they have carried out a process 
of internal expulsion (exclusion) of Palestinians onto bantustans like those 
found in Area A of the West Bank or an encircled, besieged Gaza Strip.  At its 
worst such ethnic cleansing is defended as a necessity for the formation of a 
nation state that embodies the greater end of human progress. With this logic 
Israeli historian Benny Morris, who had once used archival work to dispel myths 
surrounding the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in 1948, using the example of 
United States democracy built upon the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans.99    
Western supporters of the Peace Process did not recognise these age old 
processes at play in the OPT when adopting their own conceptual framework of 
Oslo peace building. As a Western ‘liberal democracy’, torn from the social 
fabric of the European métropole, the superiority of Israeli values as moral and 
civilised actors have largely accepted by Western leaders and policy makers, 
for they were after all representative of ‘civilised values’ in a ‘backward 
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region’. 100  That Western leadership and policy community have also largely 
acceded to Israel’s demand to be accepted as one among the community of 
advanced liberal democracies; yet to be allowed to ignore the norms of 
international law and human rights conventions in Israel and the OPT based on 
a peculiar Zionist destiny, ‘as a state in which ethnic nationalism and religious 
prophecy are enshrined’ as reasons for being.101 The technocrats’ judgement 
was clouded by their own deep internal biases. 
In this way, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was able to be conceived of as a 
confrontation based on religious and nationalist grounds, to the point of 
explicitly discounting settler-colonialism.102 When policy makers in 1993 were 
designing their development aid programme for the OPT they then classified 
Israel and the OPT as a post-conflict situation and expected Israel to decolonise 
from the OPT.103 This classification has been maintained ever since. As we will 
see in Chapter 4, there has been little evidence supporting the assumption that 
Israel was ready to embark on a process of decolonisation from the OPT. 
Instead settlement growth accelerated dramatically from the onset of Oslo, 
entrenching the settler colonial enterprise even further than before. By never 
setting an actual timetable for disengagement and constantly setting new 
preconditions to decolonisation, Israel has appeared unwilling to relinquish 
control of the OPT even though the Oslo Peace Process is premised on a two-
state solution where both Jewish Israelis and non-Jewish Palestinians receive 
land for their own states.  
Western donors to the Peace Process needed though starting in the 1990s to 
classify Israel and the OPT as a post conflict situation, because otherwise they 
could not have applied neoliberal precepts of development aid and peace to it. 
This is because the neoliberal approach to development is not able to cope with 
the irrationalities of war – or settler colonialism. Conflict poses too serious a 
challenge to their uniform analytical frameworks and rigid assumptions. Instead 
they prefer to conceive of conflict as too temporary and exceptional to deserve 
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a separate frame for analysis.104 For this reason the policy makers responsible 
for Palestinian aid, like the World Bank, have treated Palestinian economic 
performance during decades of occupation as a ‘special and temporary phase 
of irrationality, which does not deserve a comprehensive economic analysis’.105  
Since decolonisation was supposed to commence with Oslo, it seemed only to 
make sense for Western donors to help establish a local Palestinian 
government that could in turn help facilitate Israel’s removal of its garrisons 
while leaving in place some control over local government.106 However, Israel 
was not ‘merely’ engaged in exploitative colonialism exercised like a distant 
métropole from its overseas colonies.107 Rather, Israel had established a settler-
colonial entity embedded deeply within the OPT, and which was integrated 
directly into the métropole. Israel kept pursuing territoriality, expropriating 
Palestinian land and ethnically cleansing Palestinians from it.  
There were plenty of warning signs. Already in the mid-1990s Roy had identified 
four essential characteristics that defined the Israeli occupation over the OPT as 
settler colonial: ideological justification (the Zionist mission of the Jewish people 
in Palestine), legal legitimacy (the Balfour Declaration where Britain gave the 
Jewish population of Palestine the right to settle the land and form their own 
national body), land acquisition (by means such as direct purchase, non-use, 
public domain, state lands, military declarations) and racism used to justify 
discriminatory policies toward the indigenous population.108 Thus she was able 
to determine that Israel’s goal was to, ‘rob the native population of its important 
economic resources – land, water and labour – as well as the internal capacity 
and potential for developing those resources.109 Thus, 
Israel never sought to promote the interaction of Palestinian society with 
its own, and through such interaction, to educate or “enlighten” the 
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Palestinians. It did not even seek to exploit the Palestinians for economic 
gain, although that did occur. Rather, it sought primarily to dispossess 
the Arabs of their economic and political resources with the ultimate aim 
of removing them from the land, making possible the realisation of the 
ideological goal of building a strong, exclusively Jewish state.110 
 
Roy had discovered the logic of elimination inherent to settler colonialism. This 
is not a master–servant relationship marked by ethnic difference, nor a 
relationship characterised by the ‘indispensability’ of the labour of a colonised 
people. 111  Land is life’ for the settler colonial project and land itself is the 
primary good, as opposed to the natural resources or products (i.e. gold, cotton, 
oil) and human resources (i.e. labour, existing trade networks, convertible souls) 
intrinsic to colonialism.112 The indigenous person is here quite dispensable.113 
Here Zionism chose also to conquer labour, not only clearing Palestinians from 
the land but boycotting indigenous labour and produce, thereby remaking the 
modern Jew through a repudiation of dependency on others that progressively 
deprived those same others of their means of subsistence in that land for life 
struggle.114  ‘The end goal is to turn the settlers into the indigenous people of 
the land and for them to cease to be settlers’.115 Settler colonialism destroys and 
replaces the old, without room even for assimilation of the native inhabitant. 
Zionism’s founding father Theodor Herzl said of this, ‘If I wish to substitute a 
new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct’.116 
 
Democracy for Settlers, Dispossession for Natives 
A settler colonial state can be both liberal, in the sense of being democratic and 
capitalist, and simultaneously predisposed towards violence and conflict. This 
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characterises the modern state of Israel and this may have confused neoliberal 
policy makers who might assume that liberal and democratic Israel should be 
naturally predisposed toward peace, especially a Palestine state that strove to 
become the same with Western help. However, settler societies have two 
contradictory desires, which are to have their own autonomous settler 
government but to exclude the indigenous Native from it with the help of their 
metropolitan sponsor.117 Further, for a neoliberal technocrat the exclusion and 
elimination of part of a state’s population by their own government does not 
seem rational. Yet the government of Israel routinely and specifically denies 
public goods and open markets from Palestinians living in the OPT, even while 
their own settlers in the OPT agitate for and attain their individual rights. The 
colonists do this while specifically denying the same rights for the indigenous 
Palestinian, owing to an underlying belief that their own rights and democracy 
rest upon the subordination and dispossession of Palestinians.118  
From the beginning Israel was meant to be neither a multinational nor a multi-
ethnic state, but rather one exclusively for Jews.119 From 1948 onward Israeli 
policy has been governed by a Zionist ideological aim of ‘de-Arabisation’ of any 
land it conquered.120 In Israel that tendency toward Palestinian expulsion has 
come in different forms.121 Whereas genocidal wars historically focused either 
on butchering most of an enemy population or ensuring their death through the 
use of famine and disease, the logic of elimination can take on a variety of 
forms adapted for each settler-colonial situation and contemporary norms in 
international relations. This has included limited butchery, terror, forced transfer 
and dispersal to force Palestinians to vacate their homes in 1948- 49.122 Forced 
transfer and dispersion, albeit at a reduced speed, remain part of the Israeli 
strategy to get Palestinians to leave to this day.123 Other solutions include the 
creation of internal borders, small cantons, allocating Palestinians small, ever-
shrinking lands to live on, surrounded and excluded from Israeli society.  
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Behind those borders, or walls, the indigenous Native will live not as a citizen of 
the conquering state. Yet that state will argues that it is justified to control them, 
because they are backward and uncivilised people. The backwardness 
meanwhile very much fits the depiction of undeveloped societies assumed in 
neoliberal development aid. Attempts may be made to educate and culture the 
indigenous native, yet ideologically they can almost never be accepted as 
equals by a settler state, even when development and assimilation succeeds in 
transforming those people in its image, or in this case the Palestinians into a 
liberal Westernised state.  
Porous OPT borders meanwhile offer a way in for Israeli settlers but no way out 
for Palestinians, all while Israelis and even Western policy makers fret over the 
demographic ‘threat’ Palestinians represent to Israeli democracy.124 Even when 
Israel has used the language of evacuation, it has not surrendered control over 
territory in the OPT to the Palestinians. Instead that language has been used as 
a tactical measure, a distraction or subterfuge to obscure the growth of its 
settlements. Thus, when Israeli settlers evacuated Gaza in 2005 that was an 
explicit attempt to sustain the on going forced transfer of Palestinians elsewhere 
in the West Bank, while never surrendering control over Gaza itself. This is an 
example of the settler-colonial ‘non-diplomatic transfer’, where the settler entity 
retains overall control while claiming to relinquish control from a certain area for 
the Native, exactly like the reservations indigenous inhabitants live on in the 
Canada and the US.125 
Only by discriminating against the narrative of the colonised ‘other’ can settler 
colonialism be successful, because the previous inhabitants of a region must be 
dehumanised, categorised as savage and their very existence ultimately 
denied. Once this has been accomplished, any and all acts of horror can be 
inflicted upon them without recourse, because the stories of the oppressed 
become irrelevant, just as the Palestinian narrative has less weight than Israel’s 
among the latter’s Western allies. Meanwhile the concepts and terminology of 
settler-colonial occupation can perversely be sanitised and repackaged, as they 
were by Oslo. Previous patron–client relations of occupation were only, 
‘discursively repackaged and represented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian 
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“cooperation”’ when they took place. 126  Thus, pre-Oslo policies and power 
relationships were only repackaged with liberal terminology like cooperation, 
while the actual control and management of resources remained much the 
same. For example, the Israeli Mekorot water company retained ownership after 
1993 over the West Bank’s water infrastructure, as it had since 1982, supplying 
rapidly growing Israeli settlements while relying on the newly ‘liberated’ 
Palestinians to act as middle-men to enforce Israel’s discriminatory water 
distribution and collect bills.127 Occupation was recast as liberation. 
 
Where Neoliberalism Fails 
With its oppressive settler-colonial occupation of the West Bank coached in the 
neoliberal’s enlightened language of peace and progress, it was reinforced by 
soft power intervention funded by Western donors. This all allowed Israel’s 
settlement enterprise to gain new legitimacy internally and internationally after 
1993. Henceforth Israel’s state and non-state institutions, like Mekorot, could 
more easily transfer away the costs of management of the ruled Palestinians 
onto the colonised people themselves, made possible by Western aid, even as 
those Palestinians were themselves being excluded and eliminated, their 
captive OPT economy drained further by Israel.128 
The authority of the sanitised colonial discourse is profound and disturbing, 
because by normalising the colonial state, ‘the dream of post-Enlightenment 
civility alienates its own language of liberty and produces another knowledge of 
its norms’ when applied to a colonised people – separate and unequal as 
apartheid.129 The overriding tendency of Western donors has been to reinforce 
rather than counter this process, because even though they will use the 
language of neutrality and mediator in the Peace Process, they attach much 
greater weight to their relationship with Israel than for concern about Palestinian 
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human rights.130  The contemporary historical record reveals the consistency 
with which Western leaders, coming from diverse ideological convictions, have 
ultimately defined their national self-interest in ways that not only rule out 
criticism of Israel, but also assist directly or indirectly with the occupation and 
the growth of settlements.131 Both the United States and Canada have been 
particularly strong adherents to this approach. 
For this reason, Israel has been able to usurp progressive elements in the 
neoliberal process of peace building and development aid, instead perverting it 
to instead reinforce its settler colonial enterprise, redirecting Western 
development aid and soft power to its own benefit. This perversion of liberal 
idealism is not surprising though given a long history of liberalism coexisting 
alongside Western imperialism, limiting its benefits to only certain groups at the 
head of the march of progress. In fact, some such as Tocqueville and JS Mill 
and many other great thinkers within the liberal canon even extolled the virtues 
of imperialism.132 With the settler colonial occupation repackaged after 1993 
with neoliberal terms of peace and cooperation, Israel’s long-standing policies 
were legitimised and existing policies came to occupy the middle-space of 
conventional thinking, leaving any prospect for true decolonisation – and peace 
– unlikely.133  Yet the West did not really object, instead only reinforcing its 
support for the Oslo model.  
The ultimate problem is that the West, countries like the United States and 
Canada, are close allies of Israel and identify with it as a fellow democratic and 
liberal Western state. They have proven more than willing to provide cover 
support for Israel and its existing policy, even though that directly undermines 
the entire outward rationale for the Oslo Process because Palestinian rights and 
statehood are incompatible with Israeli settler-colonialism. That settler 
colonialism destroys and replaces the old, without leaving space even for the 
assimilation of the native Palestinian inhabitant, even though the West’s 
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neoliberal policy called for the development, assimilation and reinforcement of 
him/her. As we will see with Canada, support for that settler-colonial model can 
be especially fervent. 
By not accounting for the actual context of settler colonialism and Western 
governments’ support Israel, policy makers created a gaping fault line upon 
which their neoliberal development aid projects and the entire neoliberal peace 
plan had no option but to fail. Even if Western policy makers adopted the 
language of neoliberalism, and Israel did too, this does not necessarily mean 
that they acted purely in accordance with it. Their policy could not be taken at 
face value. Instead evidence suggests that behind their neoliberalism were 
alternative aims that favoured special or national interests that benefitted Israeli 
settler colonialism at the expense of the Palestinians. As we will see the 
Canadian case study will suggest that neoliberalism might only be applied 
selectively by a state and not universally, depending on its tactical aims 
formulated on its perceived interests. Perhaps this is just a legacy of liberalism’s 
historical cohabitation with Western imperialism, applied selectively to some 













CHAPTER 3 - Methodology 
Introduction 
Understanding Western donors is fundamental to understand how post-Oslo 
Palestinian development aid was structured, because it is they who determine 
how aid goes into an OPT economy that has since 1993 been aid dependent. 
While between 1996 and 2006 the Palestinian economy declined by 27% as a 
measure of Gross National Income (GNI), foreign aid per capita increased by 
14.74% and came to dominate Palestinian economic activity, accounting for 
14.42% of economic activity in 1996 and rising to an astonishing 35.34% in 
2006.134 With Israel’s suffocating restrictions on Palestinian daily and economic 
life rendering the PA leadership dependent on Western aid, the result has been 
that donors since 1993 have been able to effectively redesign the Palestinian 
state, economy and society in their own vision. Yet in spite of this gross 
imbalance in power that favours the donors, research conducted on Palestinian 
aid has to date predominantly focused on the Palestinian recipient: the way aid 
is spent in the OPT, aid’s impact on OPT economic development (often 
statistical and measured as per GDP or GNI) and the relationship of aid vis-à-
vis the Israeli occupation. By contrast little has been done looking at the donors 
themselves, analysing the models that aid is premised upon from their views, 
interests and experiences. This is a striking paradox given the preponderance 
in power that donors exercise over daily Palestinian life.135 
That noticeable gap in the Palestinian aid literature forms a justification for this 
research project: examining aid projects that are meant to contribute to 
development and peace in the OPT, run by a Western NGO or even ‘arm’s 
length’ governmental organisations, in order to better understand the Western 
donor-actor experience and their overall relationship with the post-Oslo 
framework. In so doing I chose to focus on project coordinators from one 
country, Canada, running two types of aid projects between 2001 and 2012: (1) 
human rights and advocacy, or (2) capacity building and poverty reduction 
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projects. This research was done by interviewing those coordinators about their 
experiences, structuring them based on the three stages of the linear model of 
project management that typifies the neoliberal development approach popular 
in contemporary Western aid: (1) design, (2) implementation and (3) outcomes. 
I took this approach regardless of whether or not each organisation or project 
coordinator actually subscribed to the neoliberal paradigm or its linear process, 
because ultimately those who did not can be considered outliers to aid norms in 
the period. The point is through their experiences to establish a broader and 
better understanding as to why post-Oslo Palestinian aid has failed, seeking out 
gaps that existed between the donor approach and the socio-political realities 
prevalent in the colonised OPT. 
 
Meta-Theory 
In carrying out this research, there a few meta-theoretical notes on how I 
approached this research. First, reality as we know it may be little more than a 
social construct that we as individuals can never truly view objectively. That is 
because our sense of reality is shaped by the society we live in and no matter 
how hard we try, we will always be products of that society, carrying with us the 
norms and assumptions of the society we originated out of. That means 
researchers such as myself always enter a research project with a set of values 
and expectations. Thus however powerful science and research are, they will 
be as flawed as the individuals engaged with them.136 So although I am quite 
familiar with Canadian aid to Palestine, I did my utmost to approach my 
research and each interview with as much of a sense of open curiosity as 
possible, doing my best to leave aside my assumptions while being fair in my 
analysis and prompting information from each interviewee. And although I am 
well informed, I acknowledge that I still only had a general idea of what I was 
looking for within the social phenomena I was analysing.  
Second, capturing social phenomena in the social sciences is a highly complex 
process. It necessitates any researcher be flexible, which includes avoiding 
theoretical rigidity. So even though my main concern was with the way in which 
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the larger neoliberal IR paradigm affected the social phenomena of Palestinian 
aid and the socio-political realities of Israeli settler colonialism (including the 
occupation, development and peace building), I acknowledge and make 
mention to other theoretical frameworks. Thus my approach was to adopt a fluid 
design and evolutionary strategy that developed throughout the course of 
conducting this research. Masterman warned that while we may use a single 
constructed theory to help understand the world around us, we must still 
acknowledge there could be a multiplicity of paradigms that can each be 
applied to phenomena in ways that are better or worse than one another.137 
Thus even though I describe the Oslo Peace Process and Western donor 
support as neoliberal in nature, it is not the sole paradigm that may describe the 
phenomena. 
 
Description of the Case Studies 
The 16 project coordinators I interviewed worked at 10 different Canadian 
organisations between 2001 and 2012, running projects that were best 
classified as either human rights and advocacy projects, or capacity building 
and poverty reduction projects. Generally speaking each of those categories of 
projects can be described as developmental, which means that they broadly 
seek to bring about changes to reduce poverty long-term at a structural level, 
and bearing in mind that the premise of the Oslo-aid process was meant to 
bring peace to the region by reducing poverty through the use of development 
aid.  
Although normative moral principles can vary between organisations and 
individuals, the human rights and advocacy projects generally refer to projects 
where an organisation either directly advocated for what they considered to be 
the inalienable rights of Palestinians, and/or supported Palestinian partner 
organisations to carry out that work on their own. This work is often based in 
empathy, protecting the disadvantaged and weak, and pushing for an equal 
application of the rule of law – often making reference to international human 
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rights law or the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Typically 
individuals supporting projects in this area of work had a rational motivation as 
they considered rights a pre-requisite, even necessity, for development and 
poverty reduction to actually take.  
The capacity building and poverty reduction projects took a more technocratic 
approach to development work and tried to be non-political, for instance not 
challenging neoliberal norms underlying Western aid, policy and support for the 
Oslo Process. That being said, since the overarching structural problems 
Palestinians face are from occupation and settler colonialism, even these 
organisations could not avoid politics completely and at times found a need to 
support rights work, while rights work was actually a major aim for some like 
Organisation 7.138 As with rights work the way capacity building is interpreted by 
organisations depends on how they perceive the community and situation they 
are addressing. However, most of the organisations generally referred to this as 
improving the capacity of Palestinian organisations and institutions to contribute 
to a functioning modern (liberal) state, with the ultimate aim of reducing poverty. 
These projects fit most readily into the neoliberal development model. 
The focus of this research study is on the experiences of the ‘project 
coordinators’ funding those two types projects. Although their exact job title will 
vary depending on the terminology used at the different organisations 
examined, the general denominator project coordinator describes their role as 
integral members of each organisation, responsible for delivering their 
development projects in the OPT. It is these project coordinators who determine 
if a project is successful and then find a way to explain to the donors why it was 
a success. Many of the coordinators chose who would be funded, how a project 
was designed, implemented and then how its outcomes were framed. It is a 
powerful position in aid work, and possibly the most powerful since they 
ultimately are the interlocutors between the field (and PNGOs) with the donors. 
In the case of the Canadian organisations interviewed, all worked with a 
Palestinian partner organisation in order to carry out their project. As is often the 
case in contemporary aid work, all but one were based in Canada, making just 
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occasional trips to the OPT to meet with partners for monitoring or planning. 
Only one coordinator was actually based in the OPT, and felt during his/her 
period that he/she was the only such coordinator based in the field.  
It is worth noting that Canadian charity law and government regulations force 
Canadian organisations to officially run all projects themselves, as it is not easy 
to simply grant funds for projects to non-Canadian organisations. Canada's 
Income Tax Act rules apply no matter where a Canadian registered charity 
operates. The rules allow it either to make gifts to qualified donees, or to carry 
on its own activities. Few foreign organisations are qualified donees. It is for 
instance difficult to buy equipment for non-Canadian organisations, in spite of 
the logical challenges that presents for indigenous project management and 
buzzwords like bottom-up empowerment.  As a result, most Canadian charities 
operating abroad must do so by actively delivering their own programs.139 Fear 
of breaching those norms is especially heightened in Canada owing to the 
opaque nature of charity law and the heavy politicisation of Israel and Palestine. 
This challenge of operating under Canadian charity law is described is in 
greater detail in the Chapters 5 through 9. 
In the case of this research project, the 16 people I interviewed had between 
them a great deal of experience running aid projects generally and Canadian 
aid projects in the OPT specifically. Some of the interviewees had worked in this 
area for decades. A number of them had advanced degrees and some were 
recognised professionals in their community. Many of them were Arab or Jewish 
Canadians who were attracted to the region due to their identity, while a 
number were attracted to the region due to their religious background. The 
gender background of the coordinators was fairly evenly split, though the rights 
and advocacy coordinators were mostly female while capacity building and 
poverty reduction coordinators were mostly male. Meanwhile, the organisations 
interviewed were split evenly between English and French Canada. Overall the 
coordinators interviewed represented a wealth of professional experience. 
Due to the sensitive politics of anything Palestinian in Canada, and how easily 
people’s careers are unmade when they are seen supporting Palestinians, the 
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interviews have been kept anonymous. All names were replaced gender-neutral 
pseudonyms, while organisations are referred to with just a number. 
Organisations 1 through 4 and their seven interviewees ran human rights and 
advocacy projects, while organisations 5 through 10 with nine interviewees 
were involved in capacity-building and poverty reduction. Some interviewees 
undertook multiple interview sessions, where a sequential number of the 
interview is in that case identified beside their name, i.e. Ash-1, Ash-2 and Ash-
3. Due to the need to hide the identity of the interviewees, an effort is made not 
to provide specific details that will give away their work. Some interviewees 
were concerned about their job security and many likely would not have 
participated in the interviews without anonymity.  
The median interview length was nearly one hour, though several interviews 
lasted longer or consisted of multiple interviews each of the median length.140 
Interviewees with multiple interviews were all conducted within the same month. 
The interviews took place during two periods, in the spring of 2012 and summer 
through winter of 2014. The six interviews that took place in the spring of 2012 
were with Ash and Emory (rights and advocacy), and Sawyer, Kai, Blake and 
Dallas (capacity building and poverty reduction). The ten interviews that took 
place the summer to winter of 2014 were: Ryan, Casey, Remy, Hayden, and 
Taylor (rights and advocacy), Kim, Jamie, Quinn, Alexis and Morgan (capacity 
building and poverty reduction). In the case of an interview at one organisation, 
two of the interviewees took part together in the same interview, Blake and 
Dallas at Organisation 10. 
Bearing in mind that all organisations have different structures, and in order to 
maintain anonymity, the heads of a Board of Directors will be universally 
referred to as Chairperson, while the heads of the paid staff managing an 
organisation’s day-to-day affairs will be referred to as the CEO. There were 
cases of multiple individuals occupying one of those positions for the period a 
project coordinator’s interview covered. Canada’s government department for 
foreign affairs had several different official names depending on the period and 
government in power, so it will be referred to mostly as Foreign Affairs 
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throughout the thesis, outside exceptions where a quote or reference requires 
the name of the time.141 
In a couple instances projects that ran into the early 2000s actually began in the 
late 1980s or 1990s, and for this reason are referenced backward outside the 
2001 to 2012 period of research in order to provide a fuller analysis. Any activity 
that a coordinator funded is referred to as a project, regardless of the technical 
name their organisation ascribed to what they were funding. Occasionally 
projects working with Palestinians extended outside of the OPT or originated in 
a different geographical area, bearing in mind that Palestinians live across the 
Middle East as refugees and some communities exist as a minority in Israel. All 
sums mentioned can be assumed to be in $CAD, unless mentioned as another 
currency like $USD. 
As the research involves human subjects, I successfully applied for ethics 
approval on multiple occasions from the University of Exeter. As my research 
interviews were conducted in Canada that meant taking into account the ‘Tri-
Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans in 
Canada’. In foreign aid work, information on the activities of aid projects is 
highly protected. Information is often treated at though it were a private rather 
than public good, because organisations want to use it to present their projects 
in a positive light –a success – to justify existing or further funding. Interviewees 
may for this reason fear harming their organisation’s funding health and their 
professional career by speaking too frankly about a project. As such, project 
coordinators can be sensitive about providing information about a project they 
are working on, even without taking into consideration their fear in Canada of 




The primary source of data I collected were semi-structured interviews with the 
16 different project coordinators from 10 different Canadian organisations, who 
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ran either of the two types of development aid projects. Those interviewees 
included many of the top Canadian coordinators of OPT aid during that period. 
They held numerous advanced qualifications and decades of experience 
running development projects in the OPT, or elsewhere.  
A major benefit to keeping the interviewees anonymous was the frankness with 
which they spoke. Had their identities not been anonymous, they may not have 
provided such rich information, the likes of which cannot be gleaned from 
official, publically available project reports. This is because, generally speaking, 
it is difficult to collect honest data from aid organisations about their projects. 
This is due to a high degree of self-censorship they apply when writing reports 
aimed for public or donor consumption, fearing that a bad report will lead to a 
reduction in financial support – threatening their livelihoods. It is well 
understood within the aid industry that when an organisation attempts to build 
an argument for the success of its activities, ‘socialising’ their success for 
donors, they prefer to present their project in terms that will be deemed 
successful by the donors they are dependent on.142 Thus it is not possible to 
look at an aid organisation’s report as neutral. They are very much subjective 
social constructs. Those reports are as much a tool in public relations to 
advertise their work, as a summary of what they accomplished or did not 
accomplish. Meanwhile, in a country like Canada with a highly repressive 
political climate towards Palestinian rights, the stakes are even higher and an 
entire organisation can be put at risk of losing its funding or being shut down 
when it is seen supporting Palestinians, or providing a frank analysis of their 
work in the OPT.  
Those interviews were not left on their own, but contrasted against a 
comprehensive assessment of aid and economy in the OPT taken from the 
research literature. Further, I took into account the policy recommendations and 
analysis carried out by important international organisations like the World 
Bank. This is laid out in detail in Chapter 4. The interviews are further 
contrasted against the context of Canada’s relationship to Israel and the 
Palestinians, as described in Chapter 5, which includes Israel and Palestine in 
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Canadian politics, Canadian foreign policy, government publications, news 
articles and civil society reports.  
 
Interviews 
The interviews were semi-structured. When conducting such interviews, some 
researchers advocate developing a relationship with the respondent such that 
both the respondent and researcher introduce their ideas and experiences into 
the data production process in a format commonly called a ‘collaborative 
interview’.143 Although I likely had the prerequisite professional experience to 
conduct such interviews, I shied away from taking such an approach, instead 
choosing to delve into the challenges and experiences of the project 
coordinators through a series of probes and prompts meant to elicit information 
on a semi-structured basis.  
Wherever possible participants were contacted directly and discretely, but on 
occasion indirectly through their organisation or colleagues. Before I spoke with 
them interviewees were made aware in advance of the research topic and the 
issues I was likely to raise during the course of an interview. The interviews 
were then conducted in person, by video Skype or on occasion by telephone. In 
a singular case an interview was carried out via email. Each interviewee was 
provided with a copy of my ethics approval for the interview, an information 
sheet about the research project and a consent form they needed to sign if we 
went ahead with the interview.  
Interviews took place in a quiet setting the interviewees were comfortable in. All 
audio was recorded with an audio digital recorder. In person, the interviewees 
were given control over the digital audio recorder, permitted to end the interview 
at any point and even to request that the data be destroyed – though none 
chose to. Likewise, when interviews were conducted over Skype or by 
telephone, interviewees had the same option to terminate the interview 
prematurely by closing their own device and hanging up. In some cases 
interviewees asked that especially sensitive points be omitted from the record, 
                                                
143 Ann Oakley, ‘Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms’, in Doing Feminist Research, 
ed. H. Roberts (Routledge, 1981), 44, http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/115795/. 
	 66 
which was respected. Interviewees were also given my contact information in 
order to be able to follow up with me after an interview had taken place, and 
several did. Interviewees were also provided with information about who can 
hear the recording and when it will be deleted. They were further given the 
option of requesting that the audio record be destroyed at a later date, while all 
interview data will be destroyed after a period of seven years. All interviewees 
were asked to sign a permission form for the interview to take place.  
While the golden standard in qualitative research has long held that qualitative 
research interviews are best conducted in person, I will argue that they were 
more than adequately replaced by interviews conducted digitally over Skype or 
by telephone.144 For instance, as Nigel and Horrocks point out, by selecting the 
‘full screen’ video function on Skype a researcher is provided with visual cues, 
avoids long silences and creates an experience almost as though the person is 
in the same room. 145  That helps mitigate a bias held in qualitative 
research against distance interviews by telephone, such as a perceived barrier 
in developing rapport with interviewees.146  Those biases further contradicted 
by research that suggests that there is no significant difference between face-
to-face or telephone interviews.147 Such findings held true in an even less tech-
savvy era, where research conducted in the 1980s found no major difference in 
the quality of interviews conducted by telephone in lieu of in person.148 This is I 
would argue particularly true for a tech-savvy country like Canada, where 
people are typically quite comfortable with the technology as Internet 
Communications Technology (ICT) has long been used to keep people 
connected and to carry out business in geographically large country. The 
interviewees were particularly used to employing the technology in their own 
development work to stay connected overseas, and to get around the physical 
barriers of the Israeli occupation. Further, modes of interviewing offered me 
cheaper options to conduct more interviews in a way that was much more 
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flexible for our mutual schedules, and which may arguably be better than in-
person interviews, defying the expectations of the golden standard.149 
All information collected is being kept confidential. Written consent forms are 
kept separate from the interview data in order to ensure anonymity. All data, 
including the consent forms, are held in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act 1998 (United Kingdom) in a secure location in the United Kingdom or 
Canada. Where other researchers are involved, in this instance my supervisory 
team, they have agreed to maintain this confidentiality. To protect the anonymity 
of research participants, a list of names and their corresponding contact 
information is kept as a word file separately with a numerical key representing 
each participant, which is linked to the raw data. In a second document those 
numerical keys are then linked to gender-neutral pseudonyms. Access to the 
number key and the pseudonyms are available only to my supervisors and 
myself. They are being kept for seven years from the start date of this research 
project, before being destroyed. The project commenced on July 2011, 
meaning that all data must be destroyed in June 2018.   
As is common with semi-structured interviews, these interviews comprise a 
purposive sampling of participants who were chosen because they are familiar 
with the topic being researched. The semi-structured interviews were pre-
supposed to allow me, as the researcher, to do all I can to encourage the 
participants to talk about the events, feelings and opinions they hold on the 
research topic, as they reflect on the process and impact of delivering their aid 
project(s) in the OPT. As much as possible interviewees were allowed to 
answer questions or discuss the general topic in their own way, in their own 
words.150  That is because human beings are ‘storying creatures’ that make 
sense of the world around them by constructing narratives to explain and 
interpret events, both to themselves and to other people.151 Through the stories 
that come from the interviews we learn truths that stay closer to actual life 
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events than methods that elicit explanations, particularly through structured 
questions.152 
To point out the narrow scope of questionnaires and methods eliciting 
explanations I was avoiding, Hart and Lo Forte provide the example of a United 
Nations survey of local priorities in Gaza following Operation Cast Lead in 2009. 
In that survey a UN agency tried to ascertain the primary protection needs of 
children by relying on a narrow list of needs they as the researchers perceived, 
all while failing to talk with any children themselves. That survey addressed only 
adults and was constructed in a way that allowed them only to express their 
immediate needs such as food, play space and schooling. The resulting report 
claimed that ‘psychosocial support is by far the most important need for children 
nowadays’, yet a call to end Israel’s blockade of Gaza and the termination of 
other actions that were directly responsible for the suffering that caused the 
problem was not included in the questionnaire for respondents to identify.153  
So one of the main points to the semi-structured interviews was to avoid a 
narrow determinative scope of questioning, by prompting for specific information 
but allowing the interviewees to tell their story and reveal information I might 
otherwise have missed. Bearing this in mind, my semi-structured interviews 
followed a set of themes reflecting the three different stages of the linear model 
of aid projects: design, implementation and outcomes. Questions were 
introduced in different ways or orders appropriate to each interview based on a 
guide of prompts. This helped me enable participants to talk about their 
experience in their own way, while ensuring the same basic areas were covered 
in each interview. At the same time my emphasis was less on the ‘what’ 
happened than on the ‘how’ social phenomena happened, to understand what 
they consisted of and how they were produced.154  
From an exploratory perspective, this approach to the interviews was meant for 
me discover what the participants thought was important about their aid project, 
the purpose of OPT aid and to discover how they use language to talk about 
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aid. This opened up possibilities for me to consider different traits about their 
projects with them, identifying and elaborating on perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of those social phenomena vis-à-vis the intended goals of aid 
generally, and their projects specifically. From an explanatory perspective the 
semi-structured interviews helped me elaborate on why people experienced or 
understood certain social phenomenon of Canadian aid in the OPT, taking into 
consideration their experiences, opinions and feelings to better understand their 
behaviour or attitudes. This approach was meanwhile evaluative in that I was 
trying to ascertain what the interviewees, as participants, thought about the 
social phenomenon they experienced. This approach better allowed 
unanticipated explanations to emerge from the interviewees, allowing them to 
lead me through their experiences within the framework of my research 
question. It did not disappoint, as in many ways these interviews changed the 
direction of my research project in ways I did not anticipate, described in the 
conclusion Chapter 9.  
It is important to bear in mind that the discourse of the interviews was inter-
subjective, jointly constructed by myself as the interviewer with the 
interviewee.155 Due to my shared experience as a project coordinator engaging 
with similar social phenomena, there is a potential advantage for me to better 
understand and therefore interpret the experiences of the interviewees, than if I 
had not. However, for that to be an advantage, I had to do my utmost always to 
be as fair and objective as possible, bearing in mind that it is impossible to be 
completely objective as a researcher on shared social phenomena.156 
Finally, even though the interviews are being kept anonymous, it is important for 
me as the researcher to make certain to portray the respondents fairly. I do this 
by giving the reader enough evidence to show the complexities and problems in 
my interpretation. My goal was to illuminate rather than distort the historical 
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record providing a plausible interpretation to connect all the different facts and 
ideas together.157 
 
Documentation and Corroborating Secondary Sources 
As the accounts we explored in the interviews do not provide on their own a 
transparent enough set of data, I contrasted them with other sources of data 
recording and interpreting the social phenomena associated with Canadian aid 
to the OPT.158 To start, as part of the process comparing and crosschecking the 
interviews, I carried out an in-depth review of primary and secondary sources 
providing context for Canadian aid. This included conducting a comprehensive 
survey of international aid to the Palestinians, of the OPT economy, and the 
structure of the Israeli settler-colonial occupation, written up in Chapter 4. I 
further carried out research on Canada’s relationship to the OPT, written up in 
Chapter 5, which includes: Israel and Palestine in Canadian politics, Canadian 
foreign policy, government publications, news articles and civil society reports.  
For the projects investigated out of the interviews, most had either direct or 
indirect government funding, and all of the organisations were responsible to 
report their financial accounts on an annual basis to the Canadian government 
through the tax agency CRA, or otherwise directly to Parliament if they had 
been established as an Act of Parliament.159 The majority of the organisations 
were governed as charities responsible to the CRA, which maintains online 
records about the organisations including their annual filings. Meanwhile, each 
of the organisations produce some form of reports or accounts of their projects, 
which might be available to the public, and generally list some form of 
information on their websites about their OPT activities.  
Specific reports for the projects interviewees mentioned were not available with 
consistency across the organisations. In some cases entire organisations were 
forced closed by the government of Canada while I was conducting research on 
them, an important part of the narrative of this research study, rendering 
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records unavailable. In other cases like Organisations 3 and 8, they did not 
have project reports readily available. Many of the projects, such as at 
Organisations 1 and 6, were stopped prematurely due to government 
interference. So while I did receive a few detailed project reports to compare 
and contrast with interviews, such as from Organisations 4 and 7, they comprise 
an imperfect record on their own, yet remain useful tools for cross-checking 
interviews when combined with other records. That is also perfectly fine 
because the point of this research study is not to try to measure the 
effectiveness of specific projects, but to look at the overall experiences 
structurally of Canadian organisations trying to run OPT aid projects.  
Meanwhile, project reports in aid work have themselves to be approached with 
a great deal of caution. Just because they are written in a structured manner 
does not accrue toward them any greater value than interviews. When dealing 
with any form of documentation I bore in mind that documents are ‘social facts’ 
that are produced, shared and used in socially organised ways. For, ‘Text is 
context - at once both produced by and productive of the whole social world’.160 
They are not transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-
making processes or professional diagnoses. Every document is written or 
produced by someone in a specific context and for a particular purpose, and for 
aid reporting generally that is typically connected to ensuring current and future 
funding.161  
For reasons of funding aid organisations create optimistic reports advertising 
their successes while glossing over shortcomings.162 As such we should not use 
documentary sources as surrogates for other kinds of data, where in the case of 
this research project the primary data are the interviews.163 When projects are 
deemed successful that encourages further funding, helping keep staff 
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employed. It is at that moment that an NGO becomes a business enterprise, 
with entire organisations being dependent on successful projects to remain 
funded. This impacts not just on an NGO’s employees, but their beneficiaries 
and even original granting bodies that need to show they are funding successful 
works. To show success CEOs and project coordinators need to present 
projects socially,  
Development success is not merely a question of measures of 
performance; it is also about how particular interpretations are made and 
sustained socially. It is not just about what a project does, but also how 
and to whom it speaks, who can be made to believe in it.164 
This reality encourages aid organisations to control the message produced by 
their staff for fear of bad commendations that could sabotage their efforts to 
make a project look successful. Thus, it is fair to by wary that an aid 
organisation’s data will be predisposed to tell ‘happy’ stories, while suppressing 
more contentious ones. 165  Further, although most documents can provide a 
fixed record of something that happened in a particular time, as with any 
document in any context it is not unheard of for histories to be rewritten, and 
some electronic documents are more easily subject to alteration or deletion than 
paper documents.166 Authors regularly rewrite history.167 
So it was borne in mind when interviewing employees working on aid projects 
that their professional careers can be put on the line by being identified in a 
frank interview. In addition, there is an even greater reluctance in Canada to 
share too much information about Palestinian aid projects, owing to oppression 
by the Canadian government, detailed in Chapters 5 through 9. In that case 
presenting a successful Palestinian aid project in Canada may also bizarrely 
include keeping it unseen, operating quietly, hidden from pro-Israel advocates 
at elite levels in Canadian government, public and private institutions. 
Documents produced by Canadian agencies closely linked to the government 
were approached with particular caution, bearing in mind that the Canadian 
                                                
164 Mosse, Cultivating Development, 2005, 158. 
165 Matthews and Ross, Research Methods, 287. 
166 Ibid., 277. 
167 Beverley C. Southgate, History, What and Why?: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern 
Perspectives (Psychology Press, 2001), 157. 
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government may not want them to disclose information it fears could generate 
bad press.  
Finally, when documents are used, for this period of study and type of work 
electronic documents were particularly helpful. As Matthews and Ross point out, 
electronic documents have particular uses.168 They are readily available and 
provide copious amounts of information. Despite concerns about alterations, 
they still provide, in general, a static glimpse into a particular time. Since they 
are socially constructed, that means they can also tell us more than just the 
data and information they contain, particularly when used as a crosscheck 
against the interviews. So while the focus in social research may often be 
placed on the factual content within a document, I emphasise being cognisant 
of the why and how of its production, in a particular style or form and its specific 
context. 
 
The Organisations and Interviewees 
A brief description of each of the project coordinators, their organisations and 
projects they funded follows. The projects listed are not a comprehensive list of 
their respective organisations’ activities in the research period, but rather are 
highlighted by the attention the coordinators gave to them in their interviews 
and their relevance to the research study. It is worth noting that the project 
coordinators at times funded partners funded by another organisation from 
Canada I interviewed, either concurrently and/or at a different point in time. 
Further, in some cases an organisation or interviewee worked on only one 
specific project in the study period, while some worked on several. 
 
                                                
168 Matthews and Ross, Research Methods, 278. 
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Human Rights and Advocacy 
Organisation 1 
Organisation 1 had for decades worked specifically in advocacy for human 
rights at the national and international level.169 Typical of Canada’s neoliberal 
approach to foreign policy, they advocated human rights from the perspective of 
an international agreement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet 
they did this while emphasising what they said was as a Canadian perspective, 
which meant projecting Canadian normative values and soft power abroad in 
the process.170 
The organisation received government funding to cover its budget, but was 
meant to operate at arm’s length from government. It was a relatively large 
organisation with typically more than 40 staff and a budget in the millions of 
dollars. I interviewed two project coordinators working at Organisation 1, Ash 
and Emory, who oversaw aid projects as project coordinators in the OPT.  
Emory’s work began prior to the study period, and laid the foundation for 
projects during it. He/she began working in the OPT in the early 1990s up until 
the mid-2000s. The primary projects he/she oversaw began based on a field 
visit to the OPT just prior to Oslo seeking out projects to fund, and partners to 
work with. They included: (1) a human rights centre in Gaza, (2) a Palestinian 
women’s legal aid clinic in east Jerusalem, (3) an Israeli human rights 
organisation made up primarily of medical professionals and a (4) project at an 
Israeli human rights organisation where women were tasked with mapping out 
the demolition of Palestinian homes. Emory also funded during his/her period of 
work: (5) a Jerusalem-based women’s organisation established between two 
organisations, one Israeli and one Palestinian, as a dialogue peace building 
initiative addressing women’s issues, and (briefly) a (6) Palestinian human 
rights organisation based in the West Bank. There were other smaller projects 
Emory mentioned funding, which were kept small specifically and often hidden 
inside broader programmes in order to avoid attracting attention from 
Organisation 1’s Board of Directors because it included hostile pro-Israel 
                                                
169 At one point it used government funding to sustain a project supporting a network of 
Canadian NGOs that lobbied the Canadian government on international human rights. 
170 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 3min01s to 6min59s The 1980s and 1990s were a time Emory felt 
Canadian NGOs were becoming important politically. 
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advocates. The projects Emory funded, and also contacts he/she established, 
provided a basis for some of the later projects run by Ash. One of them, the 
Palestinian human rights organisation in the West Bank would lead to serious 
problems at Organisation 1 when funded by Ash. 
Ash began around 2005 to take over OPT project coordination from Emory. 
He/she said that role entailed at first winding down funding for a hotline a 
Palestinian human rights group had set-up to monitor abuses carried out by 
Israeli settlers in the OPT. Ash’s work primarily entailed looking after a number 
of small grants, typically lying between $5,000 to $10,000, that were repeatedly 
renewed for OPT initiatives, such as: (1) a peace house run by a women’s 
group in a Palestinian village in the northern West Bank, and (2) a Christian 
society that carried out advocacy on behalf of Palestinians whose homes were 
being demolished. The biggest project he/she managed was a three-year 
$60,000 social justice project run by an OPT youth education organisation from 
2007 onwards.171  
The final projects he/she funded were three small grants meant to document 
human rights violations, carried out by either Palestinians or Israelis, following 
the Israeli ‘Operation Cast Lead’ bombardment of Gaza in late 2008/ early 
2009. 172  Those grants were made to: (1) a Palestinian human rights 
organisation based in Gaza, (2) a Palestinian human rights organisation based 
in the West Bank (funded previously in the 1990s by Emory), and (3) an Israeli 
human rights organisation. These would become very important projects to 
Organisation 1, not because of the projects themselves, but for the ‘civil war’ it 
would spark between the staff and Board. 
For the two Palestinian partners the plan was to equip researchers at each 
organisation to conduct research documenting human rights abuses reported in 
Gaza, which included hiring some additional staff. Wherever there had been 
alleged violations, those researchers were meant to go out and make sure 
those violations really took place and to document them in a ‘professional way’, 
triangulating allegations against available evidence.173  Meanwhile, the Israeli 
                                                
171 That sum was just small enough not to require approval from the Board of Directors, 
consistent with a strategy at the organisation to quietly fund Palestinian human rights projects in 
spite their having a Board that was hostile towards Palestinian rights work. 
172 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 01min00sec to 03min57sec 
173 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 18min10sec to 22min00sec 
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human rights organisation was meant to hire a European military expert to enter 
Gaza to corroborate the use by Israel of phosphorous bombs.174 Those bombs 
are an incendiary weapon the burns on contact with skin and is illegal under 
international law when used in densely packed civilian areas.175 However, the 
European expert was denied entry to Gaza by both Israel and Egypt.176 So 
instead that organisation used the funds for various activities in Israel, hiring as 
many as twenty people and training them to cross-reference human rights 
violations.177  
Ash was interviewed on 2014 March 21st (Ash 1) and 2014 March 22nd (Ash 2, 
Ash 3). Emory was interviewed 2012 March 22nd. 
 
Organisation 2 
Organisation 2 is a small Canadian registered charity run nearly exclusively by 
volunteers in Canada, which typically worked on a small annual budget in the 
$10,000s. Its primary aim was to educate Canadians about the Middle East, 
and Arab World through research and advocacy, as well as to undertake 
development projects in the region that varied from rights work to capacity 
building and poverty reduction. Organisation 2 claims to have been the first 
NGO to concern itself with education and human rights in and about the Middle 
East.  
Their research and advocacy funding to educate Canadians about the Middle 
East included: (1) cross-Canada speaking tours educating people about Israel, 
Palestine and the occupation, as well as (2) research projects about Israel and 
Palestine. They also funded projects such as: (3) an organisation that 
advocated against the demolition of Palestinian homes, starting with mapping 
out their destruction, and which Emory had in the 1990s funded a women’s 
project at; (4) a Palestinian health organisation in the OPT; (5) start-up funding 
for a youth education organisation, which Ash would later fund a social justice 
                                                
174 This Israeli partner working in the OPT needed to keep maintain a low profile in Gaza, which 
included keeping their existing channels secret to protect the identities of the Palestinian 
researchers it would hire. 
175 ‘Rain of Fire’ (Human Rights Watch, 25 March 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/81760. 
176 18min10sec to 22min00sec 
177 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 35min09sec to 36min24sec 
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project with; a (6) Gaza-based community mental health programme; and (7) an 
institute for public health located at a major West Bank university. The funds 
they provided were small, but used strategically with projects often acting as a 
seed fund to help a larger initiative get underway. They only rarely received 
government funding, though as a charity the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) 
regulated them.178 
I interviewed two project coordinators, volunteers who had worked with the 
organisation. One of the interviewees, Ryan, began work with Organisation 2 in 
the late 1980s, just prior to its official establishment. Ryan was well known in 
his/her community among family physicians due to work he/she had done with 
Latin American refugee victims of torture. He/she was invited by Organisation 
2’s founding Chairperson to work with the charity, and they worked closely 
together over the proceeding two decades. Ryan counted among his/her 
successes helping Palestinian partner organisations get established, 
particularly the Gaza-based mental health programme. The other interviewee, 
Casey, was more engaged with educational aspects of the organisation in 
Canada and played a key role seeing through a difficult transition period 
following the 2006 death of their Chairperson.  
Ryan was interviewed on 2014 December 2nd. Casey was interviewed 2014 
November 20th.  
 
Organisation 3 
Organisation 3 is a medium-sized charity with typically fewer than 40 staff and a 
budget that generally sat around several million dollars per year, but bearing in 
mind that it faced a major funding cut of a few millions dollars in government 
grants late in the research period that will play an important part in the story of 
Canadian aid uncovered in the empirical chapters of this thesis. Although the 
organisation itself was only founded at the start of the study period out of a 
coalition of organisations, its work predates the study period having been 
                                                
178 Not long after being founded they got a relatively large grant from CIDA in 1991/1992, but 
this was a rare case of government funding for them. 
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carried out by some of the organising members. Further, it operates under the 
charitable registration of one of the larger organising members. 
Organisation 3’s global focus in development is advocacy work promoting a 
progressive agenda covering issues such as the environment, women’s equality 
and notably to defend human rights. When carrying out advocacy work they 
considering lobbying and holding the Canadian government accountable to be 
in their agenda. While their focus is on rights work in the OPT, they did find 
themselves on occasion being drawn into capacity building and poverty 
reduction in their projects.  
Organisation 3 worked with a number of partners in Israel and the OPT. As a 
general rule they try to find partners who are working systemically in human 
rights and advocacy for social change. Partners they worked with ran projects 
covering issues such as: women’s rights, conflict resolution and human rights. 
Many of their projects were run with financial support from CIDA. They included: 
(1) human rights training) (2) media training, (3) women’s health for refugees in 
Gaza, (4) water resource development in the West Bank, (5) youth and civic 
engagement, and (6) community mobilisation addressing the West Bank wall. 
The human rights training project was carried out with a women’s organisation 
run by both Israeli and Palestinian women, which was a long-time partner 
Organisation 3 was particularly supportive of, and which Emory and 
Organisation 1 had funded in the 1990s. Their health work in Gaza included 
funding for a time a health clinic that was bombed and destroyed by Israel in 
2009 January during Operation Cast Lead. Their support for projects and 
partners in the OPT could come from several different internal organisational 
programmes. 
At Organisation 3 I interviewed two project coordinators who had overseen OPT 
projects, Remy and Taylor. Remy had begun work more recently on the OPT 
starting in 2009. Taylor on the other hand worked on the OPT off-and-on for the 
organisation, and a predecessor organisation, for about two decades. He/she 
had a particular concern for gender justice regarding women’s rights, peace and 
security. Both Taylor and the organisation are particularly concerned with 
gender justice and at one point used CIDA money to fund a coalition of 
women’s peace organisations working on economic justice, including 
	 79 
conducting research on where Israeli products are produced. That research 
provided data on what was produced in settlements, which has informed 
campaigns concerned with moral investment in Israel and Palestine, such as 
the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS). 




Organisation 4 is a medium sized charity with well under 40 staff and a budget 
that ranged from highs of a few million dollars to lows of several hundred 
thousand dollars per year, with the lows being linked like for Organisation 3 to a 
major government funding cut that plays an important part in this research 
study. The global focus for organisation 4 is advocacy work for human, 
environmental and democratic rights. Projects they have funded in the OPT 
included funding a: (1) teacher centre in the OPT that carried out quite a few 
citizenship projects at West Bank schools, support for (2) an alternative media 
centre largely by placing interns, and (3) from 2001 onwards running two 
Canadian government funded women and family empowerment centres. This 
third project dominated my research interview and was a major project that 
involved CIDA, a PA Ministry and another Canadian NGO linked to the post-
secondary sector. Notably prior to 2000 they had also helped fund the 
establishment up a well-known Palestinian civil society network. 
The initial aim of the project in Gaza was to fund two Centres in Gaza, ‘to 
empower low-income women and their families in the Gaza Strip, enabling them 
to improve their economic conditions and enhance their standard of living’.179 In 
spite of Organisation 4’s focus on rights advocacy, the project was very much 
oriented towards capacity building and poverty reduction. The interviewee from 
Organisation 4, Hayden described its aim as, 
To create more significant and empowering opportunities for vulnerable 
women and their families, through the provision of training and other 
                                                
179 FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 12) 
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development initiatives, and to strengthen the capacity of the PA Ministry 
… to manage such initiatives.180  
Organisation 4 would carry out the hiring process and help run the project. After 
a certain number of years the project was supposed to be transferred back to 
the Palestinian Ministry.181 Close to 85,000 people benefited from the different 
activities in this programme, and from this number over 90% were women.182  
I interviewed Hayden on 2014 August 27th. 
 
Capacity-Building and Poverty Reduction 
Organisation 5 
Organisation 5 is the case of an organisation I interviewed that worked on only 
one specific project in the OPT during the study period. It is also the rare case 
in this list of an organisation that was approached by the Canadian government, 
through Foreign Affairs and CIDA, to design and put in a bid on a specific-type 
of project that the then Martin Liberal government identified for the OPT.  
Organisation 5 is connected to a Canadian university. The single project 
coordinator interviewed, Kim, said that they had been approached in 2005 by 
Foreign Affairs to do a feasibility study about running a ‘rule of law’ project in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Organisation 5 proposed working on a project with a 
Palestinian partner, also connected to a Palestinian university, whose aim 
would be to develop a new model of judicial education for the OPT.183 That 
would include promoting the principals of an independence of the judiciary and 
the idea that human rights should be intrinsic to justice in the PA system. This 
would be carried out by training a core group of Palestinian judges and judicial 
trainers, who would then disseminate their training into a network of Palestinian 
judges.184 The project was accepted and granted several million-dollars through 
                                                
180 Hayden (2014 August 27) 33min03s to 33min24s 
181 Hayden (2014 August 27) 22min51s to 27min10s  
182 FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 7) 
183 In these situations Foreign Affairs could rely on the government Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) to provide the funding. 
184 DOC 1 CIDA 2012 Organisation 5 
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CIDA, running from 2005 to 2012 with a lot of pauses due for political reasons 
that are important to the story uncovered in this thesis.   
In spite of the budget size that was more significant than some of the total 
operational budgets of organisations on this list, Organisation 5 ran the project 
efficiently with a very small staff of just several people in Canada. Further, even 
though Organisation 5 was technically the lead organisation in the project, they 
insisted that their Palestinian partner be considered an equal co-partner. With 
that co-partner, Organisation 5 adopted a group approach where Palestinian 
judges worked with experts on specific subject matter to develop their own 
educational materials, training themselves and then training their colleagues. 
They also took advice from the Canadian judges in their training development. 
Those Canadian judges were volunteers, not paid experts, further keeping 
Canadian staffing costs down. 
I interviewed Kim on 2014 August 7th. 
 
Organisation 6 
Organisation 6 is, like Organisation 1, a development organisation that receives 
government funding, but meant to operate with independence at arm’s-length 
from government. It is a relatively large organisation with over 40 staff and a 
budget in the range of tens-of-millions of dollars. It is a development 
organisation that specifically carries out research in order to improve lives and 
livelihoods in poorer countries. As such, it has had a history of engagement with 
the Arab world and the OPT specifically. 
I interviewed two project coordinators at Organisation 6. One of those 
interviewees, Jamie, had nearly two decades of experience working on OPT 
projects at Organisation 6. The projects he/she listed managing included two 
that began in the 1990s, which (1) supported Canada’s role in the multilateral 
negotiations of the Oslo Peace Process, including the Track II process, and (2) 
helped fund Canada’s role as gavel in the Refugee Working Group (RWG). 
Their contribution to Track II included thinking about solutions for Palestinian 
refugees, with the idea that offering technical details to inform policy could 
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contribute to a solution for Palestinian refugees, and peace.185 Organisation 6 
further contributed to the process of thinking out policy solutions by funding a 
project that quantified all of the assets of settlements in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem, should a two state solution be reached through the Oslo Process 
and the settlements evacuated in a process of decolonisation.186  
Other Palestinian aid projects Organisation 6 supported included (3) research 
from 2004 onward into Islamist political parties in the Arab world, in order to 
anticipate what would happen to those parties once they joined the formal 
political process and where Hamas in the OPT was a case study. Another (4) 
project involving CIDA with some other donors was a university scholarship 
programme run from 2001 to 2013 for Palestinian women refugees in Lebanon, 
which placed in excess of 200 students in a wide variety of subject areas. All of 
the projects were funded jointly by Organisation 6 with CIDA, and all were 
defunded by 2014, the reason of which will be explained in the empirical 
chapters. Only remnants of the RWG work continued thanks to external funding. 
A final OPT aid project (5) of note for Organisation 6 was one carried out with a 
respected Palestinian research institute meant to look at electoral strategies 
used by Palestinian citizens in Israel, ranging from Islamist abstention to 
mainstream attempts to become a political force. The idea was to analyse the 
impact of the different strategies and then to provide suggestions on how to 
make the Israeli system more democratic, based on underlying knowledge that 
Palestinian citizens are marginalised by discrimination. Even though the project 
was not run with the OPT directly in mind it will figure prominently in the 
interviews of both coordinators Jamie and the second interviewee, Alexis.  
The second interviewee, Alexis, worked on this final project for nearly two years 
before it was eventually cancelled through government interference and 
complaints from Israel. Prior to that Alexis had spent nearly a decade at the 
organisation working on peace, conflict and development, often in the Middle 
East region. OPT-specific research projects he/she worked on included 
                                                
185 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 09min51s to 11min40s 
186 Jamie says that Foreign Affairs during the Harper Conservative government lost interest in 
Canada’s long-standing policy support work for a two-state solution, even eliminating Canada’s 
position as gavel in the RWG in 2009/2010. Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 00min00s to 04min20s 
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democratisation, governance, psychosocial support for adolescents, the impact 
of checkpoints, and Palestinian movement between Ramallah and Jerusalem.  




Organisation 7 was another organisation linked, like Organisation 5, to a 
Canadian university. The organisation typically had a budget of a couple million 
dollars every year, but like Organisation 5 had only several paid staff in 
Canada. The lion’s share of the budget went toward partner NGOs, sustaining a 
network that connected those partners together and funding a fellowship 
programme that was intrinsic to capacity building for the partners. 
As with Organisation 5, Organisation 7 worked on just one Palestinian aid 
project. That project began in the late 1990s and was specifically designed in a 
way meant to contribute to the Oslo model of development for peace, but 
incorporating into it a strong rights advocacy element aiming to reduce social 
inequality. This included specifically helping marginalised people to fight for 
their economic rights, social rights and for services from government. In this 
way the work of Organisation 7 was overtly political, including because it 
encouraged Israeli and Palestinian NGOs in its network to work together 
addressing rights issues.  
That network was made up of community NGOs engaged in social work from 
the OPT, Jordan and Israel. Organisation 7 set up the network as part of the 
development project. The work carried out by the NGOs ranged from legal 
rights to home rehabilitation, youth education, youth empowerment, domestic 
abuse, care and access for the disabled and elderly, referral services, public 
education and government policy research. This was all done with the ultimate 
aim of furthering both individual and community empowerment.187 By the end of 
                                                
187 DOC 1 2015 Organisation 7 
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the study period the NGOs in the network were reaching upwards of 120,000 
people per year in the communities they were working in.188 
In order to help partner NGOs carry such work out, Organisation 7 engaged in 
capacity building by training. The interviewees claimed that this training could 
be valued approximately at $100,000 per individual, which consisted of their 
enrolling for two-years in graduate school for training at the university 
Organisation 7 was connected to in Canada. The second year of the training 
consisted of a paid placement at the partner NGO each participant came from. 
Further, each participant had a contract stating that if he/she was offered a job 
by the sending NGO, he/she had to accept the contract for a period of between 
two to four years, depending on the location.189 By the summer of 2014 some 
50 individuals had graduated from the programme and returned to their home 
NGO, providing those NGOs with highly trained staff in addition to the free staff 
year in that second year of training. Historically Organisation 7 had relied on 
government CIDA funding for the project. However, that funding dried up toward 
the end of the research period under the Harper Conservative government.  
I interviewed two of the project coordinators working at Organisation 7. Each of 
the coordinators I interviewed, Quinn and Kai, had over a decade’s worth of 
experience working at the organisation. Kai meanwhile had several decades of 
experience in social work and community organising, having been a civil rights 
activist as early as the 1960s in the US and in Israel. 190 Kai said that his/her 
parents were Holocaust survivors and had taught him/her a message, ‘never 
again to anybody’ at a time he/she describes when most of kids in the holocaust 
community were taught, ‘never again to us‘.191 Kai’s interethnic community work 
in Canada, after the US and Israel, allowed him/her to test out concepts 
combining individual assistance with community organising (structural) that 
would become a core element to Organisation 7’s Palestinian aid work.192 
                                                
188 Organisation 7 2012-2013 
189 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 20min30s to 22min30s 
190 Kai noted poorest of the poor of the Jews, the Moroccan Jews, suddenly found after the 
1967 another level in society even shittier than their own, the newly conquered OPT 
Palestinians. Kai (2012 March 26) 5min17s to 10min38s 
191 Kai (2012 March 26) 00min00s to 5min17s 
192 Kai said, ‘Because in social work if you help individuals in every ends, you don’t get to the 
structural issues. If you only work, like political scientists do, on the collective issues, you often 
lack legitimacy with the very communities that you’re speaking for. So how do you do that?’ Kai 
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I interviewed Quinn on 2014 September 5th. I interviewed Kai on 2012 March 
26th. 
Organisation 8 
Organisation 8 is a charity with just several staff in Canada and a budget that 
ranged from the hundreds-of-thousands to lows of tens-of-thousands of dollars. 
It carried out both development and humanitarian projects overseas for 
Palestinians since the 1980s. This work was done with local partners primarily 
in the OPT and Lebanon.  
I interviewed just one project coordinator, Sawyer, at Organisation 8. Sawyer 
had around three decades of experience in Palestinian aid at Organisation 8. 
He/she said Organisation 8 had run quite a number of projects over three 
decades. That included a series of community development projects during the 
height of the Peace Process in the 1990s, such as: (1) training projects, (2) 
projects that sought to raise awareness among Palestinians about certain 
issues, (3) eradicating violence among the youth, (4) multi-media projects, (5) 
funding improvements at medical clinics and hospitals, (5) renovation projects, 
(6) helping establish organisations that dealt with the psychological 
consequences of occupation, (7) supporting groups from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria 
and Palestine to work together on the rights of children, and (8) education 
projects. During the 2000s their focus shifted to the needs of children, including: 
(9) renovating maternities, (10) teaching swimming safety in Gaza, and (11) 
helping a specific community NGO in Gaza to expand their activities. The 
activities of that Gazan NGO included children’s literacy and women’s 
embroidery, as well as building children’s playgrounds in the OPT. 
Funding projects from the early 1980s onwards, their approach was in the early 
years predicated on providing core funding for Palestinian partners, rather than 
funding a specific project. That evolved during the 1990s when they began to 
fund specific projects run by partners. By the 2000s they were taking both 
approaches, while also fundraising for the occasional emergency humanitarian 
aid projects.  
                                                                                                                                          
(2012 March 26) 10min38s to 10min59s Kai made several derogatory comments about political 
science and people from the Prairies provinces of Canada, which were clearly at myself. 
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I interviewed Sawyer on 2012 March 23rd.  
 
Organisation 9 
Organisation 9 is a large charity with more than 40 employees and an annual 
budget in the tens-of-millions of dollars. It is dedicated to poverty reduction 
primarily through development work, but sometimes including humanitarian 
work. Its aid projects in the OPT included capacity building by placing Canadian 
volunteers at Palestinian partner organisations. That project was the only focus 
of research for this case. This project was Canadian government backed, 
receiving a CIDA grant of nearly $1.5 million for a five-year phase from the mid-
2000s onward. 193  Meanwhile, the organisation itself received a Canadian 
government grant of several tens-of-millions of dollars between 2009 and 2014, 
where the OPT was specifically listed as one of the main regions Organisation 9 
worked in, using up between 5 to 10 per cent of that funding.194 
I interviewed one project coordinator at Organisation 9, Morgan. He/she was 
very experienced in the development aid sector, having nearly two decades of 
experience in it. He/she was just one of several people who filled the project 
coordinator function for this specific project at Organisation 9, working on it from 
2009 to 2012. Uniquely, he/she was the only project coordinator I interviewed 
who worked out of the OPT itself, unlike the rest who were based in Canada 
and only occasionally traveled to the OPT.195 
The primary aim of the capacity building and poverty reduction project was the 
reinforcement of the capacity of four PNGO partners. Two Canadian volunteers 
were supposed to be placed at each partner, where they essentially worked as 
an extra employee. Those partners included an organisation that would provide 
loans to women who wanted to become small entrepreneurs, a health PNGO 
based at a major university, a PNGO providing local capacity reinforcement 
(mostly in the Jordan valley) and a water NGO. A fifth PNGO partner was 
dropped at the start of Morgan’s placement, because its focus was in rights 
advocacy work. Cancelling the project because it advocated rights is an 
                                                
193 Doc 1 CIDA 2011 Organisation 9  
194 Doc 2 Canada Government 2014 Organisation 9 
195 Morgan surmised theirs was the biggest Canadian aid presence in that period. 
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important part of Organisation 9’s part in this research study. This also ended a 
rights advocacy element that sometimes snuck into this capacity building 
project. Of note, in addition to the volunteer placements, Organisation 9 would 
also finance small projects at partner PNGOs.  
I interviewed Morgan on 2014 December 15th (Morgan 1) and 2014 December 
18th (Morgan 2). 
 
Organisation 10 
Organisation 10 was a charity that had an annual budget typically in the millions 
of dollars, though sometimes exceeding ten million dollars. Like Organisations 5 
and 7, Organisation 10 had just several staff in Canada, expending most of their 
budget overseas on capacity building and poverty reduction projects. 
Organisation 10 focused almost exclusively on development aid as the 
interviewees said the organisation specifically avoided humanitarian projects.196 
Meanwhile the interviewees made a point to state repeatedly that their work 
was completely apolitical, which will play an important part of the story for their 
case within this research study. 
Organisation 10 had a strong base in the Muslim community in Canada, though 
it was officially not a religious organisation. I interviewed two project 
coordinators at Organisation 10, Blake and Dallas. Both coordinators had 
worked at the organisation through the 2000s. While Organisation 10 supported 
development projects around the world, many of them were carried out in the 
OPT. In the OPT, Organisation 10 was particularly interested in funding health 
and education projects, as well as some economic development projects. 
Unusually the economic projects were more like solidarity projects, not 
concerned with earning back money leant out, but rather with keeping people 
occupied to maintain their skills and support their families. This is because 
Organisation 10 considered the process of implementation and keeping people 
engaged with activities to be as important as project outcomes themselves.  
                                                
196 My review of those activities suggests that some of them might technically be considered 
humanitarian, such as help feeding poorer people or providing Ramadan packages. However, 
the line between developmental and humanitarian is never exact in aid work, and in particular 
for the story of Palestinian aid. Calendar 1 2012 Organisation 10 
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Some of Organisation 10’s projects in the OPT included: (1) sponsoring several 
thousand orphans to stay with families; (2) scholarships and bursaries given to 
over two hundred students by 2011; (3) helping universities run projects; (4) 
contributing toward the construction of an United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) administered girl’s school in the West Bank costing over $1 
million; (5) seasonal projects such as helping needy students during Ramadan; 
(6) support for senior citizens through a partner PNGO; (7) food support for the 
poor; (8) providing advanced medial equipment to clinics and hospitals; (9) 
small economic projects of $3,000 to $6,000 for families meant to keep them 
busy, employed and off the street, without requiring repayment; and (10) 
employing over a hundred women in sewing and embroidery to provide them 
with economic security and dignity. 
I interviewed both Blake and Dallas on 2012 March 30th.  
 
Before looking though at their experiences providing development aid in the 
OPT, the following two chapters will provide context for the environment they 









CHAPTER 4 – Context of Aid: Oslo and an Investment in Peace 
Introduction 
More than $USD 23 billion in aid has been disbursed in the OPT since Oslo was 
signed in 1993.197 Between 2000 and 2012 alone there were 13,714 Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) projects registered in the West Bank and Gaza, 
of which $USD 10,333,275,524 was spent and $USD 19,006,868,237 pledged, 
all placing the West Bank and Gaza in the top 20 of 154 ODA recipients for that 
period.198 The largest proportion of Oslo aid has been disbursed through three 
multilateral, international organisations: UNRWA, the World Food Programme 
(WFP) and the World Bank.199 
The US has acted as the arbiter determining the political parameters of the 
Peace Process and how aid is disbursed. It is also one of the largest single 
donors to Palestinians. The US has given more than $USD 4 billion in bilateral 
aid to the OPT since the mid-1990s: on average $USD 70 million per year from 
1994 to 1999, $USD 170 million per year from 2000 to 2007 and $USD 600 
million per year from 2008 to 2012.200 The US is also the single largest donor to 
the UNRWA at more than $USD 4 billion since its establishment in 1950.201 
The EU is the biggest Western donor to Palestinians, providing €426 million in 
2013 alone. 202  The EU has in particular been aiming build up the PA’s 
institutions for a future ‘democratic, independent and viable Palestinian State 
living side-by-side with Israel in peace and security’. 203  Differences exist 
between the EU and US approaches to Oslo aid, particularly because the EU is 
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not as close an ally to Israel as the US.204 The EU is much more likely than the 
US to reference international law when dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and the EU tends to be much less involved than the US on security 
issues. While the US has negotiated its aid programme for the Palestinians 
through Israel, the EU has not; and while the EU has supported the PA with 
direct budgetary assistance, the US has only done so only in exceptional 
circumstances due to Congressional restrictions. As a result of EU support for 
the PA from 2008 to 2012 the average number of civil servants and pensioners 
whose salaries were at least partly paid by the EU rose from 75,502 to 84,320, 
approximately half the PA’s 170,000 civil servants and pensioners in 2014.205 
Substantial aid has also flowed in from other Western donors including Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. But while these donors and the EU have 
contributed the largest sum of Palestinian aid funding, it is the US that has 
determined politically how it is spent within the Peace Process. That aid has 
helped underwrite the practical costs of Palestinian self-rule and provided the 
Palestinian leadership with the means to cultivate domestic support. Since the 
aim of those international donors was to engender economic growth to foster 
peace, there is now fairly broad agreement in the research literature that this 
has failed.206 
Contrary to peace, Israeli settlement building and confiscation of Palestinian 
land accelerated after Oslo was signed, and Israeli policies of closure limited 
the ability of Palestinians to enter Israel or move freely inside the OPT. Closure 
directly contravened the spirit of Oslo, and started almost right after the Peace 
Process began.207 It is a primary reason the OPT economy sharply declined 
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after 1993, as it caused an enormous reduction in the number of work 
remittances sent to the OPT as fewer Palestinians could work in Israel. The loss 
of income was exacerbated by Israel’s sabotage of Palestinian trade and 
industry. Further, Israeli settlement building broke up OPT territorial integrity, 
fragmented ever further into isolated communities that by 2012 were governed 
by rival Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank, and Israel in East 
Jerusalem.  
 
MAP 1: Decline in Palestinian Territory 1947, 1960, 2015208 
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The combination of closure and settlement building has terminally fractured the 
Palestinian economy, with its best parts picked at by a voraciously hungry 
Israeli economy. As a result Palestinians have come to depend heavily, if not 
completely, on foreign aid for survival. Funds coming into the OPT from aid 
sustain the PA, pay salaries and purchase basic goods – which come from 
Israel, thereby enriching the oppressor further. 209  While the post-Oslo 
Palestinian economy has declined, Israel has enjoyed robust growth.210 
As described in Chapter 2, there exists a deep rift between the way Western 
donors want to perceive Israeli-Palestinian relations, and the reality of settler-
colonialism. Due to the government of Israel’s pursuit of settler-colonialism, 
something donors prefer to turn a blind eye toward, Israel and the Palestinians 
have never moved beyond the interim stages of the Peace Process. That 
interim stage only brought about some cosmetic changes to an occupation that 
began in earnest when the OPT was conquered in 1967. Worse, Israel has 
been able better to maintain its policy thanks in large part to Western donors aid 
has subsidising the costs of occupation while the Peace Process serves as a 
metaphorical smokescreen obscuring Israel’s settler-colonial policies of ethnic 
cleansing and apartheid.  
Even when donors claim that their development aid is non-political, it is an 
established fact that all aid becomes a political participant to any conflict it is 
exposed to.211 This is notable in the case of Israel and the OPT for the way in 
which Israel has been able to capitalise on aid to subsidise the costs of settler-
colonialism. Meanwhile, most Western donors and their policy makers clearly 
favour of Israel, in spite of their stated neutrality. They blame the Palestinians 
disproportionately for violence, but largely ignore Israel’s role as the aggressor 
occupying Palestinian land that mostly ignored its Oslo obligations. It is that 
favouritism that ultimately undermines donor attempts at peace building. 
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Neoliberal Development Plan 
The Rationale behind Palestinian Aid 
Western donors have been trying to foster peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians by offering them economic incentives to cooperate together. 
Contrary to occasional rhetoric, that cooperation was not meant to be one of 
interdependence between equals, but at its best uneven mutual dependence, 
an asymmetrical relationship of interdependence. 212  Within such an 
asymmetrical system Israel would retain a preponderance of power vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians, but it was assumed at least each side would benefit from 
cooperation, and ultimately this was expected to lead to peace as they decided 
they had more to gain from trade than conflict.  
In order to get the Palestinians to buy into the Peace Process, Western donors 
planned to purchase their support with funding to spur Palestinian economic 
development and provide Palestinians with public goods, labelled a ‘peace 
dividend’.213 This was not a novel idea, and had precedent in US Middle East 
policy. Already in the 1970s the US had been using aid as a way to try 
separately to buy peace in the Middle East, while simultaneously providing 
Israel with assurances for its own security.214 This was a neoliberal ‘security 
exchange’ where the US was willing to provide different actors in the Middle 
East with ‘alternative goods’ that would replace concessions the other side was 
unwilling to offer, and was successful at establishing peace between Egypt and 
Israel from the late 1970s onwards.215 
While the US Carter administration explicitly left Palestinian rights out from 
peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the late 1970s, it did attempt a 
‘depoliticised’ solution to the Palestinian question in 1978 by adopting policy 
premised on the idea that 'happy' Palestinians who had a job, steady 
employment and a functioning administrative structure would be willing to 
negotiate for a settlement, even under Israeli occupation.216  
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In the 1980s the US Reagan Administration further attempted to find a peace 
solution palatable both to Israel and the Palestinians by promoting economic 
issues in lieu of a political settlement.217 First proposed as a ‘Quality of Life’ 
initiative in 1983-4, the US attempted to promote political reconciliation between 
Israel and the Palestinians through economic inducements that were, in theory, 
separated from politics.218 The Reagan Administration was attempting to make 
occupation palatable enough for Palestinians to accept it.219 That initiative was 
coached in a type of technocratic jargon that would come to dominate the 
discourse on Palestinian development a decade later. The Quality of Life 
initiative was tabled because at the time Israel was wary that any Palestinian 
economic development would embolden their bid for independence. The 
initiative failed to gain traction with Palestinians who feared any agreement 
made without a political resolution would reinforce Israel’s occupation. 
Palestinians were wary that it was a political ploy meant to substitute economics 
for peace. Despite dual rejection the logic behind the initiative of trying to 
separate politics from development survived in US policy circles,  
Economics may be politics in the West Bank and Gaza, but the American 
government can and should attempt to separate the two for policy 
purposes.220 
Further, through the Carter and Reagan administrations onwards a connection 
between aid, development and peace became entrenched determining the way 
aid would always be disbursed in the OPT. 
That Quality of Life initiative had basically been the Reagan Administration’s 
attempt to maintain the status quo in Israel and the OPT during the 1980s. This 
changed after the First Intifada erupted in late 1987, when ‘preserving peace’ 
rather than maintaining the status quo suddenly became the US’ overriding 
concern. Palestinians were at that time successfully challenging Israel at a 
mass level, particularly through street demonstrations and confrontations with 
the Israeli army, but also through economic boycotts of Israeli goods, jobs and 
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tax payments; all of which had a major impact on Israel’s economy.221 Israel 
responded to Palestinian protests with a policy of 'force, might, and beatings', 
curfews, closing Palestinian institutions, house demolitions, and the arrest of 
thousands.222 
In contrast to the US’ efforts to maintain the status quo in the OPT, after Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980s to target the PLO, wealthy Palestinians 
had increased funding for Palestinian resistance (sumud). Meanwhile, the First 
Intifada had had disastrous consequences for Israel’s economy and 
international reputation. That led elements of the Israeli government to conclude 
that ending the uprising should be a top priority. That finally opened Israel up to 
the US-led approach of buying peace, which Israel had previously rejected, to 
contain the Palestinian uprising. This led to Oslo, where the US and its Western 
allies reintroduced the logic of the ‘Quality of Life’ and ‘happy Palestinian’ 
initiatives. This formed the philosophical rationale behind the World Bank’s An 
Investment in Peace development aid plan written in 1993, meant to improve 
the Palestinian standard of living as a ‘peace dividend’ to encourage them to 
participate in the Oslo Process.223  That plan became the basis upon which 
pledging started for Palestinians at the very first donor conference in October 
1993.224 
 
The Aid Model 
That World Bank development plan acts as guide for major bilateral donors 
disbursing aid in the OPT to support the Peace Process.225 Economically it can 
be described as neoliberal and is similar to other programmes created by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for developing world states in the 
1990s.226 The core normative values informing the Bank’s plan emphasised: 
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open markets, economic integration with Israel, regional economic integration, 
financial liberalisation, ‘good governance’ and support for ‘democracy’. 227 
Donors had already flagged Institution building as a key priority as they wanted 
to turn the OPT into a liberal state that could transform itself into a moral 
republic, whose power would rest on the true consent of its citizens and be 
more likely to exist in a pacific union with Israel, since Israel was also a moral 
republics.228  The World Bank further prioritised Institution building based on a 
core assumption in neoliberal development that a strong central authority 
(government) and stable institutions are necessary preconditions to growth. In 
this role the Bank also set out the legal framework for Palestinian economic 
activity and Palestine's economic relations with Israel.229 Some aspects of it 
were even written into Palestinian law, such as a PA Basic Law Article 21 
stating that, ‘the economic system in Palestine shall be based on the principles 
of a free market economy’.230 
In addition to providing an intellectual framework to Palestinian aid, the Bank 
has often directly run aid programmes. Many of them have been quite 
significant, such as the Emergency Assistance Program (EAP) that ran between 
1994 to 1996 and provided a framework to channel early donor assistance to 
Palestinians. Sometimes the World Bank oversaw how the PA itself spent its 
funds. From 2008 it managed a Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 
(PRDP) Trust Fund, which was used by Western donors in the Institution 
Building period to carry out further neoliberal reforms at the PA. The PRDP 
relied on a World Bank bank account, through which most bilateral aid to the PA 
flowed. That meant the PA did not even have actual control over its own bank 
account to finance its operations. This also meant that aid could, and would, be 
blocked if the Bank felt the PRDP was not being carried out in the way the West 
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wanted. That left the PA with very little funding of its own and scant space to 
develop policy outside Western demands.231 
One 2006 estimate is that starting from 1997 the World Bank managed nearly 
5% of all donations directly.232 Another 2006 estimate made by the Bank was 
that it has been involved in 20% of all donor disbursements since 1994.233 
Further, those estimates do not even take into account the large sums of money 
going through the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) and the European 
Union’s Direct Financial Support to the Palestinian Government (PEGASE), 
programmes the Bank co-managed routing money to OPT in a way that 
temporarily avoided the PA following the Hamas faction’s 2006 electoral victory.  
The Bank also acts as the secretariat for an Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) 
formed in October 1993 by leading Western donors who funded the PA. It is 
chaired by Norway, cosponsored by the EU and US, and includes non-
institutional state members from the West such as Canada, some Arab 
countries like Saudi Arabia, and both Israel and the PA. Its membership 
includes other powerful neoliberal institutions like the UN and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Secretariat role is very influential. The Bank submits 
a report prior to each meeting to update its partners on recent economic and 
fiscal trends, while also providing economic and institutional analysis. The 
report helps to set the agenda and frame the discussion of the donor 
meeting.234 The committee plays a key role in determining Western donor policy 
toward the Palestinians, and how the OPT economy is funded under 
occupation.  
Inside and outside its role as AHCL Secretariat, from the very beginning of the 
Peace Process one of the Bank’s primary activities has been to provide 
analytical reports that help the donors frame their aid giving.  
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Praised for their timeliness, quality and thoroughness, those reports 
shaped the response, agenda and allocation of funds of the entire aid 
community in a way reminiscent of the impact the initial six-volume study 
[An Investment in Peace] and [the] EAP had had on building consensus 
and forging a common donor strategy in the first few years of the Oslo 
process.235 
Starting in 2002, the Bank began to produce a series of yearly reports on the 
Palestinian economic crises. These assessed the impact of Israeli policies on 
OPT Palestinians, of international aid and of the institutional response of the PA 
to the violent Second Intifada. When taken together with two important studies 
in 2004 about the economic and technical aspects of Israel’s disengagement 
from Gaza, the reports laid out policy recommendations for donors, the PA and 
Israel with the aim of fostering Palestinian economic recovery at the height of 
the crisis.236 Combined with the Bank’s strong links to UN agencies and other 
mainstream state agencies or NSAs working in the OPT, the result is that much 
of the data assessing the Oslo-aid process came from the same institutions 
responsible for implementation.237 
 
The Politics of Aid 
From the late 1970s to the 1980s, Arab donors had provided substantial 
financial support for Palestinians to survive the occupation and slow the Israeli 
settler-colonial process. After Oslo, Western donors led by the US came to 
dominate Palestinian aid. The EU and World Bank played important roles under 
American political oversight,  
If the Europeans were made to underwrite the American–Israeli 
dominated diplomatic process financially, the Bank underwrote it 
conceptually.238 
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In part that political dominance by the US is an expression of the latter’s 
preponderance of influence over the EU.239  Meanwhile the World Bank is so 
closely linked to the US that rival states consider it an extension of American 
foreign policy.240 It may simply have indirectly been representing US interests in 
the Oslo Process,  
The US remained after all the Bank’s biggest stakeholder, and it was the 
US which in 1993–1994 had pushed for the Bank’s prominent place in 
the aid coordination setting.241 
As will be described later in Chapter 5, Canada was likewise a major contributor 
to any Middle East peace process and a close ally of the US, often taking the 
lead from the latter in its foreign policy. 
In the wake of Oslo, Western donors undertook a technical shift substituting 
humanitarian assistance for development aid. Intellectually that meant the 
needs donors prioritised went from lifesaving assistance like food, clean water, 
emergency shelter and protection from harm, to longer-term assistance meant 
to help people rebuild their lives, secure jobs and livelihoods, and plan a better 
future for their families.242 It was designed for a post-conflict environment, yet 
eschewed political engagement even though peace was not yet established.243 
This reflected the 1980s logic of trying to separate politics from aid and peace 
building. As the World Bank stated a, 
Political settlement and peace is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for economic development in the OT [OPT].244 
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Western donors felt that development aid should target Palestinians living 
inside Gaza and the West Bank mostly through a PA they would help create. 
They largely excluded East Jerusalem from this calculus, because it had been 
annexed by Israel after the 1967 war and its status was politically contentious to 
their Israeli ally. Other ‘contentious issues’ like final status solutions for 
Palestinian refugees were largely isolated and excluded by donors. By contrast 
until the Oslo Process had begun, international consensus had favoured a 
complete Israeli withdrawal out of all the OPT, including East Jerusalem, and 
supported Palestinian aspirations to create their own state independent of 
Israeli rule. This change was part of an ‘alternative peace narrative’ that was set 
in place after Oslo was signed. 
Under this alternative peace narrative borders, Israeli settlements, the status of 
East Jerusalem and the (re-)settlement of Palestinian refugees were not 
determined, but instead left for negotiation within a Peace Process sponsored 
by Western donors who had little appetite for Palestinian political aspirations. 
The dimensions of Palestinian sovereignty had thus become radically realigned 
under Oslo and through the aid process. Meanwhile, the Oslo Accord was 
lauded as a glowing example for what peace making could achieve and Israel 
was able to re-establish its international legitimacy at a time when much 
damage had been done to its reputation. 245  Israel was also able to take 
advantage of the economic and aid arrangements that developed out of the 
Peace Process, markedly improving its own economic situation. 
 
The West is Best, and Israel is West 
Sine qua non to the bureaucratic approach adopted by the World Bank and 
other Western policy makers, their natural starting point for Palestinian 
development was to work outward from a central authority that ‘in theory’ 
represents the people being developed. Their perception of development 
objectives as a public good contributed to their conceptual belief that a 
hierarchical central authority, the PA, could structure policy implementation 
networks outward and downward to deliver those goods to their people.246 This 
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was premised on a belief that the political provision of public goods requires 
one centre of authority and responsibility, where the role of that authority is to 
utilise hierarchy and monopoly to guarantee effective coordination, control and 
efficient performance.247 That really necessitated the creation of the PA.  
In the process donors sought to create a completely new Palestinian state 
remade built on theories of liberal governance that could prepare them for 
independence from Israel, where they would grow economically rather than 
decline outside Israeli oversight, and be inclined to live in peace.248 To do this 
donors took existing ideas in Western public policy, built on the unique 
circumstances of those Western societies, then applying them to the OPT. They 
adopted this one-size-fits-all approach because their models represented, to 
themselves, the correct way to govern a modern state. The institutions they set-
up for Palestinians would be used to carry out radical changes laid out in the 
World Bank’s development plan, remaking the OPT in the Western vision.  
Neoliberal policy makers are inclined to believe that modernisation requires, 
particularly in extreme cases like the OPT, nothing short of the managed 
reorganisation of state and society to deliver development targets.249 In this way 
social life becomes instrumentalised through policy-driven ideas (buzz words) 
like social capital, civil society or good governance; ideas that theorise about 
relationships between society, democracy and poverty reduction, extending the 
‘scope of rational design and social engineering from the technical and 
economic realm to the social and cultural’.250 In this way donor intervention 
becomes a total intervention into another society. Yet though they seek to 
export Western forms of governance and social organisation through their social 
engineering, those policy makers remain quick to argue that their intervention is 
somehow non-political – which is untrue.  
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In reality the neoliberal development model being offered by Western policy 
makers is grounded with a long history of using the excuse of ‘civilising forces’ 
for a greater good to carry out some other end selfish end, often imperial in 
nature and rarely in the interest of the afflicted. Thus, Edmund Burke would in 
the Eighteenth Century excuse British Imperialism not upon aggressive aims, 
but as helping to civilise the savage, chiefly through prolonged exposure to 
‘commerce and Christianity’.251  It is a Western political logic articulating a right, 
or even duty, of self-anointed ‘advanced’ states to remake the world in their own 
image undertaken in the name of various related ideals.252 Those ideals include, 
‘to improve, to civilise, develop, modernise, constitutionalise, democratise, and 
bring good governance and freedom’. 253 When Western liberals are confronted 
with a different culture they invariably judge that society through ‘Eurocentric 
conceptions of what it means to be fully human and/or a legitimate society’.254 
The result is a preordained order within development where the world is divided 
into those who possess reason and are capable of self- government, and those 
who require tutelage to bring them up to the required standard.255  
Intrinsically such a world becomes divided into ‘adult’ and ‘children’ societies 
that matches condescending patrimonial language used by Nye throughout 
neoliberal IR theory. 256  The prescribed solution is ‘cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural transformation’ through expert tutelage by neoliberal specialists – 
who are the technocrats.257 In its most extreme iteration the ‘child-like’ people 
are the problem, incapable of creating or maintaining a stable and progressive 
political order, meaning that total transformation, or reorganisation, can be 
justified, including as humanitarian or developmental aid. This reasoning has 
been applied to the blueprint to turn Palestinian society into a liberal one.    
This is in reality little more than strong governments exercising dominance over 
and transposing their system of belief upon the weak, something empires have 
always claimed to do, spreading civilization for the benefit of those subjected to 
their rule, masking the more crude accoutrements of conquest, plunder and 
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territoriality in the process.258 In this way it was a moral conquest. Though not 
necessarily always wedded to imperialism and domination, liberalism with its 
‘civilising mission’ can, as in Nineteenth Century Britain and the French ‘mission 
civilisatrice’, form the imperialist logic of liberal political thought.259 It remained a 
central feature of imperial ideology deep into the twentieth century.260 In this 
way liberalism could exist be alongside state colonialism, at its worst settler 
colonialism, bound up with violent processes of dispossession including war, 
slavery, colonisation and extermination of indigenous peoples.261  
Colonisers meanwhile nearly never, if they have ever, acknowledge the historic 
wrongs they may have carried out against the oppressed, ‘sustained denial’ 
cloaked within the pleasant exterior of ideals like a civilising mission. 262 They 
steadfastly rationalise and justify their actions, even though colonisation ought 
according to Waziyatawin to be one of the most easily recognised forms of 
oppression in the world, until eventually they become ‘normalised, acceptable, 
and even righteous’.263 That is the effect of the framework for understanding the 
past when established by what are essentially the very same past (or even 
current) colonial occupying governments and their legal system, without 
acknowledging the historic wrongs done to Indigenous people and forgetting 
that the latter never ceded their sovereignty.264 Thus neoliberal policy makers 
could so completely misunderstand Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians, to 
the point of initially counting Israel as a fellow bilateral donor, assuming that 
Israel would undertake a benign and post-colonial civilising process of 
decolonisation with the OPT; even though Israel had long been actually de-
developing the Palestinian economy, while simultaneously displacing 
Palestinians from their land.265  
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Paris Protocol and Economic Integration 
Meanwhile, two seemingly contradictory goals have played an important 
function in the World Bank’s policy design for the Palestinian state and 
economy. Those were to increase Palestinian economic independence, in order 
for it to become less reliant on the Israeli economy, while simultaneously 
encouraging deeper economic integration between the two, reflecting the 
cooperative element of neoliberalism. A key assumption behind the argument 
for integration was the belief that Israel had a superior economy that had helped 
the OPT economy to develop. Western economists argued that Palestinian 
services and infrastructure improved under Israeli occupation, industry 
developed and the OPT thrived generally.266 This assumption was based on 
economic data, such as GDP indicators, that appeared to provide evidence for 
such growth.267 This data corroborated neoliberal belief that a liberal state will 
naturally develop the economy of an illiberal when in contact. Based on the 
benefits the Palestinians gained from exposure to Israel, and the belief in 
economic cooperation for peace, the World Bank argued for greater economic 
openness between Israel and the PA in order for their economies to benefit 
from one others’ strengths, 
Promoting regional infrastructural networks in electricity, transport, 
telecommunication, petroleum and gas pipelines and water would offer 
other opportunities for strengthening interdependence and economies 
benefitting from complementarities and economies of scale, which may 
not be available to the OT [OPT] in the absence of such cooperation.268 
Thus from the onset of Oslo, Western policy makers argued for a customs union 
between Israel and the OPT, recasting a deeply unequal trading arrangements 
into a full-fledged union with misplaced language of peace.269 
Donors, Israel and the emerging Palestinian leadership were receptive enough 
to the Bank’s idea that this union was in place by 1994.270 Called the Paris 
Protocol, it formalised a union of Israel and the OPT into a single economic 
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zone with a common currency. It also created an external border where Israel 
collects import taxes on goods destined for the OPT, before then transferring 
those taxes at its own discretion to the PA. Under the protocol, Israel should 
also transfer to the PA any Value Added Taxes (VAT) collected on goods and 
services sold in Israel that are meant for OPT consumption. This formalised 
relationship gave the occupation new legitimacy and left Israel retaining full 
power over OPT Palestinians and their economy. Israel for instance was given 
the right to unilaterally determine the tax rates imposed on imported goods and 
is allowed to take a significant administrative percentage from those funds. The 
protocol also gave Israel significant leverage over the PA as those taxes 
comprise a large percentage of the PA’s monthly revenue, which Israel has on 
many occasions withheld when it felt it needed to punish the PA.271 
Meanwhile, under the protocol Palestinian trade with other countries would 
continue to be handled through Israeli seaports and airports, or through border 
crossings controlled by Israel between the OPT with Jordan and Egypt.272 In 
that way Israel could continue to choose what gets in and goes out of the OPT 
economy. Then in 1995 the Oslo II interim agreement brought about the 
creation of joint Israeli-Palestinian units that were meant to emulate the post 
1945 Franco-German example of institutional and economic integration. 273 
Donor countries and the World Bank were encouraging the PA to engage with 
Israel, reinforcing a grossly unequal relationship.274 
While Western policy makers envisaged a Palestinian economy that would rely 
on export-led growth, Israel used control over the OPT’s borders to undermine 
Palestinian trade. The force of de-development Roy identified was just too 
strong. This was a natural outcome. In settler-colonialism the aggressor tries to 
extract as much economic value from a conquered people as possible, before 
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removing them from the land. Yet in spite of this the World Bank would 
repeatedly call for export-led growth for the OPT over the course of decades. 
From the onset of Oslo Western policy makers argued that a political solution to 
the occupation was not a necessary precondition for Palestinian economic 
growth to take place. Western policy makers were hoping that peace linkages 
would develop and grow between Israel with the Palestinians thanks to that 
approach. That depoliticisation became so prevalent that aid actors backing the 
process sanitised the language they used to describe conditions in the OPT, in 
part for fear of upsetting Israel, shying away from the use of descriptive and 
accurate terminology like apartheid or ethnic cleansing that were necessary to 
understand the actual conditions in the OPT.275 Preferring to appear neutral and 
apolitical, technocratic policy makers focused on what they considered positive 
dialogue, avoided deconstructive recriminations about past actions by Israel 
and side-stepped contentious issues, instead focusing on the benefits both 
sides could attain by moving forward with greater economic integration.276 
 
Reality and Results 
Closure and Settler Colonisation 
The initial experience of the Peace Process for many Palestinians was one of 
declining living standards. By the late 1990s the OPT was in a much worse 
condition than prior to Oslo.277 The economic situation is so poor, that the post-
Oslo years have been the worst since the beginning of occupation in 1967.278 
Within the first few years of the Oslo Process unemployment in the OPT rose 
sharply up from 11% up to 28%, reaching an astonishing 66% for a period in 
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March and April of 1996, and ‘easing’ down to 39.2% in Gaza and 24.3% in the 
West Bank by June.279 A year later in June 1997 those rates remained high at 
25% and 17% respectively, before shooting back up to 60% in August and 
September 1997.280 Those remarkably high levels of unemployment could be 
largely attributed to closure, which directly contravened the Paris Protocol and 
Oslo promise to allow Palestinian workers to enter the Israeli job market.281 
Closure was especially painful because Palestinian labour had become 
dependent on employment in Israel during the early years of economic 
integration in the 1970s and 1980s. When Palestinians were prevented from 
working in Israel, the resulting loss in income from Palestinian workers in Israel 
was enormous. The total collapse of the OPT’s economy was only averted due 
to donor aid substituting for normal economic activities. So instead of that 
money being used to develop the Palestinian economy, it was used to stave off 
economic disaster. Palestinians meanwhile continued to have a source of 
income to purchase goods, and those goods increasingly originated in Israel 
due to restrictions on Palestinian movement, trade and the de-development of 
Palestinian industry.282 This allowed Israel to continue to make a financial gain 
from the captive OPT economy while not having to invest in Palestinian labour. 
Job losses were partially absorbed by PA public sector hirings with 
development aid funding, while Israel made up for the loss of Palestinian labour 
by bringing in more non-Palestinian foreign workers.283 At the same time as 
these sharp drops in employment, private sector investment, once a strength of 
the OPT economy, declined. In fact, the post-Oslo period has seen a dramatic 
drop in private investment. The World Bank’s own estimates suggest that prior 
to Oslo the private sector constituted 85% of economy.284 Manufacturing and 
production eroded during the Peace Process. In 1993, private investment stood 
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at $USD 529 million and was equivalent to 21% of GDP, but by 1995 had 
dropped to $USD 320 million and the equivalent of 8% of GDP.285 Research 
conducted in 2010/11 found that the business climate was so bad that 
Palestinian businessmen themselves invested two to four times more in Israel 
than they do in the OPT.286 Meanwhile Palestinian savings were estimated at a 
small sum of $7 billion, of which $5 billion was invested outside the OPT.287 
This all led to a sharp decline in Palestinian economic vitality. Indicators like 
Gross National Product (GNP) suggested a decline of between 10 and 15% 
from 1993 to 1997.288 By the autumn of 1998 estimates for the actual decline in 
GNP were 30%, an astonishing collapse equivalent to the Great Depression in 
the 1930s, despite Palestinians being second only to Israel by the early 2000s 
as largest per capita aid recipient in the world.289 Meanwhile the number of 
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Figure 1: OPT GDP figures from 1993 to 2015 Q1291 
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As the private sector declined it was replaced with aid dollars to power the OPT 
economy. Macroeconomic data for the post-Oslo period indicates that growth in 
aid dependency far outstripped any economic expansion. Although between 
1996 and 2006 per capita aid increased by 14.74%, in that same period the 
Gross National Income (GNI) of Palestinians dropped by a remarkable 27%. 
Overall dependency on aid increased from 14.42% in 1996 to 35.34% in 
2006.293 In 2002, one of the worst years of Second Intifada, aid dependency 
stood at 45.1% of GNI.294 Whereas in 1991 the private sector made up as much 
as 80% of GDP, by 2009 foreign aid comprised the largest part of the economy 
at 49% of GDP.295 The neoliberal model was not working. Rather than grow, the 
OPT economy had shrunk dramatically creating aid dependency.  
 
Source: As compiled by the Authors based on OECD/DAC Aid Database in 
2014 (OECD-DAC 2014). 
 
Figure 3: Aid as percentage of the West Bank and Gaza’s GNI 1994-2012296 
 
Meanwhile, Palestinian economic decline contrasted distinctly with Israeli 
growth, and the economic difficulties Israel had faced during the First Intifada. 
One estimate is that during the 1990s Israel's per capita GDP increased by 
14.3% while Palestinian GDP fell by 3.8%. 297  Israel has also consistently 
maintained a large trade surplus with the Palestinians, selling goods in the OPT 
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that, once paid for with earnings by Palestinians workers, were after 1993 paid 
for increasingly by donor aid. Further, evidence suggests that Israel has been 
able to take advantage of violence with the Palestinians to market its defence 
industry products. Its sales of weapons and military systems hit a record $USD 
7.5 billion in 2012, up from already strong $USD 2 billion in 2002.298 Meanwhile, 
aid for Israel offset the costs of administering the Palestinians under occupation 
while contributing positive inputs into the Israeli economy, altogether reinforcing 
the process of settler colonialism. 
These are just a few of the startling indicators of Palestinian decline that 
accelerates from the start of the Oslo in 1993 up to the Institution Building 
period, and beyond. The reason for this decline was Israel’s rapid appropriation 
of OPT land and resources, accompanied by practices that that made 
Palestinian daily life difficult and unsafe. Such practices include denying 
Palestinians access to clean water, deliberate exposure to toxic waste, the 
demolition of homes, preventing family reunifications, and the destruction of 
livelihoods.299 The effects have been particularly hard on the most vulnerable 
Palestinians. By 2003, children’s malnutrition exceeded 80%, and food 
insecurity threatened more than 70% of OPT Palestinians, while chronic 
malnutrition ran between 6.7% and 17.5% that year.300 
This all happened under the cover of peace building. Settlement growth has 
since 1993 been rapid as Israeli citizens are heavily incentivised by government 
subsidies to move to settlements built on confiscated Palestinian land. Since 
the onset of Oslo population growth among Israeli settlers has consistently 
been much higher than population growth within pre-1967 Israeli lands. When 
Oslo was signed in 1993 there were approximately 110,000 Israeli settlers living 
in the West Bank and Gaza, and another 146,000 in East Jerusalem.301 By 
2002, the total living in the OPT stood at a much higher 380,000.302 By 2013 
there were an astonishing 350,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank alone, 
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with 300,000 living in East Jerusalem (Israel had withdrawn its settlements from 
Gaza in 2005).303 In 1972 there had been only a small number of settlers living 
in the OPT, with just 10,531 combined.304 
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Map 2: Settlement Growth in the West Bank305 
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That rapid growth in settlements singularly indicates Israel’s unwillingness to 
disengage and decolonise. Settler colonialism remained the force defining 
Israel’s relationship with the OPT. Concomitant to settlement growth, Israel 
enacted policies that took away Palestinian rights such as the freedom of 
movement. By 2002 movement from one part of the OPT to the other was 
extremely difficult, with Jerusalem near completely off-limits. As with labour 
movement, this contradicted Oslo, which specified that there should be free 
movement. Leaving questions of human rights aside, this had a disastrous 
impact on the Palestinian economy. Fragmentation of the OPT only became 
worse from 2003 onward during the Second Intifada. After Israel evacuated its 
settlements in 2005, Gaza entered a state of siege with people and materials 
barely or rarely able to move in and out.  
Rather than advancing peace, the post-Oslo years became a trap for the 
Palestinian leadership, with dire consequences. 306  When Israeli opposition 
leader Ariel Sharon helped spark the Second Intifada (2001-2006) with political 
provocations at the contested Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, that led to one 
of the most vicious periods of violence in the history of occupation, 
Whereas the first intifada (1987-1992) was defined by popular protest, 
general strikes and stones - and to be sure, harsh Israeli counter-
measures, including the infamous order by Yitzhak Rabin to break the 
bones of stone-throwing Palestinians - it was immediately clear that this 
new uprising was different. Demonstrations were being met with 
overwhelming force by Israel and it made popular protest impossible.307 
As usual Palestinians suffered disproportionately to Israelis in a conflict where 
both sides targeted civilians. Thousands of Palestinians lost their lives, tens of 
thousands were seriously injured and hundreds of thousands confined to their 
homes during suffocating curfews lasting days or months at a time. Israeli 
snipers and aerial drones made all the Palestinian cities completely unsafe after 
dark and much of the Palestinian infrastructure built from development aid was 
destroyed.  
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The Second Intifada was used by Israel to seize larger swathes of Palestinian 
land and build its settlements up in the OPT yet further. Creating a narrative of 
Palestinian violence and the need for security, Israel consolidated through 
concrete its control over the West Bank when in 2002 it began construction on a 
Separation Wall made up of a combination of ditches, trenches, roads, razor 
wire, electronic fences and concrete. That Wall was built deep in Palestinian 
land around the Israeli settlements. While the path of that Wall has been 
developed by a combination of different Israeli ideologies, approaches, 
concerns and tasks, it always remained true to the underlying logic of settler 
colonialism and the usurping of Palestinian territory.308 Palestinian homes and 
agricultural land were confiscated and destroyed to make way for its 
construction, and Palestinian water supplies such as the biggest West Bank 
aquifer seized. The Wall reinforced closure and the cantonisation of Palestinian 
land into disparate little parts.309 When completed Israel will have effectively 
seized nearly half of the land in the West Bank, leaving Palestinians with 12% 
of the land of the original British colony of Palestine but more than ten times the 
population when factoring in Palestinian refugees in the diaspora.310 
 
Further Decline and Institution-Building 
Altogether the Second Intifada decimated the OPT economy and the PA 
capacity to deliver public goods. By 2006, per capita GDP had fallen by almost 
40% from its already reduced 1999 level.311 At around the same time that the 
Second Intifada began to come to a close – at least in the West Bank, because 
it arguably never ended in Gaza – in 2006 January the PA held its first freely 
contested election for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), also known as 
the Palestinian Parliament. However, Israel and Western donors opposed the 
results. This is because the more cooperative Fatah faction they had worked 
with, since the start of the PA and Arafat Presidency in the mid-1990s, lost to 
the Islamist Hamas faction. The loss of their preferred candidate in the election 
led almost immediately to an embargo of the PA by Western donors, starting 
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with Canada. At the same time Israel imposed financial sanctions on the PA, 
withholding tax revenues collected via the Paris Protocol. Most aid funding that 
remained flowing in 2006 to the OPT was diverted around a Hamas run PA to 
NGOs, multilateral institutions like the WFP or otherwise to a PA Presidential 
office that remained under the control of the Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas, 
who was backed by the West.312 In June that year the EU put in place the World 
Bank run TIM to deliver aid to Palestinians in a way that avoided financial links 
to the PA.313 
By mid-2007, Fatah had regained control of the West Bank through a donor-
backed coup. Secret documents obtained by the US magazine Vanity Fair 
indicate that the Bush Administration helped Fatah instigate and fight the 
conflict, in an attempt to retake full control over the PA.314 By that time the 
Abbas-run Fatah government had developed a good working relationship with 
both Israel and the US, to a point where Palestinian security was sharing with 
Israel almost all the information it was collecting.315 In spite of their support, 
Fatah was pushed out of Gaza by June. From mid-2007 onward the OPT 
became even more fragmentised with Fatah in control of the PA in the West 
Bank, Hamas of Gaza, and all the OPT remaining under Israeli military 
occupation criss-crossed by settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  
The Fatah-led PA was rewarded by a generous increase in funding when nearly 
90 global donors pledged $7.7 billion in development aid to the PA at a 
conference in Paris 2007 December 17th.316 French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
spoke of the ‘urgent’ need to establish a Palestinian state by the end of 2008.317 
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In the same period US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice reinforced the 
West’s neoliberal vision for a PA that will live in peace with Israel, 
Our administration has put the idea of democratic development at the 
centre of our approach to this conflict, because we came to believe that 
the Israelis will not achieve the security they deserve in their Jewish state 
and the Palestinians will not achieve the better life they deserve in a 
state of their own until there is a Palestinian government capable of 
exercising its sovereign responsibilities, both to its citizens and to its 
neighbours. Ultimately, a Palestinian state must be created that can live 
side by side with Israel in peace and security.318 
Democratic development seems a paradox after instigating the PA coup. 
While donors rewarded Fatah’s putsch with generous aid packages, more of the 
Peace Dividend, those donors together with Israel hostilely cordoned off the 
Hamas-governed Gaza Strip from the outside world. Gaza was put under a 
punishing siege consisting of a combination of embargos on trade by Israel, and 
strict limitations on aid by donors. That siege is still in place eight years later in 
2015. Gaza would suffer in particular in that time from regular military 
confrontations with Israeli, the most destructive of which have been a series of 
three massive bombardments of the Strip between December 2008 and July 
2014. Those have levelled the tiny, densely populated territory. Meanwhile the 
aid and trade embargos were vigorously fortified by a newly installed Egyptian 
Sissi dictatorship in 2013. All combined the siege makes any rebuilding from 
bombardment a slow, difficult and nearly impossible process, even for essential 
services like waste management. All appearances indicate that Gaza is being 
punished for the government it elected, and which refuses to step down in 
favour of the West’s preference Fatah. 
Through their 2007 aid packages to the Fatah run PA, donors again prioritised 
state building, but with an increased emphasis on security.319 Abbas’ PA was 
given support by donors and Israel to govern, including the deployment of PA 
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police to Area A. In addition to security, donors tasked the Abbas government to 
push forward with reform.320 This manifested into a PRDP that committed the 
PA to pursue ‘good governance, law and order and the delivery of basic public 
services throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Strengthening the PA 
security services became a top priority. Secretary of State Rice wrote in 2008 
that the onus was on Palestinians to reign in violence, 
This state will be born not just through negotiations to resolve hard 
issues related to borders, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem but also 
through the difficult effort to build effective democratic institutions that 
can fight terrorism and extremism, enforce the rule of law, combat 
corruption, and create opportunities for the Palestinians to improve their 
lives. This confers responsibilities on both parties.321 
 
To carry out the neoliberal reforms required by Western donors, an economist 
who had long worked at both the World Bank and IMF was chosen to be PA 
Prime Minister. By now far removed from the democracy that had allowed 
Hamas to win government in 2006, Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as PM on 
the basis of a national emergency, bypassing the PLC. Fayyad would oversee 
the implementation of the PRDP, run through a bank account controlled by the 
World Bank.  
The PRDP required a number of cuts to PA public sector spending to reduce 
the PA deficit. These measures of austerity in a time of humanitarian crisis 
included reducing the number of workers in the Ministry of Health, implementing 
pre-paid electricity meters for thousands of Palestinians powering their homes 
with electricity bought from settlements and reducing pension commitments. 
However, the cuts did not have a significant impact on the deficit because of a 
substantial increase in security spending. In 2009, $USD 109 million was 
committed to expand the training and size of PA security forces. Those forces 
were supervised by an American General Dayton and had been under Fayyad’s 
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control already as early as 2005.322 So while PA government cuts made life 
even harder for Palestinians, increased security spending created a more 
repressive PA security apparatus that was used to suppress dissent. Thus in 
spite of extra donor aid and cost-cutting efforts by the Fayyad government, the 
PA would increase its debt load to $4.3 billion by early 2014. As a result, even 
with donor assistance and direct budgetary assistance from the EU, the PA has 
often been unable in recent years to pay the salaries of the 170,000 public 
employees that it hires. That hiring keeps the OPT economy solvent and the 
very high unemployment levels artificially lower than they otherwise would be.323 
As had happened throughout the post Oslo years, the result for the Palestinian 
people was further decline and insecurity. Using an income-based definition of 
poverty, 50% of Palestinians in the OPT (excluding East Jerusalem) were living 
in poverty in 2009 and 2010, of which 38% were in the West Bank and 70% in 
Gaza. Meanwhile, the WFP published findings in 2011 that 50% of Palestinian 
households suffer from food insecurity.324 Unemployment was stuck at around 
30% in 2009, while an official but conservative estimate by the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) counted 38.5% unemployed in Gaza in the 
4th quarter of 2013, and 18.2% in the West Bank.325 The unemployment rate for 
Palestinian youth was particularly alarming, standing at a high 43.9% in the 
West Bank and Gaza in the 4th quarter of 2013 for ages 20-24.326 For those who 
did have jobs, a 2014 report published on labour rights listed the OPT as one of 
the eight worst countries to work in alongside countries like Somalia and the 
                                                
322 Rafeef Ziadah, ‘What Kind of Palestinian State in 2011? Neoliberalism and World Bank 
Diktats’, Global Research, 13 April 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/what-kind-of-palestinian-
state-in-2011-neoliberalism-and-world-bank-diktats/18638?print=1. 
323 Khalil Nakhleh, ‘Oslo: Replacing Liberation with Economic Neo-Colonialism’, Al-Shabaka, 11 
April 2014, http://al-shabaka.org/node/758. 
324 WFP, ‘Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey West Bank and Gaza Strip, Occupied 
Palestinian Territory’ (World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), February 2011), 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp232398.pdf. 
325 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - State of Palestine, ‘Press Release on the Results of 






Central African Republic, just below countries infamous for poor working 
conditions like Bangladesh, China and the United Arab Emirates.327 
From 2008 onward there began to be a growing dependency on debt to make 
up for income shortfalls. Loose private lending encouraged a culture of 
consumption and pushed many people into a debt trap, with individual loans 
doubling in just four years from $USD 494 million in 2009 to about $USD 1 
billion in 2013. That personal debt has been used primarily to finance 
consumption, such as home mortgages, cars, marriage costs, and electric 
goods, and rarely invested in productive activities in an OPT economy. A 2014 
estimate was that 75% of public sector employees were in debt.328  
 
Unchanged Occupation with Western Backing 
The effect of Oslo seems to have done little more than to transform Israeli rule 
into a donor backed, legally enforced occupation characterised by apartheid 
and settler colonisation. Israel did not have to amend Zionist settler-colonial 
policy objectives that have remained pretty consistent, though tactically flexible, 
pre-1948, post-1948, and post-1967, regardless of which political faction is in 
power.329 Much of the ‘changes’ that took place after Oslo were more cosmetic 
than substantive, such as the Paris Protocol or the ‘shared’ West Bank water 
resource management. In spite of temporary withdrawals in-and-out of major 
centres of Palestinian population in the West Bank, Areas A and B, or the 
evacuation of settlements from Gaza, Israel always maintained harsh military 
control over the OPT.330 With the benefit of hindsight, Oslo may be viewed as 
less a period of breakthrough than a pause between Palestinian uprisings.331 
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Map 3: Areas A, B and C in the West Bank332 
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The striking question is if the Oslo Peace Process has failed so badly, why are 
the same models for peace building still being used more after more than two 
decades? In particular why is the development aid money meant to support that 
process through Palestinian economic growth still being funded in a similar 
manner, when there is strong evidence that Israel has actually warped that aid 
to offset the costs of occupation to make settler colonialism easier? The answer 
likely lies in the preference Western states, particularly under US leadership, 
confer on Israel as a liberal and Western state in the Middle East. This allows 
them to easily adopt narratives that view Israeli actions in a favourable way, but 
Palestinians not. 
For example, Western policy makers have often worked under the assumption 
that Israel was naturally inclined to peace with the Palestinians, but the 
Palestinians less so because they are less developed. Thus when the Peace 
Process has gone awry they have often accepted Israeli claims of Palestinian 
culpability that is contextually ignorant of the gross power imbalance between 
Israel and the colonised Palestinians. An example of this mind-set is a 2006 
claim by Grace and Lasensky that it was somehow the Palestinians who 
provoked closure at the start of the Peace Process, blaming it on their violence. 
A rash of Hamas bombings in the mid-1990s resulted in the first 
systematic Israeli “closure” policies – restrictions on Palestinian 
movement in the territories.333 
That though ignores the context of the gross imbalance in violence meted out 
by Israel even in the mid-1990s, and how Israel was so quick to adopt an act 
that completely undermined Oslo. In fact, their justification of Israeli policy 
appears more akin to an act blaming the victim. Israel has punished 
Palestinians relentlessly since 1993 with curfews, restrictions on movement, 
military operations, extra-judicial assassinations, killing civilians and 
confiscating land for settlements. This violence is disproportionately meted out 
against the Palestinians, while terrorism is even not the sole preserve of 
Palestinians. 334  Yet in those rare cases where Israeli violence cannot be 
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ignored, particularly terrorist acts, Western policy makers tend to blame this on 
a minority of irrational extremists who are said not to represent the wider Israeli 
mood – that of a rational and liberal state. Yet it is the Palestinians who are 
suffer a cynical state sponsored and systemic violence that permeates their 
daily reality as no extremist could imagine doing. 335  
State-sponsored violence cannot be sequestered as a temporary fit of 
irrationality or the actions of a radical, crazy minority. In fact, from the mid-
1990s onward the Israeli public has typically voted in increasingly extreme right-
wing governments, and authoritative opinion polls indicate ‘at best’ a preference 
by the Jewish-Israeli public for apartheid, 
55 per cent of Israeli Jews wanted segregated entertainment facilities, 
while more than 75 per cent said they would not live in the same building 
as an Israeli Arab.336 
Meanwhile, quantifiable evidence points out that Israel typical instigates 
violence with the Palestinians, not otherwise. 
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Figure 4: Pauses in Violence Interrupted by Israelis or Palestinians337 
 
In addition to closure, Israel has revealed no intention to removed settlements 
from the OPT for the two state solution. Each year since 1993, tens-of-billions of 
dollars have been sent secretly by the government of Israel to settlements via 
hidden expenditures by the military, interior ministry and other government 
departments.338 That money has been used to seize ever more Palestinian land. 
These expenditures are so well hidden that even Israeli Ministers have been 
unable to discern all the facts, which makes ascertaining the true costs of 
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occupation from direct Israeli government expenditure very difficult, if not 
impossible.339 A former PA Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia, who was a member 
of the Palestinian negotiation team for Oslo in the early 1990s feels Israel was 
even insincere at the time of negotiations. He says with the benefit of hindsight 
that Israel was only buying time while settling the OPT, and only wanted to 
change the appearance of the occupation with altering its structure. 340 
Negotiations may have had an ulterior motive, 
Ever since the Oslo Accords, the basic Israeli strategy has been to 
negotiate endlessly while continuing to expand settlements, with the 
number of settlers more than doubling since 1993.341 
When the Oslo Accord was reached and Israel almost immediately reneged on 
its primary obligations, such as Palestinian labourers’ freedom of movement for 
‘security’ reasons, this was part of a broader and long-standing Israeli policy of 
undermining Palestinian sovereignty on murky grounds for ‘security’.342  Even 
the Israeli President Rivlin said in 2015 that the entire Oslo process was 
unrealistic, based on a fake two-state solution of incredible asymmetry.  
With our unrelenting, condescending approach to the Palestinians, we 
think they could accept a two-state solution in which one state is an 
omnipotent power and the other is not even autonomous.343 
 
Meanwhile, led by the US, Western states have been highly supportive of Israel 
irrespective of its commitment – or lack of commitment – to the Peace Process. 
Between 1949 and 2000 the US has provided $USD134 billion in aid to 
Israel.344  If interest is added to the calculation, the total aid Israel received from 
the US from 1973 to 2008 exceeds $USD 200 billion (about three times the 
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annual budget of Israeli in 2008).345 Between 2000 and 2009, the US gave 
Israel $USD 24.1 billion of military aid. With this taxpayer money, the US 
licensed, paid for and delivered more than 670 million weapons and related 
equipment to Israel, including almost 500 categories of weapons.346 In 2007, the 
two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for $US 30 
billion of US military aid from 2009 to 2018.347 Meanwhile, US public opinion 
indicates backing for the pro-Israel policy. Even US charity funds are used to 
generously support the Israeli settlements the undermine peace.348 
 
 
Figure 5: US Public Sympathies towards Israelis or Palestinians349 
 
If Western donors keep funding a process that is either having no impact on the 
peace building or even helping sustain Israel’s settler colonialism, a close ally to 
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which they provide billions of dollars in financial and non-financial support every 
year, then this leaves open the possibility that some, if not all, are comfortable 
with the status quo. That status quo is completely contradictory to the neoliberal 
language of trade, law and peaceful cooperation that settler colonialism is the 
anathema of. It is for this reason that is seems prudent to view with suspicion 
the motives of Western donors funding Palestinian development aid, and to try 
to seek out the unspoken or unwritten intentions that may lie behind their 
policy.350 As with development aid generally those unspoken meanings are vital 
to understand how policy has been constructed, because policy is never a non-
political or neutral. Development aid has meanwhile become part of the matrix 
of control over the Palestinians, helping to cancel elections and install unelected 
governments.351 The truth is that the conventional Western donor is likely more 
concerned about maintaining its relationship Israel, than Palestinian rights. One 
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CHAPTER 5 - Canadian Foreign Policy and Aid to the OPT 
Introduction 
The previous chapter was used to lay out just how badly the Oslo Peace 
Process and neoliberal aid model has been for Palestinians, the Israeli setter 
colonial policy that caused their problems, and Western donor support – 
advertent or inadvertent – for that Israeli policy stemming from Western states 
favouring the Israeli narrative over the Palestinian. Besides the US, one of the 
countries where Israel enjoys strong support is Canada. In the Canadian 
discourse on peace building, the Palestinians are often portrayed as a natural 
security threat to Israel, and the Israelis even as victims of violence. Therefore, 
Palestinians need to be developed and civilised in order to coexist with an 
otherwise peace-willing Israel.  
Taking such a position requires Canadians to turn a blind eye toward Israel’s 
systemic discriminatory violence against Palestinians. Support for Israel by 
liberals has required a complicated balancing act distorting facts against reality. 
More illiberal conservatives have been much clearer delineating Israel and 
Palestine, and Israel’s broader relations to the Middle East as a mythical clash 
of civilisation, where Israel is ‘a light of freedom and democracy in what is 
otherwise a region of darkness’.352 All combined these tendencies manifested in 
the 2000s into a clampdown by government on civil society organisations 
providing aid to Palestinians. Even though Canada has typically adopted a 
neoliberal foreign policy that reflects its own internal social organisation as a 
liberal state, it has had to balance those positions with its support for 
contemporary Israel’s violent settler colonialism.  
 
Canadian Foreign and Middle East Policy 
According to Janice Stein, one of Canada’s most influential IR scholars, there 
are three interpretations by which Canada’s engagement with the region can be 
measured. The first is Canada as the quintessential peacemaker among its 
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allies, and in the Middle East. The second argument is that Canada has been 
neither neutral nor even-handed, but rather parochial and partisan in its 
approach to the region – parochial in its ignorance of Middle Eastern history 
and culture, and partisan in its sympathy to Israel. The third argument focuses 
on Canada’s preoccupation with the US, trying to distinguish its policy from its 
powerful neighbour and showing some independence by joining with its western 
European allies in areas such as Middle East policy. 353  Likewise, but as a 
counterargument to that third argument by Stein, Canada’s engagement with 
the Middle East may be viewed as policy resulting from Canada’s post World 
War II pre-occupation with supporting and taking cues from Washington, an 
alliance that helps define Canada’s foreign policy.354 A fourth argument Stein 
makes is of a Canada is preoccupied with forging bilateral relationships that 
have fed into an enlarged network through which Canada, as a liberal trading 
state, seeks to expand trade and protect its national interest.355 
Given Canada’s strong inclination towards multilateralism, or neoliberalism, 
Stein said in 2006 that, 
The most widely accepted interpretation, a central tradition within 
Canadian scholarship, emphasises the commitment to peacekeeping, 
mediation, and problem-solving which is characteristically and uniquely 
Canadian.356 
With this optimism comes the belief that Canada can, does and should 
contribute toward peace building in the Middle East. Thus former Canadian 
diplomat Paul Heinbecker could argue alongside Bessma Momani in 2008 that, 
There is a near consensus among our practitioners and academics alike 
that Canada has mattered in the Middle East in the not-so-distant past, 
that there remain deep wells of respect for Canada among the peoples of 
                                                
353 Janice Gross Stein, ‘Canadian Policy in the Middle East’, in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
Defining the National Interest, ed. Steven Kendall Holloway (University of Toronto Press, 2006), 
374–375. 
354 Nearly every military operation the United States has been involved in since World War II 
has been a joint operation with Canada, and when Canada has opted to stay out of direct 
conflict it has provided intelligence equipment and personnel. Bureau of Public Affairs 
Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, ‘Canada’, Press Release|Fact Sheet, 
U.S. Department of State, (23 August 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm. 
355 Stein, ‘Canadian Policy in the Middle East’, 374–375. 
356 Ibid., 374. 
	 130 
the Middle East that can be leveraged by our diplomacy, and, in short, 
that we can make a positive difference.357 
Heinbecker and Momani further claimed that, in the Canadian debate 
surrounding Canada’s engagement with the Middle East, many experts agree it 
should take a ‘principled’ approach to policy. This matches its own public’s 
desire for a principled, moral or even-handed approach.358 Consensus on just 
what ‘principled’ means broke down quickly though, with many analysts arguing 
for outright support for Israel as a fellow liberal democracy faced by chronic 
danger in a disturbed Middle East, and others advocating a case-by-case 
approach derived from international law that places less of an emphasis on 
support for Israel.359 Stein argued meanwhile that from early on Canadian policy 
was more concerned with conciliation and fair deals for all, evidence for her that 
precludes any accusations of Canadian bias in its Middle East policy.360  Rarely 
if ever is a strong case made though for supporting Palestinian rights. 
Finally, often excluded from the mainstream Canadian research interpretation of 
Canadian foreign policy in is the United States’ role as an imperial power in the 
international system, where Canada is an ally of that Empire, just as it had been 
to Britain as a colony to the British Empire. When that analysis is offered though 
Canada is often assumed to be a subordinate ally of United States imperialism, 
but where Canada’s own interests are typically being advanced alongside the 
United States.361 However, Gordon argues that while smaller and less influential 
than the United States, Canada is imperialist in its own right and actively 
supports the international order maintained by the United States. This is not 
because it is coerced to do so, but because Canada embraces the benefits of 
that system. 362  That Canada, ‘both in its historical and contemporary 
manifestations, [has] an agenda of accumulation by dispossession, in which 
Indigenous nations are a central target’ inside and outside Canadian state 
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territory.363 In this way Canada is not so dissimilar from Israel, a fellow second 
tier power and European settler colony close to the United States in its matrix of 
pwer, with Israel’s accumulation by dispossession of indigenous Palestinians. 
 
Neoliberalism and a Responsibility to Protect 
In the 1990s faced with sharp economic constraints and major budget cuts that 
significantly reduced its capabilities in the realm of foreign policy, Canada and 
its newly elected (1993) Liberal government embarked on what Allan Gotlieb 
describes as a mission, ‘to create new norms of international behaviour which, 
in turn, reflect our values’.364 This was most clearly expressed in a 1995 review 
of Canada’s foreign policy that calls for an international system ruled by law, not 
power – a very neoliberal viewpoint.365 This review coincided with the end of the 
Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a determinable 
strategic threat. That historical turning point represented for many Western 
analysts, and political leaders, the final ideological triumph of liberal capitalism 
over competing ideologies, which Francis Fukuyama famously referred to as 
‘The End of History’.366 At this juncture Canada’s financial deficit coincided with 
a feeling of strategic safety allowing the Canadian government to increasingly 
adopt the ‘rhetoric of human security’ while quietly reducing Canada’s overall 
defence and foreign aid spending.367 
This post-Cold War, post-Soviet world also seemed to offer Canadian policy 
makers a less restrictive environment within which they could chart a more 
distinct Canadian foreign policy. 368  As NATO membership and Canada’s 
bilateral US relationship faded in importance, the liberal-internationalist norm 
seemed to accrue strength. The 1995 government statement on foreign policy 
‘Canada in the World’ laid out three broad objectives: the promotion of 
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prosperity and employment, the protection of Canadian security within a stable 
global order, and the projection of Canadian values and culture.369 Not long 
after the paper was formulated an ambitious foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy 
(1996-2000) chose to champion the idea of ‘human security’ within those three 
objectives, projecting of Canadian values abroad. Within this notion of human 
security the security of the individual was put on the same level as that of the 
state.370 As such human security became the centrepiece of Canadian foreign 
policy and a people-focused approach became the hallmark of Foreign Affairs 
under Axworthy. In the process Canada reinforced its image as a multilateralist 
middle power pursuing international peace through the promotion of norms.371 
The Canadian government and its foreign Minister Axworthy commissioned the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an 
independent body that came up with the concept of responsibility to protect 
(R2P) in a 2001 December report. 372  R2P proposed a revolution for 
conventional norms of state sovereignty in world affairs by arguing that the 
concept of state sovereignty was conditional upon a state fulfilling its 
responsibility to protect its citizens. Thus any guarantee on a state’s borders 
and it sovereignty was nullified when a government proved incapable or 
unwilling to fulfil their responsibility. In that case of not fulfilling their 
responsibility, the principal of R2P held that the international community could 
‘temporarily’ assume a state’s sovereignty/responsibility in order to save lives. It 
also held that norms of international law could replace a world of international 
affairs that is based solely on hard power.373  
Canada advocated in that period of Liberal government that R2P become a 
norm for the international community. Such neoliberal Canadian foreign policy 
framed around intervention and idealism (values) sought to prevent both the 
collapse of state power or its arbitrary use. When humanitarian intervention 
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became necessary it was wrapped within social re-engineering aimed at 
rebuilding ‘functional and responsible’ states. 374  Thus, the international 
community would become increasingly drawn into nation-building projects that 
aim to establish or transform state institutions to provide peace, order, and good 
governance.375 
By 2004 Michael Ignatieff would argue that ‘peace, order and good governance’ 
should in fact form the basis of Canadian foreign policy in diplomacy, defence 
and development work. This would constitute a form of ‘muscular’ 
multilateralism that combined hard with soft power. He also believed ultimately 
that Canada’s national interest would benefit most by working through 
multilateral institutions that can provide it with a voice bigger than its own.376 In a 
sense this was an iteration of the 1995 government statement that Canada 
should project its culture and values abroad.  
In 2003 the Canadian government had developed a new foreign policy 
statement ‘A Dialogue on Foreign Policy Report to Canadians’ written up out of 
a mixture of public consultations in 2002 and 2003, including town hall meetings 
and Internet submissions. 377  However, little changed in the fundamental 
message first laid out in 1995, where Canada would project its values onto the 
world abroad, 
Canada’s foreign policy agenda must reflect the nation we are: a 
multicultural, bilingual society that is free, open, prosperous, and 
democratic. The experiences of immigrants from around the world and 
the cultures of Aboriginal peoples are woven into the fabric of our 
national identity. Respect for equality and diversity runs through the 
religious, racial, cultural and linguistic strands forming our communities.... 
In using our position to champion Canadian values abroad, we are 
advancing humanitarian concerns that Canadians have long cherished, 
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and are promoting social models endorsed by many of our allies. At the 
same time, we are helping to foster global conditions conducive to our 
own security and prosperity. As we try to realise our social and political 
values more fully at home, we can benefit ourselves by also promoting 
these values abroad.378 
 
Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin (2003-6), 
explicitly embraced the ICISS report that sovereign states had a ‘responsibility 
to protect’ their citizens.379 His 2005 ‘International Policy Statement: A Role of 
Pride and Influence in the World’ advocated a doctrine of activism in diplomacy, 
defence, development and commerce aimed at reinserting Canada into 
international affairs, by targeting an ‘arc of instability’ covering a region of ‘failing 
and failed states’ stretching more or less along the equatorial regions from 
Central America across the globe to Southeast Asia.380 Through this approach 
the government of Canada would seek to make a difference in three main 
areas: countering global terrorism, stabilising failed and fragile states, and 
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 381  While 
supposedly to breaking ‘parochial’ notions of national security, development 
would be used as a tool able to prevent impoverished states from becoming a 
source of instability.382 Development was drawn more closely to security. 
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Martin, R2P and Support for Israel 
Kim R Nossal notes by 2004 after almost a decade of being told by their 
government that one of the primary aims of Canadian foreign policy was to 
project ‘Canadian values’ abroad, it would seem that Canadians,  
Had grown so accustomed to the idea that they no longer questioned it—
much less considered that such a vision of foreign policy might be deeply 
flawed, or might fly in the face of decades of a particular ‘Canadian way’ 
of seeing the world and Canada’s place in it.383 
Alan Gotlieb refers to this as a ‘feel-good’ foreign policy of ‘norm-entrepreneur’ 
that was simultaneously characterised by government’s reluctance to even 
commit enough resources to see it through. 384  While not committing those 
resources Canada continued to moralise and advocate superior Canadian 
values abroad.385 Nossal too noted a sizeable gap between Canada’s talk about 
value-based projection and its actions, noting how Canada would abandon the 
use of multilateral negotiations in favour of unilateralism when it perceived its 
own interests were at risk,  
If Canadians are so committed to the rule of law internationally, why is 
the government in Ottawa so quick to embrace unilateral solutions when 
Canadian self-interests demand it, as occurred in the case of the arrest 
of the Spanish fishing vessel Estai in 1995 – a move that was in 
complete defiance of international law, but which garnered the 
government huge popular support at home?386 
Internally he wondered, 
Why do First Nations in Canada continue to be governed by paternalistic 
legislation and often anti-democratic practices?387 
                                                
383 Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 1. 
384 Gotlieb noted that Canada’s rhetoric in foreign policy was not being backed up by the 
resources it was allocating toward it: defense spending dropped from 7.3 per cent of GDP in the 
1950s to 1.1 per cent by the mid-2000s, and foreign aid expenditures from 0.53 per cent of GDP 
in official aid in the 1970s to 0.22 per cent. Gotlieb, ‘Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s 
Foreign Policy’, 23. 
385 Ibid., 18. 
386 Ibid., 24; Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 11. 
387 Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 11. 
	 136 
Meanwhile, Canada’s commitment to R2P seemed hollow when in the 2000s it 
did not even make the minimum declarations of concern for the fate of civilians 
when acts of aggression were carried out by friendly Israeli or US governments 
invading or bombarding Lebanon, Iraq, and the OPT.388 What Canada was able 
to do though in its rhetoric was to anoint itself an advanced state with the duty, 
or right, to try remake the world in its own image in the name of higher ideals, 
even while forgetting that its foreign policy did not neatly with those ideals.389 
While the Liberal Martin government increasingly emphasised R2P in its foreign 
policy rhetoric, it also began to align Canadian foreign policy more closely with 
an agenda offering support for Israel, drawing considerable attention at the UN 
for its pro-Israel voting patterns. Simultaneous to providing strong political cover 
for Israel, it launched a well-coordinated ‘all of government’ approach to 
providing assistance to Palestinians. This involved a concerted effort to 
reinforce Oslo by bringing to bear the expertise of between eight to ten 
Canadian departments and institutions to strengthen Palestinian institutions in 
key sectors, notably justice and border administration. 390  This was hyper 
neoliberalism and hyper Oslo, in the midst of the Second Intifada. In many ways 
Martin’s approach simply put a renewed emphasis on keeping people 
(especially Palestinians and aid workers) busy while ignoring the core political 
issues of occupation, settler colonialism and Palestinian rights. The Martin 
government was re-emphasising an Oslo approach of developing (civilising) the 
Palestinians in the OPT in order to live in peace with a liberal, democratic Israel, 
rather than addressing the root cause of their marginalisation.  
When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a key actor who sparked the Second 
Intifada with a dark history overseeing the mass murder of Palestinian civilians, 
took the decision in 2005 to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, the Martin 
government welcomed the move and expressed hope that it would be an 
opportunity for the PA to establish a state in Gaza and the West Bank, without 
mentioning East Jerusalem. To support disengagement, he offered Canadian 
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technical expertise on border crossing management and a few Canadian 
military personnel to assist the Office of the United States Security Coordinator 
(USSC) in Jerusalem with ‘Operation Proteus’ training Western-backed PA 
security forces.391 In effect Canada was helping to improve Israeli systems of 
control over Palestinians, helping the occupier rather than the occupied.  
 
Harper Conservative Rule 
The 2006 January 23rd Canadian federal election brought to power for the first 
time the Conservative Stephen Harper Government, built out of the former 
Reform and Canadian Alliance political parties whose strongest base of support 
was in the petroleum rich province of Alberta. This government would bring to 
Ottawa the views of the original Western Canadian-based, populist Reform 
Party, many of whose members were pro-Israel evangelicals who viewed it as 
an oasis of democracy and civilisation surrounded by dangerous dictatorships 
and savageness.392 That election would mark the beginning of a major shift in 
Canadian foreign policy even closer to Israel.393 
Those Middle East policies were likely driven by domestic electoral 
considerations, as will be explained later in this chapter, but may also have 
been part of an attempt by Ottawa to address the Bush administration’s 
concerns in the US about Canadian foreign policy, which had been strained by 
the Chrétien government’s refusal to join the US’ ill-fated 2003 invasion of 
Iraq.394 The Harper government adopted tougher rhetoric on terrorism, of which 
many groups designated as terrorist in Canada are Palestinian. 395  By 2007 
Canada published a counterinsurgency field manual that developed its foreign 
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policy on a ‘3-D approach’ of security in defence, diplomacy and (still) 
development work.396 
While the Martin government had already shifted Canada’s UN voting patterns 
perceptibly closer to Israel, the Harper government would take an even harder 
pro-Israel line.397 As noted, Canada was also the first donor to cut aid to the 
Palestinians following Hamas’ 2006 January 25th election victory, just days after 
the Harper government itself first came to power. This was an astonishingly 
resolute decision for a government without experience.398 The extent to which 
this new Canadian government began siding with Israel was put on display 
when during a 2006 summer war between Israel and Lebanon, Israeli forces 
killed a Canadian UN peace observer and three other UN soldiers at their 
station on the Israeli-Lebanese border.  
Informed speculation suggested that Lebanese Hezbollah fighters were using 
the outpost as a safe area, but that still did not account for a UN commander 
warning the Israeli military that Israel would kill their people if it attacked the 
area. The Canadian government opened an investigation into the events. It 
resulted in a 2008 public report concluding the deaths were preventable and the 
Israeli military was at fault for the four UN observers’ deaths. The report later 
disappeared from the Canadian Defence Department website, with the Defence 
Department claiming this was done in early 2009 for security reasons.399 Harper 
had already expressed initial doubt that Israel targeted the post, later expressed 
regret over the deaths but questioned why the UN keeps observer posts in 
south Lebanon in the first place since it was effectively a war zone.400 Harper 
was giving public support for Israeli policy even when it led to the death of a 
Canadian soldier who was part of a UN peacekeeping mission. 
During the 2006 war Harper also diverged from Western condemnation of Israel 
to insist that it was defending itself appropriately against terrorism. His 
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government would do the same during the 2008–09 bombardment of Gaza 
(Gaza war) war when his Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon solely blamed 
Hamas for the violence.401 In each case Israel was portrayed as the victim and 
the voice of reason in a war of civilisation. The Harper government was also the 
first to withdraw from the second UN World Conference Against Racism, known 
as Durban II, saying the event would ‘scapegoat the Jewish people’.402 Ever 
Since Benjamin Netanyahu Likud won power in Israel’s 2009 February election 
the Canadian government has repeatedly and publicly sided with a government 
dominated by ever more extreme far right parties with openly racist politicians 
who publicly advocate for genocide against Palestinians.403 
In 2012 November Canada sought to block a UN vote recognising Palestine as 
a Permanent Observer State, and threatened to cut off aid to the Palestinians in 
retaliation. On several occasions, Harper’s government refused to criticise the 
construction of new Israeli settlements in the OPT. By 2013 they went so far as 
to side with Israel against the US Obama Administration by voicing scepticism 
about an interim nuclear deal with Iran. In deference to Israeli hostility toward 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) Canada dropped out of efforts to refer the 
situation in Syria to that court. It is hard to imagine a stronger alignment of 
Canadian policy with Israel’s than under the Harper government.404  In 2014 
January Harper rebuffed questions about Israeli settlements saying he would 
not stand in the Middle East and criticise Israel, even though Canada has long 
had an official policy opposing settlement growth.405  
The Conservative Government abandoned any use of R2P terminology while 
accelerating Canada’s drift away from peacekeeping that had begun under the 
previous two Liberal governments.406 By 2009, Embassy magazine reported that 
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the Harper government forbade the use of phrases such as human security, 
public policy, good governance and the responsibility to protect.407 Instead it 
provided preferred alternatives such as human rights, the rule of law, 
democracy and democratic government.408 The Conservative government was 
working hard to disassociate itself from the traditions of the previous Liberal 
government, particularly liberal internationalism and intervention like R2P, yet 
not quite abandoning neoliberalism in an anticipated shift toward neorealism.  
One of the most important legacies of the Harper Conservative government has 
been its propensity to use partisan foreign policy for domestic electoral 
purposes, such as wooing Jewish voters away from the Liberals by taking an 
even stauncher public stance in support of Israel.409  Nossal goes so far to 
suggest that Harper’s Conservative foreign policy is neither that ideological nor 
conservative. He writes that it is determined not by global politics or domestic 
politics, but by the ballot box, which is primarily based on electoral 
considerations.410 There is evidence to suggest that this support for Israel has 
been a successful, winning votes in key urban ridings that were once dominated 
by the Liberal party.411 
The Harper government has acted without hesitation to provide support for 
Israel. Not unlike the Liberal government that preceded it, the Harper 
government argues that it is taking a ‘principled’ position, because Canada and 
Israel share common democratic values including transparent elections, an 
independent judiciary, a free press, and human rights.412 This of course requires 
ignoring the very undemocratic nature of Israeli military rule in the OPT and 
discrimination against Palestinians in Israel.  
Support for Israel reached rhetorical heights by February 2010 when Peter 
Kent, Harper’s Minister of state for foreign affairs, claimed that, ‘an attack on 
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Israel would be considered an attack on Canada’.413 That was an extraordinary 
statement since no treaty was in force between the two countries requiring 
anything close to such a reaction.414 Harper had said something similar though 
in 2008 May,  
Our government believes that those who threaten Israel also threaten 
Canada, because, as the last war showed [with Lebanon in 2006], 
hate‑fuelled bigotry against some is ultimately a threat to us all, and must 
be resisted wherever it may lurk.... In this on‑going battle, Canada stands 
firmly side‑by‑side with the State of Israel, our friend and ally in the 
democratic family of nations.415 
In a 2014 January speech to Israel’s Knesset, Harper reflected on a Jewish 
Rosh Hashanah prayer and promised, ‘through fire and water, Canada will 
stand with you’.416 
For the first time, a Canadian prime Minister unequivocally took a firm position 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict by siding with one party over the other because he 
considers it the ‘moral’ and ‘principled’ thing to do. In the case of Israel though, 
Conservative government rhetoric has been backed by action. Under Harper 
Canada has sided openly, at times fervently, with Israel in every one of its 
military operations. Some scholars and diplomats, ‘rank it as the most dramatic 
shift in the history of post-war Canadian foreign policy’.417  Greg Albo argues 
that in Canada’s foreign policy under Harper, there appear to be for Israel no 
legal or moral limits of acceptable international conduct being able to be 
breeched.418  
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Canada’s Aggressive Relationship with Poor Countries & Indigenous Peoples 
Then there is the more pessimistic, less self-congratulatory analysis of 
Canada’s external relations than that offered by Ignatieff, Stein, Heinbecker or 
even to an extent neorealists like Gotlieb or Nossal. Researchers like Klassen, 
Albo, Gordon, Webber and McNally describe a Canada that is less the 
progressively liberal, peace building state that is a ‘humanitarian nation and a 
model of progressive internationalism’. Rather that Canada is a settler colony 
with predatory aims of its own aimed at poorer and weaker states, or indigenous 
communities, benefitting from and participating in an imperatum pax 
Americana.419 The national elite of this Canada has an independent interest of 
its own, and cannot be seen as simply a subservient ‘comprador’ class to US 
imperial aims.420  For this reason Canada plays a leading role in multilateral 
institutions like the World Bank and IMF helping to establish conditions 
necessary to facilitate its own economic advantages. It certainly was not forced 
into supporting those IFIs’ aggressive imposition of structural adjustment on 
poorer countries.421 This is a neoliberal capitalist imperialism where ‘the creation 
of new spaces of accumulation’ inevitably involves the forceful and violent 
reorganisation of people’s lives, such as the economic reorganisation plans of 
the World Bank and IMF, as they are subordinated to the whims of capital.422  
Viewed from this perspective, Klassen argues that Harper’s foreign policy 
agenda is best viewed not as a radical shift, but, ‘as a radical extension of 
Canadian state practices in the neoliberal period’ adopting a neoliberalism 
designed, ‘as a stepping-stone for Canadian corporate expansion in the world 
economy, particularly through foreign direct investments’.423 
This Canada is an advanced capitalist state within a hierarchy of nations 
operating within the global capitalist economy. The example these researchers 
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often turn to is Canada’s intervention into Latin America.424 Gordon points out 
that since the early 1990s, Canadian corporate investments have spread at a 
considerable pace around the world and into the developing world, supported 
by whatever party is in power – Liberal or Conservative.425 He further points out 
that like other powerful and rich states, Canada's investments are mired in 
human rights violations and environmental catastrophe mirrored by its absolute 
refusal to establish human rights legislation to govern the foreign activities of its 
corporations, many of which are subsidised by the government in their 
predatory activities. Canada has even gone so far as to attempt to undermine 
the UN's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to free up spaces for 
accumulation by dispossession corporate ends in regions around the world, 
such as Latin America.426  
Canada is itself a state built rich on indigenous dispossession, defended with 
the same terms of progress espoused by Benny Morris for Israel and the United 
States.427 The Canadian state’s historic predatory relationship with Indigenous 
people provides a sharp example of these dynamics of accumulation by 
dispossession, serving as a potent reminder of Canada’s imperialist history.428 
Government ministries responsible for Aboriginal affairs have betrayed their 
economic intentions by being traditionally subsumed within economic ministries 
like ‘Mines and Resources’ or ‘Northern Development’, where a series of rules 
and regulations are used to manage Canadian indigenous lives completely and 
in a totalitarian manner – not so dissimilar from UNRWA’s management of 
millions of Palestinian refugee lives. Gordon argues that it has been only 
grudgingly that the Canadian state granted any self-governed land (referred to 
as ‘reservations’) to some of Canada’s indigenous nations, much like Israel and 
the international community granting Palestinians limited self rule on Areas A 
and B in the OPT. Yet like the Palestinians that grudging grant owes largely 
only to the Indigenous peoples’ absolute refusal to give way to settler 
colonialism.  
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When Canada has ‘offered’ indigenous people’s land it has done so in such a 
way as to undermine their self-sufficiency and provide itself with the opportunity 
to carry out closer surveillance of those colonised communities, just like for 
Israel in Areas A and B in the OPT. Not so dissimilar from the endless Oslo 
peace talks that donors strong-arm Palestinians to participate in while Israel 
colonises their land in bad faith, typically the aim of the treaty process 
negotiating over land in Canada has been, as Gordon observes, ‘to absorb 
serious political activity into the safer legal realm and bind Indigenous nations 
into legal arguments and maneuvering’ while the Canadian government buys 
time and delays decisions inside a system of resolution where anyway the laws 
are set-out by the settler colonial Canadian state itself.429  Like Israel, even 
when agreements exist, Canada has often reneged on them, demonstrating 
that it has no intention of allowing those to interfere with its ongoing settler 
colonial expansion.430 
The Canadian state maintains its nexus of total control over indigenous 
people’s based on the European imperial defence that the savages need their 
civilised guardianship.431 In its most recent incarnation as the ‘Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development’, that guardianship remains a 
neoliberal ‘civilising’ agenda with a pre-occupation toward exploiting Aboriginal 
labour through market integration, as well of course as natural resources, not 
far removed from the neoliberal logic of the Oslo aid agenda in the OPT. Just as 
the efforts of Western donors are presented in the OPT in a flattering light, the 
Canadian government’s development efforts with indigenous communities in 
Canada are presented ‘with a charitable veneer’ with developmentalist 
buzzwords like ‘economic development’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘self-government’ 
designated to indicate government policy being crafted in the interests of the 
colonised first and foremost, even when the reality remains that ‘economic 
development’ of Indigenous communities is premised on the negation of their 
self-determination. This echoes the motives of donors like Canada supporting 
Palestinians to keep them quiet under Israeli settler colonial.432 It is from this 
perspective, observing Canada’s self-denied settler colonial nature and 
exploitative imperial intentions aggressively predating upon poorer countries 
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and weaker indigenous communities around the world, by which Canada’s 
ardent support for Israel might be better understood, regardless of the power of 
Canada’s Israel lobby and opportunities taken by politicians such as Martin or 
Harper to harness it. 
 
Pro-Israel Sympathies 
Community Voting Patterns 
There is a common belief in Canada that the pro-Israel lobby wields significant 
influence on Canadian foreign policy, and some interviews with former 
government officials support this observation.433 Irrespective of this, Pro-Israel 
Jewish groups have been effective in their mobilisation to promote a narrative 
that shapes Canadian policy to their preference, at least in the Middle East. 
Even if Canadians have general views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, they tend not 
feel to strongly enough about it to actively promote their views to politicians in 
such a way as to counter the well-mobilised pro-Israel lobby.434 
As of 2011, Statistics Canada estimated that out of 33,476,688 Canadians 
those who identified as Jewish made up approximately 1% of the population.435 
Most of those Jewish Canadians held a strong affinity to Israel, particularly 
since the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.436 In spite of their relatively small 
numbers, they are a distinct community well established within Canada’s 
economic and political landscape.437 Generally liberal in their social views, they 
do not extend those views on to Palestinian rights, because they are especially 
ardent Zionists. A large portion of the community lives in Toronto and Montreal, 
where almost three-quarters have visited Israel, as compared to less than half 
that percentage for US citizens identifying as Jewish. Further, a 2006 analysis 
found that 42% of Canadian Jews identify as Zionists, compared with 25% of 
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US Jews. 438  The Orthodox Jewish community, which typically votes 
Conservative in Canada, has been experiencing a population boom.  
The Jewish community in Canada is characterised by being highly centralised 
and their resources concentrated. This may be attributed to the creation of a 
hierarchical series of authoritative communal institutions, such as the Canadian 
Jewish Congress (CJC) and the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC). The CIC acts 
as the main group lobbying on behalf of Israel, alongside smaller organisations 
such as the more right-leaning B’nai Brith and other smaller right-wing groups. 
Meanwhile, there is a small left-oriented Independent Jewish Voices (IVP) that 
criticises the tenets of Zionism. In spite of a plethora of articles in leftist online or 
print magazines critical of the occupation, there is no Canadian equivalent of 
the US liberal Zionist but left-leaning lobby group J-Street.439 Overall there is a 
more conservative pro-Israel environment in Canada’s Jewish community. 
These Jewish Canadians once voted disproportionately for the Liberals and the 
socialist CCF-NDP, while Jewish Communists once held seats in the House of 
Commons and Ontario Legislature. However, during the 2000s Conservative 
party strategists under Harper targeted the Jewish community as part of their 
outreach to score supporters in minority groups that typically voted Liberal. This 
was a new type of Canadian electoral politics similar to the US,  
It used to be you won an election in Canada by standing in the middle of 
the spectrum - I'm not sure that is the case any longer. You win through 
micro-targeting. Very American in style and substance. Fixed election 
dates only make that worse. Conservative policy targets specific ridings, 
and even groups and sub-groups within ridings. By doing that, you have 
a chance in all ridings that matter.440 
Since the Conservative party’s core constituency of Anglo-Protestant supporters 
would not be large enough to achieve their goal of forming a majority 
government on their own in a highly multicultural Canada, Harper appealed to 
non-traditional Conservatives, such as Jews, on the basis of shared social 
                                                
438 Craig Offman, ‘Jewish Community Finds a Friend in Stephen Harper’, The Globe and Mail, 
30 November 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/jewish-community-finds-a-
friend-in-stephen-harper/article15699592/. 
439 Sasley, ‘Who Calls the Shots?’ 
440 Dr. Ian Roberge, ‘Two Quick Questions - from Your Perspective’, 14 February 2014. 
	 147 
values. Jewish community leaders matched his efforts at a time when a 
changing political landscape saw a noticeable decline in domestic support for 
Israel, but also a fear for the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism. Besides 
displaying a deep-set and genuine personal sympathy for Israel and the Jewish 
Zionist agenda, Harper and his government were also able to capitalise on a 
multicultural country where, as Moses describes, a plethora of different ethnic 
communities, ‘invest “their” groups with ontological status, so that they, and not 
individuals, are the significant bearers of human rights and memory’ and the 
Jewish community leadership has sought out both support for Israel and to 
argue to the public that the Holocaust was unique from the genocide of other 
people’s, like Ukrainians and Armenians, seeking from that argument to 
educate the public on the ‘lessons of the Holocaust’ as uniquely terrible.441 In 
that type of democratic system political leaders can highlight the experiences of 
communities in order to court particular electoral constituencies, in a struggle for 
recognition that is laden with irresistible political temptations, particularly in the 
contemporary global environment where genocidal intentions against Israel can 
be ascribed to Iran and remembering the Holocaust thereby becomes enlisted 
into the ‘war on terror’.442 The Harper Conservative strategy appeared to have 
been successful capitalising on these moods changing voting patterns within 
Canada’s typical Liberal-leaning Jewish community. While many Jewish 
Canadians remained prominent in the Liberal Party, more than half of Jewish 
respondents to an exit poll in the 2011 election said they voted Conservative.443 
In their calculation of minority voting groups, Conservative strategists estimated 
that 20% of minority voters were not accessible to the party.444  This figure 
appears to include Arab Canadians, though the Conservatives have at times 
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made overtures to carefully chosen Muslim groups. Arab Canadians are almost 
twice as numerous as their Jewish counterparts, but they are not as well 
established and are more reluctant to engage in politics. There are two 
organisations that the government of Canada considers official representatives 
of the Arab community for Middle East policy.445 One is the Canadian Arab 
Federation (CAF), which was founded in 1967 as an umbrella group of about 40 
smaller organisations. The other is the National Council on Canada-Arab 
Relations (NCCAR) founded in 1985. However, the community is divided along 
national, regional and religious lines that have actively prevented it from 
presenting a united front to policy makers.446 One Arab leader noted that many 
Arabs have come to Canada to escape politics because of their experience with 
it in the Middle East. Arab community self-isolation was heightened by the 
otherness imposed on them after the 2001 September 11th attacks in the US 
and subsequent reactions by law enforcement and immigration, making the 
community more timid. 
Many non-Jewish clergy in Canada have meanwhile supported the Zionist 
cause, or the establishment of some kind of Jewish homeland in Palestine for 
the survivors of the Holocaust. This helped generate support for Israel and 
Zionism in Canadian public opinion and the media. More recently, Christian 
evangelical groups sympathetic to Zionist objectives have conducted their own 
pro-Israel advocacy work.447 Surveys indicate that churchgoers and Christians 
show the most support for the religious rights of Jews and for Israel.448 
Meanwhile, a 2012 April opinion poll found about half of Canadians thought 
their country’s policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict was balanced.449 This was 
the same figure as a decade earlier, with public opinion barely fluctuating 
between those dates. This came despite the different public postures between 
the Liberal and Conservative governments on Israel and Palestine, and events 
in the Middle East. 
 
                                                
445 Sasley, ‘Who Calls the Shots?’ 
446 Barry, ‘Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy’, 193; 
Wiseman, ‘Canadian Policy, Canadian Attitudes, and the Middle East’. 
447 Heinbecker et al., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, 
197. 
448 Barry, ‘Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy’, 193–194. 
449 Wiseman, ‘Canadian Policy, Canadian Attitudes, and the Middle East’. 
	 149 
Political Parties 
There are strong links and feelings of affinity for Israel across Canadian political 
parties and institutions. The most obvious has been the Canada Conservative 
Party of the 2000s and 2010s. Though, like most of his predecessors Harper 
had little direct experience of the region, he came to office with strong personal 
religious beliefs, an inclination to support Israel, very clear views on terrorism 
and the appropriate response to terrorist activities. Harper’s views in favour of 
Israel are so strong that Canadian Jewish officials have been taken aback and 
fear it might undermine their advocacy efforts with the other political parties.450 
However, beyond playing electoral politics and aiming to garner Jewish votes, 
Harper’s approach also reflects an evangelical Christian viewpoint held by many 
members of the dominant Alliance/Reform wing of his Conservative party, which 
has always been quite pro-Israel.451 Nearly half of the elected Conservative MPs 
after the 2011 election, up to seventy, could be called evangelical Christians.452 
During the extreme summer 2014 bombardment of Gaza by Israel, which 
earned large-scale global approbation, the Conservative Party of Canada 
released a campaign-style video on YouTube ‘Through Fire and Water’ 
advertising just how strong their support for Israel was.453  
Meanwhile the Canadian Liberal Party, Canada’s governing party throughout 
the 20th Century and a strong proponent of Canadian multiculturalism, has 
traditionally enjoyed robust Jewish community membership and votes. While it 
has at times opted to give the appearance of a balanced approach not 
favouring any side, it and party members have normally been strong allies of 
Israel. Leading Liberals such as the peacekeeper and former Prime Minister 
Pearson played a key role in the foundation of Israel.454  Prior to 1979 the 
Liberals did not even bother to give the impression of a balanced approach to 
Middle East issues, choosing simply to side with Israel, while from 2004 onward 
the Martin government again abandoned the balanced approach. One of the 
leading MPs for the Chrétien and Martin Liberal governments, as well as 
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Martin’s Minister of Justice (2003-2006), Irwin Cotler argued that the core tenets 
of Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East were protection for the security 
and legitimacy of Israel. He argued that the main reason Oslo failed has been 
the unwillingness of the Palestinian and Arab leadership to accept Israel’s 
legitimacy, that Israel had in 1947 accepted peace based on the UN partition 
but the Arabs launched a war of aggression against the Jewish state, that Arab 
states have traditionally been the aggressors against Israel, and that it is the 
Arab rejection of peace that is responsible for any conflict.455  
The third major party in Canadian federal politics is the left-leaning New 
Democratic Party (NDP), formerly called the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF). Though never elected to govern Canada, it has formed a 
number of provincial governments and played key roles influencing federal 
policy, particularly the minority Liberal governments of Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau in the 1970s, who was sympathetic to the NDP’s progressive values. 
Although initially opposed in the 1930s to the establishment of a ‘European 
colony’ in the Middle East at Arab expense, after World War II the party moved 
to support of Israel based on the perception that Israel had progressive socialist 
policies.456 In 1975, NDP MP and former leader Tommy Douglas told Israel’s 
Histadrut, ‘The main enmity against Israel is that she has been an affront to 
those nations who do not treat their people and their workers as well as Israel 
has treated hers’.457  Though by the 2000s, the party’s position appeared to 
become more balanced, Canada’s leading ‘left’ party can still be seen as 
generally pro-Israel. In May 2008 future NDP leader Thomas Mulcair was 
quoted in the Canadian Jewish News as saying, ‘I am an ardent supporter of 
Israel in all situations and in all circumstances’.458 
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Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism 
Political support for Israel transcending party lines has manifested itself in 
multiparty work for Israel on committees such as the highly partisan Canadian 
Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism (CPCCA), formed in 2009 
March. The CPCAA was a group of Canadian parliamentarians organised 
together for the stated purpose of, ‘confronting and combating anti-Semitism in 
Canada’. 459  Though not an official committee of Parliament, it nonetheless 
organised itself to conduct hearings and produce a report in the same manner 
as a Parliamentary committee. It was made up of former and sitting MPs from 
the Conservative Party, Liberal Party, the NDP and initially the French 
Canadian separatist Bloc Québécois. A Liberal MP, Mario Silva, chaired it, while 
Conservative MP Scott Reid was Vice Chair. Prominent members included 
leading former or current Liberal and Conservative Cabinet Ministers such as 
Carolyn Bennett (Lib.), Ken Dryden (Lib.), Hedy Fry (Lib.), Peter Kent (Con.), 
Anita Neville (Lib.), Bob Rae (interim leader of the federal Liberal party 2011-
2013 and formerly NDP Premier of Ontario 1990-1995), Jason Kenney (Con.) 
and Irwin Cotler, as well as MP Pat Martin (NDP).  
Following a two-year period of research on 2011 July 7th the CPCCA released a 
report on anti-Semitism in Canada.460 The CPCCA recognised anti-Semitism as 
something antithetical to fundamental Canadian values like multiculturalism, 
constitutional guarantees against discrimination and human rights as espoused 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 461  It focused on what it 
considered a ‘new anti-Semitism’ associated with the ‘radical left’, which it 
considers to be the revival of classically anti-Semitic beliefs in the guise of anti-
Zionism.462 It took note of university campuses, much of which have some type 
of Palestine rights student group, as particular venues for anti-Semitic 
behaviour in Canada. Further, they link that new anti-Semitism to the growth of 
political Islam, an issue with which the Canadian public has been particularly 
concerned. The CPCCA considers that political Islam to be a violent and 
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potentially genocidal threat to Jews, which they claim is active on university 
campuses and thereby linked to the radical left of pro-Palestine activism.463 
Irony was lost on CPCCA members that the university campus has historically 
been targeted for dissent by educated youth against existing power structures 
linked to oppression, privilege or an existing social order.464 
Recommendations by CPCCA included withholding funds from NGOS that 
preach anti-Semitism, standardising national definitions of anti-Semitism, 
increasing laws against anti-Semitism, the pooling of information across 
Canadian governmental and civil society to track anti-Semitism, having 
Canadian universities develop procedures to share and report information on 
campus anti-Semitism (essentially spying on students), and that Canada adopt 
the Working Definition of Anti-Semitism developed by a European Union 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). Critics of the report 
note that it selectively discussed testimony; chose pro-Israel, Jewish student, 
religious and community groups, and academics mainly from the US or Israel to 
testify; and that it grew out of a 2009 February Inter-Parliamentary Committee 
for Combating Anti-Semitism (ICCA) in London, which itself was the product of 
an agency of the government of Israel called the Global Forum for Combating 
Anti-Semitism. Thus in some way the CPCCA was the product of lobbying work 
sponsored by the government of Israel.  
Critics also note that key assertions of the report were entirely unsupported by 
the most authoritative testimony of the Inquiry, such as university administrators 
discussing anti-Semitic incidences on campus. Almost none of the law 
enforcement testimonials noted a rise in anti-Semitic incidences and no 
university administrators considered anti-Semitism to be a problem on their 
campus. Also, the 2005 EUMC Working Definition of Anti-Semitism has no 
official status, has not been adopted by any government and if incorporated in 
legislation could effectively ban most criticism of Israel in Canada.465 Basically 
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the CPCCA report is spurious, unsupported and driven by partisan politics, but 
was given a veneer of authority by the participation of leading Parliamentarians. 
The CPCCA panel also participated in the 2010 Ottawa Conference on Anti-
Semitism where the speakers included many members of the Canadian political 
elite. They included the Governor General of Canada (Canada’s Head of State), 
the Prime Minister, then Leader of the Opposition Liberal Michael Ignatieff and 
Deputy Leader of the NDP Thomas Mulcair (who would become leader of the 
opposition in 2012).466 Work by the CPCAA and the Ottawa Conference led to 
the Ottawa Protocol, drawn up by international parliamentarians brought 
together by the ICCA, which challenges the ‘selective’ and ‘unfair’ criticism of 
Israel, 
Let it be clear: Criticism of Israel is not anti-Semitic, and saying so is 
wrong. But singling Israel out for selective condemnation and opprobrium 
– let alone denying its right to exist or seeking its destruction – is 
discriminatory and hateful, and not saying so is dishonest.467 
Just as Canada became the first country to boycott the PA in 2006, Canada 
became first signatory to the Ottawa Protocol in 2011.  
 
Media & Academia 
The Canadian media has been accused of being quite pro-Israel, absent of a 
voice sympathetic to Palestinians. There is some research evidence of this bias. 
In 2005, the Near East Cultural and Education Foundation (NECEF) published 
a study on the Canadian print media’s coverage of the Second Intifada.468 The 
study analysed their coverage of Israeli and Palestinian deaths looking at the 
headlines and first paragraphs of articles for two one-year periods: from 2000 
September 29th to 2001 September 28th, and from 2004 January 1st to 2004 
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December 31st. It looked at three major print newspapers, the Globe and Mail, 
the National Post and the Toronto Star, at a time when print media was a 
significant source of news.  
The study seemed to confirm perceptions that much of the media adopt a 
strongly pro-Israel editorial position.469 There was a tendency for all papers to 
report Palestinian casualties at a rate approximating the rate of Israeli deaths 
throughout the conflict. This occurred despite the fact that the trend line of 
Palestinian deaths was considerably different than that of Israeli deaths in the 
periods under review. Such a finding seems to indicate that newspaper editors 
are more likely to select articles reporting conflict related deaths during periods 
in which Israelis are being targeted. There was a strong tendency toward under-
reporting and downplaying the deaths of Palestinian children’s to the point of a 
nearly complete omission in National Post coverage. Ad-hoc observations 
during the data collection process seemed to indicate that Palestinians were 
generally more likely to be described as combatants than Israelis, despite the 
fact that a greater percentage of Palestinian civilians have been victims of 
conflict than Israeli civilians.470 
While much of the major Canadian university campuses have since the Second 
Intifada had at least one student group lobbying for Palestinian rights, Canadian 
university campuses and academia share in common with the Canada’s media 
a reputation for maintaining strong pro-Israel biases. Likewise each campus has 
some form of pro-Israel student group that is better funded, linked to the 
government of Israel through its embassies and supported by the university 
administration. Those university administrations, and even major Canadian 
political parties, often protest advocacy work carried out by the student 
Palestinian rights groups. Objections by university head’s are often linked to 
obstacles including room cancelations or other forms of administrative 
intimidation. Organisers even face physical intimidation by pro-Israel activists.471 
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Intimidation extends beyond student activism into academic research. In 2009 
an academic conference at York University was organised to discuss 
possibilities for peace entitled, ‘Israel/Palestine: Mapping models of statehood 
and prospects for peace’. 472  The conference was to be funded by York 
University, Queen’s University and the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council (SSHRC). SSHRC is the Canadian government agency that 
funds postsecondary-based research and training in the humanities and social 
sciences. Although the agency should in theory operate at arm’s length of 
government and free from intervention, in a pattern we will see is common for 
the Conservative government, Minister for Science and Technology Gary 
Goodyear allegedly contacted the president of SSHRC a mere two weeks 
before the conference in order to ask him directly to reconsider the peer-
reviewed decision to grant $19,700 for the conference.473 
By contrast to York University, the prestigious Munk Centre at the University of 
Toronto held a conference in the early years of the Second Intifada mapping the 
growth of ‘anti-Semitism’. The conference was called ‘Anti-Semitism: The 
Politicization of Prejudice in the Contemporary World’. The University of Toronto 
is one of Canada’s leading universities and the Munk Centre one of most 
prestigious IR research centres. The results of the conference included a book 
entitled ‘Contemporary Anti-Semitism: Canada and the World’. 474  The book 
makes an argument that anti-Semitism is a negative force that can be traced 
consistently from Roman times onward, as a resurgent contemporary force. In 
the preface it states that, 
The conference took place in a heated political climate of international 
tension and war and was shaped by intense concerns about the revival 
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of forms of prejudice that, many thought, had been consigned to the 
dustbins of history.475 
A contributor to the volume was former Conservative Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney (1984-1993). A supporter of Israel, he wrote,  
Following the Holocaust, the cry of “Never Again” became both 
affirmation and promise. We expected that humanity would foreswear 
anti-Semitism forever. The founding of the State of Israel in 1948 
reinforced this hope. Unfortunately, today, Jewish communities and the 
world’s only Jewish state globally confront this re-emergent evil.476 
Of course, he ignores the catastrophe that ‘hope’ inflicted on Palestinians living 
under Israeli rule, who were killed or were forced into exile. The Palestinian 
narrative is often omitted in Canada. 
 
Charity Regulations 
Canadian charity law is very important to aid work in the OPT since most 
organisations either hold charitable status or aspire toward it. Charitable status 
has two key advantages, one of which is tax exemption for an organisation from 
their income and second the ability to grant tax credits to donors for 
donations.477 A third advantage is the legitimacy offered to organisations legally 
sanctioned by the Canadian government as charitable, because that implies 
that their activities and financial accounts are being scrutinised by CRA. That 
significantly increases an organisation’s ability to apply for large institutional 
grants, some of which are only available only to organisations officially 
registered as a charity. For Canadians nervous about donating to politically 
contentious Middle East causes, the assurance of government backing can be 
particularly helpful when fundraising. 
Charities fundraising for Israel in Canada have been more successful than their 
Palestinian equivalents. Following Israel’s major wars they have proven 
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particularly successful raising large sums for Israel: in the 1948/49 $9.2 million, 
in 1967 $25 million, in 1973 $54 million with $C50 million sold in bonds, and in 
the 2006 summer war with Lebanon $42 million.478 In the late 1980s, Canadians 
were the highest per capita foreign investors in Israeli bonds.479 In 1990 the 
Governor General, Canada’s head of state, Jean Sauvé promoted the sale of 
Israeli bonds during the First Intifada.480 
Publically the government of Canada is committed to the two-state solution 
offered by the Oslo Peace Process. In theory it opposes Israeli settlement 
building too, even after nearly a decade of Harper government rule, 
Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories 
occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem 
and the Gaza Strip). The Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the 
occupied territories and establishes Israel's obligations as an occupying 
power, in particular with respect to the humane treatment of the 
inhabitants of the occupied territories. As referred to in UN Security 
Council Resolutions 446 and 465, Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories are a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The 
settlements also constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a 
comprehensive, just and lasting peace.481 
Yet in practice Canada does not hold Israel to account with its position, 
including in its charity regulations. 
In 1996 a Toronto Star investigation found that a number of Canadian charities 
issued tax receipts in order to assist Israeli settlement building, at the height of 
the Oslo Peace Process.482 That meant in effect that the Canadian government 
was sanctioning settler-colonialism with tax revenue diverted via tax receipts. 
There are several prominent Canadian charities supporting settler activities in 
the OPT. These include: Canadian Friends of Yeshivath Birkat Moshe-Maale 
Adumim, which officially supports settler schools and education infrastructure; 
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Canadian Friends of Yeshivath Har Etzion, supporting schools and education 
including the biggest settler school; Canadian Friends of Beit Midrash Elon 
Moreh, which supports religious organisations including in a radical settlement 
populated by extremists adjacent to the Palestinian city of Nablus; Canadian 
Friends of Mekor Chaim Academy, which again supports schools and 
education; and the Canadian Zionist Cultural Association, which declines to 
answer questions about what it does or where it works. 483  Meanwhile, the 
Ne’eman Foundation raises funds on behalf of the Gush Foundation, which 
supports the settlement of Gush Etzion in the West Bank.484 Questions about 
supporting Israeli charitable activities were answered in a 2002 Court of Appeal 
ruling stating that Canadian charities can donate to West Bank settlements. The 
Federal Court of Appeal has ruled in the case of ‘Canadian Magen David Adom 
for Israel v Canada’ that there is no clear public policy prohibiting charitable 
activities in the occupied territories.485 
It may be illegal to advocate or raise funds on behalf of the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF) in Canada. The 1985 Foreign Enlistment Act makes it illegal for 
Canadian nationals to recruit for, or to serve in a foreign army that is at war with 
a friendly state.486 Yet the Association for the ‘Soldiers of Israel in Canada’ 
provides moral and financial support for active duty soldiers.487 Established in 
1971, it cannot itself give tax receipts but has been known to receive donations 
solicited by a charity that can, the Canadian Zionist Cultural Association.488 The 
wealthy philanthropists who control of most of Canada’s bookstores, Heather 
Reisman and Gerry Schwartz, established the HESEG Foundation ‘as a way to 
recognise and honour the contribution of Lone Soldiers to Israel, by providing 
them with an opportunity, through education and career development’. 489 
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Through it Reisman and Schwartz provide up to $ 3 million per year for post-
military scholarships for individuals without family in Israel who join the IDF, 
encouraging non-Israeli Canadians to join the Israeli army.490 The Israel-based 
Lone Soldier Center borrows Canadian charitable status from the Ne’eman 
Foundation. Ne’eman has also funded: the IDF Widows and Orphans 
Organization; Mechinat Keshet Yehuda, dedicated to absorbing and training 
talented students who aspire to meaningful service in the IDF; Warm Home for 
Every Soldier, for soldiers who do not receive suitable off duty housing from the 
army or wait a considerable length of time before obtaining a fitting housing 
solution; and Yashar Lachayal, which provides for the needs of lower income 
and at-risk Israeli youth, as well as new immigrants serving in the IDF. 491 
Meanwhile money sent to Disabled Veterans of Israel, or Beit Halochem 
(Canada), and Canadian Magen David Adom help provide support for the 
Israeli military in multiple different ways.492 In 2010 in Montréal a fundraiser was 
held for the LIBI Fund.493 LIBI is the official IDF charitable foundation. Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin and IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan established it in 
1980 to provide for the educational, religious, medical and recreational needs of 
Israeli soldiers.494 In all of these cases funds are used to supplement the budget 
of the IDF by covering the expenses associated with putting soldiers to war, and 
are subsidised by Canadian charitable taxpayers with a deduction if sponsored 
by a registered charity. 
One of the more controversial funds operating in Canada is the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF). The JNF is a more than century old Jewish agency set-up initially 
to buy land in Palestine in order to resettle Jews during the early stages of 
colonisation, pre-1948. The JNF owns 13% of Israel’s land and has little 
government oversight.495 Much of the land the JNF manages was taken from 
Palestinians after they were forced to flee in 1948, handed over to the JNF by 
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the 1950 Law for Absentee Property.496 The JNF covenant states that its land 
can be leased only to Jews, enshrining ethnic-religious discrimination that is 
now illegal in Canada.497 A 1967 Law of Agricultural Settlement further prohibits 
the sub-letting of Jewish-owned land of the JNF to non-Jews.498 
The JNF is supported in its work by charitable fundraising with registered 
charitable branches found in countries around the world. It was registered in 
Canada in 1967 with the charitable purpose to,  
Create, provide, enlarge and administer a fund to be made up of 
voluntary contributions from the Jewish community and others, to be 
used for charitable purposes.499 
One of the charitable projects funded by the JNF Canada is Canada Park, a 
1,700 acre public park built in the West Bank outside Jerusalem on three 
Palestinian villages that were destroyed and ethnically cleansed in the 1967 
war. The JNF raised around $15 million following the war using tax-exempt 
donations to build the park, worth around $80 million in in 2009 values.500 Since 
it is built on occupied Palestinian land the park violates international law and the 
right of refugees to return. It is technically labelled a closed military zone by 
Israel to help protect its nefarious status. Israeli scholar and former Member of 
Knesset Dr. Uri Davis, who specialises in research on the JNF, says, 
Canada Park is a crime against humanity that has been financed by and 
implicates not only the Canadian government but every taxpayer in 
Canada. The JNF’s charitable status means that each donation receives 
a tax reduction paid for from the pockets of Canadian taxpayers.501 
In 2007 the JNF launched a $7 million campaign to refurbish the park.502 
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The JNF often deceives supporters and donors into believing it does not fund 
projects in the OPT, which is controversial even with Zionists. Yet a 2012 
document obtained by investigative journalist Raviv Drucker reveals a list of 
projects in the settlements funded by the fund.503 JNF donations are often used 
to plant forests of pine trees over destroyed villages like Canada Park. Ilan 
Pappé argues that the true mission of the JNF has been to conceal,  
Visible remnants of Palestine not only by the trees it has planted over 
them, but also by the narratives that it has created to deny their 
existence.504 
That includes on pre-1967 Israeli lands. In the early 1980s JNF Canada helped 
finance an Israeli government campaign to Judaise the largely Arab Galilee 
region of northern Israel.505  
Canadian charity law is obligated to operate under the rules of the Canadian 
Constitution, which clearly forbids discrimination against individuals based on 
their ethnic or religious background. Section 2(a) of the 1982 Constitution Act 
guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and religion, while Section 15 (1) 
guarantees equality for all individuals before and under the law including that 
they have the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.506 By 
barring non-Jewish ownership of land the JNF violates those legal principles. 
Thus, there is an argument that the CRA should not allow continued operations 
of the JNF, but a legal challenge to an access to information request suggests 
the CRA may be protecting it.507 
Meanwhile, the JNF has supporters at the highest levels. Former Prime 
Ministers John Diefenbaker (1957-1963), Lester Pearson (1963-1968) and 
Brian Mulroney (1984-1993) have all spoken at JNF events and leading 
politicians continue to endorse the organisation. At the provincial level the NDP 
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government of Manitoba strengthened its ties to the JNF with a 2010 trip to 
Israel. 508  At a 2013 JNF fundraising dinner Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
played piano and sang for more than 10 minutes as a headline act.509 
By contrast to Mr. Harper’s patronage of the JNF, charitable organisations 
working with Palestinians have faced incredible scrutiny and worked in constant 
fear. For instance in 2009 the Conservative government took a decision to cut 
off the progressive aid group KAIROS, made up of a coalition of leading 
Churches, from federal aid funding. Immigration Minister Jason Kenney (who 
was a member of the CPCCA) initially told an Israeli audience that the 
organisation was cut off because the government did not like its views on Israel, 
and because it took a ‘zero tolerance approach to anti-Semitism’.510 Kenney 
justified this based on accusations made against KAIROS by three right-wing 
pro-Israel organisations: B’nai Brith, the Canadian Christian College and NGO 
Monitor. The first two would later nominate Harper for a Nobel Prize nomination 
in 2014. 511  The third, NGO Monitor, is an Israeli non-profit linked to the 
government of Israel. It is dedicated to undermining liberal, peace building and 
human rights NGOs that criticise Israel. It is noted for its extreme positions and 
flawed methodology. This non-profit will come up frequently in stories about 
Palestine aid work in Canada, including the organisations I interviewed.   
Minister for International Cooperation Bev Oda was ‘technically’ in charge of the 
decision to defund KAIROS. She insisted, along with other Conservative 
government members, that the decision was just a matter of procedure – a fair 
and routine decision. However, the decision was anything other than routine. 
Documents surfaced in 2010 that show CIDA's top officials signed a 
memorandum recommending $ 7,098,758 of new funding be granted to 
KAIROS over a period of four years. However, at some point someone 
tampered with the document inserting the word ‘not’ by hand in order to 
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overturn the decision.512 The Conservative government refused to say who took 
the decision and Oda was rebuked by the Speaker of the House of Commons 
for misleading a Commons Foreign Affairs Committee about the affair.  
At around the same time as the KAIROS affair, a Canadian human rights 
organisation called Rights and Democracy (R&D) was forced into turmoil over 
several human rights grants it made in the OPT. The Mulroney government had 
established R&D as an Act of Parliament in 1988 to provide non-partisan 
support for Canada's foreign policy. The Canadian government would fund the 
organisation and name its Board of Directors. By the 2010s it received about 
$11 million per year in government funding, and reported directly to 
Parliament.513 It became embroiled in internal discord during the early Harper 
years as ardently right wing, pro-Israel government appointments to the Board 
took issue with grants to a leading Israeli human rights group called B'Tselem, 
and its Palestinian partners Al Haq and Al Mezan.  
All three of those organisations are internationally respected human rights 
NGOs. As a result of those grants the President of Rights and Democracy 
Rémy Beauregard was subjected to specious accusations by Board members, 
accused of supporting extremist organisations and terrorism.514  In 2009 five 
Board members wrote to then Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon 
alleging that the Board had become dysfunctional and asked that the ardently 
pro-Israel Chairperson Aurel Braun be replaced. 515  The Harper government 
responded by appointing additional pro-Israel members to give the faction a 
majority.516 A showdown took place between Mr. Beauregard and the partisan 
faction at a key meeting 2010 January 7th where the Board voted to ‘repudiate’ 
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the earlier human rights grants.517 Beauregard died of heart failure a day later 
between tense meetings. Of its 47 staff, 45 signed a letter demanding that three 
pro-Israel Board members including Braun be dismissed. 518  A Standing 
Committee of the House of Commons called for the agency to reconstitute its 
Board, which the Harper government ignored by reappointing the same Board 
members responsible for the crisis.519 This happened when Harper still had a 
minority government, prior to gaining a majority in the 2011 election. 
Former federal NDP leader and first President of R&D, Ed Broadbent, believes 
the Harper government wanted the organisation to cut ties with any foreign 
group that criticised Israel. Broadbent likened the situation to the decision to cut 
funding for KAIROS.520  Broadbent and three other past presidents including 
Warren Allmand, Jean-Louis Roy and Jean-Paul Hubert asked Harper to 
address, ‘a subversion of the independence and integrity of the institution’.521 
During Beauregards' funeral in Ottawa, which all the R&D staff attended, its 
offices were mysteriously burglarised and its computers and files stolen. An 
expensive forensic report ordered by the Braun faction to find something 
defamatory against Beauregard came up with nothing.522 In 2012, the Harper 
government announced it would close down the beleaguered organisation.523 
Many other organisations that criticised Israel, or Canadian government policy 
on issues like the environment and women’s equality, faced similar 
difficulties. 524  After 40 years of continuous federal government funding, the 
Canadian Council on International Co-operation (CCIC) had its funding cut in 
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2010 July.525 The CCIC acted as an umbrella organisation for 90 Canadian non-
profits monitoring government policy on foreign affairs, foreign aid, trade and 
peace building. Another charity with a long-standing record receiving funding for 
17 years from the federal government via CIDA, called Alternatives, saw its 
funding cut in 2009 December despite positive evaluations by independent 
auditors.526 Alternatives had been founded in 1994 by a coalition of non-profits 
to foster social justice, participatory democracy and equal relations between 
richer and poorer countries. They claimed they were denied funding by the 
Conservative government for speaking out on Israeli-Palestinian relations, 
costing them a $2.1 million grant for 2009-10 that they had expected receive.527 
A Haifa-based Arab research organisation Mada al-Carmel received three 
grants from an arm’s-length, government funded ‘Crown’ corporation, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC).528 Money was earmarked 
for a study on the marginalisation of women in Arab-Israeli society and low 
levels of political participation by Arabs with Israeli citizenship. In the second 
year of the grant, 2009 March, without good cause the IDRC cancelled grants 
worth $800,000 that amounted to 40% of the Palestinian partner organisation’s 
budget.529 There were allegations of interference by the Israeli and Canadian 
governments. IDRC President David Malone acknowledged that concern over 
funding was first brought to his attention by NGO monitor, and the events led to 
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a 2010 April lawsuit by Mada al-Carmel against IDRC. 530  An out of court 
settlement was agreed in favour of Mada al-Carmel 2010 September.531 
In the wake of the first major bombardment (2008/9) of Gaza by Israel, CAF 
made public statements in early 2009 critical of the State of Israel, the 
Canadian government and certain public figures, while advocating Palestinian 
human rights. 532  Shortly thereafter, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
Kenney instructed Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) to cancel funding 
worth millions of dollars to CAF used for programmes for incoming immigrants. 
That effectively undermined CAF’s operational budget.533 In a similar case, in 
2012 January the Canadian government announced that funding for a 
Mississauga-based non-profit Palestine House would not be renewed after 
2012 March 31 concerns that Palestine House was ‘an extremist institution 
supporting terrorism’. 534  Established in 1994, Palestine House had provided 
language and settlement services to new immigrants, for which it had received 
substantial federal funding.  
In 2011, after a one-year suspension the CRA chose to strip the Palestinian-
Canadian charity International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy Canada 
(IRFAN-Canada) of its charitable status. Its troubles with government included 
years of tax audits, legal battles and public vilification by prominent Canadian 
Conservatives, which included a lawsuit and an out-of-court settlement for 
publicly alleging that the charity was tied to Hamas terrorists.535 By 2013 IRFAN 
suspended its operations after the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce won 
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court approval to close its bank accounts.536 The CRA would later cite findings 
that IRFAN,  
Provided over $14.6 million in resources to operating partners that were 
run by officials of Hamas, openly supported and provided funding to 
Hamas, or have been listed by various jurisdictions because of their 
support for Hamas or other terrorist entities.537   
By 2014 April 29th, a week before IRFAN was to launch a Federal Court appeal 
against the CRA ruling, the Canadian government declared it a terrorist 
organisation and that the federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
would launch a ‘terrorist financing investigation’.538 IRFAN’s lawyer denied the 
charges, while questioning the timing of the move just prior to the court appeal. 
One of the CRA allegations was that IRFAN’s Gaza-based charity partner Ard 
El Insan dealt with a food importer Israel accused of providing funding to 
terrorist groups. Yet Ard El Insan is considered to be in good enough standing 
to in 2013 August partner with the large global charity Save the Children 
Foundation to combat malnutrition in babies.539 
While there have been legitimate questions raised about the partisan nature of 
Liberal government ties to Israel, the Harper Conservative government has 
clearly been applying rules and regulations based on a partisan interpretation of 
Canada’s relationship with Israel. In 2012 the federal government budget 
launched a $13.4 million programme meant to audit charities for political 
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activities.540 Auditors are looking for any evidence of partisan activity, such as 
the endorsement of political candidates or the violation of a rule that limits a 
charity’s political activity to no more than 10% of its resources. It targeted were 
environmental groups, international aid organisations and social-justice groups, 
many of which publicly questioned government policy.541 By 2014 September 1st 
some 52 charities were affected. The CRA claims that it works at arms-length 
from government, but the type of charities targeted suggest otherwise. 542 
Research by the Broadbent Institute clearly indicates that progressive charities, 
not conservative ones, were being singled out for punitive audits.543 For this 
reason the Broadbent Institute called for an independent probe of the CRA, 
saying tax auditors are targeting critics of the Harper government while letting 
right-leaning groups escape scrutiny for their political activities.544  
Government actions have also prompted a number of international aid agencies 
to join forces against the CRA audits under the stewardship of the CCIC, which 
had been itself previously defunded. The CRA in its audits have, for example, 
required Oxfam Canada to alter its mission statement to no longer refer to the 
prevention of poverty, just its alleviation. Onerous CRA demands included that a 
small Vancouver charity, CoDevelopment Canada, translate every Spanish 
document it receives from its partners in Latin America into French or English, 
even taxi receipts, which could by administrative overhead render the 
organisation’s work impossible. Further, new CRA rules under Harper 
compelled charities to direct and control all projects abroad that are funded by 
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their money, an regulation that is completely out of step with modern aid 
practices.545 
 
Canadian Aid to the Palestinians 
By one calculation, Canada implemented 38,917 official development 
assistance projects between 2000 and 2012, in which $USD 35,301,239,778 
had been pledged and $USD 16,839,275,977 actually spent. 546  Meanwhile, 
another calculation found that CIDA, gave out more than $1.7 billion for work in 
the Middle East billion between 1989 and 2008.547 Throughout the 1990s, its 
average yearly expenditure hovered around $65 million for the 21 countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa region, reaching a height of $97.5 million in 
1991/92 in the wake of the Madrid peace conference between Israelis and 
Palestinians that led up to the Oslo Accord. A spike in disbursements between 
2003 and 2007 peaked at $207.5 million in 2003/04 due to an increase in post-
conflict reconstruction commitments linked to Iraq, while a sharp decline took 
place not long after the Harper Conservative government’s 2006 electoral 
victory.548 
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Figure 6: CIDA Expenditures in MENA549 
 
Other estimates hold that between 1993 and 2004 CIDA allocated on average 
$25 million per year for the OPT, while total disbursements reaching $333 
million by the end of 2005 during Prime Minister Martin’s ‘all of government’ 
approach to OPT aid, covering areas such as PA budgetary support, refugees, 
child welfare, municipal infrastructure and capacity building, and civil society.550 
After the immediate dip that came with the Harper Conservative government in 
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2006, a substantial Palestinian ‘aid’ package of $300 million was allocated for 
2008 to 2013, amounting to roughly $60 million per year.551 This was part of 
Canada’s commitment to the 2007 December 17th Paris conference that raised 
$7.7 billion for the PA, making Canada also one of the largest donors.552 
A mainstream interpretation of Canadian Middle East policy by Canadian 
academics is that for decades, at least until the Harper government, Canada’s 
politicians, diplomats, and media considered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be 
the core issue in the Middle East. This is predicated on the idea that solving that 
conflict would bring regional peace, security, and stability. As described in 
previous chapters this was done based on an interpretation of Israel and 
Palestine as a conflict between two sides, rather than settler-colonial 
occupation. At the same time Canada’s policy in all Middle East negotiations 
has been to make sure Israel’s Arab neighbours, and the Palestinians, 
recognise Israel, while not requiring Israel do the same for the Palestinians. 
Unlike many European states, Canada had also been relatively slow to 
acknowledge the Palestinian right to self-determination, not actually using the 
term until after the first Palestinian intifada erupted in 1987.553 Unlike the US, 
Canada long opposed Israeli settlement building in the OPT considering it to be 
a serious obstacle to peace and a violation of international law. However, the 
rhetoric of official policy has not often been matched by action, particularly 
during the Harper government. 
Canada’s main entry in the Peace Process during the 1990s was to work on the 
issue of Palestinian refugees. Both the US and Israel seemed to be more 
comfortable with a Canadian, rather than a European, chair of the highly 
sensitive refugee issue in the Refugee Working Group (RWG).554 Brynen and 
Tansley argue that this choice came due to Canada’s impartiality in the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the issue of refugees.555 However, the historical record had 
long shown that Canada was not impartial. Rather, its Chairpersonship likely 
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555 Rex Brynen and Jill Tansley, ‘The REFUGEE WORKING GROUP of the Middle East 
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owed to its long-time role as a close ally and partner for both Israel and the US, 
with all three holding compatible outlooks on the Palestinian question.  
Canada also became a member of the 15-member AHLC established in 1993 to 
coordinate donor efforts in the West Bank and Gaza.556 Canada contributed to 
the development of an important civil society network called the Palestinian 
NGO Network. A low-level diplomatic post, the Canadian Representative Office 
to the PA, was opened in Ramallah in 1999. Staff came from Foreign Affairs 
and CIDA. Canada also provided funding and political support for a number 
research projects on alternative approaches to peace known as ‘Second Track’ 
or ‘Track II’ from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. That brought together 
individuals from academia, civil society and former officials for ‘problem solving 
workshops’, ‘interactive conflict resolution’, ‘informal diplomacy’, and ‘multi-track 
diplomacy’ in what became known as the ‘Ottawa process’.557  
Canada’s Track II initiatives involved three concentric sets of activities, including 
support for sustained, non-public dialogue among a small group of Palestinian 
and Israeli experts, former officials and current officials. That ‘core group’ 
ultimately produced a joint paper on resolving the Palestinian refugee issue, 
while providing input on other Track II activities. That core group’s work had 
begun with initial Israeli-Palestinian dialogue sessions that had been proposed 
by two researchers who had close connections to Israel.558 The core group’s 
meetings and proposals were supported with assistance from IDRC, which as 
described earlier was one of a number of agencies that later faced difficulties 
under the Harper government. In 2001, Canada’s foreign Minister John Manley 
suggested on his first Middle East trip that Canada might even resettle some 
Palestinian refugees as part of a comprehensive peace agreement. This 
prompted anger in refugee camps where protest rallies were organised and 
people were asked to sign pledges not to immigrate under any circumstance.559  
Later, Canada also joined the Task Force on Palestinian Reform (TFPR), yet 
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another international coordinating body running from 2002 to 2006 to oversee 
donor support for PA reform efforts, at the height of the Second Intifada.560 
In the 1990s CIDA attempted to bolster NGOs working on the Middle East by 
sponsoring the creation of a Middle East Working Group (MEWG).561 This was 
part of an (neoliberal) approach that CIDA saw as part of a broader strategy for 
nurturing the growth of Palestinian civil society by working with secular, local 
organisations that adopted the popular lexicon of liberal democracy and 
sustainable development. 562  In the process Canada chose specifically to 
exclude Islamic NGOs that represented much of Middle East society. The first 
MEWG event consisted of a 1993 June Ottawa workshop attended by 20 
delegates from NGOs in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and the OPT, and 100 
delegates from Canadian NGOs to discuss topics concerning four sectors of 
overseas development work: human rights, women, education and training, and 
the environment.563  It is worth noting that explicitly excluding Islamic NGOs 
sparked significant debate at that meeting. 564  Some delegates said that it 
was  rooted heavily in stereotyping and ignored the fact that Islamic 
organisations were much more deeply rooted in Arab society than the more 
secular and professionalised NGOs CIDA favoured.565 
The then head of CIDA’s NGO division, the driving force behind the creation of 
MEWG, further spoke of the group in terms of its utility from a Canadian 
government perspective. It would have, 
Compatibility with Canadian post-colonial values of anti-racism, equity, 
and social justice and suggested that, while a regional initiative, it was 
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also clear that the Palestinian issue was implicitly “at the core of it”. 
Hence, it would also be correct to say that the NGO Division’s approach 
to promoting civil society in the region had an underlying political edge to 
it.566 
Definitely political since it explicitly excluded Islamic NGOs. All said, the early 
formation and values brought by Canada to MEWG reflected its 1990s 
neoliberal interventionist projection of ‘Canadian values’ abroad. It also 
reflected optimism in the idea that NGOs could be agents of change to ‘develop’ 
local society to become more like the West/Canada, which was an exercise of 
neoliberal soft power. The Canadian government believed that bringing in 
Canadian NGOs would enhance this aim.567 MEWG also reflected the view in 
Canada that Palestine lay at the centre of troubles in the Middle East. This also 
drew MEWG into a debate over whether or not it should support the Peace 
Process.  
Eventually MEWG was wrought asunder by the politics of the Peace Process. 
Participating groups argued over what MEWG’s focus should be, what kind of 
activities it should fund and to what degree it should support the Oslo Process 
and Canada’s work within the RWG. The controversy became more apparent 
as the Oslo Process began to fail. Many Canadian MEWG members were 
concerned that the issue of Palestinian refugees outside the OPT was being 
ignored, and that refugee voices were being excluded from the Western-backed 
Peace Process. This eventually brought elements of MEWG into conflict with 
work being carried out by Canadian representatives in the RWG, and drew the 
ire of Foreign Affairs officials who became concerned that CIDA was supporting 
a group like MEWG that was challenging government policy. A push by MEWG 
members advocating more strongly for the political rights of Palestinians and 
refugees eventually led Foreign Affairs to lose interest in MEWG and the RWG. 
That led to a loss in funding, which was transferred to the IDRC and ultimately 
Track II work as a way of engaging with Palestinian refugees, civil society, 
regional actors and academics. The end result of MEWG’s relationship with the 
Canadian government was that when it attempted to better represent the 
Palestinian voice, the government and Foreign Affairs deliberately weakened it 
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while CIDA turned to IDRC’s Middle East Initiatives unit organising Track II 
activities. 
Later under the Martin Liberal government, following the 2005 foreign policy 
statement and other government policy, an increased emphasis was put on the 
promotion of democracy as a way to reduce terrorist recruitment, alleviate 
poverty, and foster sustainable development in the developing world. Canada 
considered itself a legitimate promoter, reflecting ‘Canadian values’.568  Around 
this time some Canadian aid recipients working in the Middle East began to 
need to sign disclaimers verifying that they had no links with terrorist 
organisations like Hamas. This added even greater administrative overhead for 
stretched NGOs and further concern about whom they could work with, since 
much of Palestinian society could somehow be linked directly or indirectly to the 
dozens of Palestinian organisations listed as terrorist groups by Canada. This 
further segmented Canadian aid organisations off from the large sections of 
Palestinian society they were supposed to be working with to address problems 
like poverty and terrorism, while choosing for Palestinians who could represent 
Palestinian society – similar to what happened when CIDA specifically excluded 
Islamic NGOs from MEWG.569 As later seen with the example of IRFAN, the 
threat of being indicted for working with organisations that might be considered 
terrorist was real. 
 
Overall Canadian Aid 2001 to 2012 
During the early 2000s there was a lull in direct or multilateral OPT aid for 
projects funded from Canada. That excludes Canada’s contributions to 
operational costs for important international, multilateral organisations like 
UNRWA that have been intrinsic to Palestinian subsistence under occupation. 
Thus, in a 2002/3 fiscal year Departmental Performance Report, CIDA did not 
mention the Palestinians or OPT specifically, for ODA disbursements in an 
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incredibly large geographic ‘Africa and Middle East division’ that was said to 
encompass $335,019,255 or 16.7% of Canada’s total ODA.  
This was consistent for a Chrétien Liberal government that took a mostly 
distanced approach to Palestinian aid, preferring by the early 2000s for its funds 
to be hidden within larger international, multilateral contributions or by funding 
Canadian NGOs working in the OPT, in lieu of large, distinctly Canadian 
contributions. It was a government that was after all close to Israel and 
Canada’s Israel lobby. All the while Canada publically remained committed to 
the Oslo Peace Process, while funding work on refugees and Track II peace 
efforts. This was all consistent with Chrétien’s emphasis on the importance of 
Canada’s role as, ‘a mediator and partner in the peacekeeping efforts, 
particularly with regard to the refugee problem’.570 This happened regardless of 
Oslo blowing up on its own contradictions into the violent Second Intifada during 
the final few years of the 10-year Chrétien government.  
By November 2003 Chrétien was succeeded by what would be an even more 
pro-Israel Martin Liberal government, which would take a more direct role in 
Palestinian aid. In the Spring of 2005 the Martin Liberal government claimed 
that development aid was central to Canada’s efforts to inculcate a just and 
sustainable solution to the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, which amounted to 
reinforcing the Oslo aid approach described throughout this thesis. By the end 
of the 2004/5 fiscal year ended March 31st it had given a substantial $38.26 
million for the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian refugees. This aid 
excluded mention to East Jerusalem, consistent with Canadian funding for the 
OPT in the study period. This aid represented a substantial increase in direct 
project funding from zero under Chrétien.  
CIDA described this as the ‘search for peace in the Middle East’, even while the 
Martin government shifted noticeably to an overtly pro-Israel voting pattern in 
international affairs. 571  The increased aid package was part of an ‘all of 
government’ approach to development aid in the OPT, where the expertise of 
between eight to ten Canadian departments and institutions was lent to 
                                                
570 Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, 22. 
571 ‘Departmental Performance Report for the Period Ending March 31, 2005’ (Gatineau, 




strengthen Palestinian institutions in key sectors, notably justice and border 
administration.572 What was happening was that Canada under Martin increased 
its OPT aid funding in order to become more involved in redesigning a 
neoliberal Palestinian state and PA within the Oslo model, to quell the insecurity 
of Second Intifada violence that was disrupting both Israel and the OPT.573  
Following the Martin Liberal government’s ‘all of government’ approach to OPT 
aid, at first the Harper Conservative government largely withdrew from funding 
development to the Palestinians, as its own election coincided within two days 
of the election of Hamas to the PA both late January 2006. CIDA described that 
election in 2007 as political instability that impeded its work in the OPT, 
Political instability can also affect CIDA performance. CIDA programming 
in the West Bank and Gaza was restructured following the victory of 
Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and the 
suspension of Canadian assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Canada 
suspended, terminated or restructured projects that worked directly with 
the Palestinian Authority. Canada maintained the level of assistance to 
Palestinians but refocused its support to address humanitarian needs. 
Support was delivered primarily through multilateral institutions and other 
partners.574 
This was just a momentary lull before even great engagement than the Martin 
government had carried out, in spite of – or perhaps concomitant to – Canada’s 
deepening public ties to Israel under Harper. By 2009 CIDA’s website stated 
that as part of Canada’s aid effectiveness agenda the West Bank and Gaza 
was a country of focus where it wanted to build a more just and prosperous 
society by improving living conditions for Palestinians – thus yet again ‘happy’ 
Palestinians like the US Carter administration first tried to create in the 1970s. 
CIDA further said that, ‘In line with Canadian objectives, CIDA’s program in the 
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West Bank and Gaza is intended to contribute to the establishment of a future 
Palestinian state as part of a comprehensive peace settlement’. 575   That 
approach was taken in conjunction with the PRDP that international donors 
worked out with a recently installed, unelected PA Fayyad government, which 
CIDA claimed was a ‘bottom-up policy-making, planning, and budgeting process 
developed by the PA’ itself. 576  
In its development agenda the Harper government focused on capacity building 
and construction of the PA judicial system, where it considered the United 
States to be the security coordinator. Within judicial reform Canada’s main 
initiatives were to provide assistance by training judges, building courthouses, 
improving PA forensics and strengthening the PA’s prosecution services 
(though not defence services). The official hope was that this would inculcate 
rule of law leading to better business investment, thereby reducing poverty. 
That fits neatly within Ignatieff’s conception of Canadian development as a 
product of ‘peace, order and good government’.577 It is without either irony or 
coincidence that this mirrored the pre-occupation of Anglo-Saxon settler 
colonialism in North America where military forts were usually the first structures 
built on Indigenous territories, and jails shortly thereafter, to quell uprising.578  
Other Harper government priorities for OPT aid included humanitarian 
assistance such as food security and support for children and youth. By 2011-
12 the West Bank and Gaza were in the top 10 of Canada’s ODA package 
recipients with $69 million bilateral aid according to OECD statistics.579 This 
accounted for nearly half of the paltry package of aid Canada gave to the 
Middle East in spite of the dire humanitarian and development situation in the 
region, unravelling ever further since the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq. 
Harper appears quantitatively to have been even ‘more in’ than Martin’s ‘all of 
government’ approach to Palestinian development. 
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Figure 7: Canadian Bilateral ODA to the OPT 2011/12580 
 
That placed Canada in the top 10 of global donors of bilateral ODA in the OPT 
in the period 2011/12. 
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Figure 8: Top 10 ODA Donors to the West Bank and Gaza 2011/12581 
 
Direct	Canadian	Funding	for	Projects	
Using the Department for Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade website’s 
‘International Project Browser’ I was able to put together a list of Canadian 
funded projects, both developmental and humanitarian in nature, as a singular 
or multi-country project, funded during the 2001 to 2012 study period. The list 
excludes projects where a minute percentage of funding within a multi-country 
project was relevant to the OPT. All projects are listed by start date and reflect, 
as such, the Canadian government’s propensity to avoid conspicuously funded 
Canadian projects until the start of the Martin ‘all of government’ approach. 
	
Project Name Partner Period Fund Amount 








and Human Dignity 
University of Windsor 2005-11-24 — 2013-03-
28 
$4,595,030 
Improving the Lives of UNRWA 2006-01-13 — 2011-03- $12,000,000 
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Refugees in Gaza 31 
Food Aid in the West 
Bank and Gaza - WFP 
2008 




World Bank Palestinian 
Reform and 
Development Plan Trust 
Fund 
World Bank 2008-08-15 — 2011-02-
01 
$15,000,000 
Support to Public 
Prosecution Services 





Program Support Unit - 
West Bank and Gaza 
Program - 2009-2012 
Representative Office 





Quick Agricultural and 
Livelihood Recovery - 
West Bank and Gaza - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2009 
CARE Canada 2009-07-17 — 2011-07-
29 
$3,117,340 
Food Security for 
Palestinian Refugees - 
West Bank and Gaza - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2009 
UNRWA 2009-10-26 — 2012-02-
13 
$10,000,000 
Food Security for 
Palestinian Refugees - 
West Bank and Gaza - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2010 
UNRWA 2009-12-18 — 2012-02-
13 
$5,000,000 
Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan Trust 
Fund - II 




Affected Populations - 
West Bank and Gaza - 
ICRC 2010 
International 



















UNDP 2011-01-10 — 2014-03-
31 
$50,500,000 
Capacity Development in 
Forensic Science and 
Medicine 
UNODC - United 
Nations Office on 




Food Security for 
Palestinian Refugees - 
West Bank and Gaza - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2011 
UNRWA 2011-01-21 — 2011-12-
30 
$15,000,000 
Export Development in 
the West Bank 
UNDP 2011-03-11 — 2015-12-
31 
$5,512,682 
Youth Employment - 
West Bank and Gaza - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2011 







Learning Activities for 
Children and Youth in 
Gaza - UN Consolidated 
Appeal 2011 






Occupied Palestinian ICRC - International 2011-03-30 — 2011-12- $750,000 
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Territories - International 
Committee of the Red 
Cross Appeal 2011 
Committee of the Red 
Cross 
31 
Protection of Farmers' 
Livelihoods - West Bank 
and Gaza - UN 
Consolidated Appeal 
2011 
FAO - Food and 
Agriculture 





Food Aid - West Bank - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2011 






UNCTAD - United 
Nations Conference 





Canada Fund for Local 
Initiatives (CFLI) - West 
Bank and Gaza - 2011-
2012 
Representative Office 





Assistance to Small 
Farmers - West Bank 
and Gaza - UN 
Consolidated Appeal 
2011 
CARE Canada 2011-06-30 — 2012-03-
06 
$2,779,665 
Capacity Development in 
Forensic Science and 








- West Bank and Gaza - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2012 
OCHA - United 






Protection of Farmer 
Livelihoods - West Bank 
and Gaza - UN 
Consolidated Appeal 
2012 
FAO - Food and 
Agriculture 






Food Security - West 
Bank and Gaza - UN 
Consolidated Appeal 
2012 
FAO - Food and 
Agriculture 






Food Security - West 
Bank and Gaza - UN 
Consolidated Appeal 
2011 
FAO - Food and 
Agriculture 





Food Aid - Gaza - UN 
Consolidated Appeal 
2012 
WFP 2012-03-30 — 2012-12-
28 
$12,000,000 
Food Aid - West Bank - 
UN Consolidated Appeal 
2012 
WFP 2012-03-30 — 2013-06-
28 
$19,000,000 
Figure 9: Direct Canadian Government Funded Projects582 
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Canadian Funding for Projects in Multiple Countries including OPT 
Meanwhile Canada’s contributions to funding for projects including the OPT 
significantly, but also other countries, was for 2001 to 2012 as follows: 
	
Project Name Partner Period Fund 
Networking for Peace Representative 
Office of Canada to 
the Palestinian 
Authority (OPT 





Middle East Program 
in Civil Society and 
Peace Building Phase 
2 
McGill University 






Partnership - Middle 
East and North Africa 
World Bank  
















of Landmine Victims in 
the Middle East 
Collège 
Montmorency  



































in the Middle East and 
North Africa - UNHCR 
2010 










Emergency Appeals - 
ICRC 2012 
ICRC - International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross (OPT 





Figure 10: Canadian Funding for Projects in Multiple Countries including OPT583 
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Statistical Report on International Assistance — by Country Spending — West 
Bank & Gaza (PS)  
Further using data from the Department for Foreign Affairs, Development and 
Trade website I compiled a record of Canadian government spending in the 
OPT based on data for all Canadian bilateral and multilateral aid for the period 
2001 to 2012.584 Of note, the Canadian government fiscal year ends March 31st, 
so years are listed 2003/4, 2004/5, etc. Amounts are not listed prior to the first 
full Martin government 2004/5, because for 2000/1 to 2003/4 those amounts are 
listed as zero in the Canadian government data. 
Year Source/Sources Source 
Code 
Disbursement 
2004 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 10535919 
2004 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 1000000 
2004 Bilateral Aid - Voluntary Sector 1003 1104097.28 
2004 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 2700000 
2004 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 767865 
  2003/4 
Total 
16,107,881.28 
2005 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 17832324 
2005 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 1919420 
2005 Bilateral Aid - Private sector 1002 133000 
2005 Bilateral Aid - Voluntary Sector 1003 1890660.93 
2005 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 2300000 
2005 Multilateral Aid - UNDP 1021 1238474.458 
2005 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 567000 
2005 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 174935 
2005 Multilateral Aid - UNRWA (Core Funding) 1026 6093000 
2005 Multilateral Aid - IFAD 1029 24707.8 
2005 Multilateral Aid - Other UN 1034 979420.071 
2005 Multilateral Aid - Revaluation of Investments to IFIs 1039 104729.3972 
2005 Multilateral Aid - Other multilateral aid 1047 30313.63636 
2005 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Bilateral) 1051 504281.13 
2005 Bilateral Aid - Rights & Democracy 1056 12505 
2005 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 1388219.15 
2005 Multilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Multilateral) 1066 446530.8056 
2005 Bilateral Aid - Provinces and Municipalities (prior 2004-
05) 
1103 30000 
  2004/5 
Total 
35,669,521.38 
2006 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 25267642.12 
                                                
584 ‘Statistical Report on International Assistance - by Country Spending’, Government of 




2006 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 545949 
2006 Bilateral Aid - Private sector 1002 385300.37 
2006 Bilateral Aid - Voluntary Sector 1003 1250103.48 
2006 Bilateral Aid - Other (Bilateral Aid) 1012 1018742 
2006 Multilateral Aid - UNRWA (Core Funding) 1026 6033875.63 
2006 Multilateral Aid - IFAD 1029 109739.2782 
2006 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Bilateral) 1051 549400 
2006 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 1013860.895 
2006 Bilateral Aid - Provinces and Municipalities (prior 2004-
05) 
1103 40875 
  2005/6 
Total 
36,215,487.77 
2007 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 23940737 
2007 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 430913 
2007 Bilateral Aid - Voluntary Sector 1003 1478939 
2007 Bilateral Aid - Human Assistance, Peace and Security 1007 3481900 
2007 Multilateral Aid - WFP 1020 35313.00161 
2007 Multilateral Aid - UNDP 1021 137.4538957 
2007 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 242307.2901 
2007 Multilateral Aid - UNRWA (Core Funding) 1026 8041006.151 
2007 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Bilateral) 1051 3680513.7 
2007 Bilateral Aid - Rights & Democracy 1056 26155.73 
2007 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 720825.03 
  2006/7 
Total 
42,078,747.36 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 28524056.49 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 423143 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Voluntary Sector 1003 1415345 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Human Assistance, Peace and Security 1007 3050000 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Other (Bilateral Aid) 1012 10617 
2008 Multilateral Aid - WFP 1020 824.0447586 
2008 Multilateral Aid - Notes to UN Organizations 1022 32007.51477 
2008 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 161343.5507 
2008 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 162975.2257 
2008 Multilateral Aid - UNRWA (Core Funding) 1026 9924599.434 
2008 Multilateral Aid - OCHA 1027 770560 
2008 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Bilateral) 1051 1564784 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Rights & Democracy 1056 20019.7 
2008 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 352645.39 
2008 Bilateral Aid - Province of Quebec (Bilateral) 1060 50000 
  2007/8 
Total 
46,462,920.35 
2009 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 47875599.31 
2009 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 340000 
2009 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 4500000 
2009 Bilateral Aid - Other (Bilateral Aid) 1012 21250 
2009 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 92357.50348 
2009 Multilateral Aid - UNRWA (Core Funding) 1026 3076622.846 
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2009 Multilateral Aid - OCHA 1027 1154626.29 
2009 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT Services Rendered Abroad 1052 1271567 
2009 Bilateral Aid - RCMP (Bilateral) 1054 197000 
2009 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 463580.8266 
2009 Bilateral Aid - Province of Quebec (Bilateral) 1060 50000 
2009 Bilateral Aid - Other programs with international 
organizations 
1077 335 
2009 Bilateral Aid - Other Canadian Partnership Programs 1087 1334400 
2009 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund 
(Ensuring Security and Stability) 
1100 8119181.56 
  2008/9 
Total 
68,496,520.34 
2010 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 60753260.26 
2010 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 304352.13 
2010 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 625000 
2010 Bilateral Aid - Multilateral Development Institutions 1008 204000 
2010 Multilateral Aid - WFP 1020 134005.0378 
2010 Multilateral Aid - UNDP 1021 630559.2833 
2010 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 120061.57 
2010 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 126123.447 
2010 Multilateral Aid - OCHA 1027 657773.7112 
2010 Bilateral Aid - RCMP (Bilateral) 1054 269129.124 
2010 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 653829.2158 
2010 Bilateral Aid - Province of Quebec (Bilateral) 1060 12500 
2010 Multilateral Aid - Core UN Organizations (general) 1085 4550.639741 
2010 Bilateral Aid - Other Canadian Partnership Programs 1087 1050996.72 
2010 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund 
(Ensuring Security and Stability) 
1100 1839189.86 
  2009/10 
Total 
67,385,331 
2011 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 65,661,460 
2011 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 339,662.00 
2011 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 750,000.00 
2011 Bilateral Aid - Other (Bilateral Aid) 1012 10,000.00 
2011 Multilateral Aid - WFP 1020 246,258.79 
2011 Multilateral Aid - UNDP 1021 514,737.91 
2011 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 99,728.73 
2011 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 139,940.92 
2011 Multilateral Aid - OCHA 1027 1,596,200.00 
2011 Multilateral Aid - IFAD 1029 14,045.55 
2011 Multilateral Aid - The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 
1040 112,843.36 
2011 Bilateral Aid - RCMP (Bilateral) 1054 280,000.00 
2011 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 351,271.97 
2011 Bilateral Aid - Province of Quebec (Bilateral) 1060 60,000.00 
2011 Bilateral Aid - Other Canadian Partnership Programs 1087 1,114,803.29 
2011 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund 
(Ensuring Security and Stability) 
1100 6,881,452.24 




  2010/11 
Total 
78,177,176 
2012 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 55,857,597.09 
2012 Bilateral Aid - Canada fund for local initiatives 1001 227,564.20 
2012 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 999,000.00 
2012 Bilateral Aid - Other (Bilateral Aid) 1012 20,457.88 
2012 Multilateral Aid - WFP 1020 660,959.53 
2012 Multilateral Aid - UNDP 1021 96,946.66 
2012 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 198,694.50 
2012 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 122,072.57 
2012 Multilateral Aid - IFAD 1029 74,416.22 
2012 Multilateral Aid - The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 
1040 23,274.79 
2012 Bilateral Aid - RCMP (Bilateral) 1054 242,000.00 
2012 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 412,527.67 
2012 Bilateral Aid - Province of Quebec (Bilateral) 1060 50,000.00 
2012 Multilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Multilateral) 1066 25,959.54 
2012 Bilateral Aid - Other Canadian Partnership Programs 1087 604,176.15 
2012 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund 
(Ensuring Security and Stability) 
1100 5,325,899.88 
2012 IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 1111 14,396.76 
2012 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund 
(Advancing Democracy) 
1122 135,179.00 
  2011/12 
Total 
65,091,122.44 
2013 Bilateral Aid - Country and regional programs 1000 23015910.46 
2013 Bilateral Aid - International Humanitarian Assistance 1006 1539000.00 
2013 Bilateral Aid - Other (Bilateral Aid) 1012 20048.46 
2013 Multilateral Aid - WFP 1020 828617.62 
2013 Multilateral Aid - UNDP 1021 372871.47 
2013 Multilateral Aid - UNICEF 1024 58768.27 
2013 Multilateral Aid - UNFPA 1025 125169.93 
2013 Multilateral Aid - The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 
1040 182919.20 
2013 Bilateral Aid - RCMP (Bilateral) 1054 277410.00 
2013 Bilateral Aid - IDRC 1059 366771.67 
2013 Bilateral Aid - Province of Quebec (Bilateral) 1060 13608.00 
2013 Bilateral Aid - Province of Manitoba 1062 15000.00 
2013 Multilateral Aid - DFAIT (Other Multilateral) 1066 18492.28 
2013 Bilateral Aid - Other Canadian Partnership Programs 1087 613858.74 
2013 Bilateral Aid - DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund 
(Ensuring Security and Stability) 
1100 1637035.56 
2013 IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 1111 3784.03 
2013 DFAIT- Global Peace and Security Fund (Advancing 
Democracy) 
1122 35020.00 




Figure 11: Statistical Report on Annual Canadian Aid to the OPT585 
The above lists are not comprehensive for all Canadian government spending 
in those periods, not covering all donations to multilateral agencies, but 
covering much of the projects nonetheless. Rarely did Canada fund anything in 
East Jerusalem, referring only to West Bank and Gaza in its funding, implicitly 
avoiding any challenge to Israel’s annexation of the city. 
 
Trends 
Contrary to conventional expectations, greater Canadian engagement and 
larger sums of aid funding for Palestinians may not have represented a net gain 
for OPT Palestinians. The more overtly pro-Israel a Canadian government was, 
from quite pro-Israel during the Chrétien years to highly partisan with Harper, 
the more Palestinian funding seemed to increase. Thus, during the Chrétien 
years there was relatively little funding for Palestinians, mostly hidden within 
multinational organisations or Canadian NGOs. Martin changed that with sharp 
increases in distinctly Canadian funded projects in a trend that climaxed under 
Harper.  
There were qualitative differences in what was funded, with the Liberal 
governments tending to fund dialogue projects aimed at peace building, or 
refugee work and capacity building. That capacity building included a lurch 
toward security, judicial reform, under Martin that ballooned into a security 
preoccupation under a Conservative government inclined toward building courts 
and prisons to help the Western-backed PA maintain control and quiet in the 
OPT, in lieu of Israel doing so with its own military forces. That Conservative 
engagement included building on Martin’s neoliberal state-building efforts, from 
economic to public sector reforms, stimuli for business and free trade, and 
some support for farmers, while responding to periodic humanitarian calls for 
funding by multilateral organisations. Unlike the Liberal governments, rarely did 
Canada fund Canadian organisations to carry out projects, seeming to prefer to 
fund multilateral or even foreign organisations, which we see by the end of this 
                                                
585 Ibid. 
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thesis is consistent with the Harper government’s crackdown on Canadian 
NGOs working in OPT aid.  
Canada’s aid package to the OPT from 2008 to 2013 was one its most 
significant foreign aid commitments. The focus of most of the funding was on 
PA security reform.586 This approach was supported by Israel, as it reduced 
Israel’s own military costs in the OPT by outsourcing rule of parts of the OPT, 
mostly Areas A, to a Western-backed PA where Fatah had recently wrestled 
control of the West Bank from Hamas.587 Within this orientation, Canada joined 
the US and Britain on a multilateral mission of security reform to change the 
culture, and hard power capacity, of the PA. Under the supervision of the US 
General Dayton, they would build a PA force that could patrol the Israeli 
occupied West Bank and Gaza. In a 2011 profile of Canadian Lieutenant-
Colonel Ron Allison, ‘Dayton's chief of liaison in the West Bank’, it was reported 
in Allison’s hometown newspaper the ‘Times & Transcript’ that,  
The Dayton team was concerned with enhancing security on the West 
Bank of Palestine and was all geared towards looking after and ensuring 
the security of Israel.588  
Meanwhile former Canadian Ambassador to Israel Jon Allen told the Canadian 
Jewish News the basis of this Canadian aid was,589 
To create a Palestinian security force to ensure that the PA maintains 
control of the West Bank against Hamas.590  
Canada’s government seemed pleased with what it was funding. During a visit 
to the Middle East in January 2012, then foreign Minister John Baird said he 
                                                
586 Ilan Evyatar, ‘Canada’s Continuous Commitment’, Jerusalem Post, 9 September 2010, 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Canadas-continuous-commitment. 
587 The Dayton security-training mission was controversial among senior US officers at the 
Pentagon, because its goal was to create a military force that cooperates with Israel. They 
argued this will raise serious objections among Arabs and harm United States interests in the 
region. A US army colonel said in 2009, ‘This is just a stupid idea – it makes us look like we’re 
an extension of the Israeli occupation’. Mark Perry, ‘Dayton’s Mission: A Reader’s Guide - The 
Palestine Papers’, Al Jazeeera, 25 January 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011125145732219555.html. 
588 Yves Engler, ‘Canadian Aid to Palestinians Serves Israel’, The Huffington Post, 19 July 
2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/yves-engler/canadian-aid-palestine_b_3612547.html. 
589 Jon Allen was, as Ambassador to Israel, among several hundred Canadian Jews to be 
commemorated at a dedication site in Canada Park, built on Palestinian villages ethnically 
cleansed in 1967. Cook, ‘Canadian Diplomat Honored on Confiscated Palestinian Land’. 
590 Engler, ‘Canadian Aid to Palestinians Serves Israel’. 
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was, ‘incredibly thrilled by the West Bank security situation, which he said 
benefited Israel’.591 Citing Canada’s assistance in training Palestinian judiciary, 
police, prosecutors and correction officers, Baird said, ‘Canada considers this 
money well spent’.592 An Israeli Embassy spokesman said in a statement that,  
Israel supports a stable and reliable Palestinian Authority with a 
dependable security system and an effective judiciary, and Israelis 
appreciate Canada’s assistance to the Palestinian Authority in these 
important areas.593 
 
To what extent Canadian ‘aid’ to OPT was benefitting Israel after 2008 was 
revealed in heavily censored briefing notes, prepared by CIDA for then 
International Development Minister Julian Fantino ahead of a PA move seeking 
recognition as a de facto state at the UN General Assembly in 2012 November. 
The Conservative government had warned the PA of dire consequences should 
they push ahead with their initiative, threatening that Canada might stop 
providing assistance to the PA beginning with $40 million remaining on a $300 
million 2008 commitment. The notes revealed that Israeli officials by contrast 
highlighted the importance of Canadian aid to the PA, urging Canada to 
maintain its assistance, 
“There have been increasing references in the past months during high-
level bilateral meetings with the Israelis about the importance and value 
they place on Canada’s assistance to the Palestinian Authority, most 
notably in security/justice reform”, reads the note dated Nov. 2, 2012 and 
signed by CIDA president Margaret Biggs. “The Israelis have noted the 
importance of Canada’s contribution to the relative stability achieved 
through extensive security co-operation between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority”. The note is heavily censored, but does go on to 
state that, “the emergence of popular protests on the Palestinian street 
                                                
591 Patrick Martin, ‘Canadian Ministers Take Firm Line with Palestinians’, The Globe and Mail, 
30 January 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-ministers-take-firm-
line-with-palestinians/article547280/. 
592 Ibid. 
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against the Palestinian Authority is worrying and the Israelis have been 
imploring the international donor community to continue to support the 
Palestinian Authority”.594 
 
Threats against the PA reflected similar Conservative reactions toward any 
perceived threat or slight against Israel at home. It also echoed past efforts 
made by some pro-Israel hawks to weaken organisations such as UNRWA by 
withholding or bypassing funding to it, such as when the US government in the 
mid-1990s tried to make UNRWA funding conditional on it being spent on 
projects that promote peace building.595 BADIL, a Palestinian NGO working on 
the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons, says this was a 
euphemistic way of saying that its funds should be spent on the US sponsored 
Palestinian/Arab-Israeli negotiations. 596  With similar logic in 2010 January 
President of the Canadian Treasury Board Victor Toews announced Canada 
would end support to UNRWA, redirecting funds to other entities that the 
Canadian government thought would be spent on projects that reflect Canadian 
‘values’ while ‘safeguarding Israel’s security’. Those cuts were announced not 
long after Israel’s heavy 2008/9 bombardment of Gaza left the territory in a 
severe state of disrepair and acute need of aid typically delivered by UNRWA. 
Canada had until then typically been providing UNRWA with a very significant 
sum, up to 4 per cent of UNRWA’s annual budget.597 So just when Gazans and 
UNRWA most needed funding for a humanitarian disaster, Canada chose to 
punish Palestinians there further.  
Meanwhile, Canada’s close Western allies the US, the UK and the EU donated 
at higher levels in the wake of further displacement of Palestinian refugees from 
                                                
594 In 2010 the Canadian government decided to stop providing direct budgetary support to 
UNRWA. Applauded by some segments of the pro-Israel lobby in Canada, documents obtained 
by Ottawa-based foreign policy newspaper Embassy in July 2011 showed Israel was among a 
number of countries that unsuccessfully urged Canada to reverse its decision. Ibid. 
595 It is worth noting though that this was not just a Conservative approach. As seen with MEWG 
in the mid-1990s, when it ran afoul of Liberal foreign policy, this led to their defunding and a shift 
of funds to the more Oslo and Israel friendly Track II process. 
596 ‘Humanitarian Aid to Subvert Palestinian Refugee Rights – Not on Our Watch!’ (Press 
Release, 2010), http://www.badil.org/en/press-releases/135-2010/1985-nakbacommittee-
statement-jan2010. 
597 Palestine Solidarity Network, ‘Action: Canada Cuts Aid to UNRWA’, Activist, Palestine 
Solidarity Network, accessed 16 September 2014, http://psnedmonton.ca/2010/01/29/action-
canada-cuts-aid-to-unrwa/. 
	 192 
the Syrian civil war, making up for shortfalls exacerbated by Canada. In March 
2013, CIDA was shut down and absorbed into Foreign Affairs. The relative 
autonomy of the 45-year old agency had never sat well with a Harper 
government averse to autonomy.598 Further, by folding it into a new Department 
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), Canada’s development 
assistance work could be more closely linked to the international interests of the 
Canadian state.599 
 
The 10 Organisations Studied as a Sample of Canadian Aid 
Without mention to defendant representation in its funding for the PA judicial 
system, the focus in Canada’s concern with OPT security seemed very much to 
be getting Palestinians in prison over actual justice. Further, all Canadian 
governments ignored the intensifying apartheid taking place under Israeli 
military rule that undermines any sense of a fair legal system, and which is 
guarantees business investment cannot work.600 As Lloyd points out, in settler 
colonial rule the rule of law is routinely suspended by the coloniser even though 
it was already sanctifying racialised dispossession, 
The suspension of law in face of the legitimate, violent or non-violent 
resistance, or, indeed, even the very persistent presence, of the 
indigenous colonised people, is a given of every colonialism.601  
CIDA also worked only in the West Bank with the PA from the spring of 2006 
onward, other than some humanitarian projects with what CIDA said were 
trusted partners, in spite of Gaza’s immense humanitarian needs and thereby 
reinforcing Israel’s siege over Gaza. Fundamentally, more engagement by 
Canada meant more support for a fatally flawed Oslo aid model, which as 
described in this thesis, has ultimately reinforced Israeli settler colonial rule over 
the OPT.  
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Given the context laid out in Chapters 4 and 5, the following three Chapters will 
reveal how this impacted on the development projects of the sixteen project 
coordinators I interviewed from ten Canadian organisations, through the design, 
implementation and outcome stages of their projects. For those coordinators the 
ten Canadian organisations I studied carrying out human rights and advocacy 
or capacity building and poverty reduction projects in the OPT from 2001 to 
2012 represented a significant part of Canada’s aid engagement with the OPT 
for the period. This was especially so during the Chrétien Liberal government 
years 2001-2003 when there were no uniquely Canadian funded projects and 
the Canadian government took a more hands-off approach to Palestinian aid.  
Of Human Rights and Advocacy work, the four organisations focused on these 
areas of work had ranges of budgets as follows: 
• Organisation 1 was a relatively large organisation with typically more 
than 40 staff and a budget in the millions of dollars, but which mostly 
engaged with the OPT on a limited scale with small funds or within larger 
regional projects. Still, it was ultimately defunded by the Harper 
government seemingly over that OPT aid engagement.  
• Organisation 2 is a small Canadian registered charity run nearly 
exclusively by volunteers, which typically worked on a small annual 
budget in the $10,000s devoted primarily to Palestinian aid work. 
• Organisation 3 is a medium-sized charity with typically fewer than 40 
staff and a budget that generally sat around several million dollars per 
year for global engagement, including a great deal of OPT engagement. 
The organisation faced a major funding cut of a few millions dollars in 
government grants late in the research period, seemingly punished by 
the Harper government due in part to its support for OPT aid projects. 
• Organisation 4 is a medium sized charity with well under 40 staff and a 
budget that ranged from highs of a few million dollars to lows of several 
hundred thousand dollars per year in the study period, with the lows 
seemingly linked to a major government funding owing to ongoing OPT 
development work. 
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Of Capacity Building and Poverty reduction work, the six organisations focused 
on these areas had ranges of budgets as follows: 
• Organisation 5 ran a single project for judicial reform running in the OPT 
from 2005 to 2012 with a significant budget of over several million dollars 
for that period. 
• Organisation 6 is a relatively large organisation with over 40 staff and a 
budget in the range of tens-of-millions of dollars covering projects all 
around the world, but where OPT aid work was always an important area 
of work including support work for peace building during the hands-off 
Chrétien government years. 
• Organisation 7 had just several staff while funding a Middle East capacity 
building aid project of over ten million dollars in the study period, where 
the majority of the funding was directed toward the OPT. 
• Organisation 8 is a charity with just several staff in Canada and a budget 
that ranged per year from highs in the hundreds-of-thousands to lows in 
the tens-of-thousands of dollars, with primary focus was on funding 
Palestinians in the OPT or regionally in the Middle East. 
• Organisation 9 is a large charity with more than 40 employees and an 
annual budget in the tens-of-millions of dollars, which ran a significant 
OPT project backed with several million dollars in the study period.  
• Organisation 10 had just several staff but an annual budget typically in 
the millions of dollars, sometimes exceeding ten million dollars, and 
significant engagement with the OPT including singular development 
projects that exceeded a million dollars in worth.  
 
Although Canada has a history of global human rights engagement, 
fundamentally this does not extend to Palestinians ruled by its ally Israel. As 
such the Canadian organisations I surveyed represented with small budgets 
much of the Canadian support for Palestinian rights. Meanwhile, as shown in 
the above figures 9 and 10 a pattern of capacity building engagement took 
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place under the Martin and Harper governments as part of official foreign policy 
to reduce OPT poverty, notably by improving rule of law, which did not 
challenge Israeli rule. Of the less political capacity building organisations I 
surveyed they had budgets in the millions of dollars and represented a very 
significant component of the total development aid for this area of work. In this 
way what is immediately noticeable is that the more overtly political projects had 
vastly less support from Canada than the more technocratic capacity building 
and poverty reduction projects, the latter of which could more easily fit within the 
neoliberal framework of the Oslo Process. This makes sense considering the 
crackdown we will see takes place against Canadian organisations working in 














CHAPTER 6 - Project Planning and Design 
Introduction  
Inequality in the way aid projects are planned in the aid sector is un-
concealable. It is a sector-wide issue in the OPT and other regions of the world. 
Palestinians are rarely included in the development of projects, and even when 
they are, often they do not fully understand the meanings of the terminology 
used by donors to design projects. The World Bank even pointed out in a report 
published on the eve of the Second Intifada in 2000 that PA policy itself was 
shaped by donor interests, because donors were financing virtually all 
investments in the OPT.602 PNGOs can only be expected to operate from a 
weaker position vis-à-vis Western donors than the PA. In this way Palestinian 
agency is strictly limited to what Israel and the donors allow, shaped by the 
inducements of aid, donor views and limited by Israeli force. Though it is 
beyond the scope of this research study to determine the extent to which the 
ten organisations I researched determined the agenda for their Palestinian 
partners, a power imbalance and limitations on Palestinian agency will have 
existed because it was the Canadians who controlled the money.  
This is the first of three chapters looking at the experiences of the sixteen 
project coordinators I interviewed from the ten Canadian organisations 
described in Chapter 3. They carried out development aid projects in the OPT in 
rights and advocacy, or capacity building and poverty reduction, from 2000 to 
2012. The purpose of this first chapter is to provide information from those 
interviews on how they and their organisations sought out Palestinian partners, 
and developed and designed projects for the OPT. This is done bearing in mind 
the prevailing tendency in mainstream neoliberal aid to conceptualise projects 
as linear by nature, with a step-by-step process where policy and projects are 
formulated, implemented, and then followed by results they can evaluate to see 
how far the original objectives were achieved.603 Thus Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are 
broken up based on three phases, starting with the planning and design stage.  
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Analysing the interviews from this perspective provides information in this 
chapter to what extent the neoliberal paradigm influenced the design of 
interviewees’ projects, to what extent the Palestinian viewpoint was taken into 
account when designing projects and to what extent the context of Israeli settler 
colonialism was accounted for. Most important of all, though, this chapter 
reveals not just the extent to which the neoliberal model was adopted but to 
what extent the Canadian governments partisan views favouring Israel already 
undermined projects in the opening stage, and how the project coordinators 
coped with it. This could mean understanding meanings that were neither 
spoken nor obvious. 
 
Criticisms of Neoliberal Aid 
Unlike neoliberal practitioners, critics of development aid do not share a blind 
faith in the power of policy to bring about positive change. For critics 
development aid is not neutral policy to be implemented, but rather a form of 
domination that should be resisted.604 In fact it is never neutral, 
Various studies highlight the fact that funding, despite its apparently 
technical and specialised outlook, is never truly neutral, and that behind 
the noble objectives of “development” lie much more straightforward 
political (and in some cases economic) interests.605 
Like some of the realists in IR like Hans Morgenthau, some critics suspect that 
aid has an elaborate façade that obscures the true aims of a donor that is trying 
to buy political advantage from the government of another state, which in a 
sense describes the donor ‘peace dividend’ relationship with the PA.606 For this 
reason critics of aid argue that it is essential to understand the unspoken aims 
that determine how aid policy or an aid package has been constructed, to know 
why aid is being given in the first place and what it is really meant to achieve. 
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Thus, a researcher needs to actively seek out the unspoken and unwritten 
intentions that lie behind aid.607  
This is especially true for critics of Palestinian aid. In contrast to mainstream aid 
providers, Palestinian aid critics fault the failure of OPT aid (and by extension 
the Peace Process) not just on Israeli policy, but also the very way in which aid 
policy has been constructed. They are particularly critical of the neoliberal 
normative values intrinsic to Palestinian aid. For instance, they argue that plans 
for an economic integration between Israel and the OPT only benefits Israel at 
the expense of Palestinian economy and sovereignty, rather than boosting the 
latter.608 Further, they argue that the neoliberal aid model designed by the World 
Bank is both ineffective and harmful, having led to economic decline, subverted 
Palestinian civil resistance (within the peace dividend) and even subsidised the 
Israeli occupation. As a logical extension many of the critics of Oslo aid, say 
that aid has not only failed, but is acting as a smokescreen that obscures the 
occupation and helps to sustain a failed Peace Process that is being 
manipulated Israel’s advantage.609 This means that Western development aid 
after Oslo has not been helping the Palestinians, but rather dominating them 
politically and socially, all for the benefit of Israel. 
Thus critics eschew nearly every aspect of Oslo Process. Echoing a broader 
critical voice in the development aid literature, they suspect that Oslo aid policy 
is a rationalising technical discourse that conceals a hidden bureaucratic power, 
or dominance, which is the true political intent behind Western aid. Take for 
example the US’ historical attempts to use aid to keep Palestinians quiet but 
living under Israeli occupation, or Western training of Palestinian police in the 
Institution Building Period that have been used to quell Palestinian protesters 
and manage the occupied OPT.610  
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Also in contrast to the neoliberal optimism in policy, critics argue that aid has 
either harmed or done nothing for the underdeveloped world.611 For example, 
the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation argues that the aid industry has actually 
harmed Palestinian society and subverted a Palestinian-owned development 
agenda.612 Drawing on concepts found in dependency theory, critics believe that 
the West dominates its former colonies through relations of asymmetry and 
dependence – while asymmetry is actually an accepted relationship in 
neoliberal IR. In conjunction with the West's hegemonic structure there is a 
transnational elite anchored in both the business and the NGO sectors, where 
there is embodied a principle of senior and junior partners, with the senior 
partners being in the developed West and the junior partners the undeveloped 
rest. Those senior partners in the West are the decision-makers, while the junior 
partners in the underdeveloped world taking on the less important management 
roles. 613  In the case of the OPT, this has contributed to a situation where 
International NGOs (INGO) and government aid agencies overshadow their 
junior PNGO and PA partners. This has created the illusion of ‘partnerships’, 
often with Palestinian elites approved by Israel, where development aid has not 
been articulated according to the needs of Palestinians but to donor priorities, 
all within a context where, 
Israeli control over the receipt of external transfers, the distribution of 
foreign monies, and the selection of “recipient” institutions, has often 
served to perpetuate the economic and institutional status quo in the 
occupied territories instead of transforming it.614 
 
Through those senior-junior partnerships Western donors have, irrespective of 
Palestinian values or priorities, sought to build an entirely new Palestinian state 
based upon neoliberal values exported from the West. They have gone so far 
as to call for nothing short of a managed reorganisation of the entirety of OPT 
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state and society. The context of that intervention has always been articulated 
from outside the OPT.615 
Meanwhile, Canada was very much inclined throughout the post-Oslo years 
toward accepting a senior role in a development partnership. As described in 
Chapter 5 official Canadian foreign policy was by then very much based on a 
neoliberal principle of projecting Canadian values abroad, and in this way 
making the world better by making it more like Canada. In the case of the OPT 
this would mean remaking Palestinian society into a democratic, tolerant and 
liberal state with open markets like Canada. It was in this way that Canadian 
policy makers approached the Palestinians, along with their deep-set 
preferences for Israel and the Israeli narrative of their occupation over the OPT. 
 
Seeking Out Partnerships and Projects 
Development aid priorities are first conceptualised in Canada before a 
Palestinian partner is brought in on any development aid project. This is typical 
of senior-junior partnerships and of the projects run by the project coordinators I 
interviewed. This also took place in spite of those interviewees, by-and-large, 
expressing a strong preference to involve a Palestinian partner in designing a 
project from the very start. That this could not really happen may simply reflect 
the structural realities of development aid and of Canadian development aid. 
There is for example the underlying disparity in power that exists between the 
Canadian organisations that controls the funding vis-à-vis its Palestinian partner 
that has no control. Then there are the funding structures that exist in Canada 
behind the donor organisation itself, including CRA regulations and government 
policy that insists on maintaining that power disparity.   
Thus, in numerous instances projects were conceived of first in Canada, such 
as Organisation 7’s network of community social work NGOs, three human 
rights projects Ash funded from Organisation 1 in 2009 after Gaza’s 
bombardment, the rule of law project Kim at Organisation 5 was asked by the 
Canadian government to create, or in an extreme example the project 
Organisation 4 ran in Gaza that was designed by CIDA itself. The Canadian 
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government funded all of these projects according to its priorities, and the latter 
two were actually developed thematic or structurally by the Canadian 
government development agency CIDA. Only Organisation 6 could specifically 
refer to Palestinian partners pitching projects to them, though Sawyer said at 
Organisation 8 they helped partners design proposals and Organisation 10 had 
field offices in the OPT monitoring partner needs to determine project funding. 
Even though my interviews were semi-structured, allowing the interviewees to 
emphasise their own thoughts and experiences within a few broad themes, 
some common ground appeared between them. Some coordinators spoke at 
length about the way their organisation selected Palestinian partners to work 
with. Others simply had historical partners they worked with, often a partnership 
that predated a project coordinator. All of the Canadian organisations working in 
the OPT relied on their Palestinian partner to implement projects, both because 
the Canadians lacked the resources and knowledge to implement projects on 
their own, but also because they shared a genuine aspiration to empower and 
support Palestinian civil society. At the project coordinator level this was 
universal. How they chose their partners and the type of projects they would 
support reveals some information about the boundaries set upon them in their 
work by the Canadian government and the neoliberal paradigm. 
Emory was able to provide background information on the way Organisation 1 
selected its partners back to the early 1990s. He/she consciously pushed 
against the neoliberal and pro-Israeli Canadian government boundaries he/she 
encountered. Emory said that just prior to the onset of the Oslo process he/she 
wanted to find some projects that Organisation 1 could invest into in a 
meaningful way, with a limited budget. At the time Emory believed that the best 
investment would be PNGOs for the simple reason that there was then a 
capacity among Palestinians to work within a civil society that was 
complemented by a vibrant business community, before de-development really 
accelerated in the 1990s and gutted OPT business. That had been period of 
richness in civil society should look like, as compared to the years after Oslo.616  
Emory selected some early partners by traveling from Canada to Israel and the 
OPT. Based on that initial field visit, he/she chose to fund PNGOs concerned 
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with rights work. Even though it was nowhere stated directly that Emory would 
need to work with Israelis, this was made implicitly clear when the CEO of 
Organisation 1 said, ‘And what are you doing with the Jewish human rights?’617 
For that reason Emory selected two Israeli partners to work with, in order to 
create the impression of balance, mostly to better be able to defend the 
Palestinian organisations he/she chose to work with. For similar reasons Emory 
funded for a time in the 1990s a Jerusalem peace group established by an 
Israeli and a Palestinian organisation, which would later be funded with more 
enthusiasm by Organisation 3. 
Given the pro-Israel politics in Canada, Emory had felt compelled by his/her 
CEO to fund some Israeli NGOs working on Palestinian rights.618 It was not an 
approach that he/she favoured. He/she felt that PNGOs represented the more 
important investment and had the greatest need, while he/she did not like 
having to fund organisations simply on the basis of their being Israeli. Notably, 
Emory would also fund in this period a West Bank human rights organisation 
that Ash would later fund, provoking turmoil at Organisation 1 that is described 
in Chapters 7 and 8.619  
During Ash’s first years of work after Emory from the mid-2000s onwards, 
Organisation 1’s staff would support projects in the OPT by making small grants 
that did not have to be reviewed by their Board of Directors, because there was 
always a pro-Israel lobbyist monitoring their work from it.620 In 2009, Ash made 
small grants after the Operation Cast Lead bombardment of Gaza of around 
$10,000 each to three human rights organisations to document human rights 
violations. 621  The three recipients included the Palestinian human rights 
organisation in the West Bank that Emory funded in the early 1990s, as well as 
a Gazan human rights organisation and an Israeli one. As with Emory, Ash in 
part to include an Israeli organisation to create the impression of balance, given 
both Canada’s politics and the habit in settler colonialism of devaluing the 
                                                
617 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 19min57s to 21min37s 
618 Those initial five organisations were a human rights centre in Gaza, a Palestinian women’s 
legal aid clinic in east Jerusalem, an Israeli human rights organisation composed primarily of 
medical professionals and an Israeli human rights organisation where women were tasked with 
mapping out the demolition of Palestinian homes. 
619 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 39min47s to 50min16s 
620 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 4min00s to 4min30s This balance was disrupted for the worse when, 
according to Ash, a new CEO joined the organisation in 2008. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 
05min04sec to 5min15sec 
621 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 01min00sec to 03min57sec 
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narrative of the colonised. All three were chosen by Ash because they were 
internationally renowned rights organisations he/she was familiar with.622  
Organisation 3 was an example of an organisation that had historical partners 
that had mostly preceded the project coordinators and they would rely when 
making project proposals. An exception was a West Bank women’s centre they 
would start to support only from the 2010s. Shared values played an important 
part in determining whom Organisation 3 would work with. For instance, they 
preferred to support faith-based OPT organisations working in areas they could 
agree on, such as human rights. Organisation 3 also worked through a number 
of coalitions MEWG in Canada. It was in those coalitions that they sometimes 
got recommendations about Palestinian organisations working in common 
areas of concern, such as women’s issues.623  
Hayden began to work with two existing Palestinian centres in Gaza with 
Organisation 4.624 Those were though not historical partners, but selected by a 
PA Ministry in a project designed by CIDA. Organisation 4 itself did not even get 
involved in the design stage, just overseeing implementation with its Palestinian 
partners. 
Organisation 10 did not carry out projects on their own, relying on local 
Palestinian partners to implement them. They seemed to have one of the most 
structured processes for selecting partners and projects. Before each fiscal 
year-end, approximately October, they would ask the field offices they funded in 
the West Bank and Gaza to look for the most important activities that required 
funding in the OPT. Those recommendations would then be reviewed at the 
home office in Canada, where Blake would prioritise the projects, evaluating 
them one-by-one before presenting them to Organisation 10’s Board of 
Directors to decide on funding.  
The organisations that focused on capacity building and poverty reduction were 
more easily able to fit their work into the neoliberal donor model. That is 
                                                
622 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) also says that he/she nearly had ‘to beg’ the three different 
organisations to accept the fund. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 25min45sec to 26min22sec 
623 When starting a new partnership normally they would start with a sort of test fund. If that 
worked it would turn into a longer term funding relationship. Taylor (2014 September 4) 
24min07s to 27min59s 
624 They were not really functioning though due to a lack of funding for programs, existing more 
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because they avoided political engagement like Palestinian rights work. 
Organisation 7 was though an exception because it was directly concerned with 
supporting rights and advocacy for marginalised people through its network of 
social work NGOs and their projects. The reason it was able to thrive in spite of 
this may be because its work included bringing Palestinian and Israeli 
organisations together, which distinctly fit into the neoliberal Oslo model of 
peace building with cooperation.  
At Organisation 7 Kai believed development could not take place in the OPT 
unless connected to peace building, politics, which Kai believes can only be 
carried out when there is communication between both Israelis and 
Palestinians. Thus, Organisation 7 first worked to identify people and institutions 
that: shared similar peace building values, the rights people should share and a 
belief in a progressive civil society.625 Specifically Kai says he/she approaches 
the Israeli-Palestinian question with the idea that you cannot believe in Jewish 
rights if you do not believe Palestinians share the same rights, and he/she 
believes that is where the conflict starts.626  
Organisation 7 began work in the late 1990s with four initial regional partners: 
one Israeli, two Palestinian and one Jordanian.627 Quinn noted that there had 
not been a very formal or structured approach to seeking out new partners as 
the organisation expanded. This is lack of structure is something Quinn said 
they would address in 2008/9 as part of a government grant request. It is worth 
noting that none of the interviewees mentioned having a structured process by 
which they chose partners, while most seem from their interviews to have relied 
on informal networks, personal contacts and field visits to seek out Palestinian 
partners. For instance, it was through personal and professional connections 
that Ryan became acquainted with the CEO of a Gazan mental health 
programme in the late 1980s that Organisation 2 would support.  None 
mentioned being sought out by a Palestinian partner, though I cannot exclude 
the possibility this may have occurred at some point. This makes sense, since 
the Canadian organisations were ultimately the senior partner. 
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Government Funding Initiating a Project 
The way the Canadian organisations selected projects and whom they worked 
with often depended on their funding source. Specifically, a number of 
organisations funded projects after answering a Canadian government call for 
proposals for a specific thematic area of work. Regardless of the aims of the 
Canadian organisations in the region, they would have been responding to a 
government request to carry out a certain type of work, within the parameters of 
which they would have to operate. The result would be policy makers bearing a 
great deal of influence over a project.  
In the case of Organisation 5 they were approached by Foreign Affairs in the 
mid-2000s to carry out a feasibility study about Canada contributing to the rule 
of law in the West Bank and Gaza. This led to the organisation pitching a 
proposal to CIDA for a judicial education project in the OPT.628  Elsewhere, 
Organisation 6’s projects were typically designed in Canada after a request 
from government, usually Foreign Affairs and CIDA. In a more extreme case of 
direct government involvement, Hayden referred to their Gaza project at 
Organisation 4 as an exceptional one where their organisation had joined a 
Canadian partner already bidding on a CIDA contract, for a project that had 
already been designed by CIDA with its junior partner PA Ministry. As will be 
explained, CIDA would obtrusively interfere with the project at the 
implementation and analytical levels. Organisation 4 had entered into a 
development project with very defined parameters. 
Even though Organisation 7 was able to access successive multi-million dollar 
CIDA grants over the course of the three different Canadian governments who 
ruled in the study period, it was an outlier organisation for CIDA funded project 
in this study. In the case of this work, its project did not begin with a government 
call for a specific type of grant, such as social work. Instead it came via their 
lobbying the government and they felt they received the funding against the 
wishes of CIDA’s bureaucrats. So in that case Organisation 7 was able to enter 
into a CIDA grant simply to fulfil its own pre-existing aims and vision, set out by 
them in Canada, rather than creating a project based around a CIDA call for 
funding for a certain thematic area.  
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The Canadian Organisations’ Priorities 
As seen with the cases of organisations 5 and 6, and especially Organisation 4, 
the source of funding and specifically Canadian government funding could have 
a major impact on determining what kind of projects Canadian aid organisations 
would fund in the OPT. Further, an evolving Canadian political and policy 
environment would have a major impact on that aid environment. Still, each 
organisation still had its own vision and agenda for its Palestine development 
work, while each coordinator also had his/her own ideas and priorities. Some 
organisations such as Organisation’s 2 and 10 had the advantage of alternative 
funding sources not from government that let them prioritise their own areas of 
work, rather than government policy priorities.  
Emory tended to fund human rights research and advocacy work generally, 
seeking systemic political change, over developmental projects that targeted 
specific types of beneficiaries – with an exception being a women’s legal aid 
clinic.629 Ash says the projects they funded in 2009 to document post-conflict 
human rights abuses were proposed by their partners, though it must be borne 
in mind that the three partners were chosen by Organisation 1 to work on a 
thematic area conceived of in Canada.630  
Organisation 2 was among the organisations least affected by a donor’s 
mandate, especially the Canadian government, which allowed them to be more 
dedicated to their vision than finding funding to sustain their operations. When 
they worked in the OPT they preferred, as Emory tried, to contribute to 
Palestinian community, social and advocacy work. Ryan said this type of work 
was pretty natural for a Palestinians, since they had been setting up centres 
across the OPT for such work, like mental health organisation he/she helped to 
develop in Gaza. Organisation 2 meanwhile emphasised research and 
management accountability in the projects and organisations they worked with. 
This edged their work into the realm of capacity building when working on 
projects with a Palestinian partner, though the political rights component 
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remained central to their OPT intervention.631 As an example, Ryan knew that 
well-structured proposals could land a Palestinian partner the funding it needed, 
and this is how he/she helped their Gazan community mental health partner to 
develop the capacity to apply for large grants.632 At the same time Ryan pointed 
out to that partner that, ‘a good research proposal is a very good political 
instrument’. 633  Over time the Gazan partner managed to produce fantastic 
papers with international partners from all over the world.  
Meanwhile, Ryan believes that good accountability is essential to running a 
good organisation. He/she said that, ‘as you know’ the world is full of corruption, 
where even people who are not dishonest by nature face circumstances that 
compel them to manage money improperly. To help fight that tendency 
Organisation 2 emphasised accountability.634 Ryan felt that this played on the 
strengths of his/her organisation, whose Chairperson he/she said had 
‘incredible integrity’; and on the strengths of Canadians, who he/she described 
as not a particularly creative country but very good at administration.635  
The projects that Organisation 3 supported in the OPT were almost exclusively 
partner responses. During the study period 2000-2012 they would typically 
respond to those requests by including some of them in funding proposals to 
granting bodies, CIDA in particular, and this led to financial support for projects 
such as a health centre in Gaza and the peace building initiative in Jerusalem 
run between an Israeli and a Palestinian women’s groups. 636  Of course, 
Organisation 3 was still the senior partner in that relationship. 
It is worth noting that though Organisation 5 ran a project initiated by the 
Canadian government, Kim explicitly designed their CIDA funded project to be 
run in conjunction with a Palestinian partner as co-leader.637 This was not an 
arrangement CIDA was comfortable with, as they wanted the Canadian 
implementing agency to be completely in control of the project as the leader 
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632 With assistance from Ryan structuring their grant writing, that Gazan partner soon got a 
modest first $40,000 grant and within a couple years they would grow to over 50 staff with a 
million dollar budget. Ryan (2014 December 2) 06min21s to 09min49s 
633 Ryan (2014 December 2) 11min44s to 11min48s 
634 Ryan (2014 December 2) 17min29s to 19min02s 
635 Ryan (2014 December 2) 19min02s to 21min20s 
636 Reflecting like Emory on the constraints of a limited budget, Remy felt that they are not a 
large agency and this loomed in his/her view of how they approached their work. 
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(the senior partner). From Kim’s perspective it was necessary to treat their 
Palestinian partner equally in order to accomplish anything.638 This was not just 
idealism, but was based on the partner being the people on the ground who 
would feel the impact of the project. As the project progressed Organisation 5 
also came to realise they could not accomplish anything without their 
Palestinian partner. 
Organisation 6 preferred to work on the basis of partner responses. When 
working with partners Jamie said that they specifically took an approach as an 
organisation of not dictating how things should be done, seeking instead to 
engage in a reciprocal negotiation process when first designing a project. Unlike 
the other organisations I interviewed, they had a lengthy and structured 
selection process to decide what projects would get funding.639 Several versions 
of a proposed project would be written up in a lengthy process, reflecting both 
their and their partner’s perspective.640 The staff in Canada in charge of the 
assessment would then decide whether or not the project should be funded, 
passing it on for final approval to a senior manager and the CEO. 641  The 
Palestinian partner would be involved throughout the process, though it must be 
noted that once again it would be the Canadian organisation deciding what was 
ultimately worth funding from a Canadian perspective. Further, the entire 
process usually began with a government offer to fund a specific thematic area 
of work that reflected Canadian policy priorities. 
Sawyer said that nearly all of the time the partners they worked with in the OPT 
would tell Organisation 8 what they needed. 642  Those partners had to be 
PNGOs, and could never be the PA or government. The challenge he/she said 
was that those OPT partners mostly do not formulate their needs in very 
practical terms. While some PNGOs understood very well how to design a 
project, others did not and needed a lot of coaching. So Organisation 8 would 
write proposals according to aid industry norms, trying to present those partner 
ideas in a way that can get funded while involving the partner in the writing 
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process.643 Organisation 8 would go through the details of the ideas a partner 
had for a project, trying to figure out what that partner wanted to achieve, what 
the nature of the project is and what the anticipated results would be, in order to 
develop a proposal that could be presented to a donor. Regardless of 
organisations 8’s best intentions, that gap it filled helping PNGO partners, and 
itself, to receive funding ultimately meant that it had the advantage of power in 
finding funding and choosing what could be supported. 
Project coordinators Blake and Dallas focused primarily on more technocratic 
health, education and economy projects. The economic projects they funded in 
the OPT were not meant to make money, though, but rather fulfilled a 
humanitarian function keeping people busy and employed, while helping their 
families indirectly by employing a family member. For Organisation 10 the 
process of keeping people active and alive was as important as any objective. 
This resembled in some ways the Arab ‘sumud’ funding of the 1980s that 
helped Palestinians resist settler colonialism by surviving. It was also more 
practical than most of the business projects funded or encouraged by donors 
during the Oslo Process, because on a practical approach it took into account 
the impossibility of setting up successful business projects under settler colonial 
conditions.  
For each project Dallas and Blake evaluated they took into consideration two 
key questions: how many people would benefit from a project, and – with an 
extra emphasis on 2008 onward – if the projects could sustain themselves long-
term?644 With a private fundraising capacity and by not relying on government 
funding, they could more easily respond to the needs of their partners. Where 
government still interfered though in their work though was through oversight of 
Organisation 10’s work via the CRA. This would put a great limitations on their 
OPT work over time. 
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Foregoing the Linear Project Model 
Quite a number of the project coordinators I interviewed shied away from the 
linear aid model, and the short-term projects – lasting just months or a few 
years – associated with it. In those cases, they preferred to try to support a 
partner in fulfilling its vision as an organisation, reflecting its own community’s 
priorities. That is, a number of the coordinators said specifically that they were 
more concerned with the process of keeping people busy and employed, or 
providing them with funding to remain operational, than meeting the narrow 
outcomes of a prescribed project. Those project coordinators were more 
interested in supporting a partner and its vision, than just succeeding at a single 
project.  
Emory, Remy, Taylor, Kim, Quinn, Sawyer, Kai, Blake and Dallas said this 
outright. Remy for instance said that his/her organisation is most interested in 
sustaining partnerships and accompanying partners over a long period of 
time.645 Organisation 8 took a more mixed approach as Sawyer emphasised 
that approach in their early years of operations. In the 1980s and 1990s they 
focused foremost on supporting a partner and people, not specific project 
outcomes. In later years though they added more linear grant projects that were 
short term, perhaps reflecting the opening up of CIDA in the 1990s to them for 
Palestine development projects. Emory’s funding was consciously oriented 
toward helping cover the operational costs of the NGOs that Organisation 1 
worked with, acting like a small core-fund supporting their general operations 
and vision.646 Ash began work in the mid-2000s at a time when Organisation 1 
was devoted to the linear neoliberal model, limiting what Ash could do to 
support partners. Even then Ash preferred to provide core funding and claimed 
to offer it whenever possible via small grants.647 Meanwhile, Kim believed that 
part of the rationale behind aid projects is to help keep beneficiary organisations 
funded, and that that is why you grant projects.648 
Remy noted in 2014 that over time there came to be less and less space for 
small and medium-sized organisations to participate in an increasingly onerous 
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and competitive bidding processes on grants for short-term, linear projects. So if 
an organisation does not have funding to pay the costs of a bidding process 
that may result in failure, then they are taking a big risk participating.649 This 
prices out many NGOs/PNGOs from participating. Meanwhile, Challand noted 
in his own research findings in 2008 that funding for small PNGOs is very 
limited, despite their having a large positive social impact when compared to the 
amount of money spent. Further, he found that there were too many short-term 
grants for specific projects that sharply limited the ability of PNGOs to achieve 
their overall organisational objectives.650 Those short-term grants also expose 
PNGOs to a greater degree of uncertainty due to the wild swings that take place 
in global aid giving trends, undermining their ability to pursue long-term strategic 
goals for their unique regional needs. That has seen aid run rough shod over 
indigenous input or participatory agenda setting.651  
 
The Politics of Canadian Aid Giving for Palestinians 
‘Non-political’ Development and Internal Tension 
A theme that came up regularly in my interviews was the struggle project 
coordinators found balancing development work that included a human rights 
advocacy element with an overarching political environment that saw both the 
Israeli and Canadian governments grow increasingly hostile toward Palestinian 
rights work as the 2000s progressed. Yet project coordinators who did rights 
and advocacy work were quick to discount any notion that development, or 
peace, could take hold in the OPT without addressing the political question of 
Palestinian rights and self-determination. Coordinators like Ash said that it 
would not occur without advocating Palestinian rights to guarantee they have 
access to services to allow development to take place.652 As such, Organisation 
2 and Ryan specifically inserted a political element into all of their work.653 
Organisation 4 would go so far as to maintain advocacy engagement even 
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Knowledge and Resources’. 
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when threatened with the loss of government funding for so doing, as would 
happen with Organisation 3, too.  
Already at the start of the Peace Process their approach had been challenging, 
because the Oslo Process’ development aid model had been designed 
specifically to exclude a political element at the peace building stage. In reality 
that meant sidestepping issues of Palestinian rights work even when the 
accelerating settler colonial process violated countless human rights and 
ensured development could not take place. Of all the interviewees, the ones at 
Organisation 1 found particularly challenging the dichotomy of fulfilling their 
mandate to carry out rights advocacy works, recognising that the OPT was a 
major human rights issue, while groping with a political environment and 
development aid framework that tried to exclude support for Palestinian rights.  
This was as true in the 1990s even as it was for 2000-2012. This environment 
impacted tremendously limiting what kind of projects Organisation 1 was able to 
support, with whom they could work with and how projects could be designed. 
In particular engagement with the OPT provoked tensions between a staff 
concerned with Palestinian rights against a Board of Directors that was limited 
by a powerful pro-Israel element. That tension with their Board always kept their 
involvement in the OPT to a minimum, forcing them at most to engage with the 
OPT only through small grants that did not require Board approval.654 As early 
as 1992 to 1994, in a less neoliberal aid policy environment, Emory found it 
challenging to work in the OPT due to opposition toward Palestine work at the 
level of their Board of Directors. That meant that he/she had to keep their OPT 
projects low profile, was given only a very limited budget and needed to fund 
Israeli NGOs that he/she would not otherwise have supported.655 Ash would 
reflect on that historical reality at their human rights organisation, 
We’ve always traditionally had problems with our Board of Directors over 
any money or doing any projects in the PA, in the Palestinian territories, 
in Palestine. So to circumvent this, all of our [CEO]’s were very 
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conscious of the fact, so they did this behind the back of the board, 
because legally we were not obliged to report anything over $60,000.656 
 
Meanwhile, problems would often erupt between organisations and the 
government over the use of terminology and concepts advocating Palestinian 
rights. Quinn noted that words like advocacy even became ‘evil words’ in certain 
circles in Canada during the Harper government years.657 At the extreme, the 
Harper government in 2008 appointed Board members to Organisation 1 who 
outright opposed ‘advocacy’ at an organisation that was specifically mandated 
to carry out rights advocacy work. Those members went on to create a list of 
words that staff could not include in any funding proposal, one of which was 
‘advocacy’.658  
For a human rights and advocacy organisation, eliminating advocacy from its 
projects undercut its entire reason for being.659 So Organisation 1’s staff would 
try to find other terms to cover for ‘forbidden words’ like advocacy – something 
Morgan and Organisation 9 would also do after 2009, replacing terms like 
‘advocacy’ with ‘communication’ in order to retain their government funding. At 
the same time Organisation 1’s Board of Directors was more than willing to 
retain the use of forbidden words they advocacy when used against what they 
considered to be ‘bad guy countries’ like Burma or Russia.660 Ash noted that in 
later years any statements they made about human rights abuses on their 
website revealed a pattern where only countries the Conservative government 
hated were condemned, such as Iran.661 Ash noted that this approach to human 
rights was based not on rational thought, but more on an approach to foreign 
policy of good versus evil, us against them.    
Limitations imposed by the Board at Organisation 1 may have led directly to 
projects being designed out of frustration by staff to support Palestinian rights 
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advocacy. Part of the motivation for Organisation 1 approaching three partners 
in 2009 to investigate post-Gaza war human rights abuses came after an 
aborted staff attempt to make a press release at the start of 2009 condemning 
Operation Cast Lead human rights abuses by both Palestinians and Israelis. 
They wanted to do something meaningful after the Board prevented them from 
making that press release.662 Elements of that Board had held the Palestinians, 
not Israel, responsible for the conflict. 
 
The Normalisation and the Delegitimization of Terms 
Mosse pointed out that in development work, ‘long before they meet the 
livelihood needs of poor people, aid projects satisfy the political needs of 
Western development agencies’.663 Most development projects begin as texts, 
like the World Bank’s An Investment in Peace model.664 Whatever the rhetoric, 
the reality is that people participate in agency programmes, and not the other 
way round. That is, aid programmes are designed to reflect the values of the 
donor, and not necessarily owing to the needs of the people.665     
One of the great examples of this were Western donors funding post-Oslo 
development aid projects that specifically required PNGOs to cooperate with 
Israeli counterparts, regardless of the political circumstances of on going settler 
colonialism, alternative humanitarian needs pressing in the OPT after decades 
of occupation and the need to rebuild Palestinian society. Some coordinators 
were essentially forced to fund Israelis or people of Jewish heritage for political 
reasons in Canada, because otherwise they might look too ‘pro-Palestinian’. 
They needed to look politically balanced in an environment that was ardently 
pro-Israel. This happened especially for rights advocacy organisations such as 
with Emory at Organisation 1, at Organisation 2 and at Organisation 4. Casey 
said that Organisation 2 always faced pressure to combine an Israeli voice with 
a Palestinian (or pro-Palestinian Western) voice when conducting advocacy 
work, particularly when they conducted public advocacy work at venues such as 
                                                
662 Although they were mandated as an organisation to advocate human rights, by early 2009 
the Canadian government had been putting pressure on them not to make public advocacy 
statements about rights. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 22min20sec to 23min38sec 
663 Mosse, Cultivating Development, 2005, 22. 
664 Ibid., 21. 
665 Ibid., 98. 
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the United Church.666 Organisation 4 would often hire Israeli or Jewish writers to 
produce articles advocating Palestinian rights, as a way to try to avoid charges 
of anti-Semitism. 667  Just Organisation 3 enthusiastically sponsored a joint 
Israeli-Palestinian women’s project it had high hopes for, and Organisation 7 
specifically tried to foster cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in 
capacity building and poverty reduction projects that adopted a rights element. 
Kim specifically ruled out cooperation with Israelis as inappropriate to 
Organisation 5’s rule of law project, rebuffing repeated government attempts to 
involve Israelis in developing the sector in the OPT. Forcing joint Israeli-
Palestinian projects regardless of appropriateness or Palestinians’ immediate 
needs was an example where donor aid was satisfying the values and politics 
of Canada as the donor before that of the recipient. 
At the level of Canadian government, irrespective of party in power, there was a 
belief that the Palestinians had much to learn from Israel and that Israel could 
be a positive force in the development of a liberal Palestinian state. This had 
been an intrinsic normative value embedded within post-Oslo Palestinian 
development aid, generally. Thus, Kim said that the Conservative government 
had tried to encourage collaboration with Israel within his/her rule of law project 
– with the logic that Israel could help develop the Palestinian judiciary. Had Kim 
done that, it would have completely destroyed their credibility in the OPT, as it is 
impossible to have Israelis teaching Palestinians about human rights when 
Israelis are the ones systematically destroying their society through settler 
colonialism and a judicial system that legally enforces apartheid.668  
Such aid induced cooperation, especially popular in the 1990s, is linked in the 
OPT lexicon to the concept of ‘normalisation’. It gained popularity in the 1980s 
when it was used to challenge the status quo of occupation, and grew in 
importance from the 1990s onwards in the wake of Oslo’s failure and the 
delegitimization of the cooperative programs set-up by Western donors for 
Israelis and Palestinians – a cooperative element that was ideologically intrinsic 
to neoliberalism and the development of an asymmetrical environment of 
                                                
666  Although that was essentially forced upon them, Casey felt the combination was still quite 
useful as a way to share the views of Organisation 2’s CEO as a speaker. Casey Email 2014 
November 20 21:56, pp. 1 
667 Hayden (2014 August 27) 13min30s to 15min28s 
668 Coordinator Kim even laughed at the notion. Kim (2014 August 7) 29min13s to 30min22s 
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peace. Normalisation takes place whenever a relationship or ties are forged 
between an Arab people and the state of Israel, irrespective of a political 
solution and an improvement in Palestinian rights. Canada and Canadian 
organisations have historically been strong supporters of cooperative Israeli-
Palestinian projects following the Oslo Accord and some of the organisations I 
interviewed had supported such activities. 
There developed a deep concern among Palestinian rights activists that 
cooperative projects created the false impression of an Israeli commitment to 
peace building or Palestinian acquiescence to an occupation whose severity 
had only intensified after Oslo. That debate about normalisation fit within the 
larger debate as to whether or not such ‘people-to-people’ projects should take 
place before, or after, an Israeli withdrawal from the OPT – bearing in mind the 
opposite of withdrawal had taken place.669  People increasingly realised that 
those projects created the impression that ‘normal’ relations existed between 
Palestinians and Israelis, while falsely implying that the military occupation of 
the OPT has ended and settler colonialism does not exist.670 For critics of Oslo 
and its development aid models the approach represents little more than an 
attempt to normalise an illiberal system of military violence, legal apartheid and 
settler-colonial ethnic cleansing. Thus, Palestinian rights activists have in 
particular from the 2000s onward challenged any attempts to normalise 
relations with Israel, such as in culture or higher education, without first 
ensuring Palestinian rights are being protected. This has taken place within the 
growth of a broader global movement calling for boycott, divestment and 
sanctions to be applied against Israel until those rights are respected.671  
Since Organisation 7’s only OPT project had an underlying aim to foster inter-
communal cooperation between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians, they 
were forced conceptually to grapple with questions of normalisation. From Kai’s 
point of view sharp polarisation prevents people from working together, 
especially those who might otherwise be inclined to do so – and in that way 
                                                
669 Daoud Kuttab, ‘Is Normalization Possible Before Israel Ends the Occupation?’, Al-Monitor, 9 
August 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/israel-palestine-occupation-
normalization.html. 
670 Giulia Daniele, ‘Jerusalem Link. Feminism between Palestine and Israel’, inGenere, 25 
March 2014, http://www.ingenere.it/en/articles/jerusalem-link-feminism-between-palestine-and-
israel. 
671 This campaign is modelled on the successful South African divestment campaign that 
contributed to the end of apartheid there. 
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everybody loses. 672  His/her response was that he/she rejected any peace 
agreement where there would be a ‘normalisation’ of the occupation, but while 
not believing peace was possible unless the two sides worked together. It was 
for him/her a delicate ethical juggling act. 
Organisation 7’s support for a cooperative work did sometimes lead to 
disagreements with other Canadian aid actors in the OPT. 673  Still, Quinn 
described there being in Canada as late as 2014 a real hunger for joint projects 
between Israelis and Palestinians.674 Where they felt strong pressure against 
such work was in the Middle East, because the Peace Process had become so 
delegitimized that some of its key terms were too sullied to make use of any 
longer. This included the concept of cooperation.  
Kim also noted that terms associated with the Oslo Process had become 
discredited by the mid-2000s. Even though Kim sensed that the government 
funding call they had responded to sought to project Canadian values abroad, 
in line with government foreign policy at the time, both Organisation 5 and its 
partner specifically distanced themselves from Western terms like human rights 
in favour of indigenous choices. In order to avoid looking like just another group 
from the West coming to teach Palestinians about human rights’, they 
specifically adopted terms like ‘dignity’ in lieu of ‘rights’.675 Kim said, 
We focused on the concept of dignity rather than human rights because 
we didn’t want to be lumped in, “here comes another group of people 
from the West who are going to be teaching us human rights. And 
because they don’t know our law, and they don’t know human rights in 
the Arab context they’re just going to talk to us about international human 
rights law, and they’re just going to pull us into a room and lecture us 
about these norms”. So we were very conscious about wanting to 
distance ourselves from that kind of an approach, which you know in a lot 
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673 Kai (2012 March 26) 28min14s to 32min43s 
674 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 10min14s to 11min17s 
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of ways is the stereotypical approach, but it has a lot of merit to. 
[Meaning the stereotype is not far from the truth.]676 
In fact, the Palestinians Organisation 5 worked with neither focused on nor even 
took Canadian values into consideration in the project. The result was a project 
Kim felt their Palestinian co-partner genuinely embraced.  
For the same reason, Organisation 7 had to drop another key Oslo term, 
‘peace’, and change the entire name of their network. He/she said,  
Largely because the whole question of peace building is sensitive, not so 
much here, but there, on our Palestinian partners, Jordanian partners, 
[they have] never really been able to talk about their involvement in 
[Organisation 7’s civil society and peace building].677 
Part of the name change was to protect those partners and their safety.678 
Quinn even noted that one of their Palestinian partners might have left their 
network for fear of being seen contributing to a normalisation of the 
occupation.679  
As Oslo progressively failed the abandonment of words linked to post-Oslo 
Palestinian development aid also reflected a broader delegitimization of 
Western and Western-backed aid actors alongside the terms they use. For 
example, research into health charities and NGOs in the Hebron area of the 
OPT during the 2000s reveals that there has been a decline in the legitimacy of 
secular (or secular-leaning) PNGOs that had once flourished in the early 1990s, 
after years of exposure to Western funding. By contrast during the 2000s there 
was a revival in more religious Palestinian charitable foundations, particularly 
Islamist ones long excluded by Canadian donors like CIDA, who were 
addressing real local concerns like the politics of poverty, rather than the 
political needs of Western donors. The growing popularity of those charitable 
foundations may also owe to their use of discourses that resonate more with 
Palestinians than those PNGOs that adopted fashionable Western terms like 
                                                
676 Kim (2014 August 7) 13min17s to 14min4s The stereotypical approach would have entailed 
bringing in a group of Palestinian professionals, sitting them down and ‘reprogramming them’ 
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‘empowerment’, ‘good governance’, ‘civil society promotion’ and ‘reform’. 
Palestinian charitable foundations consciously rejected such terminology, while 
choosing discourses that represented local culture and tradition. 680  They 
specifically positioned themselves in opposition to Western models of donor-aid 
and the asymmetrical ‘senior-junior’ relationship inherent to it, and they gained 
legitimacy by doing so. 
 
Whatever their best intentions, the Canadian organisations were always the 
senior partner in their development relationship with a junior Palestinian partner. 
This was simply a reflection of the neoliberal conceptual values that permeated 
Canadian and Western development aid to Palestinians. It is for this reason that 
the aid and policy environment in Canada, and Canadian government interests, 
had a defining impact on what kind of projects the interviewees could carry out 
with their Palestinian partners and how those projects would be designed. At 
best the interviewees could mitigate and shield Palestinian partners from 
outside influence, but not altogether. Fear of pro-Israel voices in Canada strictly 
limited what issues they could address and with whom they could work. It also 
often necessitated adding Israeli or Jewish voices to their work just to create the 
impression of balance when they engaged with issues like Palestinian human 
rights that were politically contentious in Canada. This ultimately defined the 
planning and design stage of the projects that the ten interviewee organisations 
ran in the OPT. Inequality in the aid relationship ensured that Canada’s agenda, 
which was skewered in favour of Israel, dominated that aid. As we will see in 
the following chapters, when interviewees deviated from that support for Israel 





                                                
680 Benoît Challand, ‘A Nahda of Charitable Organizations? Health Service Provision and the 
Politics of Aid in Palestine’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 2 (1 May 2008): 
234. 
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CHAPTER 7 - Implementation 
Introduction 
The OPT is an incredibly challenging place to work. Israeli authorities routinely 
enact policy that is deliberately disastrous for the OPT economy. That policy is 
often consciously designed to make daily life difficult for Palestinians, in order to 
encourage them to surrender their claims on land in Area C and willingness to 
remain in the OPT. This encompasses a highly complex matrix of control that is 
sustaining a slow motion ethnic cleansing and concentration of Palestinians 
onto small territories reminiscent of the reservation systems used elsewhere in 
former British colonies like the US, Canada, Australia and apartheid-era South 
Africa. Since Israeli policy has been crafted to make daily life difficult and 
unsafe for Palestinians, it should come as no surprise when aid organisations 
find it difficult to carry-out development projects in the OPT whose underlying 
aim is to make life better for Palestinians. Yet in spite of an Israeli settler-
colonial occupation that contradicted every notion of development, this would 
surprisingly prove less problematic for interviewees to content with than pro-
Israeli sentiments and government interference from Canada that strove to 
undermine their work in the OPT. This dominated their discussions about the 
project implementation stage, and due to that interference many of their 
projects were halted during implementation.  
 
Challenges from the Field when Implementing Projects 
Chapter 4 outlined many of the challenges and failings of the neoliberal Oslo 
aid model in the OPT, due to that structure of Israeli occupation. Many of the 
Canadian interviewees reflected in their research interviews on the problems of 
carrying out projects in that environment. As an example restrictions on mobility, 
long the bane of development aid in the OPT, often surfaced in the interviews. 
In this way Organisation 3 faced numerous hurdles implementing projects in the 
OPT, especially Gaza.681 Taylor said there are significant mobility and safety 
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questions there, and that their ability to enter Gaza to monitor and support 
partner projects went from difficult to near impossible over time.682  
There is also always a concern for organisations working in the OPT that Israel 
will not let their employees into the country, potentially undermining a project.683 
Taylor said in the past their organisation had hired at their office in Canada an 
Israeli project coordinator who could not get into Gaza to visit partners due to 
restrictions on Israelis entering there, while in another case they had a 
Palestinian-Canadian coordinator who faced a great deal of discrimination from 
Israelis when working in the OPT.684 Kim noted that prior to having Canadian 
government support for his/her project at Organisation 5, which then had some 
tacit Israeli approval, he/she might be arrested on arrival at the Israeli airport 
because he/she had an Arabic name, which had happened in the past. 685 
However, CIDA sponsorship did not help volunteer personnel from Organisation 
9 to get through the border. Morgan had to be careful not to recruit Canadian 
volunteers, to be placed with Palestinian partners in their capacity building work, 
who had Arabic sounding names due to racist Israeli treatment. One time 
he/she recruited a volunteer who was deported at Ben Gurion Airport due to 
their Arabic name.686 In another case, the Israeli authorities made it so difficult 
for a Canadian born in Egypt to be in the OPT that Morgan sent him/her back to 
Canada less than two months after arriving.687  
Morgan suffered in other ways with mobility restrictions in his/her work. He/she 
was responsible for projects in Lebanon and Syria, too, but could never visit 
them because he/she could not enter Lebanon or Syria while having an Israeli 
work permit in his/her passport, a document that guaranteed his/her re-entry to 
Israel. 688  Meanwhile Morgan found travel to Gaza incredibly difficult, only 
entering twice in more than two years for three-day trips. This all meant Morgan 
                                                
682 Taylor (2014 September 4) 27min59s to 29min58s 
683 Amira Hass, ‘The VIPs’ Hush Money’, Haaretz, 18 January 2012, 
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was only really able to work in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, despite a 
regional focus that included Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.689   
Running projects in Gaza always proved logistically challenging due to Israeli 
military offences that compound problems of de-development, closure, siege 
and embargo. Organisation 4 fought a losing struggle trying to make work their 
Gazan project, which CIDA had designed in a pre-Intifada context. Meant to run 
on an initial five-year timeframe, the project launched in the spring of 2002 
during the Second Intifada. This caused several delays and a Canadian 
element of the project was only finally posted in the field in 2003 March.690 Due 
to the deepening humanitarian crisis, at one point the two centres in the project 
started producing candles to help people deal with frequent blackouts. They 
also hoped they could export the candles, mirroring the World Bank’s 
recommendation that Palestinians develop an export-based economy.691 Thus 
the candle initiative could potentially fit the original aims of the project, ‘to 
empower low-income women and their families in the Gaza Strip, enabling them 
to improve their economic conditions and enhance their standard of living’.692  
However, the blockade of Gaza was so severe it became impossible to bring in 
the materials necessary to produce the candles, let alone export them.693 The 
low buying power of Gazans in the besieged economy combined with a closed 
border left no paying market for the candles, even in spite of domestic need 
from power shortages.694   
Hayden said that within the centres you would see how the people themselves 
were affected by the political and economic changes in Gaza, which 
undermined the neoliberal development aims of the project. He/she noticed this 
in particular when visiting in 2006 following the imposition of Israel’s Western-
backed embargo on the PA after Hamas’ election victory. Hayden said you 
could feel like there was a prison closing in on people there. 695 He/she also said 
that the nature of the project had clearly changed, shifting from developmental 
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to humanitarian.696 This happened in spite of the official aims of the project, 
because as Chapter 4 described the conventional aims of neoliberal 
development aid are unrealistic in the context of on going Israeli settler 
colonialism. Thus, at some point the centres began to be used by people simply 
seeking psychological support to cope with the siege. Extremely popular 
medical days also began to be arranged there because it was easier for people 
to get to one of the centres rather than more distant medical clinics in a time of 
great insecurity. 697  That insecure environment later included many medical 
clinics being bombed, damaged and even destroyed by the Israeli military. This 
included a health clinic funded by Organisation 3 with CIDA money, which was 
bombed and destroyed by Israel in 2009.698 At one point even the women and 
people managing the centres asked Organisation 4 not to focus on the technical 
and vocational training that was supposed to take place within the project. 
Instead of meeting the needs of the Canadian donor, they wanted to meet the 
immediate needs of the people struggling in difficult circumstances in Gaza.699  
Meanwhile, Organisation 3 had had a great deal of hope for the joint Israeli-
Palestinian women’s project in Jerusalem. However, it was undermined by a 
combination of the inconsistencies in those 1990s people-to-people projects 
with restrictions on mobility and deepening violence.700 Throughout the 2000s 
the initiative faced difficulties because restrictions on mobility made it tougher 
for the women to come physically together. Remy says their work really became 
untenable starting in December 2008 when the first bombardment of Gaza 
pushed a deep wedge between the two groups of women, leading to an 
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unravelling of the project.701 For Taylor this was a sign of ‘hope lost’ in the 
Middle East.702  
In addition to these issues of mobility and conflict, the interviewees spoke about 
issues in reporting and their relationship with their partners. Reporting by 
Palestinian partners on how project funds were spent is arguably the most 
important part of their relationship with a Canadian donor. Without it funding will 
stop. Canadian organisations use that information to report to their own funders 
and to the CRA to prove their funding was used for charitable purposes, and to 
verify that none of it was used for terrorism. Reporting to the CRA will prove to 
be a critical issue for many organisations later audited under suspicious 
circumstances. 
Reporting is also a highly complex and challenging part of development work 
that is connected to Canadian regulations. An idea of that complexity came out 
from the interviews. Remy for instance said that reporting was one of the 
biggest hurdles they faced,  
It’s almost, if you look at it, crazy that in the places that are the most … 
struggling, you want accountability, but on the other hand these folks are 
struggling just to survive, [and] like you’re demanding a report [Remy 
laughed in amazement].703 
Meanwhile, Emory said that it is often the victims of a conflict themselves who 
often become the activists organising themselves into an NGO. He/she said that 
those people already have so many issues to contend with that when you 
demand reports from them, you as a donor-partner end up asking them to shift 
their focus to your needs rather than their beneficiaries.704 In his/her experience 
reporting expectations force PNGOs to make a dangerous reallocation of time 
from 10-15% on administration when they are operating on their own, to 
spending 60% of their time on administration the moment they get big donor 
support, leaving them with only 40% of the time in their limited schedule to do 
the actual work they are paid to do.705 Emory found that very frustrating, and 
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found some of the donor demands to be unreasonable. He/she decried the 
damage being done to the structure and effectiveness of local PNGOs by 
reporting.706 It is worth noting that this may also have contributed to their decline 
vis-à-vis the religious charitable foundations recorded by Challand in the 
2000s.707 
When explaining how challenging reporting can be, Remy noted an example 
where Organisation 3 was being audited by the CRA. The CRA was asking for 
some specific information about the local partners and in one case a piece of 
information was missing. That audit was taking place during escalating violence 
in Gaza, and Remy questioned if he/she could legitimately press the partner for 
such information at the time.708 The CRA could not of properly fathom, and take 
into account those conditions. Meanwhile, coordinators Blake and Dallas said in 
their experience that all the reports provided by partners had to be provided in 
English for reports on to the Canadian government via the CRA, but 
Organisation 10 simply lacked the time and resources to translate everything.709 
This created a significant administrative burden for an organisation that avoided 
expenses on Canadian personnel. 
Meanwhile, in the majority of the cases interviewees were happy with their 
partners’ work and often with the way in which the projects were progressing. 
Kim could point to successes in their work educating Palestinian judges. 
Organisation 6 felt their project was running well until undermined and shut 
down by government. Emory was absolutely impressed with the progress of 
some of his/her partners, especially the women’s legal aid clinic. Organisation 7 
was buoyant about their project and had hoped it could expand, while Hayden 
could see the utility of the centres in Gaza even if they were not developing the 
way their CIDA wanted. Morgan was even quite happy with how Organisation 
9’s capacity building projects were running, in spite of the challenges he/she 
faced with mobility. Ryan was likely pleased with the on going development of 
their Gazan mental health partner. 
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Only in a few cases did the coordinators face difficulties in the projects they 
funded owing to operational issues at the partners. Generally coordinators, like 
Hayden, showed great consideration with the trying circumstances their 
partners faced overseas, including in their reporting. Emory covered for partners 
who were not able to keep up with Canadian reporting requirements, while 
Remy revealed deep concern over his/her having to ask for reporting material 
from a partner during a time of great turmoil in Gaza. A number of the 
coordinators questioned the linear model of aid work, which Chapters 6 through 
8 of this thesis are structured on. Some like Organisations 3 and 5 preferred to 
work as equals sharing the experiences of their partners, though as Chapter 6 
pointed out this was pretty much impossible given the structure of Palestinian 
aid. Meanwhile, coordinators like Ash, Remy, Taylor, Jamie, Alexis and Morgan 
would find their Palestinian partners quite understanding about political 
problems they would face in Canada, which would hurt the Palestinians.  
 
Challenges From Canada when Implementing Projects 
In spite of the incredible challenges associated with managing development aid 
projects in the OPT, in my interviews I found the project coordinators 
overwhelmingly spent their time focused on the challenges they faced in 
Canada. Remy said that of all challenges Organisation 3 faced funding rights 
projects in the OPT, they found the politics of Israel and Palestine in Canada to 
be the most challenging issue they dealt with.710 Likewise Blake and Dallas said 
their greatest challenges were from Canada. 711  Jamie said that politics in 
Canada was always the hardest part of Organisation 6’s OPT work.712 
Those challenges were sometimes the result of Canadian regulations that were 
incongruous to conditions in the OPT. Little issues in reporting could cause 
enormous headaches, such as the requirement that Organisation 10 keep 
original receipts for all project expenses in Canada, when PA law required the 
originals remain in the OPT. Due diligence requirements swamped Organisation 
10 with unreasonable levels of work and unclear requirements that they said 
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hampered their ability to carry out charitable projects. Due to strict expectations 
that Canadian organisations maintain ultimate financial and managerial control 
over their projects, CIDA did not want Kim at organisation 5 to offer full financial 
disclosure of their law project to their Palestinian partner. Yet, that would have 
undermined Organisation 5’s ethos of full transparency and equality in their 
partnership, and made working together more difficult. In fact, attempts by 
project coordinators to be as transparent as possible were all too often 
undermined by their management and ultimately by government. When the 
CEO of Organisation 1 refused a request by their Board’s Chairperson to fly the 
CEO of the right-wing Israeli organisation NGO Monitor to Canada for talks, 
particularly because that was a personal request not taken by the staff through 
institutional channels, the CEOs insistence upon transparency helped spark a 
breakdown in their relationship. 
 
Managing Canadian Regulations and Due Diligence in the OPT Context 
There is an incredible incongruity between Canadian regulations and the 
realities of working in the OPT. They are completely different contexts and one-
size-does-not-fit-all. Nearly all of the organisations interviewed operated under 
Canadian charity regulations. A Canadian charity can only grant funds to 
qualified donees (described in the footnote), which a PNGO is not.713 A charity 
can only transfer funds to a non-qualified donees such as a non-profit (that is 
not registered as a charity), a business or an individual, if they are fulfilling a 
contract for the Canadian charity, and that leaves the Canadian charity 
ultimately as the owner of that work. Yet, Canadian organisations with limited 
budgets rely by necessity on Palestinian partners to get a project done. Overall 
the system of funding partners on contracts and record keeping complicated the 
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work of the Canadian interviewees at the expense of their objectives, in an 
already challenging region. The politics of Canadian government interference 
only accentuated those problems. There is added scrutiny applied to Canadian 
organisations working in the OPT, where many of groups listed as terrorist 
entities by the Canadian government are Palestinian.714 
What these regulatory restrictions meant was that, for instance, Organisation 10 
would often pay a supplier directly when buying equipment for an institution in 
the OPT, rather than letting the Palestinian institution buy it for themselves. 
They did this because from the CRA perspective that was best practice. All in all 
OPT expenses were covered by contracts that were strictly reported on and 
monitored with a reporting paper trail. Organisation 10 found that they needed 
to adopt two types of contracts for every project, too, in order to appease the 
government. One was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) describing the 
principles of a partnership, and the second a specific Project Agreement 
describing how a project they were funding was run. 715  This allowed little 
flexibility outside the parameters of the original project model, even though 
conditions on the ground are constantly changing in the OPT. Receipts needed 
to be collected for every single expense, even though they were not always 
easy to collect in a region that is often described as not being a ‘paper culture’ 
(author’s words). Further, all original copies of receipts were supposed to be 
kept in Canada and of course had to be translated to English for the CRA.  
Organisation 10 was one of the organisations I interviewed that faced the most 
problems being monitored by government, perhaps non-coincidentally because 
they had a predominantly Muslim membership. Following an audit by the CRA, 
they were told that they should conduct due diligence checks on all of the 
people they are working with, everywhere they were working.716 To do this they 
were told by CRA authorities to look at a variety of terrorist lists beyond just the 
Canadian one, such as the UK, the US and the Israeli ones.717 Yet even if you 
put a name into those lists and there was no hit, the interviewees said that it 
might appear on an Israeli list as an ‘alleged’ terrorist, which the CRA would 
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treat alleged as guilty.718 Further, they said you can be accused of misdoings in 
the OPT simply because of your family connection to someone, even if you 
yourself are innocent.719 Even a fourth degree connection might imply guilt to 
the CRA.720  
The interviewees felt that the CRA relied in particular on the Israeli list, a list 
questionable by nature since the settler colonial oppressor keeps it. Dallas said, 
For example Israel has a list, and all of it says alleged, alleged, alleged, 
alleged, alleged. Who issued that list? Nobody knows. But it’s issued 
from some source in Israel, ok? Some source in Israel. They [the CRA] 
refer to it always. They never refer to the Canadian list. They refer to that 
list and they dedicated most of their time on that list. And we said, fair 
enough, why are these organisations not closed then?721 
The difference between the CRA and Israelis is that even for Israel alleged did 
not mean guilty, but the Canadians treated it as though it were. Blake and 
Dallas pointed out that when you travel to the OPT you can find that an alleged 
terrorist organisation is operational, possibly even working with the western-
backed PA, and that it has never been closed in spite of the Israelis closing 
hundreds of other organisations 2000-2012. They believed that that alone 
should mean the organisation is still okay. Meanwhile they said that if an 
organisation did come under Israeli investigation, they stopped working with 
that group. However, that was still not enough for the Canadian government.722 
Dallas and Blake were given an impression that Canadian authorities were 
working on a principle of ‘guilty until proven innocent’, with the onus put on 
Organisation 10 to prove the innocence of the people they were working with.723 
Blake further noted that the concept ‘due diligence’ was very opaque and left 
widely open to interpretation. Since there were not any clearly defined 
parameters for due diligence they found conducting it quite challenging, 
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This word due diligence is an elastic band. You know. The more you 
stretch it the more it will stretch, you see. The same things as books and 
records. There’s certain areas where books and records have to be kept, 
and the books and records and all the originals and invoices have to be 
in Canada. It doesn’t matter where in Canada. It has to be in Canada, 
and the originals have to be in Canada. And has to be recorded in an 
electronic media in a programme which is compatible with revenue 
Canada’s programs. Now tell me where is that written that you have a list 
of programmes, which are compatible with, or are to be compatible with. 
There is nowhere written that it is to be in electronic form. It is written 
nowhere.724 
 
Dallas said that the CRA’s requirement to keep all originals and invoices for 
expenses in Canada was completely out of sync with PA law.725 He/she said, 
‘Because of auditing. The auditors in Ramallah would not do auditing without 
the originals’. 726 This is the law in the PA, yet the CRA did not care. Blake said 
that Organisation 10 may also have been being scrutinised more than other 
Canadian organisations working in the OPT. He/she discovered for instance 
that Oxfam Québec was allowed to keep just the copies of receipts in Canada, 
while retaining the originals in the Middle East where Israeli and PA law 
required they be kept. 727  Overall the CRA’s inconsistent and onerous 
requirements were a tremendous administrative burden for a charity with limited 
resources. Dallas quipped that the CRA’s requirements would be fine if they 
paid for two employees just to meet them.728 
Due in part to CRA requirements, Organisation 5 was expected to act as the 
executing agency responsible for oversight for all the finances of their justice 
project, as they were technically the owners of it in their contract with their 
Palestinian partner. This undermined Kim’s efforts to maintain an equal 
partnership. So for instance one-way Kim attempted to reinforce the partnership 
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was insisting on their Palestinian partner being at all their meetings with CIDA, 
which CIDA strongly resisted for financial meetings.729  
At the very beginning of the project I wanted to have my co-director 
involved in discussions about the budget, and CIDA said, “No! You 
should not show him the budget”.730 
Kim said he/she disagreed strongly with CIDA, as he/she wanted to have a 
relationship that was built on transparency and trust. If that could not happen, 
then Kim felt that the whole project would not work. Kim said that was because 
Organisation 5 was there to build a new model and not run things like they used 
to be run. As a university-linked organisation he/she believed that they should 
be involved in innovating, not administrating a project on behalf of CIDA.731 
Meanwhile politics and intervention by Canadian government bodies seriously 
undermined the progress of the interviewees’ projects. Morgan claimed it was 
impossible for Canadians to get anything done in the OPT, because as soon as 
there was trouble the government would halt a project, ‘because the terrorists 
are there’. In his/her view when Canada did that this essentially reinforced 
anything that the Israelis did in the OPT, just like when the CRA relied on Israeli 
terrorist lists. 732  Nor was Canada alone among donors and institutions 
reinforcing Israeli policy. For instance, the UNDP joined donors in the 
international boycott of the PA in the wake of the 2006 election, instating a no-
contact policy that specifically excluded the Hamas government and its affiliated 
NGOs. While quickly boycotting the Hamas-led PA, the UNDP hypocritically 
continued to say fostering democratic governance was one of the UNDP’s main 
aims in the OPT.733 International donors actually encouraged poor governance 
by boycotting the PA and sending funds to their chosen client PA President 
Abbas through the President's Office and his political allies, or money for 
government services through unelected NGOs. This mirrored a process in the 
early years of the Peace Process where Israel encouraged bad governance by 
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733 Tamer Qarmout and Daniel Béland, ‘The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza Strip’, 
Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 4 (1 July 2012): 41. 
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having money sent to PA President Arafat's personal bank to allow him to buy 
his position.734  
Kim suffered from that approach. Initially in 2005 Organisation 5’s project was 
supposed to operate in Gaza, but could not continue its work there due to 
Israeli restrictions on mobility that were reinforced against Gaza by Canadian 
policy following Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory. Further, the political decision by 
the Canadian government to put all projects on hold after the Hamas election 
win, purportedly to make sure there would be no Canadian support for 
terrorism, meant they were not allowed initially to do any work. This began a 
pattern of ‘starts and halts’ linked to political events that seriously impaired the 
overall project. Only eventually after a first pause in 2006 were they allowed to 
conduct some limited research for the project, and by the time they could begin 
work they found that most of the competent people for a rule of law project in 
the OPT were being hired away since all the major international aid actors were 
by then engaged with law and security projects.735 
Organisation 4’s Canadian government funded project in Gaza was also 
likewise halted after 2006. Hayden said that all the political changes in Canada 
and the OPT between 2001 and 2008 meant nothing went as planned, as their 
project always seemed to take two steps forward and one step back – or ‘three 
steps back’ depending on the period.736 The initial 2006 post-electoral stoppage 
was also near the conclusion date of the project’s initial period of funding. At 
first Organisation 4 tried to negotiate continued funding from government for the 
two centres, thinking that it made no sense to close them down, but with no 
success. They then tried to transfer the centres to another organisation to keep 
them operational, and the only organisation the Canadian government agreed 
to was the UNDP. Initially CIDA said that the transfer would take place very 
quickly, less than a month, but that took a year.737  
The delay was because until the re-imposition of a Western-backed Fatah 
government in the PA, under President Abbas in 2007 June, Canadian policy 
prevented CIDA officials from meeting PA Ministers, including at the very 
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Ministry the centres were originally meant to be turned over to. CIDA also 
underestimated the role and importance of the Palestinian Ministry in the 
project, which caused several setbacks and delays in the transfer to the UNDP. 
Organisation 4’s final report for the project states that if communication between 
CIDA, the Ministry and the UNDP had been more open from the early stages of 
the project, the transfer would have been carried-out more effectively and 
efficiently.738 Yet Canadian policy did not allow that. Hayden eventually oversaw 
a one-year transition period of the centres to the UNDP, only for them to close 
down a year later.739 The UNDP ran out of funding for them.740  
Another difficulty Hayden faced was that the person who designed the project at 
CIDA ended up becoming its monitor. The monitor could not understand why 
their initial results, set out in the design stage for a pre-Second Intifada, were 
not being met, in spite of rapidly changing conditions. For instance, the monitor 
could not understand why Palestinian women were not selling the products that 
they were supposed to be selling, though as the candle project revealed the 
occupation and siege on Gaza guaranteed that economic projects cannot work 
there – as has always been the case in the history of occupied Gaza.741 The 
monitor was stuck in the linear model where development aid projects are 
implemented step-by-step from policy (design) to implementation and 
outcomes, and that monitor’s incapacity to understand changing circumstances 
made project management much more challenging for Hayden.742 Norman Long 
wrote about that linear trap in projects or research, 
Like the dominant theoretical paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s, much 
policy analysis seemed still to cling to a rather mechanical or systems 
model of the relationship between policy, implementation and outcomes. 
The tendency in many studies was to conceptualise this as essentially 
linear in nature, implying some kind of step-by-step process whereby 
policy was formulated, implemented, and then followed by certain results, 
after which one could evaluate the process to establish how far the 
original objectives had been achieved. Yet, as my own field research on 
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the Peruvian Land Reform programme had shown - and enlightened 
planners and development workers will readily appreciate - this 
separation of 'policy', 'implementation' and 'outcomes' is a gross 
oversimplification of a much more complicated set of processes which 
involve the reinterpretation or transformation of policy during the 
implementation process, such that there is no straight line from policy to 
outcomes.743 
Gaza and the OPT are definitely complicated places to work. 
Morgan said in his/her interview that while operational principals are ‘nice 
pieces of paper’, once you are in the field you have to make do with ‘what and 
who you have’, while making sure that whatever you happen to be doing you 
get the results expected of you.744 By results he may seems to have meant the 
overall vision for a project. Morgan found the Canadian government to be a 
major obstacle to his/her work. They would limit what he/she could do, even 
indirectly threatening him/her through Organisation 9 on several occasions. 
When Morgan met Canada’s highest ranked diplomat in 2010 at the Canadian 
Representative Office in Ramallah, he/she was warned not to support advocacy 
work in the OPT, asking Morgan what value they, ‘put on the financing that they 
receive from the Canadian government’. 745  Organisation 9 took the threat 
seriously and panicked after hearing about it, because it came after a period of 
scandals where the Canadian government had defunded organisations such as 
KAIROS over their Palestinian projects. 746  One immediate result was that 
Organisation 9 dropped the word ‘advocacy’ from their operational lexicon, 
instead adopting ‘communication’ to cover for that type of work. 747  Further, 
Morgan felt obliged to drop a long-standing Palestinian partner in the West 
Bank, because that partner engaged explicitly in advocacy. He/she had to tell 
the partner that Organisation 9 would stop supporting it, saying that if they did 
not, then the Canadian government would shut down Organisation 9 itself.748 It 
was either the project or organisation. The Palestinian partner was not happy, 
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but Morgan said they understood the pressure. 749  Following that warning 
Morgan also did his/her best to avoid meeting Canadian Representative Office 
and CIDA officials.750 
The Canadian government also did not want Organisation 9 to work in regions 
dominated politically by Hamas, such as Gaza and some West Bank 
communities like Qalqilya.751 In this way Canadian policy was reinforcing Israeli 
policies of fragmentation and mass punishment of Palestinian civilians. After a 
year working in his/her post, Morgan says he/she basically said to 
management, ‘Fuck the Canadian government I’m going to do what I want to 
do’ since the government rendered development work impossible.752 Morgan 
also said that he/she also refused to stop advocacy work altogether, and would 
continue to work with partners in Gaza. Further, since there was absolutely 
nothing threating about their capacity building and poverty reduction activities, 
he/she saw no reason to stop any aspect of it.753 
There is something unique to note about the OPT and project accountability, 
conveyed by Remy. He/she says that at Organisation 3 they did their best to 
follow accountability by law, while doing their best to make sure their due 
diligence requests were reasonable for what were essentially small amounts of 
money sent overseas to the OPT. Remy said that, quite unlike the CRA, they 
did their best to try to understand the context their partners were working in 
within the OPT. There people were struggling just to survive, and Remy felt that 
might affect their ability to write reports constructed in a foreign language for a 
foreign donor.754 Remy felt very bad when faced with the dilemma of asking a 
Gazan partner for a missing bit of information requested by the CRA during an 
escalation in violence.755 Meanwhile even if their Palestinian partners were not 
always easy to work with from the perspective of reporting paper-work, unlike 
some other development contexts Organisation 3 was familiar with, they found 
Palestinians openly wanted people to visit their organisations see their work 
first-hand and conditions in the OPT. The result was that Remy found 
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monitoring visits to be quite effective. For this reason they also invited their 
members and people from their networks, along with CIDA, to visit their 
Palestinian partners.756  
 
Pro-Israel Political Pressure within Canada 
A number of interviewees suffered from the effects of political interference by 
pro-Israel lobby groups in Canada, who support Israel’s settler colonial policy, 
and genuine Canadian government support for their message. This undermined 
the projects, organisations and personal lives of the interviewees. For example, 
Organisation 4 faced a lot of pressure stemming from their human rights 
advocacy work in the Middle East, but especially for Palestinians. Hayden says 
they would get a lot of complaints at their office when they wrote about the 
situation in the OPT. This powerful pro-Israel lobby regularly targeted 
Organisation 4 them and they would frequently get accused of anti-Semitism 
over their publications about human rights in the region, which were 
accusations without basis.757 These accusations were what compelled them to 
hire Israeli or Jewish journalists when writing about Israel and the Palestinians, 
to prove they are not anti-Semitic.  
On top of being linked to anti-Semitism, Organisation 4 was accused of 
supporting terrorism by NGO Monitor, the radical Israeli non-profit who the 
Chairperson of Organisation 1 would once try in vain to invite to Canada for 
talks. In 2006, NGO Monitor listed a number of groups it alleged were terrorist, 
including an alternative media centre in the OPT. Organisation 4 was 
supporting some of those organisations using Canadian government funding. 
Based on NGO Monitor’s logic, that meant the Canadian government was 
therefore funding terrorist organisations, via Organisation 4. 758  Those 
allegations against Organisation 4’s operations likely contributed to it later 
losing government funding. Organisations 1, 3 and 6 would face similar fates 
via NGO Monitor.  
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Fomenting Internal Strife and Paralysis 
In the case of Organisation 1 issues related to NGO Monitor would play occupy 
a side position next to a violent fault line that existed between staff who wanted 
to include Palestinians in their human rights advocacy work, versus a Board of 
Directors that leaned – arguably hawkish – pro-Israel and subdued Palestinian 
rights work internally. Already since the early days of Emory’s work at the 
organisation they had stymied his/her work, such as when his/her CEOs would 
prevent him/her from producing any organisational statements about 
Palestinian rights from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Further, while the staff 
at Organisation 1 would have open discussions and debates about the projects 
they were funding, Emory’s Middle East projects were always kept out of open 
discussion to avoid drawing attention to them; and his/her budget to run 
projects was always kept very small. Emory attributed that to pressure put on 
the CEO from the Canadian pro-Israel lobby, which always had a presence on 
the Board.759  
While Organisation 1 did defend the right of Palestinian human rights 
organisations to operate, Emory wryly noted that this is very different than 
saying Palestinians have the same rights as anyone else.760 Fundamentally, 
Emory knew that his/her support for Palestinian rights in his/her role was 
sharply limited by Israel and the impact of Israeli politics’ on his/her 
organisation. Emory said that influence came through lobbying by the Canadian 
CJC, and pressure from the Canadian government.761 Emory said that if you 
work on Israeli-Palestinian issues in Canada, you have constantly to contend 
with the powerful pro-Israel lobby groups like the CJC.762 He/she further said 
that there was always a member from that lobby sitting on their Board keeping 
tabs on the work of Organisation 1, either from the CJC or the more right-wing 
B’nai Brith. He/she said this was done with the tacit approval of the Canadian 
government, and that those lobbyists would liaise either directly or indirectly 
with the Israeli government.763  
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The 2008/2009 Israeli Operation Cast Lead bombardment of Gaza caused 
mass devastation in the territory, and this galvanised the staff at Organisation 1 
to do something to condemn the violence. That led to the three small 2009 
projects to document human rights projects.764 They were designed, as was a 
tradition for staff at Organisation 1, to be small enough to not have to be 
reviewed by the Board of Directors. However, Organisation 1’s recently 
appointed CEO strove for transparency, as had happened in his/her clash with 
the Chairperson by refusing to sponsor a visit by NGO Monitor. The CEO was 
also cognisant that Israel-Palestine was a sensitive issue for the Board and 
being anything other than transparent was totally unacceptable to the CEO.765 
For this reason the staff at Organisation 1 had to prepare a whole sheet of 
questions and answers about the (tiny) projects for the Board. The staff had 
researched the organisations well and felt they had addressed every possible 
question. 766  They were sure that the two Palestinian and one Israeli 
organisations took a balanced approach to human rights, and were confident 
that they would document abuses regardless if they were carried out by 
Palestinians or Israelis.767 As Emory had pointed out in the past, creating the 
impression of balance, even after such an imbalanced conflict like Operation 
Cast Lead, was important to Organisation 1. Ash meanwhile argued that the 
projects were beneficial to Israel, because it promoted free speech and 
tolerance.768  
Organisation 1’s staff were not prepared for the reaction their new Chairperson 
would have. He had just recently been appointed near the beginning of 2009. 
On being told about the projects, ‘The guy [the Chairperson] went ballistic. He 
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was like foaming at the mouth’.769 The problem the staff at Organisation 1 faced 
was that at the level of their Board there were members, such as that 
Chairperson, who considered the three human rights organisations to be anti-
Israeli. Worse, Ash saw that some of them believed those well-respected 
Palestinian and Israeli organisations were somehow ‘terrorist entities’,  
Ash, “It was a matter of principal that the projects should not have been. 
You are giving money to terrorist organisations”. I said, “Who are the 
terrorist organisations again”? Ash then named the two Palestinian 
organisations, “And [the Israeli organisation] was … They’re not. They’re 
not on any [terrorist] list”. I asked, “So they’re not considered terrorist 
organisations”? Ash, “No, No, they’re not. But you never know. That was 
what we were told”.770 
As Organisation 10 noted about monitoring of their projects, guilty until proven 
innocent. 
Board members opposed to the grants wanted the staff to denounce the 
projects they had funded, and to get the money back. When those Board 
members could not get the request fulfilled, they froze the fund for small grants 
that the staff would use for the human rights projects.771 Since the partners were 
so well established, and the funds quite small, the one in the West Bank simply 
returned the funds – with bank transfer fees. Ash described the move as, ‘don’t 
give me shit over $10,000’.772 Ash was impressed with how well the partners 
dealt with the crisis in Canada, 
The professionalism with which they handled the crisis and handled the 
aftermath was commendable. I called them for their reports and they said 
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yes they’re coming. Anyone else would have just said, “screw you”. But 
they were fine.773 
 
This led to a couple intense Board meetings in spring and summer of 2009, 
where the CEO’s performance was evaluated – over the three small and very 
balanced human rights projects.774 Ash notes that in the summer meeting the 
Board would not give the CEO his evaluation, even though they were required 
by law to do so. So the CEO was forced to make an Access to Information 
request to see it. The Board was incensed by his exercising this legal right, the 
Board of a human rights organisation, and falsely claimed that the CEO had 
had no right to see it.775 The Board in response established a committee of four 
to review the CEO further, which included the aforementioned Chairperson and 
another highly partisan pro-Israel activist. That committee was meant to rewrite 
the evaluation by the end of 2009, with an aim of specifically not allowing the 
CEO to read it. Meanwhile, the Chairperson and partisan ally excluded the 
other two members of the committee from the process of writing it, prompting 
one of them to resign and to alert Foreign Affairs about the dubious process.776 
It was a crude example of a group attempting to exercise the hidden power that 
critics warn exists behind development aid, in spite of neoliberal claims of 
neutrality in aid. It also meant that Organisation 1 spent its energy bickering 
internally, causing paralysis, over several small human rights projects that were 
meant to support both Palestinian and Israeli rights equally.  
 
NGO Monitor 
NGO Monitor played a part in Organisation 1’s problems. NGO Monitor’s CEO-
founder Gerald Steinberg is a British-born, Israeli Political Scientist who works 
at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, where he established a ‘Program on Conflict 
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Management and Negotiation’.777  He and his organisation are linked to the 
Israeli government and specifically the right wing parties. NGO Monitor 
essentially argues that international aid projects have contributed to Palestinian 
terrorism and that established international human rights NGOs, such as, 
‘Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Oxfam and 
dozens of smaller allied groups have contributed to hatred, rather than 
supporting peace’ in Israel and the OPT.778 Steinberg also says that, ‘In contrast 
to their PR images as peacemakers, the one-sided approach of the NGOs 
boosts radical Palestinian voices’.779  Based on this argument, NGO Monitor 
analyses Palestinian aid projects to find ways to show their biases and then 
tries to get them defunded. Canada proved a receptive country for their 
message. 
Ash gave an example for how this would work. He/she said that NGO Monitor 
would go through the reports of the three human rights organisation that 
Organisation 1 funded in 2009 to see if they referred to the Israeli military as 
something like ‘occupation forces’, and would point to that use of terminology as 
evidence of bias. 780  NGO Monitor further accused the three respected 
organisations of wrong doing in reports that could not be corroborated by any 
other source other than NGO Monitor.781 Yet NGO Monitor’s specious claims 
proved critical to informing the opinions of several Board members at 
Organisation 1, including the Chairperson. Those Board members who opposed 
the grants and turned against their CEO seemed to base their evidence solely 
on the uncorroborated case put forward by NGO Monitor.782 They would not 
even accept counter-arguments made by their own management team against 
NGO Monitor’s claims. The CEO of NGO Monitor also happened to be a very 
good friend of the then Chairperson, 
He happened to be a very, very good friend of [the Chairperson], our 
board member. Our Board member had asked specifically to fly him out 
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of Israel so that he could talk about the dangers of funding Palestinian 
organisations. And when my management committee refused that, it was 
war between [the CEO] and [the Chairperson].783 
NGO Monitor and the pro-Israel Board members did not even accept the idea 
that the inclusion of the Israeli human rights organisation established political 
balance in the grants. The reason the Board members gave was that the Israeli 
organisation came from the Israeli left. Ash said that those Board members 
claimed, ‘They are like, it’s biased, they don’t care about Israel and they’re 
misleading people’.784 NGO Monitor found a group receptive to its message. 
NGO Monitor seems also to have had a hand in undermining a rights project 
Organisation 6 was funding at a well-respected Palestinian research institute. 
Jamie said it was widely believed by their staff that Gerald Steinberg had 
identified and singled out their partner because it had signed a document calling 
for more rights for Arab citizens in Israel. For this reason he objected to 
Organisation 6 funding that PNGO. 785  Alexis was even more certain that 
Steinberg’s involvement scuttled the project. 786  He/she said the project was 
scuttled during implementation after Steinberg raised questions about the 
partner and the project.787  
Alexis was told that NGO Monitor had some kind of influence in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and in the Prime Minister’s Office. For this reason, Organisation 
6 took NGO Monitor’s questions seriously.788 As a result, Alexis had to put 
together talking points about the project with his/her team in response to the 
concerns raised against the project.789 In many ways this was an odd question 
because Organisation 6 had an established and well-thought out procedure for 
first designing then choosing to fund projects. This was also odd because the 
project and partner were considered low risk, requiring lighter reporting 
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requirements. 790  Further, as described in Chapter 6 they have a thorough 
vetting and preparation process in the design stage of a project, while their 
partner on this project was internationally renowned. 791  Meanwhile, Alexis 
thought they should not even respond to NGO Monitor.792 His/her response to 
senior management while helping write out the talking points was to ask, ‘Why 
are we even responding to NGO Monitor? They’re not a credible sort of 
organisation’.793 Ash corroborated that opinion separately in his/her interview 
from Organisation 1. When asked if NGO Monitor’s reports were credible, Ash 
said ‘no’,  
They have no references. They actually accuse people by affiliation or by 
hunches. By what they think. There is not one aid organisation to the 
Palestinians that is accepted by them. Whether it be digging wells or 
advocating for Palestinian rights. All the same. Everything helping 
Palestinians is bad. And if you go to their website it’s not even well 
documented. It’s all on what they think or how they perceive things. I 
would be very happy if they were like an organisation that kind of 
dissected things good and bad, and based it on actual evidence. But 
they have no evidence. It’s just by affiliation.794 
 
Hayden said that NGO Monitor seemed to have some form of influence over 
Canadian policy, because many people at CIDA had been checking to see 
whom NGO Monitor was monitoring and would become concerned when 
information came in identifying organisations CIDA might be working with. 
Hayden says that when CIDA itself was targeted that created great concern at 
the agency, due to NGO Monitor’s influence in Harper’s government.795 Even 
though the legitimacy of NGO Monitor might be questioned, it seemed to be 
succeeding in Canada. Ash said, 
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So he [CEO Gerald Steinberg] has been attacking all of these 
organisations over the years, but I think he’s winning. He’s, like now, he’s 
been listened to in many circles inclusive of the Canadian government.796   
 
Canadian Government actions undermining OPT Aid Projects 
The political challenge of working in the OPT caused by the Canadian 
government cannot be understated, as many aid organisations rely on 
government for funding and all are ultimately regulated by government. Thus, if 
it so wanted the government could actively undermine any Palestinian aid 
project, and this is something that the Canadian government would do, 
particularly following the 2006 victory by the Harper Conservatives. Just two 
days after Harper himself won his first election 2006 January 23rd, Hamas won 
its first 2006 January 25th election and Canada was the first country to put 
sanctions on the OPT and PA in 2006 March in what was one of that 
governments first major policy decisions, at home or abroad. Canada was the 
first of Israel’s allies in the West, most of which would follow, to take this 
decision. This decision laid the grounds for a decade of Canadian Middle East 
policy under the Harper Conservatives.  
Projects and organisations receiving CIDA funding were affected immediately. 
Organisation 4 had in 2006 March to halt work on the component of their project 
comprising the hand-over of the two Gazan centres to the Palestinian Ministry, 
which CIDA and Canadian officials could not work with due to the boycott on 
the PA, undermining the key point of sustainability in the project.797 This would 
eventually mark the death knell for a project challenged since the start by a rigid 
design model not able to adapt to the worsening conditions of settler 
colonialism. Likewise, Organisation 5 was forced to pause its one law project in 
2006 March and fell behind in the implementation of this, in the pattern of starts-
and-stops that undermined the entirety of their work. 798  They also never 
returned to work in Gaza where Hamas remained in power, fragmentising the 
project further along the lines of the fragmentation of the three sections of the 
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OPT – Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem – into different forms of 
governance and daily life.799 Morgan meanwhile pointed out that patterns of 
stops-and-starts in Canadian aid projects made it impossible for them to get 
anything done in the region, while reinforcing anything that the Israelis did in the 
OPT.800 For example, reinforcing Israel’s fragmentation of the OPT. 
Notably the Harper Conservative government opposed any criticism of Israel or 
of its own Middle East policy. This stood against a long tradition of NGOs 
holding government into account in Canada, such as at the rights and advocacy 
organisations I interviewed. Organisation 9 was warned to abandon all 
advocacy work, or become defunded, leading to their dropping a capacity 
building partnership with an advocacy-oriented PNGO. Organisation 3 may 
have been defunded due to their own advocacy work questioning Canadian 
government policy. Organisation 1 was rocked by internal discord over their 
small OPT rights advocacy work, caused by Harper appointees to the Board. 
Organisation 6 was forced by government and pro-Israel lobbyists to abandon a 
project with a partner that had advocated for Palestinian rights in Israel.  
In 2009, Organisation 3 was one of a series of organisations that had their 
federal government funding stopped by the Conservative Party, similar to public 
cases of other organisations described in Chapter 5. Evidence strongly 
suggests this was done for partisan pro-Israel purposes, very likely linked in the 
case of Organisation 3 to their human rights and advocacy work in the OPT. 
This was completely unexpected because they had had a 2009 fund request 
approved at every level of CIDA, and this was only awaiting what was 
considered a formality at that point, the final sign-off by the government Minister 
responsible. They had expected, like in past years, just to be funded again after 
having had a good evaluation and audit, while CIDA had even recommended 
an increase in funding.801 However, someone in government rescinded approval 
at the last minute.802  
Once they were defunded, the result was worst for their overseas partners in 
the OPT and elsewhere. Organisation 3 suddenly had to transfer a 75% budget 
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cut on to their Palestinian partners, sharply reducing their capacity to sustain 
programmes in the OPT. 803  One immediate casualty was the Oslo-inspired 
dialogue project in Jerusalem, the organisation run by Israeli and Palestinian 
women’s groups. With a limited budget they were forced at that point to finally 
give up on it after well over a decade.804  
This may have happened because Organisation 3 was at first confused by 
government with another organisation. However, that confusion may have 
become useful for a government seeking to score political points with minority 
Jewish constituents in key ridings, as well as other pro-Israel advocates. A 
prominent Canadian Minister even said that defunding Organisation 3 was part 
of their government’s ‘fight against anti-Semitism’.805 Organisation 3 had though 
a long history of working with partners in Israel, including Israeli peace activists, 
and dialogue programmes. Their organisational material also very clearly 
opposes anti-Semitism. Remy was unequivocal in saying that they were not 
anti-Semitic.806  
A member of Organisation 3, not one of the interviewees, described the incident 
to me in an email by saying that they are big enough of an organisation that 
they could withstand government intimidation and that they do not scare easily, 
because they cannot be taken down easily. Further, he/she said that as an 
advocacy organisation they were used to having arguments. He/she also said 
that within Organisation 3,  
We debate constantly what exactly are the motives of this current 
government vis-à-vis Israel. Many of us are not convinced they’re 
religious, though no doubt religion fits into the picture somewhere.807  
 
However, Organisation 3 was big enough and separate enough from 
government for one of its members to express that opinion. Organisation 1 was 
completely at the mercy of the Harper government. Not all of its Board members 
had been opposed to the three 2009 rights projects, just a vocal and powerful 
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minority that had been appointed by the Conservative government. 808  That 
minority was though so biased that they purportedly referred to the West Bank 
as the Israeli (and biblical) region of ‘Judaea and Samaria’, a strongly 
ideological stance that acknowledges all Israeli claims to the territory and 
specifically excludes the Palestinian presence in the West Bank, and the two-
state solution that Oslo is premised upon.809 Ash even heard from the more 
moderate Board members, who eventually resigned out of frustration, that the 
partisan members basically had a problem with ‘anything Arab’.810 That is, they 
would mean there were overt racists serving on the Board of a major Canadian 
human rights organisation. Eventually they would gain a majority after further 
Harper government appointments of Christian fundamentalist and Jewish pro-
Israel activists to it. 
Organisation 6 faced a similar dilemma of government influence, though they 
would not suffer in the same way. Alexis was able to ascertain that the Israeli 
ambassador to Canada had not been happy that they were funding the PNGO 
identified by NGO Monitor, and that lobbying by the Israeli embassy may have 
played a key role in their project being cancelled halfway through, too. That 
ambassador had in particular not been happy with political statements made by 
the PNGO supporting equal rights for Palestinian residents in Israel.811 Those 
objections by the Israeli government representative to Canada and NGO 
Monitor found a receptive ear in the CEO of Organisation 6.  
Officially the CEO argued when cancelling the project that that they could not 
support the Palestinian partner since the partner was registered in Israel and 
Israel is a developed country. Alexis’ solution was to run the project through a 
partner in a developing country instead.812 The CEO though had said it was too 
late for that unacceptable option to work, telling Alexis the project should not 
have been approved in the first place.813 For Alexis these were excuses and 
double standards. For instance, Organisation 6 had a history of funding projects 
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with organisations in developed countries, such as the UK, and has funded 
projects with Israeli organisations. 
At a meeting with senior management and the CEO, as the fate of the project 
on the line, Alexis spoke out strongly against cancellation because there were 
no grounds for the action.814 He/she also argued that cancelling the grant would 
have a highly negative impact on the partner, undermining its viability as an 
organisation. This would be unfair because all of the implementation had been 
done well to that point, and all necessary procedures conducted 
appropriately. 815  When Alexis disagreed with its cancellation, the CEO told 
him/her to, ‘take it on the chin and move on’, or look for work elsewhere; but 
that it was likely better to look for a job elsewhere as his/her team was going to 
need new leadership anyway.816 So Alexis was basically told he/she was going 
to lose his/her job for standing up for the project. The Palestinian partner was 
meanwhile completely shocked by the unprecedented cancellation of a running 
project that had made it through the careful vetting process.817 The debacle did 
not go unnoticed in the Middle East or OPT, destroying the reputation of 
Organisation 6 overseas, as had happened to Organisation 1 under similar 
circumstances.818  
Meanwhile at Organisation 3, as a result of the Conservative government 
Minister’s accusation of anti-Semitism against them, Remy said by the summer 
of 2014 that they are still linked with the ‘putrid’ accusation of anti-Semitism. 
Since the exact reason they were defunded is difficult to pinpoint, that leaves 
their defunding open to interpretation, so when a ‘credible’ source like a 
prominent government Minister accuses them of anti-Semitism that may seem 
to be the legitimate reason for their defunding to some people. Remy says they 
have become part of a group of Canadian organisations that have been 
together inaccurately characterised as groups contributing to a new ‘anti-
Semitism’, just like the leftist student groups by the CPCCA.819 He/she says that 
                                                
814 Alexis (2014 October 4) 17min30s to 18min49s 
815 Alexis (2014 October 4) 18min49s to 19min57s  
816 Alexis (2014 October 4) 19min57s to 20min55s 
817 Alexis (2014 October 4) 21min16s to 22min10s 
818 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 38min35s to 40min22s 
819 Remy (2014 August 28) 07min40s to 08min00s  He/she said there has been a whole 
redefinition of anti-Semitism by Harper government, and said, ‘I just don’t accept the notion that 
criticism of Israel, the state, the policies of the state of Israel represents anti-Semitism’. Remy 
(2014 August 28) 08min54s to 09min53s 
	 249 
negative association falsely asserted by government is found everywhere and is 
highly problematic.820 As an organisation that had a long history of nonviolent 
engagement and human rights work, so Remy found any accusation that they 
could support violence or be anti-Semitic to be ‘levelled without any rationale’.821 
At the same time fighting those accusations used up a tremendous amount of 
time and energy, and affected their operations overseas by straining their office 
at home in that act of self-defence. This was inching them toward the paralysis 
in operations that could more effectively be carried out at Organisation 1 
through government appointments to the Board of Directors. 
In this climate accusations of terrorism or anti-Semitism were being too easily 
levelled at respected individuals or human rights organisations. Organisation 3 
had a prominent government Minister accuse it of anti-Semitism, while Board 
members linked the CEO of Organisation 1 to suggest he/she was sympathetic 
to terrorism in a performance review. In the more extreme cases at 
Organisations 1, 3, 4 and 6 the project coordinators I interviewed provided 
examples of NGO Monitor undermining their projects by lobbying management, 
and possibly with support of the Canadian government. There appeared in the 
case of Organisation 6 even to be Israeli government interference in their halted 
project. Yet, in spite of these severe problems during the Harper government 
years, long-serving coordinators at human rights and advocacy organisations 
like Ash, Ryan and Casey still said it did not matter which Canadian political 
party was in power. The process of government backed oppression of 
Palestinian aid and rights work was just more pronounced and less hidden 
when the Conservatives came to power. 
 
Double Standards applied against Palestinian Aid Work in Canada 
Many of the interviewees could point out specific cases of double standards 
being applied to their work in the OPT or with Palestinians, as compared to their 
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work in other regions. For example, Blake and Dallas described the different 
standards of due diligence applied by the CRA to their work in the OPT as 
opposed to Afghanistan. The double standard always worked against 
Palestinians. Taylor said that Israel and the OPT presents a particularly unique 
challenge compared to working in other regions around the world. He/she 
pointed out that if you were to criticise the Columbian government for its human 
rights record or policies, you will not described as ‘anti-Columbian’. By contrast 
if you criticise Israel you are labelled anti-Israeli, or anti-Semitic.822 Yet Taylor 
argues that human rights are universal, and he/she cannot understand why 
standards should be applied differently in different places.823 Ryan described 
the same paradox when serving as the Chairperson of the Board for a charity 
that often dealt with cases of torture in Latin America. When he/she wanted to 
support a mental health centre in Gaza, the charity leadership asked that 
he/she do so on a private basis. They wanted nothing to do with Palestine. 
Ryan said, 
Why on my own? If when we had gone to Central America I’ve been fully 
representing the [the Canadian organisation]? Why not support the 
[Gazan organisation]? Is torture not the same thing in Gaza as it is in 
Latin America?824 
 
It may be in Canada. In 2014, following Israel’s third devastating bombardment 
of Gaza in just six years, Ryan said the CEO of the same Canadian charity 
wrote a ‘letter of concern’ that omitted the two key concepts that are 
fundamental problems in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, ‘international law’ 
and ‘occupation’.825 Deliberately leaving out accurate descriptions of the OPT is 
though the norm in the Canadian discourse, and that represented a serious 
problem to Ryan. So while ‘terrorism’ is used repetitively to describe 
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Palestinians, terms that emphasise Palestinian rights are not used and Ryan 
believes this contributes to a heavily biased interpretation of the conflict.826 
Double standards were even applied internally to the way in which Palestine 
was funded at the organisations. Emory says that funding for work in the OPT 
was structured different than with other regions they worked in. Each year 
Organisation 1 would focus on a particular theme, and project coordinators 
were expected to defend the projects they were funding in a group discussion. 
There was though never a discussion about the Middle East budget, when it 
briefly existed for rights work at Organisation 1. Any discussion was kept 
purposefully quiet and between just the CEO and Emory.827 Of the numerous 
projects Emory ran over the years, it was the Palestine ones with which he/she 
found people did not ask any deep questions about, until the time came that 
they wanted to find an excuse to halt a programme. Then he/she says they 
would ask pointy questions, because they wanted to kill it.828 
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Image 1: Palestinians Protest a Visit by Canada’s Foreign Minister to the OPT 
in 2015 January829 
 
 
Given the anti-Palestinian biases described above, some coordinators indicated 
that being Canadian eventually became a liability in the OPT. Ash said that at 
one time it was seen as good for an organisation to have support from a 
Canadian donor, because Canada had had such a positive reputation that this 
would benefit its organisational CV, helping it to raise more funds. In that way 
even small Canadian funded projects, such as the ones Organisation 1 quietly 
offered hidden from their Board, were seen to have had a broader value for a 
PNGO, because it gave legitimacy to raise additional funds elsewhere in the 
world. However, Ash noted over time being funded by a Canadian donor came 
to be seen as a liability.830 This was recognised in the Canadian government 
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itself. At one point Kim had someone from Foreign Affairs came to Organisation 
5 for assistance with a project, saying bluntly, 
Look our reputation is crap, we need to be able to help out the Abbas 
government basically. We can’t put through new sources of funding. So 
is there some way you can work through your project to support the 
Ministry of Justice in particular.831 
 
That degradation in Canada’s image over its ardent support for Israel, at the 
expense of Palestinians’ basic rights, also impacted on Organisation 5’ project. 
When they finally were able to recommence their law project six months after 
the delay imposed on them by the Canadian government in 2006 March, many 
of the actors on the ground had changed and some of them resented Canada 
for being the first to boycott the Palestinian election results. For instance, there 
was a new Palestinian Chief Justice in place who had a very bad perception of 
Canada.832 Janine Clark had warned in the late 2000s that,  
An inconsistency in implementing Canadian-promoted values or an 
inconsistency in how Canada treats actors only serves to undermine its 
programs, credibility, and values.833  
 
Limited Funding Structures and the Fear of Defunding 
Finally, the ability of the Canadian organisations to have an impact in the OPT 
hinged on their financial capacity to support projects. Most interviewees 
complained that the scale of their financial contributions to projects was small, 
and many complained their budget was too limited to be truly effective. Emory 
says further that it was always a battle for him/her to retain funding for his/her 
partners in the OPT for rights advocacy projects. Emory said that he/she never 
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really had a sufficient budget to do much in the OPT. When he/she managed a 
short-lived Middle East programme at Organisation 1 in the early- to mid-1990s, 
for instance, Emory had a paltry budget of around $ 40,000 to 60,000 per year 
to work with. Yet, that was still better than in later years when his/her 
engagement with the Middle East had to be packaged within other 
programmes.834  
Fear for the loss of what little funding they had for OPT projects, or even an 
entire organisation impaired the work of a number of interviewees. Ash for 
instance perceived an attitude held by the Conservative government that you as 
an NGO needed to remain quiet, not engaging in any public advocacy that 
contradicts government policy, doing only what they accepted. He/she said, ‘It’s 
just like basically you keep your place where you are, and if you want to be 
funded you shut your mouth’.835  Ash acknowledged that such a ‘conditional 
funding structure’ at Organisation 1 predated the Conservative government.836 
There had been problems in particular from Liberal governments over Israel and 
the OPT, ‘But with the Conservative’s ideology, it’s not about balance, and 
that’s the scary part’.837 
Interviewees such as Kai felt that the way funding was structured impeded on 
their projects. Organisation 7 relied heavily on CIDA funding for its network of 
NOG partners in the Middle East, and this limited what they could achieve. For 
instance, Kai was never able to use Canadian government funding to support 
the Israeli partners in their network, because Israel as a rich country was not 
typically eligible for Canadian ODA funding.838 So instead Organisation 7 would 
set aside time and resources to help their Israeli partners raise funds, while the 
Israeli partners could benefit directly from the free trained staff that came 
periodically within the programme. Nonetheless, the impact was that the Israeli 
partners were treated differently and worse than the Palestinian and Jordanian 
ones. Kai speculated that this inequity might have led to a schism between the 
different partners, damaging the aims of their peace building exercise.839 
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Taylor said the Middle East is a very complicated place to work in and that you 
always want to do more. He/she said there never seemed to be enough 
resources, which contributed toward a certain level of frustration. Add to that the 
negative repercussions of their own loss of funding, for political reasons, which 
meant even less of a capacity to provide support subsequent to 2009. This 
meant that they could only invest in discrete and specific projects.840 Dallas 
likewise felt as though the demand was always so great that,  
Whatever you think the demand is, you’re still so small. The demand is 
so wide, and the supply is so small. So hopefully all those NGOs can a 
little bit narrow this [need] as much as they can. Will they meet all of the 
demand? The answer is no. But we [Organisation 10] do our best to help 
what we call the neediest of the needy.841 
 
 
To be certain the OPT is not an easy place to carry out development aid 
projects, because settler colonialism is the anathema to development work, as 
well as neoliberal principles like trade and cooperation. Settler colonialism is a 
force for destruction and theft, not of building up of. Thus the project 
coordinators I interviewed faced numerous challenges running their aid projects 
in the OPT, such as limitations on their movement and the destruction of 
infrastructure. Limited funding for Palestinian projects, in part due to political 
reasons, and government regulations also ensured that each of the 
interviewees could have only a limited impact on the ground. Often the 
paperwork for those regulations subsumed them, given their limited Palestine 
aid budgets. Yet, in spite of such severe operational conditions, the biggest 
challenges they faced in the implementation of their work came from pro-Israel 
actors who worked in tandem with the Canadian government to suppress and 
undermine any projects they deemed a threat to Israel, and its settler colonial 
policy. In many cases this undermined and forced interviewee organisations to 
halt their Palestine aid projects, and even caused paralysis at the organisations 
themselves. Fear of appearing too sympathetic toward Palestinians, and then 
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being linked to anti-Semitism, even affected how organisations structured their 
programmes. Some of those organisations also appear to have been defunded 
because of their aid work. Rights and advocacy projects in particular seemed to 
draw ire from the Canadian government and pro-Israel lobby groups. Theirs 
became a story of oppression by a Canadian government seeking to stifle any 


















CHAPTER 8 - OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
The final stage of the linear model for running aid projects is when donors 
evaluate the outcomes of their projects. Many of the interviewees had projects 
that did not survive to that stage of completion once the Harper Conservative 
government came to power in Canada. Even if a project survived to completion, 
its value was often questioned and outcomes not understood by government 
bodies. Those that did survive typically saw their funding lapse, even the rare 
organisation that might have a reasonable working relationship with the 
Canadian government.  
It is at this stage that the experiences of the project coordinators were 
dominated by partisan political interference in Canada, of a pro-Israeli and anti-
Palestinian nature, undermining their projects, careers and organisations. In 
fact, many of their projects did not escape the project implementation phase, 
while two of the ten organisations were forced by government to shut down not 
long after a confrontation it. Reflecting on their projects, there is a clear pattern 
of government undermining any project that might in any way challenge Israel’s 
settler colonial policies. By this point the only aid projects that were allowed to 
take place seemed to be innocuous ones that could in no way challenge the 
political reality of settler colonial occupation, those that continued to encourage 
Palestinians to work with Israelis or those that actually reinforced the 
occupation, such as the training of Palestinian police described in Chapter 5. 
This all took place in spite of official Canadian foreign policy that technically 
continued to advocate for a two state solution and the neoliberal measures laid 
out in the 1993 Oslo Peace Process. This suggests that the Canadian 
government had a hidden agenda and was, at least in the later years of the 
study period, using its development aid to dominate Palestinians in pursuit of it. 
That agenda was to support Israel, even when that meant supporting settler 
colonialism. The government deliberately attacked any Canadian civil society 
organisation that got in the way. 
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The Impact of the Development Aid Projects 
Incomplete Projects 
Many of the project coordinators I interviewed were not able to complete 
Palestinian aid projects due to Canadian government interference. Ash could 
ultimately not assess Organisation 1’s three 2009 rights projects that were 
supposed to be carried out in the wake of the Operation Cast Lead, due to the 
tumult that funding them caused in Organisation 1. That tumult led one of the 
partners, the West Bank-based rights organisation, to return the project funding 
rather than deal with the hassle of running it. In spite of the problems that the 
tumult at Organisation 1 caused for the three partners, Ash was struck by the 
professionalism and support he/she received from them throughout it. He/she 
was also impressed with what results the two that kept their funding were 
nonetheless able to produce. For instance, they presented a repertoire of well-
documented cases of human rights abuses that contributed to a UN fact-finding 
mission looking into the 2008/9 bombardment of Gaza.842 The human rights 
organisation in Gaza used the data they collected to better talk about the 
human rights situation with diplomats, the media and the broader international 
community. Overall, Ash felt the project was worth the money.843  
In spite of the incredible challenges Jamie faced at Organisation 6 for funding 
the PNGO partner that was targeted by NGO Monitor, he/she believes that the 
projects they funded with their Palestinian partners were effective. One 
advantage was that, in spite of all the problems they faced with political 
interference and self-censorship that originated out of fear, once they were 
working with a partner they would be working on their own agenda and able to 
focus on activities that mattered to each side, not solely the agenda of the 
Canadian government. He/she said that you would learn a lot in the process 
with new partners, and could contribute a lot by networking and funding people. 
In particular, he/she felt fortunate to be able to fund strategic partners over a 
long period of time with whom they could make a difference.844 Still, their project 
                                                
842 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 54min05sec to 55min06sec Known popularly as the Goldstone 
Report. ‘HUMAN RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES- 
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, Fact-finding Missin 
(United Nations, 25 September 2009). 
843 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 54min07sec to 55min37sec 
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on Palestinian political rights was terminated before it could produce results, 
being an exception where they could not follow their own agenda and focus on 
the activities that mattered to them as an organisation, because it did not match 
the agenda of the Canadian government. 
For Organisation 4’s project with the centres in Gaza, Hayden said they only 
really succeeded at fulfilling one of three objectives: actually establishing the 
two centres. Even then the centres did not necessarily develop as planned, 
because over time they became more oriented towards humanitarian work in 
lieu of the developmental aims they were intended to pursue. Despite their 
efforts to create income-generating activities for the centres that were meant to 
cover their operating costs, the results were poor. The development and 
vocational training component was the most difficult to pursue under the siege, 
because after training there was no work for participants and placement at work 
was impossible. That definitely contributed toward the project moving away from 
developmental needs. Finally, institutional capacity building at the PA Ministry, 
which was meant to take over the centres, was cut short because the 
Government of Canada did not want to work with them anymore after the 
elections in 2006.845  Even if just establishing the centres was considered a 
success, they were shut down prematurely not long after losing their Canadian 
funding.846 The programme was designed pre-Second Intifada and simply could 
not cope with the changes and actual context in Gaza from 2002-onwards, or 
the political context of the OPT in Canada. They could not survive the Canadian 
government’s boycott of regions in the OPT not governed by a group deemed 
acceptable to Israel. 
In another type of development project that was not completed, one of the 
interviewees said he/she wanted to begin working with a Palestinian hydrology 
association to rehabilitate a couple small springs supplying water for villages in 
Area C in the north of the West Bank. He/she had wanted to carry out a tangible 
infrastructure project that would help Palestinians in their day-to-day lives, at a 
cost of over $100,000 per spring. That coordinator was pleased with the results 
and decided to follow up with a $250,000 project in the Jordan Valley, an area 
in the West Bank being heavily colonised by Israel and cut off from Palestinian 
                                                
845 Hayden (2014 August 27) 33min40s to 34min29s   
846 Hayden was really sad after so much work though to see the project shut down. Hayden 
(2014 August 27) 41min04s to 42min16s 
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rule. The interviewee said that he/she had to carry out the project secretly so 
that the Israelis would not see this basic improvement of infrastructure, because 
improvements to the infrastructure for Palestinians in areas coveted for Israeli 
settlement defy the logic of settler colonialism. Likewise the interviewee said the 
project had to be kept hidden from the Canadian government, because the 
Canadian government did not want anyone challenging Israeli policy. As such, 
the Palestinians at the site of renovation tried to keep the project hidden, 
avoiding the use of heavy vehicles that might draw attention from Israeli 
authorities that did not want to see the development take place. In the end 
though, the project was discovered and $250,000 in improvements destroyed.  
Kim felt there were some great moments of cross-cultural, institutional learning 
between Canadian and Palestinian members of their respective justice systems 
during the course of Organisation 5’s law project. For instance, senior 
Palestinian judges were moved after touring Palestinian prisons and hearing 
how badly child PA prisoners were treated in court by judges like themselves.847 
As a result, a number of them said henceforth they would avoid the use of 
prison when sentencing children.848  Kim regretted that their project was not 
renewed after the funding period concluded, because a series of stoppages 
caused by a reluctant Canadian government prevented it from really getting 
going and being effective. Likewise, Kai pointed out that bane of overseas 
development was that you could never run a major project involving community 
development on a few years contract. 
 
Projects that were Hard to Quantify and Non-Linear 
Since one of the aims of Organisation 5’s law project was to discuss with the 
Palestinian members of the judiciary what the role of judges was in society, and 
then to act on those discussions, it may have been somewhat successful – 
provided the impact of the project was still being felt after its funding lapsed in 
2012. Kim and his/her organisation made sure though to point out that success 
in the project clearly could not be based on just a simple quantitative measure 
such as running set numbers of workshops, but would be based on how many 
                                                
847 Some began to cry hearing the stories from those kids. 
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of the judges they worked with came to believe that their role was to promote 
human dignity, what that meant for those judges intellectually and how they 
subsequently used their office to carry out promote human dignity.849 Its impact 
could also only be measured over a long period of time to see if that change 
took place. 
Kim was one of a number of interviewees found difficult explaining to their own 
donors that a project was successful if it did not produce easily accessible 
statistical data. Project coordinators like Kim actually objected to relying on 
quantifiable data to measure a project’s outcome, favoured by donors like CIDA. 
Likewise when asked if his/her projects were well run and provided a good 
return for the money Organisation 1 invested, Emory responded by saying that 
they were blessed ‘never to hear those questions’ when he/she worked at 
Organisation 1 in the 1990s and early 2000s. 850  Rather, Emory was more 
interested to see if the limited funding he/she provided to partners was spent in 
a way that helped them to fulfil their own vision as an organisation. Thus, Emory 
would ask them what they had done with their overall funding, beyond what 
Organisation 1 provided, to compare what they set out to do that year and with 
their vision as an organisation.851  
Questioning quantifiable measures, Emory asked just how one might, ‘analyse 
quantitatively that you have done good human rights work in Gaza’? 852 In fact, 
that was an objection Emory says that he/she made when evaluating their work 
in Gaza. Emory specifically gave an example where Organisation 1’s finance 
department decided to ‘quantify’ how many human rights violations their money 
had helped to address. Emory says that he/she said told them that that was not 
possible to do, and that showing ‘a number of violations’ does not show that you 
have done good work.853 
Nonetheless, trying to answer the ‘value for money’ question, Emory concluded 
that his/her choice of partners and projects were the right choices for the time, 
and that none of the Palestinian organisations they supported had any 
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difficulties fulfilling their stated goals.854 If anything, Emory felt there was more of 
a problem with overachievement by some partners, and this was a problem 
because overachievement could lead to exhaustion.855  
When asked about the effectiveness of Organisation 3’s projects after being 
defunded, Remy echoed comments made by Sawyer, Blake and Dallas that, 
‘Effectiveness in the Israel-Palestine context is a very difficult thing to talk 
about’.856 Remy proceeded to say what may differentiate them from other aid 
agencies is that they of course want their work to be effective, but they do not 
operate under the same time horizons. They are interested in sustaining 
partnerships, and that means accompanying people even when a specific 
project is not working, or accompanying partners when they find their own 
solutions, supporting them with those decisions. Thus, just because a specific 
project does not look effective on the linear scale that does not necessarily 
provide a reason to stop funding it, or to stop supporting the partner. Of course 
Organisation 3 tries to get results and provide ‘deliverables’, or whatever they 
are being asked for, but a large amount of their work in the OPT and other 
places around the world consists of accompaniment, presence and bearing 
witness. So while they do look to incorporate best practices and to strengthen 
the impact of their work, they believe that being faithful to their overall vision 
long-term is most important.857  
Remy and Organisation 3 specifically eschewed the linear model. He/she said 
that aid now is too focused on tangible outcomes that you can show, such as a 
hospital that you can show in a picture.858 Remy further pointed out that the 
contemporary linear, neoliberal model of running aid projects on in the OPT is 
simply flawed,859 
Because the situation is so difficult it’s like running to stay in the same 
place. In the context of a deteriorating situation the fact the people are 
                                                
854 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s 
855 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s Ryan said if people at NGOs are 
constantly on a point of burn-out, facing enormous needs they cannot possibly meet and 
dealing with daily frustrations of having not done the job well enough, the people at those 
charities often start to blame each other leading to a break-down in their work. Ryan (2014 
December 2) 1h14min08s to 1h15min01s  
856 Remy (2014 August 28) 27min05s to 27min14s 
857 Remy (2014 August 28) 27min14s to 28min45s 
858 Remy (2014 August 28) 35min44s to 37min05s 
859 Long refers to this neoliberal approach as a gross oversimplification. Long, ‘From Paradigm 
Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented Sociology of Development’, 15. 
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able to continue their organisation and programmes is probably a sign of 
effectiveness. As opposed to some kind of linear notion that you’re going 
to make huge leaps forward and progress.860 
Remy and Organisation were taking into account the context of settler 
colonialism, even if they were not overtly using that terminology. 
Taylor emphasised that you have to be flexible. This is the case for all the 
regions Organisation 3 works in, from Africa to Latin America and the Middle 
East. He/she said that you have to really trust a partner. Partners may change 
the activities they are doing based on the context, but you need to accept that 
so long as their overarching objectives (a vision like Emory supported) remains 
the same, you should continue to support them.861 Further, regardless of the 
challenges of working in the OPT, Taylor said that you always have to bear in 
mind what it would be like if you were not there. For him/her sometimes just 
accompanying partners and being present is vital. Taylor believes that that 
approach of experiencing the occupation with them adds legitimacy to 
Organisation 3’s work with Palestinian partners in advocacy.862 
Finally, though categorising his/her project as successful, Morgan said that 
linear operational principles of project management were ‘nice pieces of paper’ 
that you can ignore once in the field, needing to focus only on end results.863 
He/she also had cynical view about quantifying results. Morgan had discovered 
that donors and organisations implementing projects are far too oriented 
towards statistics (quantifiable results) and spending money.864 He/she said that 
with all those projects you have these ‘nice results’, but that ultimately the main 
goal behind them is to spend the money given for a project, and that the results 
themselves were less important than the spending.865 Morgan said they are,  
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861 Taylor (2014 September 4) 29min58s to 31min47s  
862 Taylor (2014 September 4) 31min47s to 33min07s 
863 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 32min50s to 33min41s 
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Very statistically oriented. Very cash oriented. You have a five million 
dollar project? You have to spend five million dollars. The results are not 
as important as the spending. The quality of volunteers is not as 
important as hiring the volunteers.866 
In this way Morgan felt that the value for money of a project became just 
spending the money itself, which it should not be. 
Finally, Remy pointed out that that the ‘complexity’ of the Israeli-Palestinian 
relationship made Organisation 3’s work especially challenging. He/she said it is 
so highly complex that you need to have some specialised knowledge, and it is 
almost a case such that unless people have a grasp of that complexity, then 
they cannot – or should not – be part of that work.867 The complexity of the 
occupation made Organisation 3’s advocacy work extra challenging, because it 
was difficult trying to help people in Canada understand the issues Palestinians 
faced. Canadians had a tough time understanding the complex discriminatory 
measures that Israel, a fellow liberal democracy, carried out against 
Palestinians. So they had to look for issues that people could understand, such 
as comparing the laws and conditions that Israeli and Palestinian children grow 
up under.868 Likewise it was difficult for them to explain to a donor how a rights 
project qualitatively succeeded or not. 
 
What is the Long Term Impact of the Projects 
Another prompt I managed to fit into the semi-structured interviews was whether 
the projects the coordinators funded would have a lasting impact beyond the 
funding period. In some cases the answer was in the affirmative. However, the 
premature cancellation of a large number of projects mostly excluded those 
from consideration. Some coordinators, such as Emory, said that his/her 
funding had had a long-term impact on their partners by helping the Palestinian 
partners to exist and pursue their organisational vision. To this day each of the 
partners specifically mentioned in this research study continues to operate and 
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have an important impact on OPT and global society.869 Emory was particularly 
impressed with the ability of the Palestinian women’s legal aid clinic to expand 
significantly over two decades, all while maintaining an incredibly heavy 
workload.870  
Meanwhile, Ryan and Casey had seen a number of the partners flourish 
beyond their initial point of support. Organisation 2’s modest support in the early 
to mid-2000s for the youth education project in the OPT seems to have been a 
critical investment, where a small seed fund and technical advice from the late 
Chairperson that helped it get established and expand exponentially by 2014. 
Likewise, when Ryan visited the Gazan community mental health partner in the 
early 2000s, he/she was happy to see the people that Organisation 2 had 
trained were already teaching students from across the region in mental 
health.871  
Kim did not know if Organisation 5’s project would have any long-term benefits, 
as the rule of law project never really had time to get established. However, 
he/she said that as a result of the project they and their Palestinian partner 
planned to collaborate further in the future on projects, while the Palestinian 
partner’s linked university established the first higher education Research Ethics 
Board in the OPT in the wake of the project. The head of the Palestinian REB 
says the concept of dignity that came out of the project sponsored by 
Organisation 5.872 Organisation 4’s project working with the centres in Gaza was 
cut too early to have an impact, while Hayden noted that in Gaza and OPT 
generally it takes a long time for anything to have an actual impact due to all the 
political difficulties.873 
For Organisations 1, 3 and 6 the most important legacy of their projects may 
remarkable have not been in the OPT, but in Canada owing to the scandals that 
sabotaged their Palestinian aid work. In one of those more extreme cases, Ash 
said that the damage done to Organisation 1 and its reputation may have been 
good because it exposed the beliefs of the right-wing government in Canada 
and revealed that ‘conspiracy is reality’. It exposed the hidden intentions of the 
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Canadian government and let people know its ‘actual’ – as opposed to stated – 
position towards Israel and Palestine. Ash said, 
I think in retrospect it was worth it in a way because had you had doubts 
about the government manipulation, had you had any doubts about the 
conspiracy theory, and the strength of the Zionist lobby, and all that stuff, 
which I never bought into before by the way… there you are.874 
The turmoil also generated positive publicity about the Palestinian cause and 
for the partners it affected, who ended up receiving a lot of support from around 
the world. The CEO of the PNGO rights organisation in the West Bank, which 
had returned its project fund to Organisation 1, said, 
Thank you for your project because your ten thousand dollars gave me 
one hundred thousand dollars worth of publicity. So thank you. It’s the 
best PR project we’ve ever done in our lives.875 
Ash meanwhile felt that by exposing the hypocrisy of people in their government 
and on their Board this vindicated the value of advocacy oriented human rights 
work. 876  Thus the three small human rights projects in 2009 may have 
inadvertently had much greater value than their small sums, because they 
resulted in a form of advocacy in Canada that exposed an ‘either you are with 
us or against us’ mentality in the Conservative government.877 Ash said, ‘It just 
shows you that small projects are not necessarily the bad ones’.878 
Meanwhile, the reputation of Organisation 1 was ruined. Many partners lost 
interest in working with them, while the turmoil also led to changes in the way it 
funded projects, dictating how they should be run. Since the years of Emory, 
the organisation had shifted dramatically away from providing core-funding to 
partners to, by the later years of Ash’s work, foisting upon partners projects that 
Organisation 1 would be heavily involved in – a similar experience to Hayden’s 
grappling with an intrusive CIDA monitor. So while partners did not want to be 
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dictated to from Canada, Organisation 1 only wanted to tell them what to do.879 
Even Canadian organisations did not want to work with Organisation 1 in the 
final years of the study period, before the government finally shut down the 
damaged organisation.880   
While Organisation 3 was disappointed at being forced to suddenly cancel 
projects due their loss of CIDA funding, Remy and Taylor were optimistic that 
there might be some unintended benefits. After they were defunded publicly 
(and dramatically) by the Canadian government, Remy said an unanticipated 
benefit was that they could quit working on development projects they had 
become involved in because of funding, which were though more oriented 
towards capacity building and poverty reduction. With their own limited funds 
they could focus on their priority human rights and advocacy projects.881  
Remy and Taylor’s belief was reinforced by the reaction of their Palestinian 
partners to the funding cut. Remy noted that their partners displayed incredible 
solidarity with Organisation 3, in spite of a sudden budget cut that hit those 
partners the hardest. Remy said that the overwhelming message from them 
was that the money was important, but what was more important was the way in 
which Organisation 3 had worked with them projecting their message from 
Palestine to Canada and the rest of the world. Nor did those partners want 
Organisation 3 to step back from its advocacy work,882  
They were able to articulate that and say that this kind of international 
development, transformative advocacy related to human rights was a 
really important piece of the puzzle of the broader international 
development that includes digging wells and … that this part was critical 
in a kind of broad vision. And I think that we’ve almost lost that sense in 
aid now in Canada.883 
They felt the loss of government funding might ultimately turn out for the better, 
because they would now be able to focus more on their own rights advocacy 
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mandate – their vision as an organisation – rather than on what government 
wanted. 
Likewise, Quinn was optimistic that a failure by Organisation 7 to retain funding 
from the Harper Conservative government for their network of social work 
NGOs at the end of the study period would accrue to them the benefits of 
greater focus and clarity of purpose. Further due to their subsequent – frenetic 
– fundraising efforts, Quinn was upbeat that a long-term benefit of losing 
Canadian government funding would be that they were able to establish a wider 
range of stakeholders who are now acting as ambassadors for the programme, 
all as a result of their expansive fundraising efforts. This should ensure more of 
a healthy financial picture for the organisation going forward, which is less 
dependent on one questionable – Canadian government – source. 884 
Meanwhile the fact that their partners were able to withstand the withdrawal of 
Canadian funding seemed to Quinn to point to their success due to their local 
sustainability.885 
Some interviewees saw only negative outcomes from undermined projects. The 
premature cancellation of Organisation 6’s project with their Palestinian partner 
had long-term negative ramifications on the organisation, starting with its 
reputation. It further led to a great deal of staff turnover. Not only did Alexis quit, 
having anyways been threatened with removal, but there has since been a high 
level of staff turnover throughout the organisation. 886  That instability in 
personnel is never good for an organisation’s operations. Further, the way the 
organisation designs its projects was changed, as had once happened at 
Organisation 1, for the worse. For example in a project they planned to partner 
with a major INGO on following their scandal, Organisation 6 wanted to included 
the right to have power over what that INGO could research and to cancel the 
grant if the INGO breached those boundaries. Such an approach marked an 
unprecedented level of intervention and control by Organisation 6.887  
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Value for Money 
One of the prompts I repeated in each semi-structured interviews was for 
interviewees to reflect on whether or not they thought that their OPT aid projects 
had been ‘good value’ for the money invested into them, for as Morgan pointed 
out conventional aid – which is neoliberal – is a money business,  
I’m sorry if I’m going to be a little bit cynical, but I mean international 
development is a money business. Yes, it is all about development, but 
it’s still money business. You have to spend money, you have to hire 
volunteers, so forth and so on. At one point in time the volunteers 
realised that it’s a money business, from both ends, either from the 
funding agency, but also the NGO, because the NGOs live on money 
and they get very comfortable with money, and that’s what they look 
after.888  
Whether they liked being asked that question or not, most coordinators believed 
that the projects they had been funding were good value for the money 
invested. Many of the interviewees objected to that measurement outright, such 
as Emory, Remy, Taylor and Sawyer. In their cases they were more concerned 
with just providing core funding in solidarity with good organisations that had a 
sound vision and ran worthwhile projects. In this way Remy liked to measure 
their partnerships qualitatively. Rather than just quantitatively ‘counting how 
many people came to workshops’ to assess value, he/she would prefer to take 
a more holistic understanding of what people learned in workshops and what 
impact this had on society in the thematic area of their work.889 Meanwhile, 
coordinators like Taylor pointed out that in the context of the OPT you need to 
be flexible and understanding because nothing is simple. Thus coordinators 
such as Remy, Sawyer, Blake and Dallas explicitly said that effectiveness in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context is very difficult to measure.890 For that same reason of 
difficulty, Quinn and Kai argued that their project provided very good value for 
the investment.  
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Some of coordinators were happy with the projects they funded, irrespective of 
measurement style. Those included Emory, Ryan and Casey generally. Casey 
felt that the large youth and volunteer education project they helped found in the 
West Bank was amazing after having visited it, and was quite happy with the 
work they supported at an OPT medical association. Casey was particularly 
happy to have helped the Gazan community mental health programme, but 
cautioned that he/she had no way off assessing their impact there.891 Morgan 
also considered his/her work a great success when compared to his project’s 
objectives and aid industry standards.892  Alexis and Ash meanwhile praised the 
quality of work of their partners’ work on projects that were sabotaged by 
Canadian officials, for what they accomplished and because of how well they 
reacted to those unusual circumstances. Some coordinators like Kim, Jamie, 
Alexis and Hayden simply felt it was though impossible to measure what their 
projects accomplished on the linear model, because they were so effectively 
Canadian officials ensured they never really got anything accomplished. 
 
The Canadian Government as the Primary Obstacle 
Most likely because so many of the organisations I interviewed saw their aid 
work undermined and sabotaged by people in positions of government power in 
Canada who were sympathetic to the Israeli narrative and/or lobbying, or 
otherwise because their work was so severely impaired by Canadian 
regulations incompatible with the real conditions in the OPT, most of the 
interviewees preferred to focus on problems in Canada when assessing the 
outcomes of their projects. This was the common, overarching and dominant 
theme between every semi-structured interview. Overall there three main 
bodies out of which the problems arose: CIDA, the CRA and the Canadian 
government. A combination of one or all of these three undermined the 
organisations’ OPT aid. 
Government interference could be brutally direct, as in the case of 
Organisations 1 and 3, or indirectly, through the CRA or as a result of fear from 
government punishing organisations publicly like KAIROS and Rights and 
                                                
891 Casey Email 2014 November 20 21:56, pp. 2 
892 Organisation 9 in fact attempted to get Morgan to extend his/her stay, but he/she declined 
largely due to fatigue. 
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Democracy described in Chapter 5. Regardless of the form, that interference 
was always carried out for partisan pro-Israeli purposes, in support of Israel’s 
settler-colonial government policy abetted by pro-Israel lobby groups in 
Canada. This happened regardless of Canadian political party in power, though 
the repression was definitely more pronounced during the Conservative Harper 
government’s rule from 2006 onwards, particularly for those organisations 
whose projects focused on advocacy for Palestinian rights. Thus the rights and 
advocacy projects run by Organisations 1 and 2 faced were impeded even prior 
to Harper, while organisations that ran more technocratic capacity building and 
poverty reduction programmes like Organisations 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 faced fewer 
to no problems prior to the Harper government. Emory cynically described the 
situation as one where organisations and activists working with Palestinians 
could survive under the Liberals, albeit on limited funding, but the 
Conservatives did not even want to see them survive.  
A number of coordinators bemoaned what they saw as a major shift in 
Canadian foreign and development policy, and governing style, after 2006. 
Remy noted that prior to the Harper, Canada had a history of striving for 
transparency in governance, where it would even fund organisations that were 
highly critical of government policy. This was seen as a sort of check-and-
balance on government, the notion of which completely eroded after Canada’s 
2006 election. The Conservative government did not want in any way to be 
called to account by civil society organisations, or to allow them funding to do 
so.893 In this way rights and advocacy coordinators, such as Ash, Remy and 
Taylor, would concur with Hayden’s appraisal that quite crazy events were 
taking place in the development sector from 2006 onwards.894 Further, many 
interviewees noted that the Conservatives had adopted a simplistic ‘either your 
with us or against us’ approach to governance at home and abroad. All could 
point to a hostile disdain displayed by the Conservatives against Palestinians, 
owing to their strong ideological and electoral-motived preferences for Israel. 
Some coordinators like Ash, Emory, Hayden, Jamie and Alexis even suggested 
that the extremist Israeli organisation NGO Monitor, which is linked to Israel’s 
government, had influence in the Canadian government and played a role in 
sabotaging their Palestinian aid projects. 
                                                
893 Remy (2014 August 28) 04min46s to 05min15s  




The interviewees basically never had something positive to say about CIDA, 
Canada’s one-time government development, if they spoke about CIDA at all. 
Many interviewees found CIDA employees to be naïve, ignorant and 
unqualified. Kim even complained about racism and sexism. Those CIDA 
employees had meanwhile a great deal of power as both donor and monitor 
when funding an interviewee’s project, which they could label ineffective or 
unimportant on their own whim. Yet with that power did not necessarily come 
experience. It seemed to some coordinators as though those powerful CIDA 
employees did not possess the rights skills or knowledge to assess a project. 
Some interviewees meanwhile found CIDA’s paperwork and monitoring 
requirements to be too oppressive, creating an administrative burden that ate 
up their time and undermined their projects. Their experiences were so bad that 
most coordinators likely would have preferred not to deal with CIDA or receive 
government funding altogether. Only Sawyer was ever comfortable working 
CIDA out of all sixteen project coordinators, while on the opposite side of the 
spectrum Ryan bemoaned the negative influence government had over NGO 
projects due to the power funding gave government over their work, while 
simultaneously allowing government to offload the cost of social service 
provision to unpaid volunteers. 
 
Unqualified Assessments 
Interviewees who received funding from CIDA often spontaneously cited the 
government development agency as an incredibly difficult organisation to work 
with. Many resented the extra problems it caused in already challenging OPT 
aid projects. One of the premier obstacles Kai said that he/she faced in 
Organisation 7’s development programme was working with CIDA’s 
‘bureaucrats’. To start, typically Kai went around CIDA directly lobbying 
politicians in order to get funding, and he/she felt against the wishes of CIDA.895 
That could have caused resentment. Second, there was a conflict in work 
                                                
895 Kai (2012 March 26) 54min14s to 57min15s 
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cultures and Kai found it really difficult to ‘quantify’ Organisation 7’s work for 
CIDA, which Kai said is very difficult to do from within the realm of social work. 
Third, Kai speculated that their poor relationship might have its origin in a clash 
of worldviews, where he/she saw herself/himself as an ‘organiser’ and not from 
the bureaucratic development world.896  
Kai believed that CIDA was far too obsessed with quantifiable data, pointing out 
that some things can be quantified, while others cannot.897 His/her organisation 
did do their best to quantify what they could, but just like Emory and Kim he/she 
knew they could not quantify everything. Further, Kai really did not like the 
approach CIDA took toward its operations. He/she felt they had very low 
standards for objectives, in part because politics was mixed in with their work 
and that made them risk averse.898 However, he/she had in particular a problem 
with the way they measured a project’s success, which relates to the question 
of quantifiable or qualitative evaluations, and the linear and neoliberal 
approach. Kai said that CIDA took an approach to development aid work where 
they would establish an outcome before a process would take place, which 
he/she felt was näive and would ultimately undermine any project they 
funded.899 For instance, in a peace programme where community leaders are 
brought together you need time to actually bring them together, to develop 
relationship bonds between them and to help them figure out their relationship 
before doing something in very broad terms to advance a common agenda. 
That is impossible to quantify by numbers, so Kai said, 
You want to quantify that then good luck. How are you going to quantify 
it? By how many meetings we have a year? Fuck okay.900 
                                                
896 Kai said he/she could not even stand the way they talked at CIDA. Kai (2012 March 26) 
40min52s to 43min49s Kai frequently referred to CIDA personnel as bureaucrats, in what 
seemed to be a derogatory manner, just as he/she made stabbing comments about my being a 
political scientist and from the western Canadian region the Conservatives are popular in. 
897 Kai (2012 March 26) 44min28s to 45min26s 
898 Kai (2012 March 26) 40min52s to 43min49s 
899 There is incredible pressure to present any project as a success. ‘If  “successful” projects are 
those that resemble donor policy models, then development agencies are made better at 
managing their upwardly oriented representations, while directing their practical efforts to 
system goals and preserving identity, neither of which improve the chances of learning or 
effectiveness in poverty-reducing change’. Mosse, Cultivating Development, 2004, 203. 
900 Kai (2012 March 26) 43min43s to 43min49s 
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Kai said they can have ‘so many’ meetings per year that are quantifiable, but 
that does not describe what is going on in those meetings or if they are even 
talking to each other. So it is an inappropriate form of measurement.901 Kai said, 
When you talk about complex social conditions, you talk about 
empowerment, and how do you measure that. I’ve had students do PhD 
on that.902 
 
As with Kai, Kim found CIDA obsessed with quantifiable data that was 
completely inapplicable to a project meant to promote complex social change 
for long-term benefits for the communities they are working in. However, CIDA 
wanted numbers like the number of judicial education sessions that had taken 
place and how many judges were in a room for a workshop. They also wanted 
Organisation 5 to demonstrate that those Palestinian judges had gained 
knowledge from their meetings.903 So when Organisation 5 put in place working 
groups that met for up to a year working out ideas and figuring out a common 
agenda, CIDA could not understand what was taking place. Thus Organisation 
5 really struggled with coming up with the type of ‘tangible’ – easy to 
understand results CIDA expected.904 
Ultimately Kim found it just as difficult to work with CIDA as Kai. Kim found 
CIDA’s appraisal of their project unreasonable and the amount of reporting just 
incredibly onerous without clear vision, 
It’s incredibly onerous. They don’t know what they want. Their 
expectations change from officer to officer. They clearly didn’t 
understand the rule of law sector, yet stood in judgement of. So it was 
incredibly frustrating. They always thought the project was a failure, and 
no matter how much they heard the opposite, they couldn’t get it.905 
 
                                                
901 Kai (2012 March 26) 43min49s to 44min12s 
902 Kai (2012 March 26) 44min12s to 44min28s 
903 Kim (2014 August 7) 23min21s to 23min42s  
904 Ultimately Organisation 5 was able to come up with such results, and in the opinion of Kim 
sometimes they came up with some really powerful things, though CIDA would still not think 
they were results. Kim (2014 August 7) 23min42s to 26min41s 
905 Kim (2014 August 7) 21min6s to 21min44s 
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Jamie faced challenges in his/her work with CIDA. Organisation 6’s work with 
refugees was research intensive and meant to provide policy solutions on 
refugee issues. Jamie noted that working with government is generally 
challenging, because they do not always understand the value of research, 
including policy research and the way in which it can inform policy. He/she 
found that CIDA always thought very naïvely that development has nothing to 
do with policy. Further, as in Organisation 5’s experience, Jamie found that 
CIDA could easily discount the hard work of experts just because they did not 
understand that work. So in Jamie’s experience CIDA was always much more 
challenging to work with than even Foreign Affairs.906 He/she found that Foreign 
Affairs at least respected their expertise, and treated them as such. 
Organisation 3 had also faced problems working with CIDA over reporting 
requirements prior to defunding. Taylor says that over the decades CIDA 
reporting became more and more onerous, incorporating trendy techniques 
such as ‘results based management’ that just added to the administrative 
workload and detracted from the projects. He/she says that prior to 2000 they 
had found running projects much easier, because at that time they had a 
generous donor who required just general reporting from partners.907  
 
Inappropriate Behaviour 
Kim is a senior professional and accomplished researcher. He/she found it 
difficult to accept judgement by CIDA monitors over Organisation 5’s projects, 
when those monitors lacked experience in the filed of work. What he/she found 
though especially appalling was the quality of many CIDA staff. For instance, on 
top of being unqualified for their position, Kim found some CIDA staff to be of 
questionable personal character, including sexist and racist, 
What I was experiencing day-to-day was the racism of their officers, the 
sexism of their officers, the ignorance of the people who were supposed 
to be overseeing this project. I mean they don’t hire international 
development people anymore. The guy who we were working with, a 
                                                
906 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 15min25s to 18min15s 
907 Taylor (2014 September 4) 16min56s to 20min10s 
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lovely man, had a background in artificial intelligence I think he told me 
… But he was one of their better people.908 
When I asked Kim how you could be racist in CIDA and still succeed at 
development work, Kim gave a response that belied the inherent feeling of 
superiority of the Western model that is inherent to neoliberal development aid, 
How could you NOT be racist in CIDA and succeed? I mean there are 
different forms of racism, right? The way the racism that I am talking 
about played out is in an ocean of, ‘We are developed, we are superior, 
you are not, you will bow to us’.909 
 
As a Canadian of Arab descent, Kim also found his/her loyalty questioned at 
CIDA and was asked at times to play into racial stereotypes in his/her work. Kim 
recalled one of their CIDA overseers saying, 
The thing that you’re going to have to understand and remember [KIM] is 
that you are Canadian. Don’t get lost in your Arab identity. I had a project 
… in Cairo where the guy was an Egyptian Canadian, and he couldn’t 
get anything done, until he realised that what he had to do was pound his 
fists on the desk, and yell and scream, and that’s the only way he was 
going to get respect. So just remember that you are Canadian.910 
 
Kim’s last contact with CIDA was when they hired someone to do an end of 
project evaluation, which took a long time to finalise.911 That resulted in a very 
positive report, but nonetheless did not result in a renewal of their funding.912 In 
the end both Kim and his/her Palestinian co-director had had such a bad 
                                                
908 Kim (2014 August 7) 42min49s to 43min30s 
909 Kim (2014 August 7) 43min48s to 44min08s 
910 Kim (2014 August 7) 46min05s to 46min45s 
911 Kim told the project evaluator ‘thanks for giving our dignity back’, after having been 
disrespected so much by CIDA. Kim (2014 August 7) 51min53s to 52min37s. Meanwhile, Kim 
does not know CIDA’s response to the evaluation but can say they gave the evaluator a difficult 
time. Kim (2014 August 7) 52min37s to 53min06s  
912 They and their volunteers felt their work was just tossed casually aside by CIDA personnel 
who did not have the capacity to understand the project. Kim (2014 August 7) 51min20s to 
51min53s 
	 277 
experience working with CIDA, Kim said neither of them was sure they could 
work with CIDA again, 
I mean I’ve set a price, right? Everybody has a price. They gave us $4.5 
million. To my mind it was like, yes, but you gave me $20 million worth of 
grief. So if you want to give me $20 million, I’d consider it.913 
 
Suffocating a Project through Paperwork 
Hayden also found, like Kim, that the paperwork reporting on their CIDA project 
in Gaza was overwhelming. More than once Hayden referred to it as ‘unreal’, 
Oh yea it was unreal. I’ve never produced so much paperwork in my life. 
And in just the last year of the project.914… I remember like spending 
nights, like literally nights and like early mornings, basically just writing 
and writing, and I couldn’t stop writing. There was … and then there was 
… every three month reports. [AND] … when I got there so many reports 
were late … and then there were annual reports and then special reports, 
and all sorts of memos, etc, etc. So I was just writing all the time.915 
And just as Emory warned that the entire focus of an organisation can be 
shifted to reporting by a donor, Hayden said, 
It took most of my time. Even people from CIDA based in Palestine were 
asking me why I was doing all of this, and like the office in Ottawa … the 
people were very, very nice at the time … they just kept asking for more, 
so … [Hayden laughed] … it was a bit insane.916 
 
Hayden faced a particularly tricky situation working with a CIDA monitor who 
was so invested in the Gaza women and family empowerment centres, having 
designed the project. Hayden described that monitor as having a vision for the 
project, being intense, and wanting the objectives to meet the vision. So not 
                                                
913 Kim (2014 August 7) 42min05s to 42min26s 
914 Hayden (2014 August 27) 32min30s to 32min40s 
915 Hayden (2014 August 27) 35min08s to 35min31s 
916 Hayden (2014 August 27) 32min45s to 33min03s 
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only did Hayden have to write lengthy reports, but he/she found they were read 
in-depth with time-consuming follow-up questions seeking a deeper 
explanation. He/she could simply not understand why the original design model 
was not panning out as planned, even though it is a well established fact that 
development projects rarely proceed as planned once put into motion, 
especially in such a complicated place to work as the OPT. Hayden thinks the 
CIDA monitor also represented a sort of conflict-of-interest, saying that you 
cannot monitor a project that you designed and then evaluate it ‘independently’ 
because it invariably will not meet your expectations. Thus, Hayden found 
his/her CIDA monitor to be acting more like a project coordinator than monitor, 
even going on monitoring missions to the centres, though that should have 
been Hayden’s role.917  
In 2013, Canada’s development agency CIDA was shut down and absorbed 
into Foreign Affairs. By redefining the structure of its aid agency, the 
government will have far greater control over the way development work gets 
done with the aim also of putting aid more in step with what his government 
considers Canadian foreign interests to be.918 It is worth noting that in some 
interviews, such as with Quinn and Sawyer, they provided the impression that 
CIDA personnel leaned pro-Palestinian. 
 
The CRA and Financial Audits 
Many of the project coordinators described experiences where Canada’s CRA 
tax office regulations made it difficult, sometimes impossible, to carry out their 
OPT aid work. Some policies were simply untenable in the context of the OPT, 
or required unreasonable administrative oversight. Further, Blake and Dallas 
found a clear bias in CRA questions about the charitable projects they carried 
out that depended politically on the region they were working in. Blake said that 
the questions they were asked with relation to their projects in Afghanistan, 
where Canada had contributed troops fighting a tough war, were ‘little and light’. 
                                                
917 Hayden (2014 August 27) 35min55s to 37min32s 
918 Mackrael, ‘CIDA’s Sudden Demise Shifts Control to PMO’. 
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By comparison, the CRA was concerned more about Organisation 10’s work in 
the OPT.919 
Worse, many of coordinators legitimately suspected that the CRA was applying 
unfair standards or levels of rigour to monitoring their OPT aid projects, 
because they were working with Palestinians and possibly due to partisan 
political interference. For instance, Organisation 2 was one of the least 
conformist organisations researched within the context of the neoliberal aid 
norm, dating back to the 1990s when Emory was surreptitiously supporting 
them in advocating Palestinian rights in Canada. Casey was forced in 2006, 
during a transition from the Martin to Harper governments, to deal with an audit 
by the CRA at the same time that their CEO died. He/she felt besieged saying 
that he/she had to deal with a biased auditor who questioned his/her 
sympathies toward terrorism. Casey also suspected that the audit had been 
launched under questionable circumstance. By the summer 2014, Organisation 
3 and Organisation 4 became two of a large number charities that were also 
being audited by the CRA under dubious circumstance, the common point 
being that all were left-leaning organisations with positions critical of the 
Canadian government.  
As of being interviewed in the summer of 2014, Remy said that Organisation 3 
had yet to receive proper guidance from the CRA for the onerous process of 
undergoing an audit.920 Using the example of a Latin American partner affected 
by the audit process, he/she noted that the guidance that partner had received 
seemed completely unreasonable. That partner was being asked to translate 
every document they had into English or French, from the contribution 
agreement down to every taxi receipt.921 Remy was not sure what would come 
out of the audit process, and noted that the CRA seemed preoccupied with the 
organisation’s political activities. This was new territory for Organisation 3 
because they had never been audited before. Remy said that it could be 
reasonable to be audited periodically, but recent history and the context of the 
                                                
919 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 50min01sec to 51min07sec 
920 Remy (2014 August 28) 44min43s to 46min07s  
921 Remy (2014 August 28) 46min07s to 46min54s  
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CRA audit just a few years after their high profile defunding made them 
suspicious that they were being targeted politically.922  
For these organisations, each a registered Canadian charity providing the CRA 
with annual reports on their finances and activities, the audits seemed to be 
being used unfairly as weapons against them owing to their overseas work in 
places such as Palestine combined with their advocacy work. Advocacy is a key 
word here, and theme in my research, where the organisations that advocated 
Palestinian rights often faced the biggest challenges in their work. Advocacy 
work would be used as an excuse by government to undermine their work, 
because according to CRA regulations charities can only spend a small 
percentage of their funding on advocacy work. Under the Income Tax Act a 
registered charity must devote all of its resources to charitable purposes and 
activities. Notwithstanding that rule, they are allowed to allocate a small amount 
of their resources to political activities. That small amount has been defined as 
up to 10% of a charity’s total resources, while 90% or more must be devoted to 
its charitable activities.923 So the overwhelming majority of their funding must be 
directed toward their charitable purposes. Yet in Canada a lack legislation 
defining what exactly is charitable has left the courts to interpret common law in 
order to determine what that encompasses. To do that the courts have relied on 
a less-than-modern 1891 interpretation of a 1601 Elizabethan Law delineating 
four types of charitable activities,  
1. Relief of poverty 
2. Advancement of education 
3. Advancement of religion 
4. Certain other purposes that benefit the community in a way the courts 
have said is charitable924 
                                                
922 Remy (2014 August 28) 44min43s to 46min07s  
923 Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Policy Statement CPS-022, Political Activities’, Government of 
Canada, Political Activities, (15 September 2003), http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-
gvng/chrts/plcy/cps/cps-022-eng.html#politicalactivities6.2. 
924 Canada Revenue Agency, ‘What Is Charitable?’, Government of Canada, What Is 
Charitable?, (30 April 2009), http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/pplyng/cpc/wtc-eng.html; 
Those purposes are based on a 1601 Elizabethan law, the Statute of Charitable Uses. The 
Statute of Elizabeth (a.k.a. the "Statute of Uses") of 1601 is widely agreed to be the foundation 
point of charity in the common law world. It lists categories of needy folks, including maimed 
veterans, and public projects. The prose has a Shakespearian feel. It was modified by the 
courts over the centuries with key case (Pemsel) in the Victorian era. That is when the 4 heads 
of charities was confirmed. Bridge, Richard. 2014 Nov 3 email  In Commissioners for Special 
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Charitable status is highly valuable to non-profit organisations, which eight of 
the ten organisations researched at one point had. Once registered, a charity 
pays no income tax and is able to issue tax receipts to donors. Tax receipts are 
used for substantial non-refundable tax credits or deductions, encouraging 
larger donations from supporters. A further benefit of being able to issue a tax 
receipt is assurance given to donors that the government through the CRA has 
verified the issuing organisation. The significance of that assurance cannot be 
understated when donating to projects related to Palestinians, where so many 
Palestinian and predominantly Muslim organisations are listed as terrorist 
entities – nearly 80% of Canada’s terrorist list is made up of Muslim 
organisations.925  
Meanwhile, according to the Income Tax Act and Canadian common law, a 
charity should not be established for political purposes to, 
(1) further the interests of a particular political party; or support a political 
party or candidate for public office; or (2) retain, oppose, or change the 
law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign 
country.926  
According to the CRA the main reason the courts ruled out political purposes for 
charities is because a purpose is only considered charitable if it generates a 
public benefit. The CRA does though allow charities to engage in public 
awareness campaigns about its work or an issue related to that work, so long 
                                                                                                                                          
Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531 (H.L.). ("Pemsel") the Statute of 
Charitable Uses was broken down into four headings under which a charitable purpose must 
fall. They are: (1) the relief of poverty; (2) the advancement of education; (3) the advancement 
of religion; and (4) certain other purposes beneficial to the community. If a charity’s "purpose" 
does not fall within one of these four headings, the charity cannot receive the benefit (i.e. tax 
free status and ability to give tax receipts) of being officially registered as a charity under the 
Income Tax Act. The courts in Canada have strictly adhered to the charitable purpose headings 
contained in Pemsel (and by implication the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses written 
in 1601). Hull & Hull LLP, ‘Statute of Charitable Uses - A 17th Century Framework in the 21st 
Century’, Toronto Estate Law Blog, 9 January 2012, 
http://estatelaw.hullandhull.com/2012/01/articles/topics/estate-trust/statute-of-charitable-uses-a-
17th-century-framework-in-the-21st-century/. 
925 Of the listed terrorist organisations as of 2015 March 31, 7 were Palestinian and a further 43 
of Muslim background, including a former Canadian Muslim charity, out of 54 listed 
organisations. Public Safety Canada, ‘Listed Terrorist Entities’. 
926 Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Policy Statement CPS-022, Political Activities’. 
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as the activity is, ‘connected and subordinate to the charity's purpose’.927 For 
instance, Sawyer pointed out the importance of advocacy for a charity because 
of the need to raise awareness about an issue, in order to build up support for 
that issue and then raise funds for. He/she said that people only donate to a 
cause if they are aware of it. 928  Further, while advocacy does mean 
demonstrated support for a cause or particular point of view, it is not necessarily 
a political activity. This only becomes a political activity if it, 
1. Explicitly communicates a call to political action; 
2. Explicitly communicates to the public that the law, policy, or decision of 
any level of government in Canada or a foreign country should be 
retained, opposed, or changed; or 
3. Explicitly indicates in its materials that the intention of the activity is to 
incite, or organise to put pressure on, an elected representative or public 
official to retain, oppose, or change the law, policy, or decision of any 
level of government in Canada or a foreign country.929 
When a registered charity makes a representation to an elected representative 
or public official, this is considered to be charitable provided this falls within the 
general scope of its charitable activities, even if it is challenging or supporting a 
law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign 
country.930 
However, a lack of clarity in the charitable legislation leaves open to 
interpretation whether a charity is conducting too much advocacy or not. The 
line between legal and illegal advocacy work is opaque. Thus, this unclear 
dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate advocacy may have been taken 
                                                
927 As a result of the measures introduced in the 2012 federal budget, which came into force on 
June 29, 2012, a political activity also includes the making of gifts to qualified donees intended 
for political activities. Ibid. 
928 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 00min00s to 5min10s 
929 As a result of the measures introduced in the 2012 federal budget, which came into force on 
June 29, 2012, a political activity also includes the making of gifts to qualified donees intended 
for political activities. Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Policy Statement CPS-022, Political Activities’. 
930 It should though remain subordinate to the charity's purposes and all representations should: 
(1) relate to an issue that is connected to the charity's purposes; (2) be well-reasoned (or where 
time constraints make this impractical, should be based on a well-reasoned position and such a 
position should be submitted in a timely manner to the elected representative or public official 
concerned); and (3) not contain information that the charity knows or ought to know is false, 
inaccurate, or misleading. Ibid. 
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advantage of as a weapon against several of the registered charities in this 
study, as an excuse to file audits by the CRA against them, such as 
Organisations 2, 3 and 4 carrying out advocacy work. That is if they were not 
already being audited on some other basis, such as Organisation 10. 
Meanwhile the single advocacy Organisation 1 that was not audited as a result 
of the CRA, perhaps because it had an alternative legal structure, instead went 
through an audit triggered by its ardently pro-Israel Chairperson, who 
commissioned an independent forensic audit of Organisation 1’s finances as 
one of the weapons the government appointed Board used in their fight against 
the organisation’s staff.931 Audits and the threat of losing charitable status seem 
to have been consistent strategy employed by pro-Israel activists in government 
against organisations engaged in Palestinian rights work.  
 
Research Confirmation of a CRA Bias 
Research released in 2014 by the Broadbent Institute seems to confirm this 
bias and speculation by left-leaning charities, not just Palestine rights work, that 
the Harper Conservative government has targeted them for political reasons.932 
That report provides evidence indicating a CRA bias against charities that are 
critical of government policy.933 The report further raises questions about the 
accuracy of annual filings made by right-leaning conservative charities that 
claim 0% political activity, citing recent public statements from 10 of them that 
appear to meet the CRA definition of political engagement. While those 
charities have not faced scrutiny by the CRA, as many as 52 charities that 
challenged government policy have been hit with political-activity audits under a 
special two-year, $8 million programme that was first announced in the 2012 
                                                
931 Ironically the auditor hired was at a conflict of interest since it was also the same firm that 
audited then the three human rights organisations in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel, yet no 
fuss was made about that. Ash said, ‘they found nothing of course’. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 
30min20sec to 30min49sec 
932 ‘Stephen Harper’s CRA: Selective Audits, “Political” Activity, and Right-Leaning Charities’ 
(Broadbent Institute, October 2014), 
http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/sites/default/files/documents/harpers-cra-final_0.pdf. 
933 One of the first groups targeted were environment charities critical of energy and pipeline 
policies that were also vilified by several Conservative cabinet ministers. The audits later 
expanded to include charities that promote social justice, poverty reduction and religion. Beeby, 
‘Revenue Canada’s Political Activity Audits Biased, Think-Tank Says’. 
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federal budget year.934 The charities being audited included very well-known 
organisations in Canada such as Amnesty International, the David Suzuki 
Foundation and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.935 Those charities 
say the audits drain them of limited resources and critics say the audits have led 
to fears of engaging in advocacy. 
Yet even prior to 2012 and the Harper Conservative government, Canadian 
organisations with a charitable registration running projects in the OPT were 
dealing with audits they felt might be motivated against them politically. Casey 
says that the CRA was one of the biggest challenges that he/she faced carrying 
out OPT aid work at Organisation 2. He/she says that around the time that their 
Chairperson died in 2006, a CRA auditor grilled him/her during an audit about 
his/her sympathy toward terrorism and forced him/her to give up their donor's 
list of the past two years. Their new Chairperson eventually complained about 
the experience to the CRA, which replaced the auditor.936 This use of audits 
even led to Organisation 10, which seemed to be targeted more than other 
charities, to lose its charitable status in 2011. 
 
Canadian Politics and Government 
When on the eve of the Second Intifada, the World Bank found in a survey of 
opinion leaders that donors received mixed marks for coordination with each 
other and the PA, and for the monitoring and evaluation of aid projects. They 
meanwhile received poor marks for the identification and prioritisation of 
projects, expediency in processing proposals, and their fulfilling aid pledges. 
One of the reasons the opinion leaders identified for this was,  
The impact of donor politics (both domestic pressures and foreign policy 
interests) on aid programmes was seen as particularly negative.937 
As described in Chapters 4 and 5 there were strong pro-Israel domestic 
pressures affecting that work in Canada.938 
                                                
934 That programme was later topped up to $13.4 million and made permanent, while the CRA is 
cutting tax auditor positions internally, and at a time of growing and costly tax evasion involving 
many billions of dollars. Ibid. 
935 ‘Stephen Harper’s CRA: Selective Audits, “Political” Activity, and Right-Leaning Charities’, 2. 
936 Casey Email 2014 November 20 21:56, pp. 2 
937 ‘Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza’, 81. 
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The story uncovered by my interviews with OPT aid project coordinators was 
one of constant government harassment undermining their projects, especially 
during the Harper Conservative government. Often this harassment directly 
contradicted official Canadian policy and the neoliberal paradigm that had long 
dominated their approach to Middle East politics.  
 
Government Attacking an Organisation from the Inside 
Organisation 1 was, along with Organisation 10, one of the two organisations I 
researched who suffered the worst fate of Canadian government persecution 
over OPT development aid work, because each was shut down by government 
in my study period. While Organisation 1 faced its toughest days during the 
Harper government, as Emory pointed out having worked through both Chrétien 
and Martin Liberal governments as well, he/she felt as though the Canadian 
government’s policy on Israel and the OPT did not depend much on what 
political party held power. Whether there was a Liberal or Conservative 
government made no difference. Even though the internal office politics of 
Organisation 1 became very ugly after Emory left it in the mid-2000s, in the later 
Martin years he/she says that working in Palestine was never easy for a 
Canadian.  
In particular, Emory felt you had always then to pay attention to the politics of 
the Canadian government’s relationship to the pro-Israel lobby, typically its 
relationship to the CJC.939 He/she said that was key and always has been.940 
For example, when a prominent Palestinian politician from the Oslo Process’ 
peace-camp was visiting Canada in 1995 and Organisation 1’s CEO wrote an 
article that was critical of the occupation, they were censured from above during 
the Chrétien government. This effectively scuttled their future work in the Middle 
East by eliminating any chance they had to run a programme that focuses 
                                                                                                                                          
938 Heinbecker et al., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, 
197. 
939 In 2011 the Canadian Jewish Congress was replaced by the Centre for Israel and Jewish 
Affairs (CIJA). 
940 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 9min22s to 11min10s 
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specifically on the region.941 Any projects carried out with Palestinian partners 
could only be funded for limited periods of time on contracts with low 
probabilities of renewal. By 1997, Emory said that nearly all OPT aid work 
stopped for a period lasting until the early-mid 2000s.942 As the Second Intifada 
raged on Organisation 1’s then CEO decided, in the early 2000s and late in 
his/her term, to travel to the OPT. That CEO then published an article critical of 
Israeli house demolitions, a key strategy to settler colonial ethnic cleansing, in a 
major Canadian newspaper. The result was that one of Organisation 1’s Board 
members, who was also an important government Minister, reacted angrily and, 
in the words of Emory, ‘all hell broke loose’ – foreshadowing the serious 
problems Organisation 1 would face in 2008/9.943 Emory says that that CEO 
was essentially summoned to present himself to the pro-Israel lobby to explain 
his actions, and he/she obeyed’.944  
By the late 2000s when Organisation 1’s CEO attempted to take a very 
‘balanced’ approach to the Middle East, Ash thinks that that ‘balance’ may have 
been his/her undoing. He/she says the government appointed Board members 
viewed the world not through a lens of individual human rights, but as a highly 
simplistic black-and-white checkerboard of ‘good guy’ and ‘bad guy’ 
countries,945 
[Ash] “So they wanted to work in Cuba. They loved our China 
programme. Anything that was perceived as us against them, the 
virtuous right against the bad lefties was a really, really good project. 946 If 
it’s a leftist dictator, it’s bad. But a right-wing dictator wouldn’t be bad. So 
doing work in Columbia was tricky. Doing work with First Nations in 
Bolivia was out of the question.947 
                                                
941 That also forced Emory have to afterward quietly fund any engagement with Palestinians, in 
the shadows, covered up within other programmes. Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 11min10s to 
14min01s 
942 Outside Emory attending some joint meetings, maintaining an interest in the work of 
Canadian NGOs in the sector and quietly funding a women’s project accompanying Palestinian 
farmers. Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 14min01s 
943 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 11min10s to 14min01s 
944 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 11min10s to 14min01s 
945 Their approach echoes the simplistic, tribal view of the world politics popularised in IR by 
Samuel Huntington. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of 
World Order, New edition edition (New York: Free Press, 2002). 
946 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 45min19sec to 46min43sec) 
947 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 46min47sec to 47min05sec 
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Ash noted that their organisation had always had Jewish and Zionist Board 
members who caused problems with their projects.948 However, the members 
appointed by the Conservative government were part of the extreme right of the 
Jewish community, or else were pro-Israel non-Jewish members also from the 
extreme right who sought to quash all Palestine-related work.949 He/she found 
that for those members anything to do with the Middle East was wrong, 
inherently bad, undemocratic and potentially terrorist. One of the Board 
particularly feared Palestinians fighting for their rights through the use of law, as 
a form of ‘lawfare’.950 The pro-Israel Chairperson was so partisan that when his 
spouse passed away soon after his/her 2009 appointment, he/she asked the 
staff not to send flowers but rather to make donations to the Israeli army in her 
memory.951 For these Board members being anti-Israel was the same as being 
anti-Semitic and they seemed to think of Middle East people were inherently 
predisposed to violence and a desire to kill Jews, reflecting the neoliberal 
developmentalist, as well as settler colonial predisposition to see the ‘other’ as 
inherently savage or uncivilised.952 These Board members had a very irrational 
checkerboard approach to rights work that led Ash to compare those Board 
members to Islamic extremists, except that they were very right-wing pro-Zionist 
extremist.953   
Those Board members were so extreme in their partisan views that at one point 
the CEO of Organisation 1 was criticised for not having a single Jewish 
employee. They seemed to have too much time on their hands or were not 
allocating their time properly to the subject of supporting human rights. Ash 
says they came to that conclusion by looking at the names of everyone working 
at Organisation 1. Ash could not understand how that could be a problem, since 
asking someone what their religion was is not a pre-requisite to hiring. In fact, it 
contravenes Canadian law as a right not to be judged according to your religion 
or ethnicity. Ash further pointed out at that time that there were also no 
homosexuals, blacks, transsexuals or First Nations people working at the 
                                                
948 Corroborated separately by Emory (2012 March 22) 
949 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 18min30s to 22min13s 
950 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 08min18sec to 14min40s 
951 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 25min35s to 28min29s 
952 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 22min13s to 25min35s 
953 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 25min35s to 28min29s 
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organisation, so why was it a problem just that there were no Jewish 
employees?954 
Another organisation with direct government funding and a similar 
organisational structure was Organisation 6. Jamie said that the organisation 
was aware in 2006 that the then minority Harper government had a strong pro-
Israel position. As a minority government this was quietly acknowledged, but 
became public policy once they achieved a majority status on a third electoral 
attempt in 2011. Since then the government has been unabashed in naming 
Israel as a main ally and partner. Jamie says that it is through their relationship 
to Israel that the government views the entire Middle East, and that this drives 
their policy.955  It was the same checkerboard good-guy, bad-guy approach to 
foreign policy taken by human rights Organisation 1’s Board members. 
Overall since Harper’s accession to power Organisation 6 is much more careful 
about what development work they do, and that self-censorship out of fear 
increasingly impedes their work. This change was also a direct reaction of 
Organisation 6 seeing what had happened at Organisation 1,956 
It’s an atmosphere that just … they’ve developed this political culture and 
this political environment that’s just surreal actually, for all of us.957 
Meanwhile, Foreign Affairs is now no longer interested in the organisation’s past 
work with refugees, which was reflected when it killed Canada’s position as 
gavel of the RWG around 2009/2010.958 Changes in government policy and fear 
at Organisation 6 forced Jamie to adopt an approach to Palestine work once 
adopted by Emory in the 1990s to early 2000s of drawing Palestine into 
regional projects that are not OPT-specific.959 This is a sharp departure for an 
organisation that in the past actively supported projects about Palestine based 
on the merit of the work, not considerations of Israel-Palestine politics in 
Canada.  
                                                
954 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 28min29s to 37min10s 
955 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 23min46s to 25min23s 
956 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 27min01s to 28min09s 
957 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 32min35s to 33min05s 
958 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 00min00s to 04min20s 
959 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 25min23s to 27min01s 
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Jamie thinks that self-censorship from fear may be one of the worst symptoms 
of government and pro-Israeli intimidation afflicting their work. The staff at 
Organisation 6 constantly ponder what they cannot do, because they are afraid 
of what the government will say or how it may react. Sometimes their own fears 
are exaggerated beyond even how government might actually react. For this 
reason Jamie believes that self-censorship is the worst type of censorship, a 
challenge and a shame.960 You anticipate what the Harper government reaction 
is going to be, and hence your memos, your notes, your analysis, your 
proposals and your projects all cater to how somebody may react. He/she said 
you stop ‘pushing the envelope’ and sometimes you are not even truthful as a 
result.961 He/she adds that the problem is pervasive beyond just Organisation 6 
into the public service itself across Canada. People are afraid of speaking out 
anand contravening government policy. It is a culture of fear in Canada. Jamie 
says that stress from this definitely has an impact on you as an individual, 
too.962  In the case of the human rights organisation Rights and Democracy 
mentioned in Chapter 5, that may even have contributed to their CEO’s heart 
failure in 2011.963  
In the case of Organisation 1, Ash was constantly given the impression that 
right-wing conspirators had for some reason thought Organisation 1 was an 
effective organisation, and that they wanted to take it over for their own political 
ends. 964  Ash says that he/she spoke with colleagues at other progressive 
Canadian organisations, and detected a pattern of the Conservative 
government riddling Boards of Directors with certain types of extreme people, 
changing the Board Chairperson and bringing the organisation’s work to a 
halt.965 This strategy worked at organisations where the government had direct 
power, such as at Crown Corporations, where they could attack from the inside. 
                                                
960 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 33min05s to 34min18s Studies of work carried out by aid 
organisations in the OPT reveal that they are more likely to engage in self-censorship rather 
than challenge the political status. Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated to Fail?’, 639. 
961 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 34min18s to 35min05s 
962 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 49min53s to 51min08s 
963 Cheadle, ‘The Staff of a Government-Funded Rights Advocacy Group Is Calling for the 
Resignation of Three Conservative Appointees from Its Board.’ 
964 Yet, Ash did not think his/her organisation was even necessarily effective. Ash-3 (2012 
March 22) 37min10s to 42min49s 
965 One example Ash gave where that took place was at the Canadian Commission on Human 
Rights. Employees would be driven to burning out, taking sick leave or departing. Ash-3 (2012 
March 22) 28min29s to 37min10s 
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For organisations where they had no direct power, they would use their 
influence to them from the outside, as happened at Organisation’s 3 and 10.  
 
Government Attacking an Organisation from the Outside 
Organisation 3 became one of several organisations I examined where 
evidence suggests they were defunded by the Conservative Harper 
government, in part related over their OPT aid work. Organisation 3, like many 
others in this research was pro-peace and pro-human rights, irrespective of 
ethnic, national or religious background. Unfortunately for them, they felt that 
the Harper government did not take the same approach. From 2006 onward 
after the Conservative’s first election victory, Remy said a major problem they 
faced was from people in power who, ‘see the world in black-and-white’.966 
He/she said the simple answer as to why they were defunded in 2009 was 
linked to their advocacy work, which was critical of government policy. There 
were a broad set of issues in which Organisation 3 had been critical of 
government, holding it to account on climate change, tar sands, the Columbia-
Canada free trade agreement, mining and Israel-Palestine. The Conservative 
government does not want in any way to be called to account. 967   Remy 
speculates that any one might have gotten them into trouble with the 
government.968 However, a prominent government Minister did accuse them of 
anti-Semitism just prior to defunding, so their Israel-Palestine stance must have 
played a role. 
Remy said that the Conservative government not only did not want to fund 
human rights and advocacy work, but wanted to distance itself from any 
organisation that engaged with it.969 Taylor sustained this argument by saying 
that within the overall context of aid in Canada there is less and less funding for 
programmes like civil society and local partnerships, part of a general 
movement by government away from supporting civil society organisations.970 
Hayden noted the same trend saying the Canadian government no longer 
                                                
966 Remy (2014 August 28) 39min11s to 40min30s 
967 Remy (2014 August 28) 04min46s to 05min15s 
968 Remy (2014 August 28) 05min15s to 07min40s 
969 Remy (2014 August 28) 04min14s to 04min46s 
970 Taylor (2014 September 4) 44min30s to 45min24s 
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supports organisations in the global south, breaking with Canada’s long-time 
foreign policy vision as a mediator between the West and its former colonies – a 
European-born state that views itself as taking an independent voice without a 
history of ‘colonial or imperial encumbrances’ and by which ‘constructive 
mediation and the promotion of international law’ become integral to its 
diplomatic identity.971 One of the results of this move away from solidarity has 
been the devaluation of the narrative of global partners, beyond just the OPT, 
where Canadian charities now have to send their own people to a poorer 
country in order to have ‘real, trustworthy accountability’ for projects, with the 
indigenous narrative devalued. Such an approach further disempowers local 
management and reinforces hierarchies of control, and the dominance of a 
richer country over the poorer. 972  Unsurprisingly, Hayden says that the 
Canadian government does not support solidarity programs in any way 
whatsoever. 973   This all meant Organisation 4’s style of engagement was 
problematic for the Canadian government, just like its advocacy work and 
support for Palestinian rights. 
Organisation 4 is certain that the Conservative government is hostile toward 
them, because of their rights advocacy work. Their work with Palestinians may 
have been particularly irksome for the Conservative government. Hayden says 
they for example received a letter from a government Minister in 2013 where 
that Minister said that Organisation 4 does really good work in many countries, 
but also works in the OPT and with groups that are very problematic, which the 
Minister said could, ‘jeopardise their overall work’. 974  With such evidence, 
Hayden himself/herself believes that the policy position that causes 
Organisation 4 the most trouble with the Canadian government is Organisation 
4’s opposition to the occupation. Hayden said of the Conservatives, 
                                                
971 Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, 7. 
972 In that way rich countries in the West like Canada are able to encapsulate the lives of people 
of the underdeveloped world, reducing their autonomy and regulating them, and in the end 
undermining indigenous or local forms of cooperation and solidarity. Long, Norman. “From 
Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented Sociology of 
Development.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies no. 49 (December 
1990): 3–24, pp. 5-6. 
973 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s  
974 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s  
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I don’t think the Canadian government recognises that there’s any 
occupation … [laughing in disdain]… I’m not exactly sure.975 
Whether a one-state or two-state solution, Organisation 4 believes that any 
solution should include an end to the occupation. 976  In the meantime they 
support the BDS until the occupation stops. Out of sheer frustration 
Organisation 3, once a strong supporter of the people-to-people dialogue 
projects, was pushed to back BDS due to Conservative government policies, 
too.977 
Beyond just blocking or taking away government funding, Hayden noted that 
the Conservative government was as of 2014 trying to take away the charity 
number of organisations it disagrees with, such as environmental organisations 
or charities working with Palestinians. 978  He/she cited the example of the 
Muslim-Canadian charity called IRFAN that also lost its charitable status in 
2011, eventually being listed as a terrorist organisation in 2014.979 Hayden’s 
suspicions are not unfounded given a pattern of defunding, audits, the 
revocation of charitable status and even accusations of terrorism or anti-
Semitism being used as tools by pro-Israel advocates and supporters in 
government to clamp down on Palestinian rights activities in Canada. These 
suspicions are also widely taken as fact by progressives in Canada suffering 
from this pattern, whether in OPT aid work or some other thematic area, which 
the Broadbent Institute seems to have confirmed through its own research.980  
 
Fewer Attacks on Less Overtly Political and more Neoliberal Projects 
A couple of the capacity building and poverty reduction organisations I 
interviewed faced the fewest problems from the Canadian government or its 
                                                
975 Hayden (2014 August 27) 16min42s to 16min50s 
976 Hayden (2014 August 27) 16min07s to 16min42s 
977 Though in a very nuanced position aimed at using economic measures to provide social 
justice. Remy (2014 August 28) 40min30s to 42min17s 
978 In 2012 the Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver, an investment banker, branded local 
environmentalists and First Nations as foreign radicals in a letter, because of questions they 
raised about the economic and environmental impacts of a Chinese-funded pipeline.  The 
Oliver, ‘An Open Letter from Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver’, The Globe and Mail, 9 
January 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/an-open-letter-from-natural-
resources-minister-joe-oliver/article4085663/. 
979 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s  
980 ‘Stephen Harper’s CRA: Selective Audits, “Political” Activity, and Right-Leaning Charities’. 
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regulatory bodies, though even then they were not unaffected. One of the 
longest working project coordinators, Sawyer, said he/she did not face any 
particularly big challenges from the Israel lobby in Canada, though he/she 
attributes this in part to their not engaging heavily in political advocacy work in 
Canada. Whatever advocacy work they did engage in was always done on a 
small scale, and often consisted of supporting other organisations.981  
Quinn meanwhile felt that Organisation 7 never really faced any major obstacles 
from the Chrétien, Martin or Harper governments.982 Kai even succeeded in 
soliciting government support for its Palestine work, purportedly against CIDA’s 
objections, for many years. They in particular made active use of connections in 
the Canadian Liberal party to access funds from CIDA. While Organisation 7 did 
not have the same poor relationship with the Harper government as the each of 
the other organisations I interviewed, it would still ultimately face a cut their 
funding, in spite of assiduous lobbying by Kai that included having the Canadian 
government’s ally, PA President Abbas, lobby Prime Minister Harper directly on 
behalf of Organisation 7.983  Kai was even able to enlist support from what 
he/she referred to as Canada’s version of AIPAC, who he/she approached 
saying, ‘while they do not agree on everything, that lobby needs to show the 
world that someone in the Canadian Jewish community is doing something 
progressive’, with the caveat that those lobbyists had to actually believe in the 
Palestinian and Jordanian components of Organisation 7’s work as much as the 
Israeli.984 
In the end that pro-Israel lobbyist was able only to secure a small fund from the 
Harper government for Organisation 7, which was more of a holdover grant for 
2010 through 2012 – approximately 8% of what it was seeking, or $2 million out 
of a $25 million dollar request – in order to keep the programme solvent until it 
                                                
981 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 58min25s to 1h06min50s 
982 He/she felt that they were never controlled in any way, maybe in part because they were 
supported via a ‘contribution agreement’ from CIDA, which is different than ‘direct programme’ 
funding. He/she said that meant the Canadian government was contributing to the programme 
by providing financial assistance to it, so they had no authority over operational decisions. 
Quinn also felt excluding government operationally helped the project over its lifespan. Quinn-1 
(2014 September 5) 14min32s to 18min45s  
983 Kai blamed this in part on the Albertan Christian evangelicals that surround Harper, 
suggesting they did not share Abbas’ letter with Harper. Kai (2012 March 26) 45min26s to 
51min12s 
984 Kai (2012 March 26) 51min12s to 52min10s 
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could find other funds.985 So even if Organisation 7 did not face overt hostility 
from that government, they also could not depend on it for support in spite of 
impressive networking within that government’s network of allies. Just because 
Kai believed everyone should be equal in their rights that did not mean the 
Canadian officials he/she dealt with felt the same way. 
Sawyer meanwhile did not share the negative assessment of the Liberal 
government given by coordinators like Emory and Ryan. Rather, he/she had in 
his/her experience, like Organisation 6, felt there was a much better 
development aid environment for the OPT under the Liberals. Sawyer remarked 
that until the First Intifada took place, leading to a change in perceptions in 
Canada about Israel and the Palestinians, Canada had simply labelled the 
Palestinian struggle as terrorism and would not give funds to any groups, 
including humanitarian ones, working under any umbrella that supported the 
Palestinians. Palestinians appeared pre-First Intifada to be excluded from a 
Canadian neoliberal foreign policy that was oriented towards helping people 
develop their societies with Canadian funding. That changed with the First 
Intifada when Sawyer said Palestinians were suddenly included, especially 
he/she felt during the Chrétien Liberal government.986  
This does though not necessarily contradict Emory’s observation that the 
Canadian government consistently opposed Palestine development work, 
regardless of party in power, because Sawyer did caveat his/her observation 
with the point that while CIDA personnel seemed to be excited about the 
chance to support Palestinians, the politicians in power never were.987 Further, it 
is worth nothing that Organisations 6, 7 and 8 that had a relatively good 
experience with the Liberals were engaged in capacity build and poverty 
reduction projects that did not directly contradict any of Canada’s neoliberal 
foreign policy aims or its orientation support for the Oslo Process. By contrast 
human rights and advocacy project coordinators like Casey, Ryan and Emory 
who publicly advocated for Palestinian rights and questioned Oslo faced 
obstacles from the Liberals, much like MEWG when Foreign Affairs abandoned 
it under the Chrétien Liberal government.  
                                                
985 Kai (2012 March 26) 52min34s to 54min14s 
986 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 5min10s to 10min17s 
987 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 10min17s to 13min58s  
	 295 
Finally even though Organisation 7 was optimistic that it could get Harper 
government funding in the late 2000s, and still by 2014 had not yet felt the 
averse impact of government oppression experienced by other organisations, 
Quinn felt from a moral standpoint that he/she would almost feel guilty if they 
had been funded by the Conservatives. He/she felt that it might ‘rightly’ bring 
about a lot of questions by other NGOs in the sector of OPT aid work if 
Organisation 7 were to be funded. Quinn said that the government is so far to 
the political ‘right’ that he/she prefers to receive financial support from people 
who actually care about their work and genuinely support it, not the 
Conservatives.988 
 
A Consistently Pro-Israel Government 
Emory felt that Canada historically had a unique position within the Group of 7 
(G7) as a sort of ‘middle man’ country between the richer and poorer nations of 
the post-colonial world. However, he/she said Canada had by 2012 stopped 
filling that role and is now just one more burden for people trying to have a 
chance at having a decent society. Perhaps though Emory had fallen prey to 
what Gordon describes as the mistake of many Canadian leftists in thinking that 
Canada, ‘is not an imperial power nor has it an imperial ambition’, despite a 
settler colonial history within its own borders and its status as an advanced 
capitalist country preying on the poor and weak the world-over.989 Through that 
interpretation, contrary to popular mainstream interpretations, it would make 
sense then that Emory does not see much of a difference between the Liberal 
Chrétien, Liberal Martin or Harper Conservative governments in the OPT. 
Emory felt there is a measure of continuance in all their policy towards Israel 
and the Palestinians. The difference was that the Liberals knew better how to 
present their policy coated with a ‘more socially progressive veneer’ than the 
Conservatives. The other difference was that activists in Canada had a better 
chance of simply existing in Canada under Liberal rule, even if what funding 
existed for Palestine work was anyways a pittance of what was needed.990 As 
                                                
988 He/she said it was a big eye-opener to see to what extent the government in power really 
saw things from a ‘different’ angle from them. He/she had tried hard pursuing, but just felt ‘dirty’ 
engaging with them. Quinn-2 (2014 September 5) 00min00s to 02min27s 
989 Gordon, ‘Canada, Empire and Indigenous People in the Americas’, 48. 
990 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 1h34min17s to 01h41min43s 
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Israeli politics became more and more Conservative during the early 2000s, and 
lobbying by the CJC became more ferocious, the Canadian government did not 
want to be bothered with Palestine, especially with fewer principled actors in 
Foreign Affairs after idealist Ministers like Lloyd Axworthy and Alan Rock in the 
Chrétien era.991 
Echoing Emory’s observation of consecutive Canadian governments, Ryan 
reminds us that rights and advocacy work has always considered differently 
with the Palestinians because their oppression was by a friendly government. 
Not only friendly, but very friendly, and for that reason the Canadian 
government did not want that situation of Palestinians to be revealed to the 
public. From Ryan’s perspective for instance torture carried out by Israel in the 
OPT is not important to the Canadian government, because it is being done by 
a friendly government – that was very clear. Further, he/she said that you could 
see many people in Liberal government in the 1990s were very strong 
Zionists.992 So even if the presentation was different, Ryan suggested that at its 
core the Liberal government still had a rather black-and-white view of friendly 
and unfriendly countries in international relations. 
Morgan said the Harper Canadian government seemed to classify all 
Palestinians as a bunch of terrorists, ‘end of story’. Morgan went so far as to 
say that he felt the Conservative government considers Fatah to be a terrorist 
organisation and PA President Abbas a terrorist, while noting that the Canadian 
government is the closest ally to Israel in the world. Morgan said they are even 
stauncher defenders of Israel than the US, and that the Canadian government 
works on the principle that Israel can do no wrong.993  
 
Reflections by the Project Coordinators on Palestinian Aid from Canada 
At the end of each interview I asked the interviewees to reflect on the aid 
process they participated in, including what they could have done differently or 
advice they would have for other people carrying out OPT development aid 
projects in Canada.  
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A number of coordinators had suggestions for how, with the benefit of hindsight, 
their funded projects might have been better. Quinn would liked to have found 
some way to foster even greater self-sustainability for Organisation 7’s partners 
in its network, which would also have helped them better to cope with the loss 
of Canadian government funding – though they were at least able to survive the 
loss. Emory would have preferred not to have been forced to fund any Israeli 
NGOs operating in the OPT because of Canadian politics, or to force Israeli and 
Palestinian organisations to work together based on his/her observations of 
negative results being generated by donor-forced cooperation projects. Emory’s 
views though on cooperation were very different from Organisations 3 and 7 
who embraced cooperation projects. A number of coordinators, particular those 
funding capacity building and poverty reduction projects like Kim, Quinn, 
Morgan and Kai felt that they could have done a better job if their projects were 
just funded in a different way, with less interference, and for all but Morgan for a 
longer period.  
Upon reflection many coordinators were critical of the type of assistance being 
provided by Canada and other international donors to the Palestinians under 
the Oslo aid model. Nearly all were critical of the limitations they faced providing 
aid due to Canadian government restrictions. In part this problem in Canada 
emanated from a lack of education about the situation in the OPT, and a fear to 
face reality because of the Israel lobby. Hayden suggested that fear kept many 
organisations from wanting to face the truth, exacerbated by what Remy said of 
Canadians being very poorly informed about the actual facts about the 
occupation. Morgan even suggested that government deliberately kept 
Canadians uninformed so as to not disrupt its own policy, while Ryan had said 
that Canada tolerated rights abuses if perpetrated by an ally.  
Remy noted that in 2014 in the Canadian media coverage of the third 
devastating bombardment of Gaza they were still largely characterising the 
conflict in a decontextualized manner as though there were no occupation, 
reminiscent of the early failed Oslo years of the 1990s. He/she said that the 
Canadian government certainly contributed to that perception. He/she said the 
media and government never use the word occupation and that creates a totally 
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distorted from reality.994 That is though very consistent with the NECEF study on 
Canadian print media coverage of the Second Intifada.995 
Perhaps because of that unwillingness to engage with the reality, coordinators 
like Morgan said that Canadian OPT aid reflects policies that are taken 
completely out of context from the actual the situation, leading to stupid or 
useless projects getting funded.996 Some coordinators like Ash, Kim, Sawyer 
and Morgan said meanwhile that Canadian aid was reinforcing the occupation, 
which is a premise that comes up frequently in the literature on post-Oslo 
Palestinian aid with critical researchers pointing out how aid has come to 
subsidise the costs of occupation for Israel.997 The practitioners were confirming 
the researchers observations. For instance, Sawyer said that Canada was 
funding Palestinian police who were geared toward confronting people who 
resist the Israeli occupation, reinforcing Israeli settler-colonialism.998 Above all 
else the story told by the coordinators was about the way in which the Canadian 
government supports Israel and its occupation. This was the case for all sixteen 
projects coordinators.  
 
Problems with the Oslo Process and Post-Oslo Palestinian Development Aid – 
Not really Liberation but renewed Occupation 
Reflecting on the Oslo Process and Palestinian development aid, much of the 
coordinators corroborated the failure of the development and peace model as 
described in Chapter 4, and how the Peace Process was even warped to 
strengthen the Israeli occupation of the OPT. Emory claims to have been critical 
of the Oslo Process from its start because it seemed to him/her to ask 
Palestinians to work within the framework of occupation, rather than toward 
their freedom.999 One objection he/she had was that any Palestinian from civil 
society who wanted funding in the early period of the Oslo Process in the 1990s 
was forced to participate in dialogue projects and joint funds with Israelis. The 
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result was that this killed off a lot of possibilities for projects because there were 
many people who at that point did not want to start working with Jewish-Israelis 
solely on the basis of cash-incentives, while it was widely acknowledged that 
donors were injecting funds precisely to encourage Palestinians to work with 
Israelis as a peace dividend. Further, Emory felt that too much of the Oslo-aid 
funding went towards dialogue projects that did not provide concrete assistance 
to PNGOs, which had such different needs than Israeli ones.1000  Eventually 
those dialogue funds created tensions in the OPT, attracting animosity toward 
those people and groups that were working with Israelis for payment as Oslo 
failed and the OPT economy de-developed.1001  
Emory says that in some ways Oslo-aid funding began to undo the work 
Palestinians had been doing in the OPT among themselves. Palestinian civil 
society became divided between those social entrepreneurs who were 
concerned foremost with making money, against those who were not. In 
Emory’s opinion this stalled any momentum that had been building in the OPT 
toward establishing a vibrant civil society that existed in the OPT prior to 
Arafat’s arrival in Gaza to establish the Western-backed PA Presidency 1994 
July 1st. Emory believes that this disruption of Palestinian civil society killed off 
any move toward Palestinian democracy, because democracy needs to come 
from people with a capacity to organise themselves. When donors told them 
that the only way to organise was by ‘working with the occupation’, that 
completely changed the way Palestinians understood and worked with each 
other. The donors peace dividend may have actually moved Palestinians away 
from democracy, in direct contradiction to their development goals.  
Emory says that a further effect of post-Oslo Palestinian aid was that it 
increased divisions between Gaza and the West Bank from the early 1990s 
onward. That is, it contributed to Israel’s divide-to-conquer fragmentation of the 
Palestinians. The reason was that there was less of a chance for the elite in 
Gaza to work with Israelis, because it has always been more difficult for them 
there to have a civil society than in the West Bank. 1002  Thus for example 
Organisation 7 never had a partner in Gaza in their network of Palestinian, 
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Israeli and Jordanian partners, in spite of the great need existing there for social 
work. This is because Organisation 7’s network included Israeli partners. This 
funding structure also meant that in the 1990s there were actually less funds 
available to Gazans than Palestinians in the West Bank or East Jerusalem, 
pushing them further outside the Peace Process.  
Emory’s concern about the way Oslo was structured was based in part on 
feedback from the human rights centre in Gaza that he/she had funded. That 
partner found the Oslo Accord problematic, as had an Israeli human rights NGO 
that Organisation 1 was working with.1003 Yet the Canadian headquarters of 
Organisation 1 strongly disagreed with the Gazan partner’s assessment, as 
they and Canada backed the Oslo Process and left no room for dissenting 
opinions. At one point Emory said that he/she felt the need to quit publicly 
expressing his/her doubts about the Oslo Process, lest that cut off his/her 
access the already limited resources he/she had to support partners.1004 In the 
euphoria of the 1990s, there were few observers like Edward Said who could 
publicly criticise the doomed process and still be taken seriously.1005 
Over time Emory’s optimism about the ability of Palestinian NGOs to effect 
positive change waned. By the early 2000s pessimism superseded optimism 
based on his/her observation that in the wake of the Peace Process there came 
to be much less of an OPT business community, which is consistent with the 
economic decline of the OPT described in Chapter 4, and one effect of that 
decline was for there to be less local civil society capacities and fewer PNGOs. 
Emory also found that the composure of PNGOs changed in the OPT. Religious 
organisations, many Islamic but also some Christian, grew in importance as 
secular PNGOs grew weaker during the Oslo Process, a phenomenon 
confirmed by Challand’s research in the late 2000s.1006 Emory was concerned 
about this trend because he/she felt that PNGOs oriented toward political Islam 
act in an authoritarian manner, which further undermined civil society.1007 
Sawyer was much less critical than Emory of Oslo aid and Canadian aid, even 
giving CIDA’s work a positive assessment in the 1990s during Liberal 
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governance. However, Sawyer said that as of 2012 he/she no longer felt this 
way, because there had been a fundamental change in the way foreign aid was 
being delivered, both through CIDA and as a global process. First, Sawyer felt 
that CIDA’s priorities were no longer as independent from government policy as 
they had once been in the 1990s – which would be reinforced by CIDA’s 
dissolution in 2013 after the interview. During the time of Conservative rule 
CIDA had become little more than an instrument of Canadian foreign policy. 
Second, he/she said that global aid priorities had shifted toward justice, 
democracy and security. Sawyer said that this was unrealistic in the OPT, 
where people did need security, but security spending was always geared 
toward security for Israelis and never for the oppressed Palestinians.1008 So 
when Canada funded the PA special police, funding was structured in such a 
way that those police were confronting people who resist the Israeli occupation, 
not protecting Palestinians; and that meant Canada was ultimately funding a 
security apparatus that would help Israel sustain the occupation by proxy 
through Palestinian forces. 1009  Labelling this as aid to the Palestinians is 
disingenuous, for as Frantz Fanon said about French colonisation of Algeria 
that, ‘Goal of liberation is not to just substitute a French policeman for an 
Algerian one’.1010 It does not help the Palestinians to replace the Israeli soldier 
with a Palestinian policeman, if the structure of settler-colonial occupation 
remains the same.  
Kai was trying to do exactly the opposite though Organisation 7’s aid project. 
He/she argued that if Palestinians had the same rights as Israelis that would 
make the occupation too expensive to sustain. Thus, Kai used his/her Canadian 
government funded capacity building project to provide mechanisms that would 
help Palestinians fight for those rights, making the occupation more expensive 
occupation and Israelis less interested in maintaining it.1011 Their programme 
was therefore designed in exactly the opposite manner as the security 
programmes noted by Sawyer, and perhaps that difference in structure is why 
they also lost Canadian government funding in spite of their lobbying. 
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Reflecting on the Gap between Canadian Development Aid and the Needs of 
Palestinians 
Some interviewees emphasised that development was not possible under 
occupation, within the framework of Oslo and a neoliberal approach that 
refused to acknowledge the politics of occupation. For example, Hayden said 
that development work was not possible for the period 2000-2012 in the OPT, 
especially Gaza, given the conditions there. He/she said that all aid in that 
context should be classified as humanitarian only, because development is not 
possible in that context. Hayden said that donors insisted OPT aid be classified 
as developmental, because otherwise the neoliberal approach aid model could 
not be applied to the OPT and because Western donors did not want to tackle 
the politics of occupation,  
We don’t want to classify it as humanitarian because then we would have 
to act, and the global community and donors don’t want to act.1012  
Organisation 4 made an attempt to help reclassify aid to the OPT as 
humanitarian, but without success. For example Hayden said,  
It’s funny there’s a big network of humanitarian workers in Canada, which 
is called PAGER. And we hardly attend any more. Whenever we would 
attend, whenever there was a crisis in Gaza we would bring up the 
question of Gaza … and people would like turn their heads and basically 
look elsewhere because they were afraid that the government would … 
hear this and that would threaten their funding …1013 
Hayden said that as soon as you spoke about Palestine in Canada people 
assumed that you are politically biased. Hayden said though that Palestine 
encompasses an unjust situation, an occupation and a humanitarian situation. 
He/she said that has nothing to do with being biased.1014 Just like Ryan, he/she 
did not believe human rights standards should be applied differently around the 
world. Rather, they should be universal. 
                                                
1012 Hayden (2014 August 27) 42min25s to 45s 
1013 Hayden (2014 August 27) 42min46s to 43min24s 
1014 Hayden (2014 August 27) 49min01s to 50min20s 
	 303 
Sawyer felt that more aid should be given to the Palestinians and that donors 
should adopt a more organised approach, under the umbrella of a Palestinian 
national strategy. However, even then Sawyer acknowledged that the 
occupation has to end first before aid can really lead to development. Sawyer 
also noted that the number of Palestinian NGOs is unbelievably high compared 
to other societies. He/she felt that this results in a disorganised, uncoordinated 
approach to the provision of social services, and it is highly inefficient. He/she 
felt that there also needed to be a national infrastructure to fulfil health, 
education and cultural needs for Palestinians. He/she said although there is a 
PA government, it has neither the money nor the means carry out any of this, 
and instead is fixated on just finding ways to pay wages and meet basic needs 
such as hospitals, schools and roads. To counteract this and provide the 
national infrastructure Palestinians need, Sawyer calls for public funds from 
donors to be made available for the Palestinian community establish that 
national plan and to develop the OPT themselves without Western oversight.1015  
This stands in complete contrast to heavy Western oversight of the OPT 
development process. Further, the World Bank has already set out the 
Palestinian national plan followed Western donors, while donors have never 
shown any interest in allowing Palestinians to be anything other than junior 
partners. That is consistent with the West-centric neoliberal development aid 
model.  
In contrast with most Western donors and government donors, Organisation 10 
did their best to provide as much funding as they possibly could in the OPT, and 
in support of the PA. In particular Organisation 10 did its best to offset any 
funding withdrawn by the Conservative government. For instance, in 2010 
January the President of the Canadian Treasury Board Victor Toews 
announced just after the first major Israeli bombardment of Gaza that Canada 
would withdraw its funding from UNRWA, when Canada had been providing up 
to 4% of the overstretched agency’s budget.1016 Canada was reinforcing Israel’s 
punishment of Gaza. Organisation 10 doing its utmost to counter that policy by 
contributing to the humanitarian and developmental needs of Gazans. Perhaps 
then it should come as small surprise that Organisation 10 was punished so 
                                                
1015 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 58min25s to 1h06min50s 
1016 Palestine Solidarity Network, ‘Action’. 
	 304 
severely by a Conservative government that did not tolerate policy dissent 
within Canadian civil society.  
Morgan observed while in the OPT 2009 to 2012 that there were many bad aid 
projects. He/she observed that Canadian aid funding seemed to be focused on 
basically two limited areas of work at that piont, which were reinforcing forensic 
sciences and building up the criminal justice system. Other than that he/she 
said there were a few poorly thought-through projects such as trying to export 
products like olive oil and za’ater (a spice) out of the OPT, or investing in 
maternal milk. Any oil and spice exports would face all the debilitating 
challenges of running an export business caused by Israeli restrictions that has 
seen these businesses fail repeatedly and consistently countless times since 
the early days of closure at the start of Oslo, including the candle project the 
two centres Organisation 4 funded in Gaza attempted to export.1017 The attempt 
to develop an export-oriented economy has been a central plank to the World 
Bank development plan since 1993, and as described in Chapter 4 one of the 
central failures in neoliberal Palestinian aid.  
In his/her interview Morgan lent support to one of the main arguments critics 
have against neoliberal aid. Those critics harangue a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
conventional aid applies to all situations, saying it is dangerously simplistic and 
contextually Euro-centric. Such policy models isolate aid intervention from the 
history, politics and the social realities of poorer countries, bending reality to 
match the logics of their solutions.1018 Morgan, who by the Winter 2014 had 
experience working for nearly two decades in the development aid sector 
across Africa and the Middle East, said that all aid environments are basically 
treated the same, in spite of the great variety of factors differentiating each poor 
or war-stricken region. He/she said when comparing work in the OPT with other 
regions that all of the systems of project management were pretty similar, 
because, ‘I mean because the job is the same. Whether in Congo, in Haiti, in 
Burkina Faso, I mean it’s the same frickin’ job anyways’.1019 Yet in reality the 
OPT, being colonised by Western settlers protected by the same Western 
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states donating to Palestinians, had to be incredibly different than Congo, Haiti 
or Burkino Faso. 
Morgan put an extra emphasis on how stupid the maternal milk project was. 
He/she said that the Canadian government likes to invest in maternal milk in 
Africa, too, but that this does nothing whatsoever for development. Morgan said 
that he/she could understand investing in agriculture, water, democracy 
projects, but not fringe projects like maternal milk,1020 
So what they were doing in fact is that they were coming up with 
projects, which everybody knew would not work.1021  
Generally speaking, Morgan thinks that the way Canadians work reflects 
policies that are taken completely out of context from the occupation, which is 
consistent with the history of decontextualized post-Oslo Palestinian aid. For 
this reason stupid or weak projects tend to get funded.1022  
Put it this way, I mean investing in forensic sciences as a development 
tool, it was useful for nothing.1023 
Morgan further said that the courthouses being funded by Canada were useless 
from a development perspective.1024  Quinn had expressed a similar point of 
view in his/her interview, referring to those ‘courthouses, forensic labs, and all 
the other crap’ Canada was funding as ineffective.1025  Of course, as Sawyer 
pointed out security sector investment broadly benefitted Israel’s occupation. 
Hayden found quite remarkable the fear of Canadians had about publicly 
engaging with Palestine as an issue in overseas aid or rights work. For 
instance, a couple years prior to his/her summer 2014 interview some schools 
and a medical clinic in Gaza were bombed. When Organisation 4 fundraised to 
help rehabilitate them they saw in that campaign the highest number of 
anonymous donations they had ever gotten – and they rarely get anonymous 
donations. The point was that Canadians were so afraid of being seen publicly 
supporting Palestinians, that they did not want even to be seen even donating 
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to rehabilitate schools and medical clinics.1026 So while his/her organisation opts 
to speak quite openly about the Israeli occupation, most people opt not to, and 
for this reason Organisation 4 had been blacklisted by the government.  
Morgan said that he/she was so fearful of government oppression that he/she 
even avoided sharing stories on social media like Facebook posts about the 
occupation, in case that would lead to a visit by the RCMP to investigate 
him/her at home. 1027  Another coordinator, who asked to be left absolutely 
anonymous, said that he/she discovered that since 2012 a guide has been 
circulating around Canadian government departments like Foreign Affairs that 
restricts the language you can use, such as not being allowed to use the word 
‘occupied’ when describing the OPT.1028 
As of the summer of 2014, Organisation 4 was one of the over fifty left-leaning 
organisations being audited by the CRA in a suspicious manner, which could 
result in the loss their valuable charitable status like happened to Organisation 
10. In spite of this, Hayden takes a principled human rights stance and says 
that he/she finds it incredible that the international community keeps so quiet 
about the situation in the OPT. He/she believes that serves nothing, that the 
powerful Israeli lobby serves no real economic interests and that its aims are 
really in no one’s interest.1029 He/she does not know what justifies that policy of 
silence provoked by fear.1030  
Morgan said that one of the things that results of not being able to do any 
advocacy work, due to fear of government oppression, is that you as an aid 
coordinator could not write about Palestinian rights. This self-censorship 
contributes to the problem by not getting first-hand information out to Canada 
while the government and media keep the Canadian population misinformed 
with a one-sided, pro-Israel view of what is happening in the OPT, 
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And obviously when you get a governmental point of view, particularly 
with this government, what you get is that you get, “the poor Israelis, 
they’re always fighting for their lives, they have a right to defend 
themselves”.1031 
The may be a reason for public opinion polls in Canada suggesting that 
Canadians felt their government had a balanced approach to the Middle 
East.1032 
 
The Canadian Government’s Hidden Agenda 
Ultimately all of the organisations I interviewed suffered in some way from the 
Canadian government and pro-Israel lobbyists who were undermining the 
interviewees’ Palestinian development aid projects in the OPT, though 
organisations running rights and advocacy projects may have been targeted the 
most. This all indicates that the Canadian government may have had an ulterior 
agenda that did not match its official policy toward Israel and Palestine.  
Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories 
occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem 
and the Gaza Strip). The Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the 
occupied territories and establishes Israel's obligations as an occupying 
power, in particular with respect to the humane treatment of the 
inhabitants of the occupied territories. As referred to in UN Security 
Council Resolutions 446 and 465, Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories are a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The 
settlements also constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a 
comprehensive, just and lasting peace.1033 
That agenda would be to ardently support Israel, Israel’s policies and by 
extension Israeli settler colonialism. 
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Organisation 1 was ultimately shut down as a consequence of staff attempts to 
run the three small human rights projects after Gaza’s 2009 bombardment, 
which at one point resulted in accusations of support for terrorism being lobbed 
at their CEO by Board Members who also instigated an audit of their own 
organisation in an attempt to discredit the work of its staff. Organisation 2 was 
forced as a small organisation to go through a hostile audit by the CRA at the 
time of the death of their CEO, which included an accusation by the auditor that 
Casey was sympathetic to terrorism. Organisation 3 saw millions of dollars in 
funding taken away in dramatic fashion by the Conservative government 
despite a glowing recommendation for funding by CIDA. In this case a 
prominent government Minister lobbed accusations of anti-Semitism at it and an 
audit by the CRA soon followed. Organisation 4 saw a government funded 
project in Gaza cut suddenly in 2006 after a Hamas election victory, a 
government Minister call their work in the OPT problematic and an audit by the 
CRA soon followed that could threaten their charitable status. 
Some interviewees speculated that the reasoning behind Canada’s Palestinian 
aid was simply for public relations purposes, creating the impression that 
Canada was providing assistance to Palestinians. Some project coordinators 
speculated that the reason for Canadian government support for Palestinian aid 
projects was even more cynical, which was to provide support for Israel and its 
settler-colonial policies there.  
Whatever the reason, Kim could conclude from his/her experience working with 
CIDA that Canada’s international development agenda is not meant to address 
actual development, but rather reflects internal Canadian politics and the 
impression Canada wants to project of itself abroad,  
International development, as I came to learn, [and] most people would 
have learned this a lot faster than I did, isn’t about the actual 
development, it’s about Canada, and what the perception is in Canada, 
so the Canadian government could say, “Look we’ve got this really great 
project where we’re getting Israelis and Palestinians to work together 
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rather than fight each other”, that that would make Canada look good. So 
I think that was what was driving it.1034 
Meanwhile, the fringe projects like maternal milk share two traits: they were not 
political, insofar as they do not challenge the occupation; and they gave the 
impression that Canada is providing aid to the Palestinians. Morgan agreed that 
the projects Canada does fund are for public relations.1035 
Morgan was unique among the interviewees in that he/she contacted me 
specifically suggesting a follow-up interview to discuss how Canadian aid to the 
Palestinians actually reinforces the Israeli occupation, and to discuss what the 
hidden financial costs of that aid are for Canada.1036  Morgan also said that 
Canada invests a lot of money in national parks in Israel, a developed country 
Canada/CIDA should not have donated to, and that those parks are also 
located Area C. They may be built in Israel but infringe on Area C.1037 Morgan 
also said that Canada permits the transfer of funds to build settlements. He/she 
said that those settlements are built with money from private donors in the US, 
EU or Canada.1038 Further yet, Canada will allow a company to sell expertise 
and goods to the Israelis to build settlements. 1039  This in spite of Canada 
technically supporting the Oslo Process, the two state solution with a 
Palestinian state established in the OPT on pre-1967 boundaries and Canada 
never changing its public opposition to settlement growth even under Harper.1040 
With that in mind, Morgan concluded,  
In terms of projects there’s absolutely nothing that Canada does in terms 
of really helping [Palestinians] to develop, to being able really to develop 
Palestine, or to be able to give Palestine a voice in terms of doing some 
advocacy.1041 
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At best, Morgan said that what the Canadians essentially are doing is 
reinforcing the occupation, or turning a blind eye to what is happening, while 
claiming, ‘Oh yea well we’re helping, we’re doing this, we’re doing that’, like 
funding maternal milk and forensic labs.1042 Meanwhile, Morgan says that the 
occupation is felt by Canadian taxpayers from destroyed development aid 
projects – as happens to European ones.1043 He/she said that if you get funding 
for a project, for instance if you are building something in Area C, the Israelis 
often come in and destroy it. When a project like that is destroyed either it is a 
loss, money that has been spent and is gone, or one that needs to be built 
again doubling the cost to the taxpayers.1044 Of course, as described throughout 
this paper since the OPT is dependent on Israel for goods as a captive 
economy, purchasing material to build in the OPT typically benefits the Israeli 
economy, too. Thus destroying and rebuilding in the OPT can be good for 
Israel. 
Further, Morgan said that if your organisation’s project is destroyed you cannot 
say anything about this because, because the Canadian government will simply 
justify the Israeli military action.1045 He/she said that a Canadian agency or NGO 
in the field will never speak up about a project being destroyed by the Israelis, 
and Morgan said that went for himself/herself too.1046 He/she said that what the 
Canadian government keeps Canadian organisations silent about the abuse of 
Palestinian rights and that for this reason nobody in Canada really knows about 
Area C. When you tell Canadians that the West Bank was divided into Areas A, 
B and C, Morgan said they will still work under the assumption that if Israel is 
doing something a certain way, ‘it is okay’ because they need to in order to 
protect themselves from the Palestinian terrorists.1047 Morgan had observed a 
Canadian government predisposition to viewing all Palestinians as terrorists.  
Ryan considers contemporary Israel-Palestine to be a ‘perversion on history’ 
with Israel using military force to sustain a colonial situation on the Palestinians. 
                                                
1042 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 21min32s to 21min55s 
1043 Arthur Neslen, ‘Compensation Calls as Israel Seizes EU-Funded Aid Projects’, EurActiv, 
April 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/compensation-calls-israel-
seizes-eu-funded-aid-projects-301501. 
1044 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 00min00s to 01min51s 
1045 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 11min22s to 12min23s 
1046 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 12min23s to 13min10s There is strong evidence of the 
strength and pervasiveness of political pressure on agency officials. Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated 
to Fail?’, 639. 
1047 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 39min01s to 39min51s 
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Meanwhile, he/she said with great pessimism that while progressives thought 
they had beaten colonialism in the 1970s, a new form of domination in the form 
of neo-colonialism allows many of the old powers, and new, to retain control 
over a country without needing an army there. Worse, you had apartheid in the 
Israel and the OPT.1048  
Remy noted the irony that in spite of its ardently pro-Israeli actions and 
positions, in the late summer of 2014 the Canadian government’s official 
position on its website toward the occupation of the OPT remained: support for 
a two-state solution, an end to occupation and that Israeli settlements in the 
OPT contravened international law. Remy said that Organisation 3 itself holds a 
similar position, yet unlike government meant what it was saying. All the while 
organisations such as Organisation 1 and 3 were categorised as extreme for 
acting in the spirit of official Canadian policy.1049 
Many of the project coordinators found their experience running Palestinian aid 
projects traumatising. Kim reflected on how hard it is to implement such 
projects, especially because of the negative interference by partisan Canadian 
authorities. He/she said to me, ‘We should probably have a therapy session at 
some point’.1050 At best there can be said to have been a major gap existing 
between official Canadian government policy and its actions, but at worst it 
most likely Canada using official policy to obscure its actions and real interests. 
Dallas said this was a reflection of a situation where there is a lot of political 
pressure put on governments around the world to put up obstacles toward 
people working on Palestine or in the OPT.1051 Given this situation and the role 
of government one might understand why Ryan said he/she thinks one of the 
most serious flaws with NGOs is that government funds them.1052  
 
 
                                                
1048 Ryan (2014 December 2) 1h25min01s to 1h28min02s 
1049 Remy (2014 August 28) 37min05s to 39min11s 
1050 Kim (2014 August 7) 49min35s to 49min40s 
1051 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 47min26sec to 48min14sec 
1052 ‘One of the main flaws from my point of view is that 90% or 99% of their finance comes from 
the government’. Ryan (2014 December 2) 29min31s to 29min39s 
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The project coordinators were able to reflect on a number of weaknesses and 
gaps in the way in which Canada provided Palestinian development aid. 
However, the overarching problem they had was trying to operate in a staunchly 
pro-Israel environment like Canada, to find some way to fund meaningful 
Palestinian aid projects from there, to operate in spite of unrealistic regulations 
from CIDA and the CRA, and ultimately for most of them to cope with the impact 
of Canadian government disapproval of their work that could lead to a funding 
lapse or government interference into both their aid project and the 
organisations themselves. In the extreme cases this led to premature 
defunding, CRA audits and forced closures. This took often in contradiction to 
Canada’s official policy toward Israel and Palestine, supporting the neoliberal 
Oslo Peace Process. In fact, the Canadian government appeared in the later 
years of this research project to be funding Palestinian projects that either 
helped the Israeli occupation or made certain not to threaten it in any way. 
Thus, the experience of these project coordinators from Canada suggests that 
in the case of understanding why Palestinian development aid projects have 
failed, and Oslo, it is vital to understand the unspoken aims and power of 
government donors. The allegiance of Canada to its ally Israel seems to have 











CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION 
While the Canadian government did not officially alter its foreign policy and 
deviate from the agenda laid out in the neoliberal Oslo Accord, not so dissimilar 
from the Israeli government’s insincere lip-service paid toward the Peace 
Process, the Canadian government’s actions deviated from its public rhetoric 
into a staunchly pro-Israel agenda that equated into support for settler 
colonialism. That settler colonialism is the anti-thesis of Palestinian 
development, the pre-requisite to the peace proposed by the Oslo Peace 
Process publicly promoted by Western states and policy makers. For the 
Canadian government, particularly ardent during the time of the Harper 
Conservative government, this meant destroying any development project and 
attacking any organisation that got in the way of Israeli policy, in particular if 
they advocated Palestinian rights. This was the experience of the sixteen 
project coordinators from ten organisations I researched. 
This was, as Ryan observed, Canada taking an approach that behind the 
neoliberal public agenda was a foreign policy where its closest allies could do 
no wrong and were permitted to carry out even the most severe human rights 
abuses without Canada objecting, with the Canadian government going so far 
as to suppress information about those abuses taking place. 1053  As that 
approach became increasingly overt with a Harper government that was micro-
targeting voters from select communities and constituencies in Canada, notably 
Jewish Canadians, and taking a hard-line in favour of Israel; the technicalities of 
official policy that once obscured the real aims and interests of the government 
were put further aside laying bear real evidence that Canada’s development aid 
has a hidden agenda, and might indeed be little more than domination that 
should be resisted, such as its support for PA police training.1054  This also 
provided evidence for Morgenthau’s 1962 observation of aid projects that they 
are little more than bribes, like the ‘Peace Dividend’, and inefficient forms of 
political influence buying that require a pervasive system of ‘make believe’ 
feigning the goal of economic development around them.1055 
                                                
1053 Ryan (2014 December 2) 27min47s to 31min14s 
1054 Mosse, Cultivating Development, 2004, 5. 
1055 Morgenthau, ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’, 302. 
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In my initial, and subsequent, semi-structured interviews the project 
coordinators did on occasion discuss the obstacles they faced on the ground 
running projects in an incredibly complex OPT environment of occupation/settler 
colonialism. For instance, Taylor and Morgan spoke about the debilitating 
restrictions on entry at the border that restrict or ruin projects, including where 
people with an Arabic name might be restricted entry at the border by Israel, 
and the broader problems with border controls that undermine development aid 
projects in the OPT, such as Organisation 4’s Gazan centres not being able to 
export products. Remy spoke about the frustration of a medical clinic 
Organisation 3 funded in Gaza being destroyed in an Israeli rockets strike, 
Hayden about the psychological pressure put on Gazans as the Strip became 
as it became ever more closed and Taylor about the way in which the violence 
of the Second Intifada could terminally undermine the dialogue project they had 
been running in Jerusalem. Emory spoke in depth about the way aid’s 
structures could determine and even drown PNGOs under mountains of 
paperwork, reorienting their organisational aims towards the donor’s aims in the 
process.  
Yet in spite of the difficulties of carrying out development aid projects in the 
OPT, where development has been failing repetitively since 1993, it was their 
experience in Canada that the project coordinators concentrated on in each of 
their semi-structured interviews. This was the story that remained consistent as 
I expanded my pool of interviewees and organisations outward in order to see 
how consistent this was. Theirs was pretty much a universal experience of 
frustration stemming from their own government undermining their projects, 
their organisations and even their careers, simply for running development aid 
projects that fit within the parameters of official Canadian policy. Government 
interference could be indirect, such as regulations that were just not congruent 
with the context of the OPT, but more often than not that interference consisted 
of direct government sabotage. The latter case became particularly overt during 
the Harper Conservative government years from 2006 onwards, and part of a 
general trend of suppression of left-leaning charities in Canada in that period. 
The organisations that suffered most tended to be the ones that carried out 
human rights advocacy work for Palestinians, which might be construed as 
political, while an organisation that was predominantly Muslim and more 
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technocratic suffered equally to all. When obstacles erected by government 
moved from indirect interference toward direct sabotage, there appeared in my 
research a pattern of oppression that came in several stages. The first was, 
where possible, government placing pro-Israel advocates in key positions of 
power in an organisation, where they can sabotage its OPT aid work and bring 
activities to a halt. The second stage was a process of either defunding a 
specific OPT project, or an entire organisation. This stage could also consist of 
the fear that funding might be revoked, such as a threat made against 
Organisation 9 or self-censorship endured by Organisation 6. The third stage 
was to launch an audit of an organisation that could lead to an organisation 
losing its charitable status. The final stage tended to be quite severe. It could 
include accusations of anti-Semitism or terrorism, and tended to happen around 
the time an organisation was forced closed. 
This affected 15 out of 16 interviewees representing 9 of the 10 organizations. 
Those techniques consisted of: 
1. Placing ardent pro-Israel advocates in key positions of power at an 
organisation, such as the Board of Directors, where they could sabotage 
its work and bring its activities to a halt. Those advocates tended to 
represent the extreme right of the political spectrum, and often could be 
described as holding racist views towards Arabs, Muslims and/or 
Palestinians. 
2. Defunding a specific aid project or an entire organization. This could 
include threatening organizations with the loss of funding or offering 
funding if they abandoned their Palestinian work. Often just the fear of 
seeing others defunded was enough to scare organizations into 
debilitating self-censorship. Defunding could also include letting funding 
lapse on a project that might be renewed. 
3. Launching an audit of an organization via the CRA. This could lead to 
their loss of charitable status and ability to fundraise. 
4. Shutting down an entire organization. Typically, this would be linked to 
specious accusations of anti-Semitism or sympathy for terrorism.  
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Thus it was that Organisation 1 had its Board of Directors riddled by pro-Israel 
advocates placed by the Harper government, the first group of which 
persecuted their own staff for trying to run three small human rights monitoring 
projects in 2009, contributing to the suppression of knowledge about Israeli 
human rights abuses in the process. This paralysed the organisation. The 
Board also instigated an audit while giving its CEO a highly biased and negative 
review that included accusations of his/her being sympathetic to terrorism, in an 
opaque process that circumvented the rules of good governance. Ultimately the 
government closed down Organisation 1 just a few years after the tumult 
started.  
Organisation 2 was one of the first organisations to be audited, taking place in 
2006 around the time of the death of their CEO. In a murky process, Casey said 
he/she was confronted with an auditor who suggested Casey was sympathetic 
toward terrorism. Organisation 3 was defunded by the government, in spite of a 
positive recommendation by CIDA, and publicly accused by a Minister of anti-
Semitism. As of completing this research it was being audited by the CRA. 
Organisation 4 was also defunded by the government and told that its stance on 
the OPT is problematic. As of completing this research it was also in the midst 
of a CRA audit. 
The government never directly sabotaged organisation 5, though Kim’s CIDA 
funded justice project went through constant stop-and-starts caused by 
government for political reasons, and those ultimately prevented it from 
succeeding in its developmental aims. The same political interference also 
prevented them from working in Gaza after the 2006 PA election. Kim said the 
CIDA personnel he/she dealt with were not qualified to understand the work 
they were carrying out, yet were the monitors judging its success and labelling it 
a failure, in spite of external evaluations to the contrary. Worse, Kim found a 
number of the CIDA personnel were sexist and racist, and that the CIDA 
paperwork was overwhelming. Ultimately the project did not receive renewed 
funding in 2012, even though it was never really given a chance to get going.  
Kai likewise felt that CIDA’s monitors of Organisation 7’s project were not 
qualified for that role. While Organisation 7 had more success than most relying 
on CIDA to expand its programme in the region, this came primarily by its going 
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around CIDA to the politicians in charge. This included in the worst times of 
Harper governance going to Canada’s equivalent to AIPAC and PA President 
Mahmoud Abbas for recommendations for a fourth funding renewal that 
ultimately failed. Even then project coordinator Quinn suggested he/she would 
not have been comfortable receiving funding from the Conservative government 
given their oppression of other organisations. It might have made Organisation 
7 look bad within Canada civil society, too. 
Organisation 8 experienced the least suppression, though it preferred the 
Liberal government and saw funding for projects become worse in structure and 
availability from the 1990s onwards. A review of its budgets also reveals 
declining funds as time progresses toward Conservative governance. 
Organisation 9 continued to function with government funding, but in order to 
retain this Morgan had to drop a PNGO partner involved in rights advocacy 
work, following a threat from Canadian officials. Similarly, Organisation 6 had 
been forced to take the unprecedented action of withdrawing funding, without 
good reason, in the implementation stage of a project with a Palestinian partner, 
because of political interference by pro-Israel advocates. The reason was that 
the partner was a supporter of Palestinian political rights within Israel. This 
severely tarnished the reputation of the organisation, led to a lawsuit and 
settlement, led to a negative restructuring in the way their projects are 
managed, and resulted in a destructive high turnover in personnel. Meanwhile 
Organisation 10, a predominantly Muslim charity, suffered as severe a fate as 
Organisation 1. It constantly faced challenges meeting Canadian regulations, 
finding they faced a double standard in accountability that was more stringent 
for them as opposed to a non-Muslim organisation like Oxfam. Likewise, they 
found government standards of due diligence were bizarrely higher for their 
OPT aid projects than ones they carried out in Afghanistan. They eventually 
were served with an audit and by 2011 lost their charitable status, being linked 
to terrorism along the way. 
The experiences of these coordinators were consistent with some of the public 
cases laid out in Chapter 5. The protestant Church coalition KAIROS, a 
charitable wing of a group of Churches representing millions of Canadians, was 
defunded in a high profile scandal and accused of anti-Semitism. The Canadian 
government funded, arm’s-length human rights organisation Rights and 
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Democracy, was rocked by a scandal that included its being closed down and 
its CEO dying in his sleep between meetings where he had been harassed by 
pro-Israel Board members appointed by government. A Muslim charity IRFAN 
was audited, lost its charitable status, and listed as a terrorist organisation the 
moment its delisting as a charity was set to go to trial. This was the experience 
of these Canadian organisations carrying out OPT aid projects. It is already very 
difficult to carry out good development aid projects in a settler colonial 
environment like the OPT where the environment is designed to make 
Palestinian development fail, let alone with a sinister pattern of oppression 
destabilising your work as an organisation from Canada to.  
 
A Return to Theory 
Throughout the Second Intifada (2001 to 2006) and Institution-Building period 
(2007 to 2012) Canada remained, theoretically in its official policy, committed to 
the neoliberal Oslo Peace Process. When looking at Israel and Palestine from 
within the neoliberal lens that Process was meant to establish an asymmetrical 
peace between Palestinians and Israelis, with Israel remaining the dominant 
party. In that state of peace, the relationship between each people would come 
to be redefined upon the economics of free trade, open markets and 
cooperation. This reflected the confidence of Western intellectuals in the post-
Cold War predominance of the neoliberal model, laid our in IR by Nye and 
Keohane, and the allure of cooperation over conflict in the modern age.  When 
policy makers approached peace building between Israel and the Palestinians, 
it was with faith in Rosecrance’s 1986 argument that a major crossroads had 
appeared in international affairs where it was no longer cheaper to just seize 
another state’s territory than to trade and engage in commerce with it.1056 
Typical of neoliberal development aid, US-led Western donors who championed 
the Oslo Process assumed that the non-Western Palestinians were the less 
civilised party in the conflict and that they would need to be dramatically 
developed to become democratic and more liberal, like Israel and its Western 
allies, in order for the Palestinians to become less inclined to conflict and more 
                                                
1056 Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State. 
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accepting of peaceful cooperation. The Palestinians needed to become more 
rational in order to realise that it was better to trade in order to gain wealth, than 
to engage in conflict. Thus, development aid was meant to act as a sort of 
‘Peace Dividend’ creating happy Palestinians with a higher quality of life, so that 
they would buy into the Peace Process and neoliberal development model 
Western donors laid out with the intellectual guidance of the World Bank. That 
investment in peace included a plan for donors to dramatically remake 
Palestinian society and create a Palestinian state with institutions built in the 
image of the West. That institution building would be essential to remake 
Palestinian society and this would be accomplished through the exercise of soft 
power via development aid. In that way Western experts and Western NGOs 
getting the Palestinians to think and act like the West.   
That exercise in soft power was natural for a neoliberal country like Canada 
predisposed to using alliances and multilateral institutions to gain influence in 
world affairs. Regardless of the government in power, Palestinians became 
wrapped up in a Canadian policy of projecting Canadian values abroad through 
Canadian soft power. At its most basic level that meant, where it could exercise 
that soft power through aid via multilateral institutions or its own NGOs, Canada 
would attempt to remake the OPT in an image of itself. Among the many values 
the Canadian government claimed to be championing abroad were progressive 
liberal values such as democracy, free trade, good governance, law and order, 
and democracy.  
What neoliberal Canadian policy makers and intellectuals failed to take into 
account is that telling other peoples how to live their lives, backed up by real 
hard power when they fall out of line, is by nature deeply illiberal. Further, 
unbeknownst to Western neoliberal policy makers, with their deeply biased and 
decontextualized understanding of Israel and the OPT, Israel was not interested 
in granting sovereignty to the Palestinians or abandoning its settler colonial 
project. The Israeli leadership seems to have thought it could pay lip service to 
a ‘two-state’ solution, particularly when addressing international audiences, 
while simultaneously operating decisively to prevent its emergence.1057  
                                                
1057 Veracini, ‘The Other Shift’, 32. 
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Further, in a process of self-denial endemic to European liberal powers over the 
past few hundred years, Western donors were unable to take account the 
impact of their own biases. The problem with their support for the Peace 
Process was their strong support for Israel as an ally, particularly highly partisan 
states like the US – the arbiter of the Peace Process – and Canada, who 
identified with Israel in very deep socio-political ways. As a result of those 
partisan sympathies they shield, protect and fund Israel, allowing the latter to 
warp development aid to abet rather than constrain its settler colonial policy, all 
with the support of Western states like Canada. Thus a lack of reflexivity and 
partisan behaviour by Western donors has only abetted the Israeli settler 
colonial project in the OPT further. For now that Israeli settler-colonial state 
seems unlikely to lose the support of its non-Jewish, but socially similar liberal 
métropoles in the West, who appear willing to continue to underwrite its state-
building project in the OPT. Western states even appear ready to do this if that 
damages their own position in global affairs, or at least with Muslim 
countries.1058 The implication is that the international community is complicit with 
and helping to fund the dispossession of Palestinians, or in its least violent 
moments apartheid.1059 
As Nossal points out the so-called neoliberal paradigm was never ‘very much 
liberal’, since it involves Western governments and IFIs telling others how they 
must live their lives and organise their communities. So when Canada projects 
its values abroad, by telling others how they should live, think, organise their 
communities, and practice their politics, it is taking a deeply paternalist and 
even imperialist approach that Canadians tend to despise when they see it 
carried out by others. Here he converges with analysis provided by critics of 
Canadian imperialism like Gordon, Webber, Klassen, McNally and Albo. Thus 
Canada, through its neoliberal agenda, is echoing previous Western processes 
of power projection like the European propagation of Christianity by persuasion 
or coercion, or of the European empires civilising ‘savages’ by maligning 
indigenous ways and replacing their culture with European values. 1060  This 
maintains the senior-junior development aid relationship that disempowers the 
indigenous Palestinian, guaranteeing that Palestinian development aid first 
                                                
1058 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. 
1059 Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development, 176. 
1060 Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 12. 
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meets the demands and political aims of Canada. It also reflects a Canada with 
a long history of aggressive behaviour taking advantage of poorer states and 
weaker indigenous communities internationally, or abroad, defended under the 
accoutrements of civilisation and progress.  
If liberal states have shown a propensity toward establishing peace among 
themselves, they have shown a remarkable level of aggression toward illiberal 
states they consider more savage and uncivilised, the ‘other’. That is, their 
inclination toward peace appears mostly to be only among themselves, and 
toward states they see as similar to themselves culturally and politically. Kant, 
one of the intellectual apostles of liberal peace theories, anticipated this 
centuries earlier when arguing that while liberal states would establish a 
separate peace among themselves, they might then discover illiberal reasons 
for aggression toward others.1061 So when Western donors assumed that Israel, 
as a Western and liberal state would naturally be inclined toward peace, they 
conveniently ignoring a history of Israeli (and Western) aggression starting wars 
with its neighbours. It also offered excuses for Israel to be the aggressor when it 
wanted. It seems in Canada that Palestinians were judged guilty until proven 
innocent. However, it was not the Palestinians that needed to buy into peace, 
but Israel that needed to be pressed to live in peace with the Palestinians. 
 
Either You’re With Us or Against Us 
Western donors have proven all too willing to support, sustain and underwrite 
Israel’s settler colonial policies indirectly through the Oslo Process and Oslo aid, 
and Canada is more zealous in providing this support than most other Western 
governments. Their concern for Israel and support for its policies wrapped 
within the Palestinian development aid package hints at the hidden intentions 
behind Canada’s aid. This was exposed on my interviewees with Canadian 
project coordinators who found that the Canadian government, in spite of its 
rhetoric, held Israel to different standards than other peoples. While Ryan 
suspected this due to double standards he/she observed in the way in which 
the Liberal government of Canada had treated Palestinian human rights, this 
                                                
1061 Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, 1152. 
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reality became bluntly apparent during a Harper Conservative government that 
pushed forward a strong alliance with Israel in international affairs. So while 
Emory noticed that the Chrétien Liberals tolerated and allowed Palestinian 
rights advocates to exist, just with very little funding, the Harper government 
persecuted them. 
During that drift toward Israel Canada’s official policy did not officially deviate 
from Oslo Process or the two-state solution. Yet behind the cover of official 
policy Harper’s government applied a checkerboard view of world relations as 
between ‘good guy and bad guy’ countries, reminiscent of Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilisations.1062 That government’s approach to human rights and international 
affairs became one not based not on rational ‘liberal’ thought, but more of good 
versus evil, us against them; and anyone with ‘them’ is against ‘us’. Since Israel 
was one of Canada’s closest allies this allowed highly partisan Israeli advocacy 
groups, such as NGO Monitor or even the Israeli-inspired CPCCA, to help 
shape the Canadian government’s policies would be toward Canadian civil 
society organisations running Palestinian development aid projects or 
advocating Palestinian human rights. 
 
Filling the Gap 
When I completed my interview with Organisation 10 they asked and told me 
that it was my role, as the researcher, to find out what exactly was happening in 
Canada. They felt they were being unfairly persecuted, 
[Dallas] “It’s up to you to find out. You know it’s not up to me. You are 
asking the question.” [Blake] “You know it’s your responsibility.” [Dallas] 
“It’s your responsibility. We publish what we have. And you have to 
vindicate that.”1063 
 
The outcome of this research study indicates that Canada, as a Western state 
mostly employing a neoliberal foreign policy, has alternative hidden goals 
                                                
1062 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. 
1063 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 52min11sec to 52min27sec 
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embedded in its OPT development aid agenda. Or at least it reconfirms the 
ability for liberal progressivism to cohabitate with imperial dispossession 
abroad. Evidence strongly suggests that those goals are to support Israel, even 
if that means Israeli settler colonialism. What this research suggests from the 
Canadian case study is that post-Oslo Palestinian development aid projects 
have inherent contradictions that doom them to failure. Those contradictions 
consist of a neoliberal development aid model that is contextually inappropriate 
to the settler colonial process taking place in the OPT, and a neoliberal 
approach to peace building equally unable to cope with Western partisan 
support for Israel. 
Ultimately Canada’s ardent support for Israel and Israeli policy, which is settler 
colonial and eliminatory, is as illiberal as any policy can be. Canadian 
development aid has even been shaped to obscure and sustain that process, 
particularly during Harper Conservative rule. The failures of the Peace Process 
and the neoliberal development aid model there seem to lend credence to 
Morgenthau’s description of foreign aid as little more than an elaborate ruse 
that obscures the real political aims of a donor. In Canada’s case those political 
aims are to support Israel. Meanwhile, the Canadian case suggests that 
progressive liberal elements within neoliberalism might only be applied 
selectively and not universally by a state, depending on its government’s 
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